You and me

Abstract

Are there distinctively second-personal thoughts? I clarify the question and present considerations in favour of a view on which some second-personal thoughts are distinctive. Specifically, I suggest that some second-personal thoughts are distinctive in also being first-personal thoughts. Thus, second-personal thinking provides a way of sharing another person's first-personal thoughts.

Keywords:

• first person
• second person
• thought
• shareability
• indexicality
• Richard Heck
• John McDowell

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the British Academy for supporting the completion of this paper. An earlier version was presented at a European Society for Philosophy and Psychology meeting in Granada and I am grateful to the audience on that occasion for useful discussion. Thanks especially to Thomas Crowther, Naomi Eilan, Matthias Haase, Hemdat Lerman, Matthew Nudds, Lea-Cecile Salje and Matthew Soteriou for comments and discussion.

Notes on contributor

Guy Longworth is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Warwick. His interests include the nature of linguistic understanding, the communication of knowledge, and the history of Analytic Philosophy.