Abstract
This special issue brings together philosophical perspectives on the debate over cognitive ontology. We contextualize the papers in this issue by considering several different senses of the term “cognitive ontology” and linking those debates to traditional debates in philosophy of mind.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Annelli Janssen is a joint-degree PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at Macquarie University and the Department of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies at Radboud University, Nijmegen. She works on cognitive ontology and is interested in how the theory of difference-making can help us revise the cognitive and neural categories we use in functional neuroimaging research.
Colin Klein is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Macquarie University and an Affiliate Investigator in the ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders. His work focuses on philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, especially where the two intersect in philosophy of psychology.
Marc Slors is professor of philosophy of mind in the Department of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies at Radboud University, Nijmegen and visiting professorial fellow at the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong. He worked on personal identity, consciousness, social cognition and free will and is currently working on the connection between situated cognition and cultural inertia.