Fluid identities, contested categories: Jats, Patels and the demand for reservation in India

ABSTRACT

The most recent demand for reservation quotas in India has come from the regionally dominant castes of the Jats and Patidars in the arena of education and employment. However, given their status as ‘dominant’ castes, it is paradoxical that these castes are claiming a ‘backward’ status. This demand raises questions of two kinds. Firstly, what is the nature of caste identity that they wish to leverage for purposes of gaining access to state quotas? Secondly, what are the different ways in which identities, expectations and mobilisations are shaped by electoral politics? The paper argues that ethnic identities are fluid which take on newer features and markers as they interact with categories of recognition that the state establishes. These negotiations have been exacerbated by electoral politics and the policy of economic liberalisation which have together upset dominant caste equations.

KEYWORDS:

• caste
• identity
• categories of recognition
• reservations
• Patidars
• Jats

Acknowledgments

This paper has benefitted from the comments of participants at the SASNET conference on ‘Modern Matters: Negotiating the Future in Everyday Life in South Asia,’ at Lund University, Sweden in 2016 and also of those at the International Political Studies Association (IPSA) joint colloquium on ‘Diversity and Democratic Governance: Legacies of the Past, Present Challenges and Future Directions?’ at the University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it was presented in 2019. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their comments which helped me to clarify and improve the arguments made in the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Jodhka, Caste in Contemporary India

2. Srinivas, Social Change in Modern India, 99.

3. See Ghurye, Caste and Class in India cited in Srinivas, Social Change in Modern India, 100

4. Srinivas, “An Obituary on Caste as a System,” 459.

5. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, cited in Varshney,” Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” 277

6. See Chandra, “What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter?”417

7. Ibid., 419

8. Reddy, “The Ethnicity of Caste,” 547.

9. Ibid., 556.

10. Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” 290

11. Ibid

12. Chakrabarthy, Habitations of modernity, in Reddy, “The Ethnicity of Caste,” 555.

13. Zwart, “The Logic of Affirmative Action” refers to the writings of Bernard Cohn (1968, 1987), Edward Said’s book, Orientalism (1978) and Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983) apart from others commentators who have held this view

14. Ibid., 235.

15. Ibid., 246.

16. Ibid.

17. The Mandal Commission set up in 1980, identified 3,743 backward castes on the basis of social, economic and educational criteria

18. Bajpai, “Rhetoric as Argument,” 676

19. For instance, Gang et al., “Was the Mandal Commission Right? contend that economic disadvantage suffered by OBCs is not very different from that experienced by SCs and STs and therefore they must be given recognition by the government for inclusion within welfare oriented and affirmative action programs. Basant and Sen, “Who Participates in Higher Education in India?” 62, argue that one of the reasons why reservation in higher education was provided for OBCs was that this would help augment their participation. However according to them, data on these deficits was not significant enough to warrant adoption of affirmative action policies for the said groups. Deshpande and Ramachandran, “Dominant or Backward?” 28, in their analysis of the demand for quotas by the Jats, Patels and Marathas assert that while the anxieties of these groups are founded on the structural changes that are taking place in the economy and particularly agriculture; they are not the ‘most marginalised’ groups in their states.

20. Gudavarthy in, “Can we De-Stigmatise Reservations in India?” 55 and 59, emphasises that the ‘politics of recognition’ of OBCs associated with extension of reservations to OBCs has helped to destigmatise reservations while also aiding ‘vernacularisation’ of the discourse of reservations. Balagopal in, “This Anti-Mandal Mania,” 2231,2232 and 2234 argues that opposition to reservations for OBCs is based on a ‘falsehood’ deliberately created by the upper castes. He argues that the forward castes have for long controlled capital, land and other resources which give access to power and status. Therefore if caste is the basis on which the needy have been excluded then it is caste identity which should be the basis of extending state benefits to them.

