Paradoxical configuration of advocacy groups for multiculturalism discourse in South Korea

ABSTRACT

This article demonstrates that the paradoxical configuration of groups supporting multiculturalism in South Korea stems from uniquely Korean experiences of colonialism, territorial division, and modernization. Unlike other societies, conservative political force advocates for multiculturalism and blames nationalism for its intolerance. On the other hand, its political counterparts have lingered on Korean nationalism, often presented as an antipode of multiculturalism. For exploring the antecedents of South Korean multiculturalism that contributed to shaping such configuration, I use the Foucauldian theoretical concept of governmentality and genealogy. Governmentality focuses on the conditions or circumstances under which policy problems are produced and genealogy allows us to trace back to its origin of the discourse, for de-familiarizing and dismantling the widespread perception of South Korean multiculturalism. This article explores how historical and geopolitical conditions have shaped engagement with multiculturalism discourse and how the emergence of post-nationalism laid the foundation for multiculturalism policy.

KEYWORDS:

• Anti-colonial nationalism
• anti-communism
• multiculturalism
• nation
• post-nationalism

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Xiaobei Chen for comments on previous draft.

Notes

1. The term ‘Korea’ in this article is used only to refer to both North and South Korea together or when analyzing circumstances which arose before the territorial division. Thus, subjects of Korean ethnic nationalism are also presupposed to include not only South Koreans (51.6 million) but also other Korean ethnic groups such as North Koreans (25.4 million). See KOSIS, ‘In-Gu [Population].’

2. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun.

3. Risse, ‘The Evolution in Anti-Americanism in South Korea.’

4. In official government’s documents and academic publications, the two terms, North Korean refugees and defectors, are simultaneously used in South Korea. However, I adopt the term North Korean defectors for consistency because there is another Korean term ‘nanmin’ which exactly means refugees. And according to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, North Korean defectors are not considered political refugees. It is because since the end of the Great Famine in 1998, the North Korean government has not treated its defectors as political prisoners taking their economic difficulties into consideration. See Choi, ‘Current Status and Position of North Korean Defectors Abroad.’

5. According to McNeil ‘What We Mean by the West,’ the term Western means both the cardinal direction but characteristics which influence categories of their nationalisms. Snyder’s The New Nationalism explains that fissiparous nationalism in European and melting-pot nationalism in the Unites States were formed by forces for colonial expansion, aggression, or economic expansion, thus, those sparked backlashes such as black nationalism in Africa and anti-colonial nationalism in Asia.

6. BBC, ‘South Korea – Timeline.’

7. Lew, Brief History of Korea.

8. Park, The Era of Transition.

9. Bacchi, Introducing the ‘What’s the Problem Represented to Be?’ Approach.

10. Stone, Policy Paradox.

11. Foucault et al. The Foucault Effect.

12. Lemke, ‘The Birth of Bio-Politics,’ 191.

13. Dean, Governmentality. Also see Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’ and N. Rose and Miller, ‘Political Power beyond the State’

14. Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse,’ 226.

15. See note 12 above.

16. Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.’

17. Studies in Korean about Korean ethnic nationalism have also difficulties explaining those concepts although those studies use Korean words minjokjuui: Jeon Jae Ho, one of prominent researchers who have studied Korean minjokjuui confessed that ‘anyone knows what minjok is, but it is not easy to explain or define it’ and explained minjokjuui as an ideology, movement, even discourse which only works in combination with other ideologies that practically contribute to ‘minjok’s independence, unification, development, promotion of self-confidence’ in his book Nationalisms-Devlopment and Traits of Korean Nationalism, 7–9.

18. Shin, ‘Nation, History, and Politics.’

19. Ibid., 165, and Renan, ‘What is a nation.’

20. B. Kang, ‘Large-Scale Reservoir Construction and Political Centralization.’ There are several different opinions pointing out different historical moments as the birth of Korean national identity; Pankaj’s ‘Historical texts on early Korea’ puts importance on a historical literature, the Samgukagi, written in the 12^th century which outlines a distinguishable Korean identity. Porteux’ ‘Reactive Nationalism and Its Effect’ takes into account Korea’s relationship with China in its early history and Lankov’ ‘South Korea’s nationalist passions’ points to the Korean people’s experience during Japanese colonization. According to Phillips, Yi and Kim’s ‘Koreans and Foreigners,’ the popular understanding holds that on the October 3^rd, the National Foundation Day, 4352 years ago (2333 before Christ), Korean minjok formed its nation.

21. See Choe and Norimitsu, ‘South Koreans React to Shooting in Virginia’ and Hua, ‘Virginia Tech Massacre/ Korean Americans.’

