Public discourses of stem cell science in Singapore (1997–2010)

Abstract

In most industrialized countries, policy debates around stem cell science manifest in public discourse. Assuming that a functioning public sphere exists where matters of science policy can be discussed, examination of these discourses can help provide an understanding of how science policies evolve. The aim of this paper is to provide a preliminary analysis of how the public discourses around stem cell science have developed in Singapore. Using a theoretical model of “focused discourse,” our analysis indicates that there have been five distinct phases, marked by discernible shifts that reflect important changes in how biomedical science is funded in Singapore. While our results are preliminary, we argue that public discourses around science policies do exist in Singapore but are limited by a lack of diversity that would be expected in a more heterogeneous public sphere.

Keywords:

• stem cell research
• public discourse
• Singapore

Introduction

Over the last decade, embryonic stem cell (ESC) research and somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) have been subject to political, bioethical, and public debate as governments have sought ways to regulate this emergent science. In this time, most industrialized countries have enacted legislation that generally seeks to balance ethical concerns surrounding the protection of human embryos while allowing important biomedical research to proceed (Hauskeller 2005, Chang and Tan 2010). However, there is great variation in the permissibility of ESC research between, and sometimes within, different nations (Walters 2004). Some countries, like the UK, have relatively liberal laws that allow the use of SCNT and the creation of human embryos for research, while others have placed outright bans on all ESC research (Lysaght and Kerridge 2010). In the US, while federal funding was (until recently) limited to cell lines that pre-dated former US President George W. Bush's 2001 executive order, individual states such as California have implemented their own legislation and funding initiatives to pursue ESC research (Salter and Salter 2010).

Differences in national regulatory approaches have generated competition to implement stem cell programs that will give countries an edge in the global knowledge economy (Gottweis et al. 2009). Several East Asian nations – particularly China, South Korea, and Singapore – have adopted science-friendly policies, and invested heavily in building the infrastructure necessary to attract scientific talent from abroad and develop local industries in stem cell science (Levine 2008). While these investments have paid off to a degree, some commentators have suggested that the overall outputs from all three countries “have failed to impress” and “none is at present a major player in the stem cell arena” (Sipp 2009, p. 853). Others have criticized the top-down approach to science policy development in Asian countries, and an over-emphasis on recruiting senior expatriate scientists, as key factors that are impeding the progress of biomedical science in the region (Huang and Tan 2010, Zhang 2011). In this paper, we focus on Singapore as an example of how policies for stem cell science have developed in East Asia.

Stem cell policy development in Singapore

Singapore's approach to stem cell science sits within a broader policy framework that promotes the biomedical sciences as part of a strategy to transform the country into a knowledge-based economy (Waldby 2009). Central to this framework have been: (1) the establishment of a national funding body, the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*Star), which sits under the Economic Development Board (EDB); and (2) the rollout of strategic plans to compete in the global bioeconomy (Reubi 2010). Key aspects of this strategy have been the provision of taxation incentives and venture capital schemes to encourage public–private partnerships, and the generation of highly educated workers through university scholarships and the placement of graduates under internationally renowned scientists (Ong 2005). Other important aspects have included the technological infrastructure and development of science parks and, most notably, the Biopolis, which is a multi-million dollar complex that houses key research institutes, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, and governing bodies (Waldby 2009). Complementing the physical construction is the “soft” infrastructure (Reubi 2010), which has included the creation of national ethical boards, and specifically the Bioethics Advisory Committee (BAC).

The BAC was established “to examine and make recommendations for potential ethical, legal and social issues arising from research in the biomedical sciences” (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2000). In 2002, the BAC delivered recommendations on stem cell research in a report entitled Ethical, legal and social issues in human stem cell research, reproductive and therapeutic cloning (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002). This report advocated a relatively liberal approach that would allow research on human embryos and SCNT to proceed under license (Kian and Leng 2005). The report was endorsed by the government and is now used as the national guidance (Colman 2008). The only specific legislation to emerge from this report is the Human Cloning and Other Prohibited Practices Act 2004, which prohibits reproductive cloning.

