‘S’éclairer en dedans’: Rousseau and the Autobiographical Construction of Truth

ABSTRACT

The objective of this article is to shed light on how Rousseau’s autobiographical writings – not only the Confessions, but also the Dialogues and the Rêveries – bring out the peculiar conception of his philosophy of truth, which, far from counterpoising itself to the philosopher’s autobiographical narrative, finds in it its preferred means of expression. The point of departure for the analysis is the fourth Promenade in the Rêveries. In addition to presenting an important taxonomy of lies, this work takes shape ‘negatively’ – that is, through a defensive attitude from Rousseau – a true theory of autobiographical fiction. At the heart of this theory is an unprecedented distinction within the notion of truth. Alongside effectual truth, exalted by other philosophes and inevitably opposed to fiction, is a moral truth. The autobiographical narrative represents Jean-Jacques’ preferred means of access with respect to the second type, which the philosopher dedicated his entire existence studying – as indicated by his favourite motto, vitam impendere vero. Here resides the intrinsic philosophical dimension of autobiographical narration: in it fiction does not only give access to truth, but has the function of constructing it.

KEYWORDS:

• Jean-Jacques Rousseau
• fiction
• truth
• lies

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Marco Menin is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences at the University of Turin (Italy), where he teaches History of Philosophy. He specialises in the philosophy of the late Enlightenment – in Rousseau’s thought in particular – and in the relationship between philosophy and literature.

ORCID

Marco Menin http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0261-0868

Notes

1. Unless otherwise stated, all citations referred to Rousseau Œuvres complètes [OC] (Rousseau 1959–95); the English translation is taken from The Collected Writings of Rousseau (Rousseau 1990–2010).

2. ‘Among the few books that I still sometimes read, Plutarch is the author whom I enjoy most and find most useful. I first read him as a child, and he will be what I read last in my old age’ (Rev4, OC I, p. 1024). On the influence of Plutarch on Rousseau, see Morel (1926); and Pire (1958).

3. The motto ‘Dedicate one’s life to truth’ is taken from Juvenal (Satires, IV, 91). On the meaning given to that motto by Rousseau, see Villaverde (1990); Starobinski (2001); and Berchtold (2006).

4. The taxonomy of lies (imposture, fraud, slander, etc.) in the fourth Promenade was reconstructed in detail by Perrin (1997); and Gourevitch (1980).

5. During his stay in Bossey, a 10-year-old Rousseau is accused of breaking Mlle de Lambercier’s comb, when in fact he was innocent. He puts forth a heated self-defence, but is not believed by his accusers and is punished. The importance of the scene lies in the extraordinary value Rousseau accords it: it demonstrates to the child the existence of injustice in the world.

6. This tendency is systematically expressed in the work of Starobinski (1972) and, more generally, in the reflections of the ‘Geneva School.’

7. One exception can be found in Citton (2006).

8. In the following pages, we will always use the notion of fiction as a synonym of ‘moral fiction’ or ‘philosophical fiction,’ knowingly leaving aside all other implications of Rousseauian insight regarding the fictional dimension. For a deeper analysis of this perspective, see Menin (2015).

9. Consider the famous definition of true speech offered by Plato: ‘That speech which says things as they are is true, and that which says them as they are not is false’ (Cratylus, 385 b). A similar definition is that of Aristotle: ‘To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not is true’ (Metaphysics IV, 7, 1011 b 26 ss).

10. This passage brings out – albeit indirectly – the problem of truth in the political realm. As is known, according to Rousseau, a legislator can lie for the greater good. For more on this complex matter, which we purposefully leave aside in this article, consecrated to autobiographism, see Margel (2007).

11. On the positive value attributed to the dimension of illusions and chimeras, see Sosso (1999); and Sozzi (2007, 136–141).

12. The image of the planète étrangère is found in the first Promenade: ‘I am on earth as though on a foreign planet onto which I have fallen from the one I inhabited’ (Rev1, OC I, 999).

13. In 1749, Rousseau became a writer by a fortuitous event: as he was walking from Paris to Vincennes to visit the imprisoned Diderot, he stopped to rest beneath a tree when he noticed in the October issue of the Mercure de France the subject of a prize essay announced by the Academy of Dijon. It read: ‘Has the advancement of civilization tended to corrupt or improve morals?’ He then experienced 15 minutes of ecstasy during which ideas flashed through his mind and he perceived with clarity the development of the theme. This experience is referred to as the ‘illumination of Vincennes.’

14. For more on the relationship between the Dialogues and autobiographical truth, see Jones (1985); and Knee and Allard (2003).

15. The sensational beginning of Confessions highlights this aspect: ‘Here is the only portrait of a man, painted exactly according to nature and in all its truth, that exists and that will probably ever exist’ (OC I, p. 3).

16. For more, see the opening pages of the seventh book of the Confessions (OC I, pp. 277–278).

17. See dialogue:

  N. My judgment depends on the answer you are going to give me. Is this correspondence real, or is it a fiction?

R. I don’t see that it matters. To say whether a Book is good or bad, how does it matter how it came to be written? (Nouvelle Héloïse, OC II, 11)

18. On the centrality of the fiction in the Émile, see also Still (1991); Citton (1994); and De Negroni (2006).

19. For more on the relationship between history and fiction, see Hakim (2008).

20. For more on the ‘atemporality’ of human nature, see Poulet (1952, 158–193); and Sozzi (2004, 234–247). On the relationship between fiction and temporality, see Labrosse (1991).

21. See Lardreau (1988, 27). The image of the animated statue is found in the Traité des sensations, in which Condillac depicts a lifeless statue gradually acquiring the human ‘senses’ of smell, taste, etc., one-by-one.

22. According to Rousseau, ‘truth (his truth) does not exist outside of fiction, which transmits it (and therefore identifies with it)’ (Mall 2002, 318).

23. This is the principle theory by Eigeldinger (1962).

24. On the relationship between truth and veracity in Rousseau, see Gagnebin (1964).

25. In addition to the already mentioned works of Sosso (1999) and Sozzi (2007), see Farrugia (2012, 27–50).

26. On the centrality of the physiological dimension for the deployment of reverie, see Perrin (2008); and Menin (2013).

27. On the topic of happiness, see the classic study of Robert Mauzi (1960).

28. The same concept is at the heart of Crogiez’s interpretation of the Rêveries: ‘The Rêveries reverberate this happiness, which is undoubtedly dreamt, but for this very reason real, lively and enduring’ (Crogiez 1997, 29).

29. For more on the figure of Rousseau as a supporter of the ‘fruitful illusion’ and for a comparison with the notion of ‘transcendental illusion’ in Kant, see Sozzi (2007, 351–352).