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Abstract
This paper addresses a key issue that remains under-studied in discussions of Buddhist–Muslim hostility and violence in the northern Rakhine state in Myanmar. It reveals how the public narratives of both Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim political parties rely on the concept of ‘indigeneity’ to assert their claims as citizens and rightful sons of the soil, and to discredit the other’s position. This paper argues that this discourse, and the debate as it is presently formulated, has deepened the gap between two communities and obscured opportunities for identifying common ground that could be leveraged to foster more pragmatic approaches to deep-seated communal problems.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank three anonymous reviewers, Jenifer Whitten-Woodring, and Gwen Robinson for their valuable comments and suggestions. All errors are mine.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. 1989, the Myanmar military junta replaced the existing English names for the country and its divisions, townships, cities, streets, citizens, and ethnic groups with what it considered to be more authentic Myanmar names. Thus ‘Burma’ became ‘Myanmar’ and its citizens ‘Myanmars’;‘Rangoon’ became ‘Yangon’; and ethnic groups such as the Karen were renamed ‘Kayin.’ In this paper, I will use the term ‘Burma’ to refer to the country in the precolonial period and the term ‘Myanmar’ for post-1990 period.
2. Estimates vary widely – from 725,000 (Lewa,’North Arakan: An Open Prison for the Rohingya in Burma,’ 11–13) to 1 million (UNHCR) to as much as 1.2 million (Dapice, Fatal Distraction from Federalism, 5).
3. The UN Declaration was adopted by a majority of 143 states in favor, 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine). See the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples.’ Also see Francesca Merlan, ‘Indigeneity Global and Local,’ 303. Despite their initial opposition, the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia eventually signed up to it.
4. Baird, ‘Construction of “indigenous peoples” in Cambodia,’ 159.
5. Bellier and Préaud, however, argued that Asian governments voted in favor of UNDRIP because they already had active policies towards ‘their indigenous minorities.’ Bellier and Préaud, ‘Emerging Issues in Indigenous Rights,’ 477.
6. Larson, Johnson, and Murphy, ‘Emerging Indigenous Governance,’ 53–82. Baird, ‘Translocal Assemblages and the Circulation of the Concept of “Indigenous Peoples in Laos,”’ 54–64.
7. Bellier and Préaud, ‘Emerging Issues in Indigenous Rights,’ 477.
8. Bertrand, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights as a Strategy of Ethnic Accommodation,’ 850–869.
9. Kuper, ‘The Return of the Native,’ 392. Also see Flesken, ‘Ethnicity Without Group,’ 395.
10. Dove, ‘Indigenous People and Environmental Politics,’ 196.
11. Balaton-Chrimes, ‘Indigeneity and Kenya’s Nubians,’ 347.
12. Kuper, ‘The Return of the Native,’ 395. Also see Flesken, ‘Ethnicity Without Group.’
13. Li, ‘Ethnic Cleansing, Recursive Knowledge,’ 351–371.
14. Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact, ‘Aims and Objectives.’
15. A similar position is shared by the Kenyan government (Balaton-Chrimes, ‘Indigeneity and Kenya’s Nubians.’)
16. Transnational Institute, Ethnicity without Meaning. Ferguson, ‘Who’s Counting? Ethnicity, Belonging, and the National Census,’1–28.
17. Author’s interview of a leader of organization working on the promotion of minority ethnic nationalities.
18. Berlie, The Burmanization of Myanmar’s Muslims.
19. Lynn and Hlaing, ‘Interview with Rakhine History Expert.’
20. Leider, ‘Rohingy: The Name, the Movement,’ 230.
21. Ibid., 225.
22. Ibid., 226. South Indian immigrants were also brought to work in the administrative system as well. Other economically driven migrants, although originally very poor, proved to be commercially savvy and rose to become among the most wealthy members of the community.
23. Yegar, Between Integration and Secession. Chan, ‘The Development of a Muslim Enclave.’
24. There have been inconclusive findings regarding whether the cards displayed the name ‘Rohingya,’ ‘Myanmar-Muslim,’ or ‘Muslim.’
25. Tonkin, ‘Rohingya: Breaking the Deadlock.’
26. Blitz, ‘Refugees in Burma, Malaysia, and Thailand,’ 30.
27. Leider, ‘Rohingy: The Name, the Movement,’ 208.
28. Blitz, ‘Refugees in Burma, Malaysia, and Thailand,’ 30.
29. Rakhine Inquiry Commission, Final Report of Inquiry Commission, 7.
30. For a comprehensive – though government-sponsored – report on communal violence in Rakhine state, see the Rakhine Inquiry Commission, Final Report of Inquiry Commission.
31. Initiated by the Buddhist nationalist group called Ma Ba Tha, an acronym for the Association for Protection of Race and Religion, these four bills aimed to place restrictions on inter-faith marriage, birth, religious conversion, and polygamy.
32. TNI, Ethnicity without Meaning, 11.
33. It is, however, difficult to know the private views of these hardliners.
34. Hardy, Harley, and Phillips, ‘Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis,’ 12, 19. Florian Schneider, ‘How to Do a discourse analysis.”’