Singapore's permissive regulatory approach and laissez-faire economic policies have been applauded by the international scientific community (Einhorn et al. 2005, Arnold 2006, Walsh 2006a, 2006b). Singapore has since recruited a number of high profile scientists with generous research budgets and the freedom to pursue innovative lines of research (Arnold 2006). Star recruits have included husband and wife duo Neal Copeland and Nancy Jenkins, who were appointed to the Institute of Molecular and Cellular Biology (IMCB) in 2007, and Dr Alan Colman who was formerly with PPL Therapeutics (van Epps 2006). According to Colman (2008, p. 520), Singapore was attractive because it lacked “unduly onerous political or legislative restrictions” on the use of human ESC research.

Previous empirical research has shown that stem cell scientists opt to work in geographic areas with liberal regulation (Wainwright and Williams 2008) and US researchers are attracted to Singapore because of a perceived favorable political environment (Levine 2010). However, recent reports suggest that this climate may be changing with the government's new Industry Alignment Fund (IAF). Starting from 2011, 30% of A*Star's budget will be redirected into a pool for projects that are supported by an industry partner (Bennett 2010). The implications of this policy change for Singapore's stem cell community are not yet understood, although early indications suggest that some scientists are unhappy. From a recent Nature editorial (Editor 2010, p. 731), a number of high profile scientists have resigned, including Copeland and Jenkins who were “frustrated by the changes,” and there are others “looking for new posts.” The editors cite specific complaints about a lack of transparency and an over-bureaucratized grant review process.

Such sentiments are a departure from the enthusiasm that scientists have previously exuded for Singapore's “no strings attached” approach (van Epps 2006, p. 1140) and they raise questions about how the discourse has arrived at this point. These developments are important, not just because of the implications they may have for Singapore's economic aspirations, but because they reflect on how stem cell science is being “co-produced.” Implicit in this idea of co-production is an open and transparent discourse that allows a multiplicity of actors to deliberate and debate the development of science policy (Jasanoff 2005). Some scholars have pointed to the BAC's consultation processes as providing a forum for public debate on stem cell science (Ho et al. 2010). However, other scholars have argued that even though Singapore has endeavored to adopt liberal ideas of public engagement in science policymaking, “there is no public as such to engage” (Holden and Demeritt 2008, p. 83). We aim to examine the development of public discourses around stem cell science in Singapore by drawing on a theoretical model that approaches public discussion around science policy as a particular type of focused discourse.

Theoretical approach: public debate as a focused discourse

For our examination, we applied a theoretical approach of focused discourse that is described by Little and Lipworth (2007). This approach is “a purposive, patterned, restricted use of language and other signs constructed and employed by a community of people who implicitly or explicitly agree to abide by a set of semiotic rules and meanings that determines both the purpose and the membership of the community” (Little and Lipworth 2007, p. 7; see also Little et al. 2003, Little and Sayers 2004a, 2004b, Little et al. 2007). Focused discourse “permeates common discourse by way of [for example] the mass media […] [and] frame[s] our ethical understanding, our ethical language, and ultimately our ethical practices” (Little 2010, p. 94) to explore the “capacity to extend our moral horizons into domains and territories where we cannot otherwise go” (from Little 2010, p. 93, referring to the work of Nussbaum 1995a, 1995b). The result is a descriptive account that alludes to “… natural histories,” ideas about “fragmentation, paradigm change or disintegration,” and “meanings around such words as justice, equity, fairness, rights, autonomy, contract, consent, and so on” (Little 2010, p. 95).

According to this model, public discourses evolve over five phases. Briefly, the first phase occurs with the emergence of an event or an affair, which triggers a public response and the shaping of those responses in the second phase. In the third phase, actors align with communities that share the values and ideals that are expressed within a prevailing discourse. However, this apparent unification masks other discourses that are developing in or around the dominant one. During this fourth phase, critical discourses emerge to reflect and add balance to the prevailing discourse. The final phase is characterized by a realignment that should reveal the heterogeneity of a public discourse. This model provides a useful heuristic for understanding how public discourses around science policies develop and is thus used to examine those around stem cell science in Singapore.

Method notes

While various sources of public discourse exist, we concentrated on the print news media because it is the most accessible and dominant source for tracking public discourse (Kennamer 1992). We included the four main categories of print media content: news items, features articles, opinion editorials, and letters to the editor. All articles published between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2010 in the Straits Times, Today, New Paper, International Herald Tribune, and Business Times were retrieved from the Factiva database using the truncated search string of “stem cell, human embryo or cloning.” We also included a search for billboards, blogs, and chat rooms based in Singapore.1 Initial results were assessed for relevance. Items relating to animal cloning and other non-contextualized use of the term “cloning” (i.e. photography, software, etc.) were excluded. Articles were then examined qualitatively using thematic analysis techniques (Lincoln and Guba 1985, Denzin and Lincoln 2005) to generate a narrative of key policy events that have shaped the public discourse around stem cell science.

