![Sample our Social Sciences journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110822/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Social-Sciences.jpg"})
Abstract
Regulators try to change consumers' behaviour by issuing advice. This regulatory approach is built on a particular, normative theory of social action that assumes that individuals are unable to make rational decisions when they have imperfect knowledge about risk, and that this deficiency can be overcome by advice that offers them proper information. This paper examines the question, can a regulatory tool based on rational choice theory be efficient in reducing risky behaviours? After considering the debate within the risk-communication community about the use of this kind of a regulatory tool, we analyse (using the example of fish consumption advice) the risk assessment that the advice is derived from. Then we analyse the public response to the advice through the implementation of a five-month experiment among 200 French households. We show that individuals did not change their consumption to comply with the advice. We conclude that the advice transfers the initial uncertainty onto consumers turning it into ambiguity and complexity.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded by the project ‘Benefits and risks of fish consumption: public Information and consumer behaviour’, National Program of Research in Human Nutrition, INRA-INSERM, France. The authors are very grateful to Ákos Róna-Tas for his invaluable comments, suggestions, and assistance with the statistical analysis. His insights were tremendously helpful. The authors wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their very thoughtful and constructive comments.