Abstract
This article presents qualitative research in flood risk areas of England that suggests that the desire to feel secure can sometimes deter people from taking actions that would reduce the actual physical damage of a hazardous natural event. That is, it argues that people sometimes put what Giddens calls their ontological security above their physical security. Preferring to think of their homes as places that are innately safe, they reject the idea of defending them; preferring to think of nature as a positive moral force, they hesitate to view it as a source of real danger; and preferring to think of society as a competent protector of last resort, they are reluctant to accept the need to protect themselves. Being central to ontological security, such social representations (of ‘home,’ ‘nature,’ ‘society’ etc.) are defended by avoiding perceptual shifts and behaviours that might challenge them. This paper discusses how and why they are defended, what happens when they become indefensible and why some householders and groups of householders are more willing than others to take self-protective actions against risks such as flooding.
Notes
1.See, for example, Bostram et al. (1992) and Atman et al. (Citation1994), who seek to identify gaps and misconceptions in people's understandings of risk situations in order that these can be ‘corrected.’
2.According to Morreall (Citation1983), incongruity is an important aspect of much humour.
3.For example, the use of removable rugs instead of fitted carpets.
4.That is, if he is adhering to the co-operative principles (Grice Citation1975) that usually govern conversations, according to which spoken contributions should be relevant to the context. The relevance of the statement is not evident in its semantic content, so it must be implied. The most obvious implication would seem to be that something that is natural is better than something that is not.