Results

The data for our preliminary analysis comprised 970 items: 799 news and feature articles, 141 opinion editorials and letters to the editor, and 30 blog entries. Figure 1 indicates that the total number of items published fell from 22 to zero in 2000 but then rose to 95 in 2002. This number dropped in 2003 but increased again to peak at 131 in 2005. From 2007, the media coverage began to decline until just 63 items were published in 2010. Many of these items referred to scientific reports and policy developments overseas, which were important to include in tracking the broader context of Singapore's public discourse. As our analysis progressed, we then focused on items that related more specifically to Singapore and the government's policies.2 Results presented below describe the key events that have shaped five overlapping, but distinct phases of public discourse.

Figure 1. Number of news/feature articles, opinion editorial/letters to the editor and weblog/forum articles included in the analysis.

Public responses to international events and local policy episodes (1997–2002)

Discussion of stem cell science first emerged in February 1997 with the announcement of Dolly the sheep (Wilmut et al. 1997). This event did not attract a large volume of newspaper coverage or public commentary in Singapore. In the single editorial found, Singaporeans were advised against taking an “alarmist reaction” that could result in “funding cuts” and “all sorts of legal and ethical restrictions” (Editor 1997). The research that produced the first human ESC line (Thomson et al. 1998) went by with even less media interest. Indeed, this announcement went unreported in Singapore's major newspapers and attracted little attention until mid-2001, when President Bush issued his executive order. One article suggested that Bush's policy would encourage “frustrated” American scientists to move offshore and provide countries with more liberal regulatory environments the opportunity to “take lead” (Knowlton 2001).

Soon after, Singapore announced its ambitions of becoming a global supplier of ESCs with the EDB's $17 million investment in ES Cell International (ESI). At the time, ESI owned six out of the 21 existing ESC lines that would be approved for US federal funding. In 2001, ESI set up its main research and production facility in Singapore and it was envisaged that this investment, along with a liberal regulatory attitude, would help cement the country's leading position in the global stem cell market:

Along with Australia, Sweden and India, the Republic is now among what The New York Times described last week as “an unexpected new order of world powers” in human embryonic stem cell research. This highlights the newcomers' inventiveness, as well as how the traditional biomedical powerhouses have been held back by political and ethical controversy, it said. Singapore, free of such roadblocks, presently shares the lead in the marathon that is stem-cell research. (Chang 2002c)3

Around the same time, the BAC announced that it was seeking public input on issues relating to stem cell research and cloning. According to BAC Chair Professor Lim Pin, “we have to weigh all the religious and cultural sensitivities … right now, it is a free-for-all situation” (Chang 2001). Thus, a sub-committee was convened to carry out public consultation on guidelines for ESC research, which commenced in November 2001. In June 2002, the BAC released its recommendations in a report that would allow scientists to carry out ESC research under “strict rules” (Chang 2002d). The BAC recommended that research be limited to embryos less than 14 days old, that reproductive cloning be prohibited, and that the creation of SCNT-derived embryos be permitted for research with approval from a proposed statutory body.

While the recommendations were well received, not everyone supported them. Some commentators warned that more debate was needed on the issue and criticized the BAC by suggesting that the statutory board “slated” to replace it should look “more closely” at the Committee's “wisdom” of legalizing research cloning (Ho 2002). The BAC responded by reiterating the inclusiveness and transparency of the consultation process:

It's not a 100-per-cent happy situation for everyone, but we have made all efforts to ensure all views have been taken into account. No one should feel that he has been ignored. We have taken great pains to ensure that. (Anon 2002)

Soon after, the government officially announced that it would accept all of the BAC's recommendations starting with the development of specific legislation.4

Pseudo-unification of Singapore's stem cell discourses (2002–2005)

