Defining terrorism – a typology

Abstract

This paper argues that philosophers require a strict canonical definition of terrorism if they are to be of any use in morally evaluating the changing character war. This definition ought to be a narrow, critical one, articulating precisely what is wrong with terrorism and strictly specifying which incidents fall into this derogatory category and which do not. I argue against those who avoid definitions or adopt wide and apologetic ones. The latter claim neutrality for themselves and accuse those who define terrorism strictly of political bias. The apologetics of terrorism often allege that stringent, critical, definitions of terrorism beg important questions of justification, rendering terrorism unjustifiable by definition. The apologetics of terrorism however, have an obvious political agenda. Those who deliberately blur the distinctions between terrorism and other forms of violence cannot claim academic ‘neutrality’ or ‘objectivity’ for their wide, defensive definitions, which are in fact deliberately designed to advance particular political views.

Keywords:

• terror
• terrorism
• Israel

Notes

1. Noam Chomsky (2001, pp. 23, 40–54, 57, 73–74, 90–91) repeatedly makes similar points concerning the inconsistent and self‐serving use of the term ‘terrorism’ on the part of the United States, which he regards as a terrorist state.

2. Emphasis added.

3. For Walzer’s discussion of the World War II terror bombings, see Walzer (1977), Chap. 7, pp. 106–109; Chap. 16, pp. 255–268. Coady accuses Walzer of building a pro‐state bias into his analysis of ‘supreme emergency’ which would exclude the possibility of its use by sub state terrorists, thus rendering group terrorism unjustifiable and inexcusable in all cases (Coady 2004b, pp. 88–91). This may indeed be Walzer’s view, as expressed in some of his comments. Both Held (2004) and Coady (2004b) refer to Walzer (1988). My point is that the unjustifiability of terrorism is not built into Walzer’s definition of terrorism.

4. Netanyahu defines terrorism as the ‘deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends’ (Netanyahu 2001, pp. xxi, 8; Netanyahu 1986, p. 9).

5. Throughout After the terror, Honderich (2002, e.g. p. 151) places a great deal of blame on ordinary citizens of western democracies, particularly the United States and the UK, for the ills of third world nations. Aside from which he specifically holds Israeli civilians responsible for their government’s actions vis‐à‐vis the Palestinians.

6. Primoratz (2004, pp. 19–20), cites Walter Laqueur claiming that: “if it is claimed that terrorist violence is random, then it cannot also be claimed that it is directed solely against the innocent.” This is clearly not what is claimed by such definitions, as Primoratz makes clear. Rather it is claimed that terrorists fail to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, exhibiting a disregard for innocent life.

7. Arguing for the rights of insurrectionists, Palestinian historian Karma Nabulsi (1999), for instance, rejects the stark distinctions drawn by modern laws of war between civilians and combatants.

8. Paul Berman (2003, pp. 132–133) argues persuasively that in both these cases death is in fact the primary goal.

9. For descriptions that include fear, or intimidation, see, all along the political spectrum: Walzer, Waldron, Fletcher, Primoratz, Goodin, Netanyahu, Held, Trotsky and many others such as Wellman (1979, pp. 250–252).

10. E.g. Waldron (2004, esp. pp. 8–9, 11–12, 33), who discusses fear but refrains from defining terrorism, as do Fletcher (2004), Honderich, (2002, pp. 98–99) and Derrida (in Borradori 2003, pp. 102–103), who define terrorism only inclusively together with other forms of violence including those employed by the state.

11. Elsewhere, Coady’s definition appears as the ‘organized use of violence to attack non‐combatants (‘innocents’ in a special sense) or their property for political purposes’ (Coady 2004b).

12. Coady (2004a, p. 7) holds that harming essential civilian property ought to count as terrorism. Primoratz (2004, p. 21) agrees only so long as the property in question is vital to the actual survival, or livelihood, of non‐combatants. Otherwise, he argues, it is unlikely to cause the type of fear, or even fury, that characterizes terrorism. Coady (2004b) himself admits that harm to property of innocents is less severe and also different in kind than bodily harming the innocent, and that the former is at times justifiable.

13. Coady (2004a, p. 5) is inclined to think that it should not, arguing plausibly that in general a threat to do X does not amount to the crime of doing X.