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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how participation in insurgency during conflict impacts notions of collective gender identity among low-level male combatants, using Nepal as a critical case. In addressing the research question, the paper focuses on changes in attitudes toward gender-specific roles and conduct, notions of acceptable behavior within male–female interaction, and perceptions of gender hierarchies. Male low-level combatants are defined in terms of a collective identity and the analysis utilizes the concept of relational comparisons of other identity groups as a tool through which to explore gendered meanings and perceptions of the “masculine self,” “the collective,” and the “gendered other.” Using empirical data from qualitative interviews with former members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), relational comparisons are applied to three out-groups: (1) state forces, (2) female PLA members, and (3) the rural population. Contrary to other studies on men and insurgency, this research strives to move beyond a focus only on masculinity and violence, and places particular emphasis on how men engage with a more gender-equal ideology within the movement than exists in society. By presenting fresh insights into this area of study, the paper also discusses normally disregarded possibilities for former combatants as agents for change in post-conflict transformative agendas.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Heidi Riley is Assistant Professor in International Relations in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin.
Notes
1 For a discussion of the post-conflict context, see Riley (Citation2017).
2 These tended to be male relatives.
3 For a more comprehensive discussion the notion of a “protector masculinity,” see Cohn (Citation2013, Chapter 1); Duncanson (Citation2013).
4 There is also scholarship that contradicts this claim and argues that women are still denied sufficient recognition in the Naxalites; see Shekhawat and Chayanika (Citation2015).
5 In the 1990s, the female literacy rate was 17.4 percent compared with 49.2 percent in men (UNESCO Citation2012).
6 An example of such rituals is the practice of Chhaupadi where women and girls were banished from the home during menstruation and required to sleep in a small hut, often with animals, where they were exposed to harsh temperatures or sexual violence. Although the practice is now illegal, it is still practiced in some areas. Other discriminatory practices are often associated with marriage and festivals. For example, when a woman marries she is understood to become half of the body of the husband and thus should devote her life to the husband. She is expected to move to the husband’s home and accept her husband’s world and family as her own. During the Hindu festival of Teej, women were required to fast and pray for their husbands, and widows were required to remain in a position of continued mourning after the death of their husbands. It should however be noted that, in this multiethnic society, levels of patriarchy varied between ethnic-caste groups; however, Brahmanical practices that were particularly discriminatory tended to dominate social, political, and economic norms. See Yadav (Citation2016).
7 Nepal’s social structure is heavily influenced by caste hierarchies. It was therefore important to include a variety of different castes in the interview process. In addition to Hindu castes, there are over 80 different indigenous groups in Nepal, often referred to as janajanis or “nationalities.”
9 This was a Nepali-language publication produced during the war. Archived copies are stored by the Nepal Media Council and accessible on request.
10 An alcohol ban was introduced in many rural areas under Maoist control. The rationale is widely understood to have been the identification of alcohol as a key driver of domestic violence.
11 Although minimal compared with the state forces, there is now some evidence of sexual violence carried out by the Maoists; see Human Rights Watch (Citation2014).
12 This was part of Prachanda’s statement to Lee Onesto in 1999. See Onesto (Citation2005).
13 This is a position held by other commentators; see Pettigrew and Schneiderman (Citation2004).