21. See Bajpai, “Rhetoric as Argument.” Verma in Non-discrimination and Equality in India argues that affirmative action policies are often supported because for caste distinctions to be obliterated, they must first be made salient. Also, merit is overrated, and reservations may help bring to the fore diverse creativities made possible by the democratic culture supported by institutions of higher education. On the other hand, Beteille, Equality and Universality cited in Gupta, “Towards Affirmative Action,” 156 and Galanter, “The long half-life of reservations,” 311, argue that while the reservations extended to the Scheduled Castes and tribes in the constitution aimed at promoting ‘equality of opportunity’, subsequent reservations extended to the OBCs were more about maintaining a balance of power. Deprivation of the OBCs was is no way comparable to that of the Scheduled Castes and tribes The Mandal Commission was more concerned with ensuring ‘equality of results’ than ‘equality of opportunity’. Such reservation would only result in the OBCs now acquiring urban mobility in addition to already possessing rural economic and political capital. Social polarisation on the basis of ascriptive identity and the stigma attached to availing special quotas which includes acceptance of being inferior, are social costs often highlighted by critics of reservation policies. The lack of spill-over effects and indiscriminate cornering of benefits by a few amongst the backwards are other lacunae identified in the design of reservation policies. In fact, Gupta in “Towards Affirmative Action,” advocates collecting ‘biographical profiles of actual and potential beneficiaries’ to prevent repeated use of benefits by the same individual or family.

22. See Balagopal, “This Anti-Mandal Mania,” 2231.

23. Comparing the case of affirmative action in America and India, Gupta in “Towards Affirmative Action,” 156, argues that the American system is based on representation of races and does not allocate quotas and neither does it allow standards to be traded off for social justice.

24. See Galanter, “The Long Half-Life of Reservations,” 313.

25. See Desai, “Quantifying the Caste Quotas,” cited in Kumar, “Stooping to Conquer: Jats and Reservations in Haryana,” 15.

26. See Kumar, “Stooping to Conquer: Jats and Reservations in Haryana,” 15.

27. Sadasivan, A Social History of India, 257.

28. Chaturvedi in Peasant Pasts: History and Memory in Western India, 34 and Sadasivan in, A Social History of India, argue that the colonial policies had aided the landed and peasant cultivator Patidars to establish their dominance in the countryside.

29. Basu, Villages, Women and the Success of Dairy Cooperatives in India, 232.

30. Cort, “Jains, caste and hierarchy. In north Gujarat,” 80

31. See Naik, “Social Status in Gujerat.” In Cort, “Jains, Caste and Hierarchy. In north Gujarat.”

32. The Jats as a kinship group are Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. Hindu Jats are not known to have sub-castes but rather clans. Villages of the clan inhabiting a geographical area come under the jurisdiction of a clan council known as a Khap. The clan headman or ‘chaudhry’ also heads the Khap panchayat while the ‘Wazir’ is the secretary. The Khaps are essentially of the Hindu Jats however some other castes are also known to adopt the Khap system including the Gujjars, Rajputs, Tiyagi Brahmans and others. See Pradhan, “The Jats of Northern India: Their Traditional Political System I,” 1821.

33. Macdonell, “The Early History of Caste in India,” 234.

34. Datta, Forming an Identity: A Social History of the Jats, 10–11.

35. Ibid., 11.

36. Campbell, “On the Races of India as Traced in Existing Tribes and Castes,” 138.

37. Pradhan, “The Jats of Northern India: Their Traditional Political System I,” 1821.

38. Chamars are included in the category of Scheduled Castes. They were traditionally outside the caste system and subject to the practice of ‘untouchability’. Their traditional profession was of making leather and associated products

39. Omvedt, “Jats and Their Union.”

40. Jaffrelot, Religion, Caste and Politics in India. 433

41. Ibid., 433.

42. The BLD was formed in 1974 by the merger of the SSP and the BKD

43. Ibid., 444.

44. This was based on the recommendation of the Bakshi Commission (1976) which had identified 83 castes as backward castes and recommended 10% reservation in class III and IV jobs and 5% in class I and II jobs. The Commission which was set up in August 1972 also recommended 10% OBC reservation in educational institutions with the additional condition that there would not be more than 5% difference between the last general category candidate and the OBC candidate. See Rana, Reservations in India: Myths and Realities, 107

45. Harijan is the name given by Mahatma Gandhi to the untouchables who are also referred to as Dalits

46. Patel, “Debacle of Populist Politics,” 681

47. Bose, “Social Mobility and Caste Violence,” 713

48. Yagnik, “Spectre of Caste War,” 553, argues that the Patel landlords in Central and Northern Gujarat felt ‘deprived’ on account of reservation of house sites, Gochar (grazing of cattle) land for Harijans and the demand for raising minimum wages. As a part of the impact of the reservation agitation in rural areas, the Patels adopted a social boycott of the Harijans including, ‘ … no water to farms, no farm-work, no milk, no newspaper.’