With funding and regulatory mechanisms in place, or at least in the planning, the stage was set for Singapore to pursue its recruitment drive. From 2002, there was a growing focus on attracting big names in stem cell science. The media had already extensively covered the profile of Sri-Lankan born Ariff Bongso, an obstetrician at the National University Hospital, as a “pioneer” in the field of ESC research (Anon 2001). Then, in early 2002, Alan Colman was appointed as Chief Scientific Officer (CSO) at ESI. This appointment was covered with much enthusiasm and hope that he would “act as a magnet” and “create a snowball effect” that would encourage other foreign scientists to “follow suit” (Chang 2002c). According to ESI's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Robert Klupacs:

Alan has a wide network of scientific contacts, collaborators and friends. Part of his role at ESI will be to build the company's scientific talent in Singapore. (Chang 2002a)

The need for Singapore to attract foreign scientists, build capacity and develop a local pool of talent was a key theme that framed Singapore as a regulatory “haven” and “world leader” in stem cell research (Chang 2002b). Scientists, policymakers, and journalists coalesced around this framing in a discourse that spoke about Singapore as having a “government and population” that was “very supportive” of ESC research (Tan 2002), where scientists could work without being “strait-jacketed” by “absurd laws” that limited research funding elsewhere (Chang 2002b). In backing up its commitment to ensure that “science-friendly Singapore doesn't just do good research, but the right kind,” the Ministry of Health (MOH) announced in 2003 that it had drafted and was seeking public feedback on the Regulation of Biomedical Research Bill 2003 (Chang 2003). After receiving feedback, the MOH decided to split the bill claiming it was too broad and, instead, would regulate human cloning under separate legislation. The Human Cloning and Other Prohibited Practices Bill 2004, which was enacted in September 2004, prohibited the placement of any cloned human embryo into the bodies of animals or humans and the development of human embryos outside the body beyond 14 days. This legislation meant that, in some circumstances, human embryos could be cloned as long as they were not implanted into a biological womb or developed for longer than 14 days.

The only counter-discourses to emerge consistently were from various sections of the Christian Church, who stressed their concerns over the destruction of human embryos and argued for the potential of adult stem cells. An edited position statement of the Singapore Catholic Medical Guild was posted on SG Forums, which stated their opposition to research cloning and generated a small thread of discussion (Anon 2004). Otherwise, there was an apparent unity within the discourse that continued throughout 2004 as news of Woo Suk Hwang et al.'s (2004) reported successes in creating SCNT-derived ESC lines dominated the media. This coverage peaked in 2005 with Hwang et al.'s (2005) announcement of patient-specific ESC lines, and the subsequent news that this research was fraudulent and conducted unethically. However, this high profile event attracted little commentary within Singapore. The main response was to provide assurances that such an episode was unlikely to occur in Singapore given its existing regulatory frameworks, management systems and “extensive use of foreign scientific advisers” (Liu 2005).

Singapore's success in attracting foreign expertise was attributed by some to “the critical mass of scientists and institutions clustered at the Biopolis” (Ho 2005). By 2005, the facility housed ESI's laboratories along with prestigious A*Star-funded research institutes and pharmaceutical giants such as Eli Lilly and Novartis. However, despite the concentration of industry and scientific expertise, some analysts complained that the Biopolis lacked the “entrepreneurship” needed to “bring science to market” and attain Singapore's economic goals (Ho 2005). These counter-discourses about the lack of economic outputs from the country's venture into stem cell science signaled upcoming changes in Singapore's investment strategy.

Reflection on Singapore's investment policies (2005–2007)

By 2005, a number of key buzz words and catch phases had entered the lexicon: “collaboration,” “translational clinical research,” and “bench to the bedside.” The entrance of these terms coincided with Singapore's new focus on funding projects that were more likely to generate economic outputs sooner than its basic research. Singapore began by consolidating its research efforts into the Singapore Stem Cell Consortium (SSCC). The SSCC was initiated with a $75 million fund that would spread over three years to help scientists “share expertise, avoid duplication and stay focused in their goal to find cures for major diseases” (Chang 2010). According to then-chairman of A*Star Philip Yeo, Singapore was “too small to have its talents pulled in different directions” (Chang 2005). In the following year, Yeo resigned as co-chair at the EDB to chair ESI claiming that he had “left it [ESI] to the scientists to run” and now wanted to take the company “through its next stage” (Anon 2006a). Yeo installed three new directors on the board, which included the CEO of Bio*One Capital – the EDB's capital investment arm – and hotelier Jennie Chua, who was brought on as a layperson because, according to Yeo, “you don't want a board of people (who are) all the same, talk alike, because they (ultimately will be) dealing with patients” (Anon 2006a).

