The misbehaving jeks: the evolving regime of Thainess and Sino-Thai challenges

Abstract

This paper traces the evolving cultural-political regime based on the ethno-ideology of Thainess with which the Thai state controlled and contained the immigrant Chinese and their Thai-born descendants politically, and assimilated them culturally, while making use of their labour and entrepreneurship to develop Thai capitalism economically, through its absolutist, militarist and electocratic phases. It also sketches the challenges successively mounted to that regime by immigrant communists, radical democratic nationalists, and globalised capitalists, whose ethnic Chinese descent has yielded gradually over time to class and political identity in the context of successful cultural assimilation, changing international politics, growing wealth and economic crisis, coups, and political polarisation. Meanwhile, lurking in the background are the rural peasants and urban poor/marginalised population, whose majority vote and changing political loyalty may prove decisive in the outcome of the latest political contest.

Keywords:

• Chinese minority
• Thai state
• national identity
• ethnic assimilation
• cultural politics
• monarchy

Notes

¹This paper was first presented at ARI Asia Trends 2008, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, September 11, 2008. Jek is the popular derogatory term for the Chinese in Thailand.

¹

²‘’, tài huá yì ài tài guó. The slogan denotes people of Chinese descent who were born in Thailand and love the Thai nation.

³For background information on Thaksin, Sondhi, the monarchy, the coup and ongoing political conflict, see Tejapira, ‘Toppling Thaksin’, 5–37; and various articles in ‘Thailand's “Good Coup”: The Fall of Thaksin, the Military and Democracy’, special issue, Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008). As for Samak's relationship with Thaksin, see his public address right after being elected head of the People's Power Party (PPP) – essentially the Thai Rak Thai Party reconstituted, Sundaravej, ‘phom ja pen nominee hai thaksin’, 2.

⁴ http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000060266. See also Sondhi's explication of the Thai nation cited in Sitthisaman, Prakottakan sondhi jak seua si leuang theung pha phan kho si fa, 54–5.

⁵For the concept of Thai royal-nationalism, see Winichakul, ‘Prawattisat thai baeb rachachatniyom jak yuk’, 56–65. See examples of Sondhi's ‘patriotic lookjins’ speeches at http://www.prachatai.com/05web/th/home/12683; http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView. asp?NewsID=9510000081009; http://blogazine.prachatai.com/user/headline/post/1103.

⁶For example, see http://www.prachatouch.com/content.php?id=7990; http://www.prachatai. com/webboard/topic.php?id=706210; http://www.prachatai.com/webboard/topic.php?id=706 2106.

⁷See http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000057561; http://www. manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000092391; Anonymous, ‘Lookjek rak chat look phraya … ?’,12; http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=95100000921 19. For pro-PAD columnists' comments in the Manager Daily, see http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000092374; http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView. asp?NewsID=9510000092803; http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510 000092832.

⁸Phongpaichit and Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand, 16ff, and http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000077154.

⁹This includes leading political pundits such as Associate Professor Anek Laothamatas and Professor Chai-anan Samudavanija; see http://www.parliament.go.th/news/news_detail.php? prid=144392 and http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000097001.

¹⁰ http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000071866 and http://www. manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000071893. The PAD marathon rally did not come cheap, in contrast with other normal mass political rallies in Thailand. Having been broadcast live 24/7 via the Manager Media Group's satellite ASTV, radio station and internet website from the outset, it was probably the first ever ‘reality show’ mass political rally in the world, allowing for off-site, hooked-up virtual participants in its non-stop, real-time audience democracy. Consequently, it cost the PAD around 500,000 to 1 million Baht per day (the current exchange rate being approximately 34 Baht/US$), to organise and transmit live its ongoing rally cum media event, depending on the number of people attending it. Related expenses included rental cost for the platform, light and sound equipment, purchase of gasoline for generators, food for staff, speakers, performers and some participants, as well as salaries and operating costs for the ASTV live-broadcasting team. According to Mr Suriyasai Katasila, the PAD co-ordinator, the PAD's revenues came from donations that ranged from 300,000 to over 1 million Baht per day, adding up to 26 million Baht in the 25 days of its rally, and the sale of its protest-themed products at the rally, for example, the 90,000 ‘lookjin rak chat’ T-shirts, which fetched over 25 million Baht in three months. Altogether, these revenues barely covered the said expenses, making the PAD rally by and large financially self-sustaining. See http://www.komchadluek.net/2008/06/10/x_pol_k001_206300.php?news_id= 206300; http://www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000071360; http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1219408975&grpid=03& catid=01.

