Gambling and the risk society: the liberalisation and legitimation crisis of gambling in the Netherlands

Abstract

The liberalisation of gambling is associated with gambling addiction; thus gambling markets can be interpreted in line with Ulrich Beck's thesis of the ‘risk society’. This article analyses the dynamics of the risk society in the case of Dutch gambling markets. It is argued that a paradigm shift relative to gambling policy—from the ‘alibi model’ to the ‘risk model’—has created a legitimation crisis of gambling policy in the Netherlands. This crisis is characterised by a chain of small but significant adjustments to market forces, justified by changing and often contradictory policy motives. Although gambling markets increasingly tend to be regulated with reference to risks, what exactly constitutes these risks is in many cases controversial. This article highlights the ambiguous nature of the risk society and commercialised gambling.

Notes

Umberto Eco (1991) in his comment on Huizinga's game theory distinguishes the ‘active game’ (Ludere alea: the gamblers have something to play with and influence the course of the game) and the ‘passive game’ (Alea iacta est: the gamblers can merely start the game and have no power over the course of the game, as in a lottery). This distinction can also be made between the role of the game structure (expressive) versus that of the result of the game (instrumental). In gambling policy this crude distinction is also known as long odds versus short odds (the difference between stake and profit), ‘slow’ versus ‘fast’ profit games (the time between distribution of profit and next stake), ‘non‐continuous’ versus ‘continuous’ gambling (the speed of the wager–play–outcome sequence) or ‘low‐risk’ versus ‘high‐risk’ gambling (the odds of addiction).

Joost van Loon (2002, p.15) criticises Beck's thesis of the risk society on the grounds that this macro‐sociology is not particularly suited to understand the dynamics behind the logic of its own thesis.

These figures are based on the financial statements of the entrepreneurs themselves. In 1996 tax returns rose 25% on average, after a tightening of inspection by the tax authorities.

VAN, Op weg naar een branche die gezien mag worden. Beleidsplan van de Vereniging Automatenhandel Nederland voor de jaren negentig (VAN Policy Plan for the 1990s), Rosmalen, 1989.

VAN, Kwaliteit zaaien, Onderscheid oogsten. Strategie en beleid van de sectie Amusementscentra van de VAN (VAN Policy Plan of the Amusement Arcades), 1996.

Casinos Council, Advies aan de Staatssecretarissen van Justitie en van Economische Zaken betreffende uitbreiding van het aantal casinovestigingen van de Nationale Stichting tot Exploitatie van Casinospelen in Nederland (advice concerning the expansion of casinos in the Netherlands), The Hague, 1983.

For the development of Holland Casino I have studied annual reports and business plans. In addition I have used several of my own interviews with the management and staff of Holland Casino in the period 1991–93.

Holland Casino, Integrale beleidsvisie van Holland Casino voor de jaren negentig (Policy Plans of Holland Casino for the 1990s), Hoofddorp, 1990.

Interview with the CEO of Holland Casino: Gaming and Wagering Business, 1 June 1995.

However, included in the bill of 1991 is that the State Lottery receives 5% of the gross income from the instant lottery to compensate.

Raad van State, ‘Advies wijziging van de Wet op de Kansspelen betreffende sportprijsvragen en de lotto’, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1990–91, wet 22.172, B, 2 (Proceedings of Parliament). By using the concept ‘channelling’, the legislators themselves refer to aspects of the alibi model.

‘Memorie van toelichting. Wijziging van de Wet op de Kansspelen betreffende sportprijsvragen en de lotto’, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1990–91, wet 22.172, no. 3, 9 (Proceedings of Parliament).

‘Memorie van toelichting. Wijziging van de Wet op de Kansspelen betreffende sportprijsvragen en de lotto’, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1990–91, wet 22.172 (Proceedings of Parliament).

‘Wetsvoorstel Wijziging van de Wet op de kansspelen in verband met het organiseren van de instantloterij’, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1992–93, wet. 22.269, 1735/1737 (Proceedings of Parliament).

A state committee proposed a merger to avoid competition, in particular with regard to the instant lottery.

Ladbroke's venture in the Netherlands was unsuccessful. According to the Dutch Trotting and Racing Association, Ladbroke misjudged the Dutch betting market and invested too much. According to Ladbroke, the Dutch Gambling Act, in particular the gambling tax, was detrimental for betting.

Kingma, S. 1993. Risk‐analysis Gambling. Research into the Nature and Prevalence of Gambling Addiction in the Netherlands, Tilburg University. This report contains the account of a written questionnaire with 7840 respondents from the population from 12 to 75. Every person who participated in at least one gambling game during the first nine months of 1993 is considered a participant. Addiction was measured by asking the respondents about any possible gambling addicts among their acquaintances.

Bingo is allowed only in informal settings with no commercial providers (Kingma 1998).

In 2000 a departmental study group proposed plans to further liberalise the Dutch gambling market (MDW–wergroep kansspelen, 2000). These liberalisations have not been implemented since government considered them too far‐reaching.

In this respect gambling addiction has similar characters to other much discussed typical dangers in the context of the risk society, such as our environment (climate changes or the ozone layer) or health (HIV and AIDS, BSE and CJD) (Van Loon, 2002).