Other shifts in the discourse were evident with the types of foreign scientists Singapore was now looking to recruit. This “second wave” of talent was made up of “scientists with medical relevance or doctors doing research, or even scientists with industrial experience” (Huifen 2006). According to an acting executive director of A*Star's Biomedical Research Council, this “new wave of recruits” would help Singapore “embark on the next phase of growth” that would emphasize “bench to bedside, bench to industry and molecule to medicine” (Huifen 2006). This shift also translated into public funds being directed towards scientific programs that linked up with clinics in Singapore's hospitals. To help drive this vision, A*Star created the Translational and Clinical Sciences Group, which was earmarked as the main focus of Singapore's biomedical science initiative.

A year after these announcements, Alan Colman, who had been installed as CEO at ESI in 2005 following the departure of Robert Klupacs, reportedly resigned to return to his “true love” of research (Kesava 2007b). Colman was then appointed as Executive Director at the SSCC to “stimulate research” through collaborations among Singapore's academic institutions (Kesava 2007a). He also was given a senior research position at the Institute of Medical Biology (IMB) and was soon joined by most of ESI's scientific staff when the company scaled down its research operations. ESI would no longer “play scientist” but instead would focus on being the “commercial arm” of stem cell research (Kesava 2007c). The board denied that the company had diverged from its original charter and issued assurances that ESI had the “industrial branding and commercial expertise” to translate research at the SSCC into “economically viable therapies” (Huifen 2007a). Colman, who remained on the board, claimed that the strategic shift was necessary because investors were like “fund managers” who wanted “fast results” and had been “losing interest in therapies that are years away from fruition” (Kesava 2007c).

These discourses were evolving against the backdrop of scientific and political developments overseas. International press articles posted on SG Forums about how US federal funding policies were benefiting Singapore generated some cynical comments suggesting that “the competitive edge it once had” was diminishing and that “the bioscience sector is a huge gamble, [as] many projects don't see commercial viability for a long time” (Anon 2006b). Then, in 2007, scientists in Japan announced that they had successfully re-programmed somatic cells into pluripotent stem cells without the use of blastocysts (Yamanaka 2007). This event was reported with very little analysis on the implications that it might have on the direction of Singapore's stem cell programs. It did, however, attract criticism that Singapore could no longer afford to continue funding research that was unlikely to generate any returns in the near future. A freelance writer warned that Singapore could “end up like the drug companies which carried on with long-term research that went nowhere because decision-makers refused to cancel unpromising fields of research” (Tan 2007).

While the recruitment drive for foreign scientists continued, reports had emerged that some of Singapore's star recruits were either leaving or going part time. David and Birgitte Lane, who were recruited to the IMCB and the IMB respectively, returned to Scotland in 2007 (although both have since returned). Later in the year, Alan Colman announced that he would divide his time between Singapore and his new post in London. Colman gave reassurance that his “new appointment should not be viewed as a reflection on Singapore's biomedical potential” but instead would “lead to greater collaboration” with the UK (Huifen 2007b). However, this development was criticized by Professor Lee Wei Ling in a Reuters article posted on a number of blogs/forums. Lee, who is the sister of Singapore's Prime Minister and was appointed as Director of the National Neuroscience Institute following the highly publicized dismissal of Professor Simon Shorvon in 2003 (for an overview of this affair, see Holden and Demeritt 2008) was quoted saying:

How can you run research in Singapore on one-third or one-quarter of your time? You must be extremely efficient or not involved enough and so are not worth the money. (Loo 2007)

Comments posted in response to these and other criticisms made by Lee on Singapore's funding of basic biomedical research varied. Some agreed with Lee suggesting that Singapore should “discard our ambition to lead in researches of this sort and just concentrate with doing what are more practical” (Anon 2007a). Others were more sympathetic with researchers, as one comment suggested that the “exodus” of foreign expertise was due to Singapore's over-bureaucratized biomedical sector while another suggested it was because scientists were feeling “isolated” by restrictions on their ability to communicate openly (Anon 2007b). We found no evidence of these concerns in the mainstream media until the IAF was announced.

