What's the matter with monism?

Abstract

If the connection between monism and totalitarian politics is a possibility rather than a logical necessity, value‐pluralists must consider what their attitude towards non‐totalitarian monisms should be. In particular, they must respond to Ronald Dworkin's claim that when a conflict between values is experienced, rather than treating the conflict as unavoidable, we should seek to eliminate it by reconstructing and harmonizing the meanings of the values involved. This paper shows, through a discussion of the concept of positive liberty, that there are non‐coercive monisms, and identifies a ‘monistic continuum’. It also determines the means of arresting the slide from weaker to stronger forms of monism. The paper concludes that stronger forms of monism, which collapse the boundaries between concepts, deplete our moral/political resources and leave us unprepared to understand value‐conflicts when we encounter them. Value‐pluralists should reject these forms of monism, even when it is unlikely that they will furnish support for totalitarian politics.

Keywords:

• conceptual construction
• justice
• monism
• positive liberty
• truth commission
• value‐pluralism

Acknowledgements

I want to express my thanks to Joshua Cherniss, George Crowder, Henry Hardy, and Maurice Meilleur for their most helpful criticisms, comments, and corrections.

Notes

1. Mario Ricciardi argues that distinguishing sharply between conceptual analysis and historical diagnosis misunderstands Berlin's project in ‘Two concepts of liberty’ (Ricciardi 2007, pp. 128–129). I agree, but as this point does not affect the present argument, I shall not pursue it here.

2. The term ‘uniformitarian’ is proposed by Steven Lukes (2001, pp. 46–47).

3. Henry Hardy has drawn my attention to a fourth kind of monism, different from the three listed here: the belief that ‘a single creed or ideology applies to all mankind’, a view found in monotheistic religions (Hardy 2008, p. 15). It seems importantly different from the first three types, and is not easily located on the ‘monistic continuum’ that I am about to describe. However, like these other monisms, it may be restrained by the force of distinct values, or at least by skepticism concerning the feasibility and value of attempts to realize it or impose it.

4. I should stress that nothing in my argument hinges upon whether Wollheim's account is correct as an interpretation of Mill.

5. Moreover, as Bernard Williams notes, one may be committed to value‐pluralism without subscribing to Berlin's account of negative liberty (Williams 2001, pp. 92–93).

6. There is a report of the Pistorius case on the BBC website, entitled ‘Blade‐runner handed Olympic ban’, 14 January 2008, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/olympics/athletics/7141302.stm, [accessed 28 February 2008]. For an excellent discussion of the general issue of value‐pluralism and tragic loss, see Plaw (2004, pp. 111–116).

7. I have argued this elsewhere. See Allen (2001, pp. 35–37) and (2007, pp. 246–248)

8. The simplistic picture of value‐pluralism is suggested in Berlin (1990, p. 13) and is also suggested by Berlin's approval of Joseph Butler's observation: ‘Things and Actions are what they are, and the Consequences of them will be what they will be: Why then should we desire to be deceived?’ (Berlin 1969b, p. 49). For his recognition that new values arise or are reconstructed over time, see Berlin (1996b, pp. 168–193).

9. Charles Taylor suggests that changes in political cultures resolve some conflicts, while also generating new ones. Like Berlin, he argues that new values may emerge – for example, Romantic ideas of authenticity, and contemporary understandings of gender equality (Taylor 2001, pp. 118–119).

10. See the fascinating example from Brecht quoted in Lukes (1985, p. 143).

11. This appears, of course, in Lewis Carroll's Through the looking glass.

12. Bernard Williams frequently defends this view, though nowhere so elegantly as in this comment on Janáček's music: ‘Janáček can stand as a reminder even to a philosopher of what should be done: granted essential technical complexity and inescapable self‐consciousness, to address, express and restructure real emotions in ways that neither evade them with formalism nor degrade them into kitsch’ (Williams 2006, p. 120).

13. Williams refers to the basic concerns underlying a value and the history of attempts to respond to these concerns as together constituting the ‘contour’ of a value (Williams 2001, p. 94). Elsewhere, he describes the basic concern as the ‘primitive core’ underlying the elaborations of the value found in any society, but which is too schematic to settle most controversies surrounding it (Williams 1995, pp. 136–138, 142–143).

14. I am thinking of Bernard Williams's claim that we can identify ‘a primitive conception of freedom … freedom as power, action unimpeded, in particular, by other people’ (Williams 1995, pp. 136; 2005a, pp. 78–80; 2005b, p. 116).

15. Elizabeth Kiss offers the best account of this interpretation of the TRC (Kiss 2000, pp. 79–90).

16. I want to stress that I am not opposed to limited restorative justice as a practical reform movement. I am concerned only when advocates of these reforms take the additional step of claiming that they provide the basis for an account of justice.

17. Justinian offers the best formulation of this core understanding of justice; ‘justice is the constant and perpetual will to render everyone his due’ (quoted in Allen 2007, p. 246).

18. I argue this at greater length in a previous article, drawing on the work of Jean Hampton (Allen 2001, pp. 35–38).

19. For a full report see ‘Apartheid criminals beware – NPA’, news24.com, 24 January 2006, available from: http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1868631,00.html [accessed 28 February 2008].

20. This is nicely illustrated throughout the Dispatches Channel 4 documentary ‘Stealing your freedom’, but especially in the interview between Peter Hitchens and Lord Falconer, where Falconer repeatedly denies that heightened security measures threaten basic liberties in any way. The documentary is currently available on Google Video at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=9200571097985634440 [accessed 28 February 2008].