22. Shin, ‘The Incipient Phase of Modern Korean Nationalism,’ 251.

23. Ki, Silhak Thought.

24. Bell, Cheondogyo and the Donghak Revolution, 274.

25. Yoon, ‘Eastern Learning Peasant Revolution and Religion.’

26. Choi, ‘A Study on the Joint between Christianity and Nationalism in Korea.’

27. Ibid.

28. Sung, ‘Why Did the Donghak Peasant Movement Become an Armed Struggle against Japan?.’

29. See above 22. 223.

30. Kim, ‘Study of Lessons Focusing on Vietnam, Yemen, and Germany,’ 27.

31. Noh, ‘From National Reunification to Civic Reunification.’ Lee explaines in his study ‘Changes in North Korea’s Perception of Capitalism’ that the North Korean government utilized the concept of minjok for justifying jingoism and characterised the South Korean people as the subjugated to the U.S.

32. Koh, ‘The Reality of Division on the Korean Peninsula,’ 3.

33. Renan, ‘What is a nation,’ 19.

34. Mosse, Confronting the Nation, 13.

35. There was another student activist group named Minmintu (Fight for Minjok and Democracy). Kang explains in his book, History of Student Movement in the 1980s, that the name of this group also includes the word minjok though this group advocated for stronger anti-capitalism, thus, even if capitalists contributed to national movements, the capitalists were thought to be overthrown.

36. Shin, ‘Nation, History, and Politics,’ 148–49.

37. Ibid., 215.

38. The ruling power generally refers to a force which has held vested interests in South Korean society since its liberation from Japanese colonialism (1945). See Kim, Dong-Chun’s books, This Is a Battle against Memory and Why the Republic of Korea?.

39. Kim, ‘A Study on Public Administration and Policy’

40. Kang, Rewritten Korean Modern History.

41. See note 41 above and Kang, Rewritten Korean Modern History.

42. Hong, ‘Nationalisms’ Competition and Post-Nationalism Discourse.’

43. See Park and Seo, ‘How Spies Have Been Manipulated in Korea’ and Choe, ‘Film Shines Light on South Korean Spy Agency’s Fabrication of Enemies.’

44. Han, ‘Manipulated “fake” Spies for Livelihood of Anticommunist NIS Agents.’ It is estimated that no more than 50 of the 1,000 spy cases announced by the National Security Planning Agency (NSPA) since the 1970s were in fact real. See Han, ‘ “Incapable” Spies, Will They Reappear?.’

45. Han, ‘Manipulated “fake” Spies for Livelihood of Anticommunist NIS Agents.’

46. Kang, Why Do Korean Conservatives Choose Multiculturalism?.

47. Tangherlini and Pai, Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity, 10.

48. Ibid., 7.

49. Thus, the movement communicated its demands through key slogans, such as ‘anti-dictatorship and democratization’ and ‘anti-foreign power, national sovereignty, and unification of fatherland. See Kang, Student Political Activism.’

50. Lim, ‘Exploring Literary Teaching-Learning Methods through Critical Writing.’

51. Kang, ‘The Epic of the Republic of Korea’s Minjok.’

52. In 1994, the number of migrant workers including undocumented workers was about 70 thousand, and in 2000, the number increased to over 308 thousand. See Oh et al., ‘Current Status of Southeast Asian Manpower Delivery.’.

53. Bae, ‘Book Review: South Korea’s New Nationalism’

54. See note 47 above.

55. Kim, ‘Post-Modern Theory of History,’ 36–37.

56. Kim and Choi, Dangerous Women.

57. Jeong and Hanhwang, Women’s Human Rights Can Be Protected with Their Death.

58. See Cho, ‘Multiculturalism and Homogenous Nationalism in Korea’ Also see C.-G. Kang, ‘Critique of Modernist Interpretation of Nationalism.’ and J. Lee, ‘South Korean Nationalism and Multiculturalism.’

59. Choi, Jang-Jip, ‘The Ideational Base for East Asian Community.’

60. Jeon ‘The Post-Nationalism,’ 57–58.

61. Ko, ‘Hankyoreh Prism: State versus. Minjok.’

62. The title of the engagement policy, Sunshine, was borrowed from Aesop’s fable, the Wind and the Sun. The moral of the fable is that warm sunshine instead of strong wind, can strip the traveler of his cloak.

63. Kim, ‘Comparison of Parties’ Unification Policies.’

64. Moon, ‘The Kim Dae Jung Government’s Peace Policy toward North Korea,’ 184.

65. Park, Myung-Lim. ‘Structure and Transformation of Orders in Division System.’

66. The current, liberal president Moon Jae-In has maintained a similar policy towards North Korea. In 2018, he gave a speech in Rungrado Stadium in North Korea, where he highlighted the Korean minjok, stating that: ‘we ourselves determine our own fate … our minjok are outstanding, our minjok are resilient, our minjok love peace. And our minjok must live together’ See Moon, ‘Address by President Moon Jae-in’ This type of speech would be criticized in other societies for being nationalist or xenophobic. However, in South Korea, this speech was instead criticized by the conservative media for being leftist-leaning and communist.

67. The first agreement of the North-South joint declaration in 2000 is ‘the South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.’ In this context, ‘through the joint efforts of the Korean people’ actually translates in Korean to through the joint efforts among Korean insiders (uri minjokkiri).