¹¹Data about Chinese migration and population in Siam during that period are meticulously compiled and analysed in Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 50, 61, 79.

¹²See, for example, Ram Vajiravudh (King Vajiravudh), Prawat ton ratchakan thi 6, 323, where the ‘strike’ was referred to as ‘the jeks’ demonstration of power'. The account in this part is drawn from my published doctoral dissertation; see Tejapira, Commodifying Marxism, Chapter 2, ‘Lookjin Communists: The Bridgehead of Siamese Communism’, and Tejapira, ‘Imagined Uncommunity’, 75–98.

¹⁴Ibid., 72–120. For an overall account of King Vajiravudh's ‘Asvabahu’ nationalist essays and their critics, see Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism and the 1932 Overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam’, Chapter 3.

¹³Asvabahu (King Vajiravudh), Phuak yew haeng booraphathis lae meuang thai jong, 59–86.

¹⁵Anderson, ‘Studies of the Thai State’, 193–247, see 212–13n.32, 221–3.

¹⁶Similar patterns of relationship between the immigrant Chinese business class and the colonial and post-colonial nationalist political élite are also seen in other Southeast Asian countries. See a broad-brush regional comparison in ‘Sauve Qui Peut’ from Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons, 302–4. A pioneering influential comparative political economic study of the subject is Yoshihara, The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism. A succinct and popular version of the same plus an update on its latest development in the region appears recently in Studwell, Asian Godfathers, xiii.

¹⁷The memorandum is published in full as Appendix C in Benjamin A. Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam, 303–7. One could not help but marvel at the prophetic foresight of the above passage in view of the political turmoil in Thailand since former PM Thaksin of the Khu clan, and his multi-millionaire, largely lookjin coteries in the ironically named Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) Party, came to power in 2001.

¹⁸Barmé, Luang Wichit Wathakan, 129–30; Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand, 102–3, 153–4; Sattayanurak, Khwamplianplaeng nai kansang chat thai lae khwampenthai doey luang wijitwathakan, 168–73.

¹⁹See, for example, an eyewitness account of a revealing incident involving a drama produced and personally performed by Luang Wijit on the occasion of Phibun's birthday in Banomyong, Pridi by Pridi, 242; see also Amphasawet, Phlik phaendin: prawat kanmeuang thai 24 mithunayon 2475–14 tulakhom 2516.

²⁰The account here is drawn from Tejapira, Commodifying Marxism, Chapter 3, 43–58.

²¹For more details, see Murashima, Kanmeuang jinsiam: kan khleuanwai thang kanmeuang khong chao jin phonethale nai prathet thai kho.so. 1924–1941, 141–2.

²²Ibid., 118–43.

²³Quoted in Murashima, ‘Samphanthamit thai-yipun kab chaojin nai prathet thai samai songkhram lok khrang thi song’, 182–3.

²⁴Leowiwat-uthai, ‘Kanprabtua khong naithunjin: phap sathon khwamplianplaeng thang setthakij lae sangkhom thai nai thossawas 2490’, 80–3.

²⁵Richard J. Coughlin, Double Identity, especially Chapter IX.

²⁶The account here is drawn from Tejapira, ‘De-othering Jek Communists’, 245–62.

²⁸Lao Jiaohua, personal letter to a civil law professor, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, August 5, 1964 (a photocopy). I am grateful to Prajak Kongkirati, a colleague of mine at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, who unearthed this revealing letter in the Thammasat University archive and made it available to me years ago.

²⁷Prime Minister's Executive Office, Official Letter No. 5469/2506, from Major General Hiran Siriwat, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Prime Minister to Secretary of Thammasat University on the Change of Alien Students' Names and Surnames, dated August 27, 1963.

²⁹For an as yet unsurpassed wide-ranging socio-economic and cultural political analysis of the incident and its aftermath, see ‘Withdrawal Symptoms’ in Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons, 139–73. Among the 71 protestors killed in this bloody uprising, eight had an alien Chinese name and/or surname. See the list in Charnvit Kasetsiri, Bantheuk prawattisat 14 tula 2516, 179–80.

