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ABSTRACT
In 2019, a year before the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted two more resolutions – UNSCRs 2467 and 2493 – under the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) thematic agenda. The WPS agenda is considered revolutionary for bringing women’s rights and security into the UNSC; however, it also reflects the precariousness of the alliance between feminist activists and the UNSC. During the drafting of UNSCRs 2467 and 2493, the United States (US), Russia, and China – all permanent members of the UNSC – objected to the inclusion of certain language in the final texts. The US pushed for the deletion of language on sexual and reproductive health from UNSCR 2467, while Russia and China challenged the definition of women human rights defenders in UNSCR 2493. These objections epitomize and contribute to the global pushback on women’s rights and security, which foregrounds concerns that the UNSC and feminist activists make for “strange bedfellows.” In this article, we consider whether the UNSC has been used as a forum to damage women’s rights and security.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their time and helpful comments. Previous versions of this article were presented at the International Feminist Journal of Politics conference (July 2022), the “Feminist, Queer, and Decolonial Approaches to Security, Law, and Human Rights” conference at the University of Sydney (June 2022), and the EuPRA conference (June 2022). We thank Sara Bertotti, Annick Wibben, Laura Shepherd, and Soumita Basu for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. Any errors remain our own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 See the statement by the Costa Rican representative, who noted that, while Costa Rica co-sponsored the resolution, it wanted to “make clear that our country rejects any interpretation that seeks to include abortion in the reference made in operative paragraph 10 to reproductive rights” (UNSC Citation2009b, 23).
2 See the statement by the French representative, who noted the continued contestation over sexual and reproductive health services (UNSC Citation2013b, 13). See also the statement by the Holy See (Note 9 below).
3 See also 7044th Meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC Citation2013d), especially the statement by the Guatemalan representative.
4 Sexual and reproductive rights are recognized in UNSCRs 1889 (UNSC Citation2009a, OP 10) and 2106 (UNSC Citation2013a, OP 19). CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, adopted in 2013, also recommends that states provide “access to sexual and reproductive health rights and information” (CEDAW Citation2013, 14).
5 Russia has long objected to bringing human rights within the remit of the UNSC, maintaining that there are other institutions that are more appropriate to address such concerns. In March 2018, for example, Russia objected to, and prevented, the then-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al- Hussein, from briefing the UNSC on the human rights situation in Syria. The Russian representative argued, unequivocally, that they saw “no justification for such a meeting, since human rights is not a subject on the Security Council’s agenda … [and that] the Secretariat blindly obeyed the delegations that decided to hold this briefing, in violation of the division of labour among the main organs of our Organization, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations” (UNSC Citation2018, 2).
6 In the preamble of UNSCR 2467, the UNSC recognizes that violence exists as a continuum. Though this is a significant step toward addressing all forms of gender-based violence, it does not necessarily change the way in which the UNSC approaches issues of peace and security within its remit.
7 The first reference to CT/CVE in a WPS resolution was in UNSCR 2242 (UNSC Citation2015a, OP 11–12).
8 The agenda has been criticized for adopting a narrow view of women, as either peacemakers or victims. The focus of the agenda on victims of sexual violence has also been scrutinized (see Engle Citation2020).
9 The Holy See, as a UN Observer State, participated in the UNSC debate on the adoption of UNSCR 2106. In the debate, the representative for the Holy See expressed their regret that the resolution used the language of sexual and reproductive health, which they took to mean the right to abortion (UNSC Citation2013b, 60).
10 At the time that UNSCR 2467 was adopted, the US was led by Donald Trump. The Trump administration held strong anti-abortion views.
11 Significantly, the resolutions do not refer to “sexual and reproductive health rights.” UNSCR 1889 references “sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights and mental health” (UNSC Citation2009a, OP 10, emphasis added), and UNSCRs 2106 and 2122 reference sexual and reproductive health services, not rights (UNSC Citation2013a, OP 19; UNSC Citation2013c, preamble).
12 See Note 14 on Russia’s objections to the establishment of the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace and Security in UNSCR 2242 (UNSC Citation2015a).