35. RNDP 2012, 15
36. TNI, Ethnicity without Meaning, 5.
37. See 1982 Burma Citizenship Law. Human Rights Watch, ‘Discrimination in Arakan.’ In addition, the government imposed onerous burden of proof for application and imposed restrictions on freedom of movement, higher education, and holding public office by associate and naturalized citizens. Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 62.
38. NDPD, 18.
39. Ibid., 29.
40. Ibid., 22, 25, 26, 45
41. Ibid., 30.
42. Ibid., 54.
43. Ibid., 36
44. Ibid., 47.
45. Ibid., 31.
46. Ibid., 35, 51.
47. Ibid., 51.
48. Ibid.,37.
49. Ibid., 39–40.
50. RNDP, 9, 13.
51. Naming Rakhine as ‘Magh’ also implies that Rakhine people are not the first settlers in the region
52. RNDP, 10, 64.
53. Ibid., 10.
54. Ibid., 10.
55. Ibid., 15.
56. Ibid., 18
57. Ibid., 17.
58. Aye Chan also notes that the colonial administrators of India regarded the Bengalis as amendable and ‘frugal folk’ who paid their taxes, while characterizing the indigenous Arakanese as defiant, rebellious, and addicted to gambling and opium-smoking. Land disputes between the Rakhine and Bangladeshi immigrants became common under colonial rule, evident in an increase in lawsuits and litigation over land ownership. Eighty-five percent of litigation over land heard in the courts was initiated by Chittagonians. Loss of land and economic opportunities by Rakhine residents during the colonial period served in their eyes as a warning against any conciliatory policies directed towards immigrant populations. Aye Chan, ‘The Development of a Muslim Enclave,’ 396–420.
59. RNDP, 80.
60. Bigelow, ‘The 1960 Election in Burma.’
61. Ibid.
62. NDPD, 17.
63. RNDP, 82.
64. Ibid., 68.
65. Ibid., 67, 20.
66. Ministry of Immigration and Population, Department of Population, The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, The 2014 Myanmar Population, 2.
67. The claim of early origins was made by the Muslim Council of Northern Arakan. Tonkin, ‘Rohingya: Breaking the Deadlock.’ Derek Tonkin is a former British ambassador to Thailand and Vietnam and currently an adviser to Bagan Capital Limited.
68. Tonkin, ‘Je suis Rohingya: The West’s Dilemma.’
69. Lynn and Hlaing, ‘Interview with Rakhine History Expert.’ Tonkin also notes that ‘No historical sources for the origins of these “various R-words” have ever been provided in support of any of these designations, and they are regarded in Myanmar itself as contrived.’ Tonkin, ‘Rohingya: Breaking the Deadlock.’
70. Leider, ‘Rohingy: The Name, the Movement,’ 236.
71. According to Tonkin, ‘The Muslim Council of North Arakan said that they did not wish to be called “Chittagonians” but “Burmese Muslims” or “Arakan Muslims” and that descendants of the Arab settlers were actually known as “Ruwangya” or “Rushangya.”’ Ba Tha, a Muslim scholar at Rangoon University, has suggested that Rohingya were originally called ‘Roewenhnya,’ and that after many years of intermarriage this term had morphed into ‘Roewengya.’ Tonkin, ‘Rohingya: Breaking the Deadlock.’
72. Tonkin, ‘Rohingya: Breaking the Deadlock.’
73. Lynn and Hlaing ‘Interview with Rakhine History Expert.’
74. Tonkin, ‘Rohingya: Breaking the Deadlock.’
75. Email Conversation with the author, September 2015. Also see the Rakhine Inquiry Commission, Final Report of Inquiry Commission, 55.
76. Ibid., 55.
77. Ibid., 25.
78. The light green and blue cards both record an identification number, name of the holder, gender, date of birth, place of birth, marital status, and father’s name, with visible identification marks in Burmese and English.
79. Leider, ‘Rohingy: The Name, the Movement,’ 208
80. Ibid., 210.
81. Tonkin, “Rohingya: Breaking the Deadlock.”
82. Li, ‘Ethnic Cleansing, Recursive Knowledge,’ 367
83. The Rakhine Inquiry Commission reported in 2013 that all 1200 Rakhine respondents mentioned having been warned continually by grandparents, parents, and teachers that the Muslims harbored evil feelings against the Rakhine. Rakhine Inquiry Commission, Final Report of Inquiry Commission 18.
84. Myint, ‘Arakanese Ire Raised over Citizenship Verification Drive.’
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung
Professor Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung is the Chair of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts. She is the author of the ‘Other’ Karen in Myanmar (Lexington Books 2012), Beyond Armed Resistance (East West Center 2011), Karen Revolution in Burma (2008), and Behind the Teak Curtain: Authoritarianism, Agricultural Policies and Political Legitimacy in Rural Burma/Myanmar (2004). Professor Thawnghmung has recently completed a book manuscript on The Everyday Politics of Economic Survival in Myanmar, which is currently under review for publication.