Realignment of stem cell discourses (2008 to present)

From 2008, the media interest in stem cell science began to decline. The BAC's public consultations on “human animal combinations” and payments for human oocytes led to recommendations which were endorsed by the government. However, when the IAF was announced at the end of 2010, it was followed with suggestions that the government was growing impatient with the pace of the biomedical sector and the perceived lack of economic returns. As one commentator has described it:

It's been a dream 10-year run for the biomedical industry – research funds flowing like rivers of gold, Biopolis with its gleaming buildings, superstar scientists from across the world signing up – but the cost accountants have gatecrashed the party. But this new focus on “economic outcomes” has triggered a near-panic among scientists – a scramble in a bureaucratic maze to get a share of the cash, while the real work gets put aside. (Chang 2010)

Members of the scientific community expressed a number of concerns about the new policy changes. Some reportedly were concerned about having to spend more time and resources in preparing grant proposals and nurturing industry relationships instead of doing research. Others claimed that the funding agencies were trying to “micro-manage” science–industry relationships and “dictate what the balance between basic and clinical sciences should be” (Chang 2010). This was followed by complaints that the funding agencies had become over-bureaucratized and inflexible:

The regulatory environment has got far more complicated, and unfortunately, more complicated than it needs to be. There may be more money at stake, but I think that the administration of research must change if this money is going to be well spent. (Chang 2010)

Concerns have been expressed over the limited number of potential industry partners in Singapore, which reportedly diminished with the recent closure of Eli Lilly's drug discovery center and the withdrawal of ESI from Singapore following its acquisition by a US-based company. These concerns have followed warnings that more of the high profile scientific talent brought into Singapore will leave and, indeed, already had with the resignation of Neal Copeland, who replaced David Lane as Executive Director at the IMCB in 2007. No indications were given in the media about whether his resignation had anything to do with the IAF. However, the government was also criticized in comments found on the Internet as having relied “excessively” on foreign talent and been “unwilling to invest and cultivate locals for long term research” (Anon 2009). Growing resentment towards the use of foreign expertise was evident in other comments.

Discussion and conclusion

Our analysis of public discourse is limited by our sample which, in effect, included mostly media texts from English language newspapers. This approach excluded Chinese and Malaysian language newspapers that might have reported on aspects not captured in our sample. However, most of the media texts were sourced from the Straits Times, which has a daily readership of over 1.4 million and is read by relatively affluent readers who are most likely to constitute discourses around stem cell science (Chang and Tan 2010). Additionally, while we attempted to locate sources outside the mainstream media, we were unable to find substantial online discussion on stem cell science other than the materials included in the analysis. Thus, it was important to include materials not written by professional journalists, such as the letters to the editors and opinion editorials, so that the sample was not simply representative of a media discourse.

In addition, our study was not intended to provide an in-depth discourse analysis. Rather, we have provided preliminary insights into how public discourses around stem cell science within Singapore have evolved over the last 14 years. According to the theoretical model of focused discourse (Little and Lipworth 2007), science policy issues emerge in the public sphere in response to events that occur within the specialist discourses of science. In the context of stem cell science, the cloning of Dolly and the derivation of the first ESC lines were events that reached beyond the peer-reviewed pages of Science and Nature and into the public sphere. Unlike in the US where both events generated widespread commentary and controversy (Nisbet et al. 2003), little media attention was paid to either episode in Singapore until the BAC's public consultation began. Therefore, the trigger for public discourse in Singapore can be pinpointed to the BAC's consultation rather than the two scientific events.

The other type of discourse that emerges in response to major scientific events, and public discussion of them, is the reflective critical discourse (Little and Lipworth 2007). Bioethics typically constitutes the central critical discourse around stem cell research. However, talk of bioethics in Singapore emerged much earlier than the Little and Lipworth (2007) model would predict. Rather, bioethics was an important discourse that may have helped shape favorable public responses to the government's regulatory approach. It has been argued elsewhere that bioethics functions not merely as a critical voice but as “an institutionalized political discourse” (Jasanoff 2005, p. 172) that is employed as a means of legitimizing regulatory policies and maintaining public trust in stem cell science (Salter and Salter 2007). In Singapore, the establishment of the BAC and adoption of secular bioethics forms part of the “soft” infrastructure considered necessary to build the nation's credibility and reputation as a biomedical hub (Reubi 2010). Thus, the “strict” ethical guidelines of the government's permissive regulatory approach fit well into this lexicon.