68. Moon, ‘The Kim Dae Jung Government’s Peace Policy’ 180.

69. Lee, ‘The Labor Movement Should Sead the Unification Movement.’

70. Lee, ‘What’s More Important?’

71. Joongangilbo, ‘[Editorial: Let’s Break down a Formula]’

72. Other derogatory expressions for the liberals and progressives are ‘leftists subordinating to North Korea (jongbug jwapa).’ On the other hand, derogatory expressions referring to conservatives include ‘naturalized Japanese raiders (tochag waegu).’

73. Kang, ‘The Clash of Liberal Democracy.’

74. Hwang, ‘Textbook Controversy.’

75. Park, ‘The Third World Revolution and Democracy.’

76. Park, Who Have Said They Read Arendt and Tocqueville, 503.

77. Levin and Han, Sunshine in Korea, 52.

78. See Jeon, ‘“The Post-Nationalism” Debate in Korea’ and N. Park, ‘The Republic of Korea Corporation, 167

79. Ahan, ‘South Korea’s “New Right.”’

80. Lee, Model of Korean Capitalism.

81. Ibid.

82. Kim, ‘Reality of a State.’

83. Anderson, Imagined Communities.

84. See note 64 above.

85. Lee, ‘There Is No “Korean Ethnicity” 100years Ago.’

86. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism.

87. Lee and Park, Re-Understanding Contemporary Korean History after Liberation, 13.

88. Hong, ‘The Debates on Nationalism,’ 151. Furthermore, by locating the origin of South Korea in 1948, this narrative acknowledges pro-Japanese collaborators as the founding fathers of South Korea while simultaneously minimizing the accomplishments of the Korean independence activists.

89. Yang, ‘[Keynote Announcement] Korea’s Conservatism,’ 12.

90. See note 76 above.

91. In 2020, 60.4% of South Koreans said that some of the practices of human rights NGOs should be banned because they escalate tensions between the two Koreas, interrupt their dialogues, and do not offer practical help to the North Korean people. See Lee, Hyo-Yong’s article ‘60% opposes to flyers to North Korea.’ After the inter-Korean summit in 2018, 85.6% of South Koreans said that they were in favor of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un visiting South Korea. See Jeong and Heo’s ‘85.6% Favor for Kim Jong-Un’s Seoul Visit.’

92. Park, The Republic of Korea Corporation. He is a naturalized South Korean. He ran for the National Assembly as a candidate for the leftist party in 2012.

93. Min’s ‘People to Shine in 2005’ and see note 90 above.

94. See Lee’s Model of Korean Capitalism. And Also see Jeong’s ‘The Comparative Analysis of Neocon in America’ and Jayasuriya’s ‘Nationalism Marries Neoliberalism.’

95. See note 90 above, 393.

96. Porteux, ‘Reactive Nationalism and Its Effect.’

97. Kim, ‘Anti-Communist Liberalism as an Origin of the Korean-Style Neo-Liberalism.’

98. Park, The Republic of Korea Corporation, 167.

99. Lee, ‘A Case Study of Social Roles of Countermovement,’ 18.

100. Park, Comfort Women of the Empire.

101. Kim, ‘A Historian, Jeon Woo-Yong, Criticizes One by One a New Right Member.’

102. Ibid.

103. Tisdall, ‘Korean Comfort Women Agreement’

104. Ibid.

105. See note 102 above.

106. See note 44 above.

107. Jee, ‘Minjok That Has Not Learn from the Past.’

108. This comment was a part of his opinion about a large-scale massacre that a Norwegian terrorist Breivik killed 77 innocent people in 2011. Jee said that the act of terror was committed for the sake of protecting the Norwegian national identity against Muslim culture. Interestingly, Jee added that Muslims were rather acceptable in South Korea, but the communists were not. See Jee, ‘Words of Greeting in August for the Members.’.

109. Byun, ‘Failure of European Multiculturalism?’

110. See note 71 above.

111. Taylor, ‘For South Korean Conservatives’ and Kim, ‘Trump’s Approach to North Korea.’

112. 4.4 billion won (around $4 million USD) was allocated to policy for multicultural families in 2007, and, in 2010 under the Lee Myung-Bak conservative government, this allocation rose to 58.1 billion won (around $5.3 million USD). A year later, in 2011, the budget reached 92.6 billion won (around $84.2 million USD). See Jung, ‘Budget for the Multicultural Families.’. In spite of the rapidly growing budget, it is noted that the number of international marriages had decreased during this period thus the increasing rate of international couple had slowed down. See Cho, ‘Declining Filipino Wives.’

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Yihyun Ryu

Yihyun Ryu works as a researcher at the Asia Development Institute of the Seoul National University. Her current research interests include multiculturalism, nationalism, feminism, multiculturalism policy, minority policy, and politics of the Korean peninsula. Yihyun Ryu draws her inspiration from Foucauldian theoretical concepts, particularly governmentality, because of their power to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions in discourse.