Three approaches to social unity and solidarity

ABSTRACT

This paper reassesses theorizations of the basis of social unity in a polity, arguing that what I call the joint activity approach provides a more dynamic understanding of social unity as well as a more inclusive sense of solidarity. The paper begins by reconsidering the major alternatives in the history of political philosophy, as different views take different ties, bonds and relations as most fundamental to citizens’ sense of unity and togetherness in society. In view of this plurality, the paper first sets up a distinction between conceptions of social unity that are based on the existence of shared or common grounds such as national identity (Kymlicka, Tamir, Miller), identification with the institutions of a polity (Mason), patriotic identification with the constitution (Habermas) or an agreement on the principles of justice (Rawls) as the source of citizens’ sense of unity; and conceptions of social unity that rely on the joint and ongoing activities of citizens ―productive (Durkheim and Marx) and political (Aristotle)―as their basis. Second, the paper evaluates the implications of these different theoretical conceptualizations of social unity for the issue of social inclusion, integration and solidarity. It argues that the former conceptions are similarly limited in their capacity for inclusive solidarity since all of them focus on what citizens already share in common without paying sufficient attention to the production of what they take to be shared in society. The paper contributes to the growing literature on solidarity by bringing the widely neglected joint activity view back to the debate.

KEYWORDS:

• Social unity
• solidarity
• social inclusion
• national identity
• joint activity
• productive cooperation

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Lucas Thorpe, David Owen, Manuel Knoll, Jan Kandiyali, Barry Stocker and Ville Paukkonen for their reading and commenting on the earlier drafts of this article, and to two anonymous referees of the journal for their excellent reports with many constructive criticisms and comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Lesch (2018, p. 611) proposes a distinction between ‘identity-based’ and ‘ideology-based’ models for solidarity which is similar to the one I argue for in this paper. However, in common with others in the field, he neglects the third alternative, namely the joint activity view. This is the point at which my work contributes to the discussion.

2. Here, we should distinguish between two types of arguments for the importance of national identity. For Tamir, the sense of belonging to national community is also intrinsically valuable since it gives meaning and continuity to individuals’ lives (Tamir, 1993, pp. 85-86). See also Michael Sandel for a similar view (Sandel, 1984, p. 150).

3. Here, I would like to point out two exceptions to this general conclusion. In Political Liberalism (2005), Rawls’ idea of overlapping consensus, which constitutes the source of unity among reasonable comprehensive doctrines, is not the result of a rational agreement. Rawls’ argument is instead historical, and he points out a transformation from a modus vivendi to an overlapping consensus on toleration in Europe. This is doubtless a more dynamic view for accounting for how we come to share certain principles and feel united by them. Similarly, in Irreducibly Social Goods, Taylor (1995b, pp.133-138) conceptualizes language and culture as ‘irreducibly social goods,’ and views them as jointly produced and reproduced by the contributions of members of community. In this respect, Taylor acknowledges the ways we jointly produce the culture we share. His account of national identity is less static compared to other national identity views. Nonetheless, Taylor’s emphasis is still on the resulting product (culture) and its importance for us; and not primarily on its being a joint productive activity. For Durkheim, on the other hand, we will see that the dependencies and ties that emerge through people’s joint productive activities are the real source of social unity in society. It is at precisely this point that the joint activity view is distinct from Taylor’s view. I will return to this point at the end of the paper.

4. In Philosophy of Right, Hegel claims that the differentiation of individuals gives rise to a higher level of social unity since individuals are more than ever forced to cooperate by the increased interdependence in society (Stern, 1989, p. 83). Yet, as we will see, Marx’s account differs from Hegel’s (and also Durkheim’s) in that the way production takes place in capitalist society is detrimental to the otherwise unity-generating potential of productive activity.

5. Since these sources of unity is derivative of the productive activity, for Marx, the unification potential of productive activity is not limited to the nation-state, and could unite people across borders.

6. In Marx’s former account of unity, it is not productive activity itself, but the alienated form of that activity that gives rise to the unity of workers. For Marx, in a capitalist society, what unites workers as a class is their being subject to the similar oppression, exploitation and inhumane conditions (Marx, 1978b, pp. 479–480). Marx also stresses that workers have a shared goal ―abolishing the capitalist relations of production― which also contributes to their unity. Here, I would like to make a distinction between workers’ solidarity and social solidarity. What unites workers under capitalism and lead them to act in harmony is the similarity of their condition rather than their joint productive activity. Therefore, for Marx, solidarity cannot be genuine under capitalism and it is always generated as a form of opposition between rival classes (Marx, 1978d, pp. 34–35).

7. Axel Honneth draws attention to a similar understanding in John Dewey’s conception of democratic society. Dewey argues that it is a characteristic of the division of labor that individuals relate to one another, and jointly contribute to the production and maintenance of society. Honneth observes that, for Dewey, if citizens were to acknowledge the natural (but hidden) processes of production in society, then the solidarity implicit in their natural relation would become apparent to them. (Honneth & Farrell, 1998). Also see Tischner (2005) for a similar account of work (or productive cooperation) with and for others as a form of socializing and bond-forming activity.

8. See Jan Kandiyali (2018) for an extensive discussion of the pernicious effects of the division of labor in Marx as well as a critical evaluation of Marx’s suggestions to overcome these effects. Durkheim, in his reply to the self-realization objection, rejects the view that differentiation is necessarily a threat to the self-realization of individuals. (Durkheim, 2014, p. 313) For a similar view of Hegel, see Stern (1989).

9. It is important to note that for Marx, this subjective situation emerges from the objective conditions of the productive activity under capitalism. Since the sole end of capitalism is profit maximization, it gives rise to greater specialization and isolation of workers to the limited tasks. Thus, for Marx, without changing the objective conditions under which production take place one cannot transform the way individuals conceive their productive activity on the subjective level.

10. In the Division of Labor, Durkheim argues that organic solidarity historically succeeds mechanical solidarity and takes its place gradually with the decline of the tradition and common consciousness. However, Durkheim also views these two as coexisting: mechanical solidarity on a group level, and organic solidarity in a society wide. Thus, he conceives organic solidarity as the social cohesion of different mechanical solidarities. (Müller, 1994, p. 83) This resembles to Rawls’ characterization of the well-ordered society as a union of social unions in Theory (1971, p. 527).

11. For a discussion of how contribution entails social inclusion, see Walzer’s account in Spheres of Justice. Briefly, Walzer (1983, pp. 56–61) points out the productive contribution of guest workers in Germany, arguing that such a contribution is a step towards political integration. For a more radical version of how contribution entails social exclusion, see Gauthier. Gauthier (1997) understands contribution to society strictly in terms of a person’s usefulness to society, and uses it to justify the exclusion of so-called idle, useless and irresponsible citizens from society.

12. I thank the anonymous referee for questioning the possibility of hybrid views and calling my attention to the work of Taylor and Kohn.

13. I should underscore that in this paper the scope of my argument is restricted to social unity and solidarity in the nation-state. However, I am aware that there are spheres of solidarity which occur at various levels of joint productive activities: local, national, and global. There also many criss-crossings and conflicts between these spheres of productive solidarity. A full analysis of these relations, however, is beyond the limit of this work.

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Tuğba Sevinç

Tuğba Sevinç is a lecturer at Bahcesehir University, Istanbul, Turkey. She received her PhD in Philosophy from Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey in 2015. Her dissertation is titled Reconsidering Rawls: Justice and Solidarity. She is currently working on theories of solidarity. Her area of interest is social and political philosophy, particularly John Rawls' theory of justice, liberal nationalism,  Philip Pettit's modern republicanism, and theories of political liberty.