The critical discourse instead reflected on the economic sustainability of Singapore's funding policy. Public discussion of Singapore's biomedical science policies has tended to focus narrowly on economic dimensions (Holden and Demeritt 2008). The influence of these discourses was most discernible in government shifts away from funding basic research to investing more heavily in translational clinical science and industry-partnered projects. In response to these policy changes, counter-discourses have emerged to imply that Singapore may no longer be the regulatory haven, free of political and bureaucratic meddling that it was once thought to be (Editor 2010). However, while this provides some evidence of the stem cell community realigning around new discourses, the plurality and diversity that would be expected in a more heterogeneous discourse are not strongly evident in our results. If the realignment phase is still ongoing, then this conclusion may be premature. If not, then it could raise questions about the limits of public discourse in Singapore.

Holden and Demeritt (2008) suggest that no “public” exists in Singapore to engage in a public discourse of science policy. However, given the support of our results for the Little and Lipworth (2007) model, this claim may be a little strong. While there was not a multiplicity of discourse communities (Little et al. 2003) engaging in public debate of stem cell science, we cannot say that it was any more or less homogeneous than the discourse would be in other metropolitan cities given similar circumstances. A*Star scientists are restricted from making comments in the media (van Epps 2006) and we expect that these, far from unusual, contractual obligations will prevent key sources from making disclosures which would otherwise inform a discourse in critical ways. However, we expect that the controlled licensing of media outlets in Singapore certainly confines critical debate of government policy (Tan 1999, George 2002, 2007). A number of scholars have also commented on the “climate of fear” and prevalence of self-censorship that deters public involvement in Singapore polity (for a review see Lee 2002).

While much can be said about the political landscape of Singapore in terms of the polity and the public sphere, such a task is beyond the scope of this paper.5 Importantly, the ongoing examination of research investment and priorities in political and scientific spheres continues to gain widespread media coverage. The latest event to occur was the shock resignation of the Director of the Genome Institute of Singapore, Professor Edison Liu, whose departure follows other high profile American scientists and “many more at all levels are also planning escape routes” (Chang 2011). Unless these events are being unnoticed entirely by the Singaporean citizen, permanent resident, and expatriate worker on the “Heartlands omnibus,” it is reasonable to argue that public discourses do exist in Singapore.

Moreover, it is important to note that public discourses everywhere, while theoretically open, have many context-bound limitations (Lysaght et al. 2011). Public discourses around science policy are constituted by the specialist discourses of science and sustained through processes that allow members of discourse communities to speak with credibility and authority (Little and Lipworth 2007). According to the concept of co-production (Jasanoff 2004, 2005), public discourses develop through knowledge production and embed science with societal values that shape the construction of scientific knowledge. In Singapore, it is not yet clear whether this process will result in a specialist discourse (and thus science production) that is constrained by political micro-management or a more heterogeneous public discourse that is open to a greater diversity of voices. It is also unclear whether the neo-liberal economic discourses that are employed around science policy will ultimately work to help Singapore reach its goal of becoming a major player in the global bioeconomy. Only time will tell.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks are given to Calvin Ho, Alastair Campbell, Ryan Bishop, Catelijne Coopmans, Simonetta Cengarle, and Greg Clancey from the National University of Singapore for their helpful contributions made to the formulation of this paper.

Notes

To identify relevant material, we conducted searches of the Internet for relevant websites and then applied the keyword to search for items published from 1997 to 2010. Sites searched included “Singabloodypore,” “Singapore Notes,” “Singapore Life and Times,” “art.hropod,” “Fresh Brainz,” “Just Singapore,” “Peacebella,” “SgBlogs,” and “SgForums.”

These items were identified in articles that made explicit references to organizations, institutions, and individuals within Singapore and discussion of the government's policies on regulation, funding, education, and recruitment for stem cell science. This smaller sub-set comprised 229 items.

The New York Times article referred to in this quote did not mention Singapore explicitly.

The government has yet to establish the recommended statutory body.

There is a cornucopia of scholarly works addressing specific conceptual and normative issues that concern Singapore; for a particularly comprehensive analysis on health care policy, see Hsiao (1995, 2001), Barr (2001), and Lim et al. (2002).