Infected by evil

Abstract

In this paper I argue that there is good reason to believe that we can be influenced by fictions in ways that matter morally, and some of the time we will be unaware that we have been so influenced. These arguments fall short of proving a clear causal link between fictions and specific changes in the audience, but they do reveal rather interesting and complex features of the moral psychology of fiction. In particular, they reveal that some Platonic worries about the dangers of art cannot be dismissed lightly.

Acknowledgements

I owe thanks to many people for helping me improve this paper and for helping to nudge me in the right direction. I would like to thank Kristin Andrews, Lee Bowie, Anne Eaton, Jerrold Levinson, Sam Mitchell, Ann Murphy, Jenefer Robinson, Jennifer Rosner, and Ronald Sundstrom. In addition, Shaun Nichols' detailed comments and suggestions for further reading shaped the direction of the paper significantly. Earlier versions of the paper (or, in some cases, earlier and quite different attempts at solving the same problem) were given at the University of Memphis, Washington University's ‘Philosophy Day’ symposium, York University, and at a workshop session of the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute Art, Mind, and Cognitive Science. I am grateful to the audiences at these events for their thoughtful questions and comments.

Notes

1. There are many examples of this kind of criticism. Catherine MacKinnon, for example, alleges that men who viewed the film Deep Throat came to see their sexual partners in the way that the film sees its female characters: ‘Chic, rising young executive men who took their women to this film came out saying, if you love me you'll do that too’ (MacKinnon 1987). An excellent discussion and evaluation of different kinds of causal claims with regard to pornography can be found in Eaton (2001).

2. That is, perhaps rather than pornography causing consumers to become more likely to commit sex crimes, those who commit sex crimes may be drawn to consume pornography.

3. These authors focus on different kinds of abilities (not necessarily the same ones Nussbaum has in mind) that are both required for and improved by imaginative engagement with fiction.

4. According to Nussbaum, conscious, careful attention is required in order to acquire and improve moral abilities, but it may well be the case that the exercise of these new or improved abilities need not be conscious. I am grateful to Jennifer Robinson for pointing this out.

5. Nussbaum's most in-depth discussion of the moral dangers of fiction appears in ‘Steerforth's Arm’ (Nussbaum 1990c). Her discussion there is complex and at times difficult to follow. Even while she acknowledges that the character of Steerforth in David Copperfield is represented as both attractive and amoral, she also suggests that he teaches us something about the value of love that is quite morally valuable. She says nothing there, and little elsewhere, about works of fiction or characters which are on the whole, harmful to readers.

6. Tamar Szabo Gendler (2000) connects these two reasons by suggesting that the inability Hume discusses arises from unwillingness.

7. While both virtue and vice are voluntary, only virtue requires choice and hence deliberation (Aristotle 1980, III.5).

8. Fiennes' report raises the question of whether the process is perfectly automatic: perhaps he was aware of being affected as he was affected. As noted earlier, the distinction between automatic and controlled processes is imperfect.

9. These studies are described in Harris (2000, chap. 4).

10. Some might take issue with this bald claim. There are some cases, especially concerning addiction, where it might be held that people are responsible for changes that they could not control. Typically, though, such arguments appeal to some earlier, controlled choice of the agent.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

James Harold

Email: [email protected].