49. On the suggestion of the Union Health Ministry, the government of Gujarat had reserved 7 and 13% seats at the post-graduate level in medical colleges for the Scheduled Castes and tribes respectively in 1975. This reservation was raised by another 5% in July 1980 for the OBCs.

50. See Bose, “Social Mobility and Caste Violence” and Patel, “Debacle of Populist Politics.”

51. This increase was based on the recommendation of the Rane Commission which was set up in March 1981 and submitted its report in December 1983. The Commission reversed the criteria of identifying backwardness used by the Bakshi Commission. Instead of caste, it used occupation and income as defining criteria of backwardness.

52. Patel, “Debacle of Populist Politics,” 681.

53. Patel, “Legitimacy Crisis and Growing Authoritarianism,” 948, mentions that in this phase of the movement there were many incidents of violence. Notably, the police too became complicit in the violence while government employees’ belonging to different classes namely I and II on the one hand and III and IV on the other confronted each other invoking their caste identity. The Judiciary it is alleged also played a partisan role in favour of the upper castes, reprimanding the police for obstructing democratic protests of the upper castes against the government’s policies. Given the protracted violence, Solanki stepped down and Amarsinh Chaudhary became the chief minister.

54. Patel, “Legitimacy Crisis and Growing Authoritarianism,” 947

55. Jaffrelot, “Patels and the Neo-Middle Class Syndrome,” writes that for the first time, OBC MLAs constituted 24% of the total strength and formed the largest segment in the Gujarat Legislative Assembly. The Patidars came second with representation of 21% of the total MLAs. Also, 13 of the 22 ministers in the Madhavsinh Solanki government were from the Kshatriya, OBC, Dalit or Adivasi community with none belonging to the Patel or Patidar community.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Yagnik, “Spectre of Caste War,” 31–33

60. Earlier the BJP had formed a coalition government with the Janata Dal (JD-G) led by Chimanbhai Patel. However, when three state governments were dismissed by the Narasimha Rao government in the centre following the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the BJP withdrew from the coalition government. The JD-G then merged with the Congress and Chimanbhai continued as chief minister. Following Chimanbhai’s death in 1994, Chhabildas Mehta became the chief minister.

61. Desai, “The Gujarat vote share Trend Conundrum,” 12. A revolt in the BJP led by Shankersinh Vaghela resulted in another state assembly election in 1998 in which the BJP under Keshubhai Patel’s leadership again emerged victorious. In 1995, 30% of the BJP’s 121 MLAs were Patidars which was an improvement of 2% when compared to the 1990 state assembly election. Quoting CSDS data, Jaffrelot, “Patels and the neo-middle class syndrome,” writes that as while the OBC vote share for the Congress and the BJP was the same in the 1995 election namely 38%; 67% of the Patidars voted for the BJP while only 20% voted for the Congress. Also, once Narendra Modi became chief minister in Gujarat, 82% of the Patidars voted for the BJP in the 2002 state assembly election.

62. The party returned to power in the state in 1998, 2002, 2007 and again in 2012. In the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP swept all 26 Lok Sabha seats in the state with a vote percentage of 59.1. See Desai, “The Gujarat vote share trend conundrum,” 14.

63. Langa, “Get rid of quota or make all its slave, says leader of Patel group.”

64. It was claimed by Patel leaders that the BJP would have lost in urban areas too, had it not been for manipulation of electoral rolls such that the names of 5 lakh Patels went missing from the list of voters (Johari 2016)

65. The demand for reservation brought together two sub-castes of the Patels namely the Kadava and Leuva Patels. However, another smaller sub-caste, the Anjanas who were known to practice the barter system and were hence considered socially backward were included within the category of the OBCs. This also flared resentment amongst the other Patels who then launched the demand for reservation in areas of North Gujarat where the Anjanas share neighbourhoods with other Patels. See Trivedy, “The Real Story of What Hardik Patel,” 21, “Wants-And Why.”