³⁰This was acutely noticed by Benedict Anderson early on in a 1990 essay entitled ‘Murder and Progress in Modern Siam’; see Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons, 180, 185, where he remarked that: ‘[During] the massacre of students at Thammasat University on 6 October (1976) … the victims were, many of them, the privileged children of the bourgeoisie itself (one has only to look at the Sino-Thai faces of the students inside Thammasat's gates, any day of the working week, and the Thai-Thai faces of the vendors outside, to sense this) …’.

³¹For example, the CPT gleefully, if quietly, went along with Communist China when the latter massively attacked Vietnam in February 1979 to ‘punish’ and ‘teach Vietnam a lesson’ for overthrowing the Khmer Rouge, its staunchest ally in the region, two months earlier. Furthermore, the party passively acquiesced at its own expense in a de facto anti-Vietnamese strategic alliance, which Communist China initiated with the Thai government, its own arch-enemy. As a result, the party estranged its former Indochinese comrades, lost its across-the-border bases and lifeblood supply lines in Laos and Cambodia, and had to ‘temporarily’ close down the Voice of the People of Thailand radio station in southern China, its single most effective broadcasting propaganda organ, as demanded by the Thai government from its Chinese host. Hence, the deafening subsequent accusation that it sold the Thai revolution out to China. See, in this regard, Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1–2; see also ‘Radicalism after Communism’ in Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons, 290.

³² Thai-Jin [Thailand-China], CD-ROM (Siam Archives, 2004), November 5, 1978, November 28, 1978.

³³The tripartite conflict and war among the three communist neighbours is dealt with in Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War. As to China's changing relationship with the CPT, see Tsui, China and the Communist Armed Struggle in Thailand.

³⁴Useful works on this increasingly hot topic are Chaloemtiarana, ‘The Evolution of the Monarchy and Government’, 41–56; Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 309–34; David Strekfuss, ‘Kings in the Age of Nations’, 54–80; Hewison, ‘The Monarchy and Democratization’, 58–74; Jeamteerasakul, Prawattisat thi phoeng sang: ruam botkhwam kieokab korani 14 tula lae 6 tula; Winichakul, Kham hai phon prachathipatai baeb lang 14 tula: pathakatha 14 tula prajam pi 2548; Winichakul, Prawattisat thai baeb rachachatniyom; McCargo, ‘Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand’, 499–519; McCargo, ‘A Hollow Crown’, 135–44; Chitbundid, Khrongkan an neuang ma jak phraratchadamri; Handley, The King Never Smiles; Ouyyanont, ‘The Crown Property Bureau from Crisis to Opportunity’, 155–86; Suwannathat-Pian, Kings, Country and Constitutions. See also ‘Thailand's “Good Coup”: The Fall of Thaksin, the Military and Democracy’, special issue, Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008), especially articles and book reviews by Thongchai Winichakul, Michael K. Connors and Kevin Hewison.

³⁵In 1993, the Nomura Research Institute estimated the ethnic Chinese equity ownership in the Thai bourse at 81% and the ethnic Chinese proportion of the Thai population at 10%. Cited in Studwell, Asian Godfathers, 200n.10.

³⁶Chaloemtiarana provides interesting data and observations on donations received by the King and the audiences granted by him to various groups of people from the mid-1950s to 1971; see Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 325–34. Such occurrences have long become a regular feature of the nightly 8PM Palace News Report on every free TV channel in the country.

³⁷Tejapira, ‘Chamlae rabob leuaktangthipatai’, 29–59.

³⁹Drawn and modified from Tejapira, ‘Imagined Uncommunity’, 75–6, 90n.1 – n.4.

³⁸People's Daily, ‘Thai Queen Sirikit Visits Shanghai’; Sound of China, ‘Thai Princess Chulaporn Presents her 3rd Guzheng Concert on Oct 25–26, 2005’. For a useful outline of the relations between Thailand and China since 1975, see http://www.chiangmainews.co.th/viewnews.php?id=18396&lyo=1.

⁴⁰See for example, http://www.ryt9.com/news/2001-11-28/23590633/; http://www.pantown. com/x_group.php?url=content.php&id=22121&name=content4&area=3; Ngan thessakal trusjin yaowaraj: 18 kumphaphan 2550,152.

⁴¹Sikkhakosol, ‘Trusjin song tai pi kao ton rab pi mai’, 76–98.

