Humean agent-neutral reasons?

Abstract

In his recent book Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons (hypotheticalism). He argues that it is compatible with ‘genuinely agent-neutral reasons’. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons (if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. If the argument is successful, it could help avoid an error-theory of moral language. I argue that it isn't, and that we should reject a Humean approach to reasons.

Keywords:

• Mark Schroeder
• hypotheticalism
• practical reasons
• weighing reasons
• instrumentalism
• moral judgment
• error-theory

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Krister Bykvist and two anonymous referees of Philosophical Explorations for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. I would also like to thank the Arts & Humanities Research Council, the Royal Institute of Philosophy, the Nuffic, the Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, the VSB fonds, the Stichting Fundatie van de Vrijvrouwe van Renswoude te ‘s Gravenhage, the Stichting Hendrik Muller's Vaderlandsch Fonds, the Stichting tot Financiële Ondersteuning Niet-Gesubsidieerde Projecten voor Mensen in Ontwikkeling and Jesus College, Oxford for their generous support of my studies in Oxford.

Notes

Although Schroeder doesn't qualify it, (K) should presumably be read as saying: ‘The fact that Katie needs help is a reason to help her for anyone who is in a position to do so’.

I am indebted to an anonymous referee of Philosophical Explorations for pointing this out.