66. Janmohamed, “Reservation for Patels: Four factors that led to the revolt in Gujarat.”

67. Pinto, “Saffronisation of Affirmative Action,” 3644, argues that the BJP extended reservations to Jats in Rajasthan for electoral purposes. The BJP was attempting to create a new ‘social axis’. The poll promise had helped them win handsomely in Rajasthan. While the NCBC had made a recommendation for 372 communities to be included in the Backward Classes list, the NDA government accepted the case for 130 communities, camouflaging as it were the more visible inclusion of the Jats. Responding to the Central government’s move, the Rajasthan government led by Congress chief minister Ashok Gehlot also granted OBC status to the Jats of Rajasthan in the state list. See Muralidharan, “The politics of reservations.” He also writes that the government’s decision marked, ‘. … . [T]he first breach in the covenant that the enumeration arrived at by the Mandal Commission and various States would not be seriously modified’.

68. PTI, “Jat Leaders Slam INLD for Backtracking on Quota Issue.”

69. Rajalakshmi, “Upping the Ante.”

70. Datta, Forming an Identity: A Social History of the Jats, 3172

71. In Haryana 27% reservation is for the OBCs, 20% for the Scheduled Castes and 3% for the disabled.

72. Trivedy, “The Real Story of What Hardik Patel, 21, Wants-And Why.”

73. Jaffrelot, “Patels and the Neo-Middle Class Syndrome.”

74. Tilche, “Migration, Bachelorhood and Discontent among the Patidars.”

75. Jaffrelot and Kalaiyarasan, “The Political Economy of the Jat Agitation,” 30–33

76. Ibid., 30.

77. Alpesh Thakore is said to have gained prominence on account of raiding illicit liquor vendors in North Gujarat which was seen as a kind of ‘social service’ in dry Gujarat. He led the Thakore Sena. He became an MLA from Radhanpur on a Congress ticket in the 2017 assembly election but subsequently resigned from the party. Jignesh Mevani is a journalist who became a Dalit activist. He headed the protest against lynching of members a Dalit family in Una for skinning a dead cow in 2016. He was supported by the Congress on the Vadgam seat and became an independent MLA. However he did not campaign for the party in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections and the party claimed that he was keener to build his image as a ‘young dalit leader’. See Bhattacharya, “Hardik Patel, the last standing young Turk.”

78. Teltumbde, “Rahul Gandhi’s Zabardast Jhatka in Gujarat Election,” 10.

79. Aurora, “Lok Sabha Elections 2019: Measuring The Mood Of Gujarat Voters,” writes that Narendra Modi laid the foundation for the Rs 1000 crore, Umiya Dham temple complex dedicated to Maa Umiya, who is the deity of the Kadva patels.

80. See note 66 above.

81. Mehta, Gujarat beyond Gandhi – Identity, Society and Conflict in Janmohamed, “Reservation for Patels: Four Factors that led to the Revolt in Gujarat.”

82. Datta Forming an Identity: A Social History of the Jats, 3172

83. Jeffrey, “Youth, Class and Time among Unemployed Young Men in India,” 469.

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Radhika Kumar

Radhika Kumar is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Motilal Nehru College, University of Delhi. She completed Bachelors in Political Science from Lady Shri Ram College, University of Delhi. Thereafter she pursued an MA, MPhil and PhD from the Centre for Political Studies (CPS) Jawaharlal Nehru University. Her doctoral research work is a comparative sub-national study of Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh in the post liberalisation period. Radhika is interested in political economy and how it relates to electoral politics. Her other area of interest is political communication and electoral campaigns in India. She is also engaged with and is keen to further develop her work on the state of Haryana with robust inputs from the field. These include issues of decentralisation and women’s empowerment; land acquisition and urbanisation and fluidity of caste identities. She has contributed papers to various edited books and journals.