⁴² Korani ekkasan prajamtua khontangdao bida nayokratthamontri,1996; Korani nai banharn silpa-archa, 1996. I should also mention that shortly after I published a newspaper article criticising the opposition's reckless exploitation of racial matters in this censure debate against PM Banharn, I received an unexpected phone call from former PM Anand Panyarachun (1991–1992), whom I had not known personally before, and who commended me for the article and mockingly trashed the stupidities of Thai racism. See Tejapira, ‘Sisuajo bothao bonao’, 11.

⁴⁵ Thairath, September 18, 1997, 3.

⁴³See Tejapira, ‘Chamlae rabob leuaktangthipatai’, and Tejapira, ‘Post-crisis Economic Impasse’, 323–56. For a regional overview of the same financial crisis, see Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics, Chapter Five, especially 88–91.

⁴⁴A sober retrospective analytical survey of the Thai corporate casualties and survivors of the 1997 crisis, as well as the causes of their different fates was provided by Chang Noi (pseudonym), ‘10 Years After the 1997 Crisis’.

⁴⁶Junvith and Thanaratsuttikul, ‘Loke si mon khong pholek chavalit yongchaiyudh’.

⁴⁷I owe this penetrating insight to Dr Seksan Prasertkul, the most prominent student leader in the October 14, 1973 popular uprising, a former guerrilla fighter and now, a colleague of mine at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. The best book in English about Thaksin's personal background and economic and political rise is Phongpaichit and Baker, Thaksin.

⁴⁸The account here is drawn from Tejapira, ‘Toppling Thaksin’.

⁴⁹Analyses along this line can be found in Pongsudhirak, ‘Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism’, 277–90; Satha-Anand, ‘Fostering “Authoritarian Democracy”’, 169–87.

⁵⁰‘Thaksinomics’ or the economic policy of the Thaksin Government consists basically of two main elements, i.e. 1) neo-liberal privatisation of state enterprises for the benefit of the well-connected rich, and 2) populist consumerism for the benefit of the voting poor. For elaboration, see Phongpaichit and Baker, Thaksin, Chapter 4, 99–133. See also Phongpaichit and Baker, ‘Thaksin's Populism’, 62–83.

⁵¹Sufficiency economy or Setthakij phorphiang refers to an alleged universally applicable, peasant community-derived philosophy of moral economy under the Buddhist precepts of cautious moderation, which would avoid the worst excesses and risks associated with free-market capitalism, consumerism and materialism. King Bhumibol discoursed on it at length on the occasion of his birthday in December 1997 in the aftermath of the economic crisis five months earlier. For further details, wider context, systemic presentation and a trenchant critique, see Phongpaichit and Baker, Thailand's Crisis, Chapter 8, 193–216; Baker, Thailand Human Development Report 2007; Hewison, ‘Review of Thailand Human Development Report 2007’, 212–5.

⁵²In Phongpaichit and Baker's analysis, the political base of the Thaksin power bloc accounts for 67% of the labour force in 2004, comprising 41% in the agrarian sector and another 26% in the informal sector of the economy. See Phongpaichit and Baker, ‘Thaksin's Populism’, 71. For a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the rapid socio-economic change in the city and countryside of Thailand in the past three decades that has given rise to the political bases of the pro- and anti-Thakins forces, see Nidhi Eoseewong, ‘Kanprab robob kanmeuang’, 6, and ‘Kanprab robob kanmeuang (2)’, 6.

⁵⁴ www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1220313488&grpid=04&catid=01.

⁵³Wassana Nanuam provides a similar, if differently-periodised, analysis; see Nanuam, ‘The Battle for Power Enters Phase Three’, 9.

⁵⁵Anderson, ‘Stateless Peoples’ (keynote address, Southeast Asian Studies's seminar on ‘Lives of the Stateless Peoples and Unidentified Nationalities’, Sriburapha Auditorium, Thammasat University, Bangkok, February 22, 2008).

⁵⁶ www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9500000006469.

⁵⁷ www.manager.co.th/asp-bin/mgrView.asp?NewsID=9510000057561.

⁵⁸Khaen Sarika (pseudonym), ‘Khom pik sai’ 106–13; Niramit Mai (pseudonym), ‘Wiphak ‘sai thi iang khwa’ wa duai sakdina thi mai sakdina’, 22.

⁵⁹Pichit Likitkijsomboon, Maihet prachathipatai 19:9:49.

⁶⁰Jakrapop Penkair, ‘Transcript of a talk on “Democracy and Patronage System of Thailand”’.