13 Cupać and Ebetürk (Citation2021) define this episode and the activities of the anti-feminist NGO coalition as a backlash. Crucially, they argue that the backlash is not against the current liberal international order; much more worryingly, it is occurring from inside that order.
14 In a statement the following year, at the UNSC Open Debate on WPS in October 2020, the Russian permanent representative stated “Russia’s intention to join the work of the Security Council’s Informal Experts Group on Women, Peace and Security, established in 2015. Our goal is a constructive contribution to the work of this panel on the basis of non-politicized, transparent, and democratic decision-making, needed to establish mutually respectful inter-state dialogue on this vital topic” (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Citation2020).
15 In the same debate, the UK representative noted: “I know that not all Member States agree with this, but from the perspective of the United Kingdom sexual and reproductive health services are a vital part of public services for women in all countries and a vital part of ensuring that women can play a truly equal role in the building of their countries” (UNSC Citation2019d, 4). The French representative made similar comments – “It is regrettable that the Security Council continues to be silent on the crucial issue of sexual and reproductive health and rights” (UNSC Citation2019d, 5) – as did the representatives of several other countries.
16 In their analysis of UNSCR 2467, Esther Barbé and Diego Badell note that Russia and China had previously supported WPS resolutions despite their objections to avoid being viewed as outsiders (Barbé and Badell Citation2022, 284).
17 South Africa voted in favor of the draft resolution, noting that it believed that the draft safeguarded the entire normative framework and urged implementation of all previous resolutions, including UNSCR 2493. However, it pointed out that “each of the resolutions on the women and peace and security agenda maintains its relevance and none are superseded by the current draft resolution” (UNSC Citation2020, annex 24). We do not go into the motivations for why the other states voted in favor; however, their statements of explanation are available (UNSC Citation2020).
18 Due to the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UNSC did not meet in person, and votes were recorded by letters addressed to the President of the Council.
19 “The adoption of this draft resolution, particularly on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), would have compromised progress made over the past 20 years” (UNSC Citation2020, annex 19).
20 “Our engagement has also been based on the conviction that we cannot take a step back on our commitments” (UNSC Citation2020, annex 20).
21 “Had the draft resolution been adopted, it would have eroded the hard-won gains of the women and peace and security agenda and watered down previous achievements on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of resolution 1325 (2000)” (UNSC Citation2020, annex 22).
22 “The adoption of this draft text would have undermined the significant achievements made on this critical agenda and the enduring efforts of so many women’s rights activists” (UNSC Citation2020, annex 26).
23 “By abstaining in the voting on the Russian Federation’s draft resolution S/2020/1054, the United States and nine of our fellow Council members are taking a firm stand to protect this critical agenda from attack by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China” (UNSC Citation2020, annex 27).
24 Niger, Norway, the United Arab Emirates, the UK, Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Japan, Malta, and Switzerland committed to making WPS a top priority during their respective presidencies of the UNSC in December 2021, January, March, April, June, July, September, and October 2022, and January, February, May, June, July, September, October, and December 2023 (see Bertotti Citation2022).
25 Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Niger, and the UK co-hosted a meeting entitled “Reprisals against Women Human Rights Defenders and Women Peacebuilders Who Engage with the UNSC and Its Subsidiary Bodies” in February 2020; however, the Open Debate was the first formal meeting of the UNSC on this issue.
26 Note above where we discuss Russia’s statement on why it abstained from the vote on the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan.
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Notes on contributors
Jenna Sapiano
Jenna Sapiano is a Research Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, USA. Before this, she was a Lecturer and Research Fellow at the Centre for Gender, Peace and Security (now the Global Peace and Security Centre) at Monash University, Australia. Her research focuses on mediation, the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and post-conflict constitutions.
Natasha Singh Raghuvanshi
Natasha Singh Raghuvanshi is a critical feminist scholar within the discipline of international relations and politics. She is currently a Research Fellow at the Global, Peace and Security Centre at Monash University, Australia. She was recently awarded a PhD from Monash University’s Department of Politics and International Relations. Her research critically investigates India’s engagement with the Women, Peace and Security agenda, foregrounding challenges faced by women to their protection and participation in building peace. She also analyzes violence against women through the concept of gendered states to provide insight into the post-colonial state's security practices.