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ABSTRACT
Shock events are often pivotal moments in geopolitics and objects of intense disagreement among conflicting parties. This paper examines the downing of a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over eastern Ukraine in July 2014 and the divergent blame storylines produced on Russian and Ukrainian television about the event. It then examines results of a question asking why MH17 crashed in a simultaneous survey conducted in December 2014 in six oblasts in Southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, and the de facto states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. An analysis of the surveys shows that blame attribution was driven more by television viewing habits than by any other factor.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Natalia Kharchenko and Volodymyr Paniotto of the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), and Alexei Grazdankin of the Levada Center, for their cooperation in the refinement of the survey questionnaire and their subsequent supervision and professional administration of the survey in multiple locations in late 2014. Thanks also to Gela Merabishvili for research and translation work on the television news reports. Finally, the comments of two anonymous reviewers for Geopolitics helped refine and sharpen our argument.
Funding
This research was supported by a RAPID [grant 14-1442646] from the US National Science Foundation for the project ‘Attitudes and Beliefs in the Russian-Supported ‘de facto’ States and in South-east Ukraine in the Wake of the Crimean Annexation.’
Notes
1. Dutch Safety Board, Crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014, Oct. 2015, available at <https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/1006/debcd724fe7breport-mh17-crash.pdf>, accessed 3 Sep. 2017.
3. The Dutch Investigating Committee video is available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sf6gJ8NDhYA>.
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6. M. Sienkiewicz, ‘Open BUK: Digital Labor, Media Investigation and the Downing of MH17’, Critical Studies in Media Communication 32/3 (2015) pp. 208–23. Bellingcat later allied with the Washington DC based advocacy organization, the Atlantic Council. For a video recounting their MH17 investigative work, see <https://www.facebook.com/DFRLab/videos/1747134938634385/>.
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23. N. Oreskes and E. Conway, Merchants of Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury 2010); G. Supran and N. Oreskes, ‘Assessing ExxonMobil’s Climate Change Communications (1977–2014),’ Environmental Research Letters 12/8 (2017) p. 084019; A. Wilson, Virtual Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press 2005).
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25. I. Yablokov, ‘Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of Russia Today (RT)’, Politics 35/3–4 (2015) pp. 301–15.
26. A. Barry, Material Politics: Disputes Along the Pipeline (Malden: Wiley Blackwell 2013); S. Wagner, To Know Where He Lies: DNA Technology and the Search for Srebrenica’s Missing (Berkeley: University of California Press 2008).
28. Ostrovsky (note 21) pp. 54–5.
29. D. Korol, Y. Vinnychuk, and D. Kostenko, ‘Informatsiina zbroia – komu nalezhat’ ukraiinski ZMI’, Insider, 9 Dec. 2015, available at <http://www.theinsider.ua/infographics/2014/2015_smi/vlasnyky.html>, accessed 3 Sep. 2017.
30. BBC News, ‘Ukrainian Siege of ‘Pro-Russian’ Inter TV Studios Ends’, 6 Sep. 2014, available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37288630>, accessed 3 Sep. 2017.
31. E. Gaufman, Security Threats and Public Perception: Digital Russia and the Ukraine Crisis (London: Palgrave 2017); V. Shevchenko, ‘Web Users Debunk Russian TV’s MH17 Claim’, BBC Monitoring, 15 Nov. 2014, available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30064374>.
32. Dutch Safety Board (note 1) p. 26.
33. See <http://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-07-17/37495-boing_777_malayziyskih_avialiniy_poterpel_krushenie_v_donetskoy_oblasti> and <http://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-07-17/37496-boing_777_malaziyskih_avialiniy_ruhnul_na_territorii_ukrainy_nedaleko_ot_posyolka_snezhnoe>.
37. See, for example, <https://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-07-17/37503-redaktor_zhurnala_natsionalnaya_oborona_i_korotchenko_prokommentiroval_aviakatastrofu_boinga_777>.
39. See <https://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-07-18/37575-na_mesto_krusheniya_boinga_777_pribyli_nablyudateli_obse>.
43. Ambassador V. Churkin, United Nations Security Council, S/PV.7219, 18 July 2014>.
44. See <https://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-07-18/37587-kak_politiki_mogut_ispolzovat_katastrofu_na_ukraine>.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
50. The animation segment is 25 seconds long, from 6:48 to 7:13.
51. See <https://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-07-18/37587-kak_politiki_mogut_ispolzovat_katastrofu_na_ukraine>.
52. See <http://podrobnosti.ua/news-release-list/2014/7/17/20/0/> (full broadcast 17 July 2014).
54. See <http://podrobnosti.ua/news-release-list/2014/7/18/20/0/> (full broadcast 18 July 2014).
56. See <http://podrobnosti.ua/985381-merkel-prinjala-reshenie-o-rasshirenii-sanktsij-protiv-rossii.html>.
58. See <http://podrobnosti.ua/985385-moskvichi-vosprinjali-avariju-boinga-kak-lichnuju-tragediju-video.html>.
59. See <https://www.rt.com/news/174412-malaysia-plane-russia-ukraine/>. The translation that follows uses that provided for this video.
62. For a video segment immediately after criticizing the United States, see Grigori Yemelyanov at <https://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-07-22/37829-zamyat_dlya_yasnosti_reaktsiya_kieva_i_vashingtona_na_ob_ektivnye_no_neudobnye_dlya_sebya_dannye>.
63. See <http://podrobnosti.ua/985716-videoobraschenie-putina-k-natsii-snimali-vpopyhah-video.html>.
66. See <http://podrobnosti.ua/985880-eksperty-obse-vernutsja-v-torez-za-telami-i-oblomkami-samoleta-video.html> (22 July) and <http://podrobnosti.ua/985881-rossijskij-ekspert-nazval-glupostju-versiju-kremlja-o-gibeli-boinga-777-video.html> (23 July).
68. For example, see 23 July report, available at <http://podrobnosti.ua/986027-vse-tela-zhertv-katastrofy-boinga-777-otpravjat-v-gollandiju-do-pjatnitsy-video.html>.
69. See <http://podrobnosti.ua/986203-hodakovskij-v-intervju-reuters-priznal-chto-Buk-vernuli-v-rossiju.html> (24 July 2014).
70. The Russian text was: СЛЫШАЛИ ЛИ ВЫ О КРУШЕНИИ 17 ИЮЛЯ МАЛАЗИЙСКОГО САМОЛЕТА В НЕБЕ НАД УКРАИНОЙ, И ЕСЛИ ДА, ПОЧЕМУ, НА ВАШ ВЗГЛЯД, ПОГИБ ЭТОТ САМОЛЕТ? We have used a paraphrase of the interview question for this article’s title. We are well aware that MH17 was less a plane ‘crash’ (which suggests accidentally hitting the ground or another object) than a shoot-down (purposeful destruction in flight).
71. For the results and brief analysis, see <http://www.levada.ru/2014/07/30/katastrofa-boinga-pod-donetskom>.
72. Quoted in A. Luhn, ‘MH17: Vast Majority of Russians Believe Ukraine Downed Plane, Poll Finds’, The Guardian, 30 July 2014, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/30/mh17-vast-majority-russians-believe-ukraine-downed-plane-poll>, accessed 3 Sep. 2017.
73. In July and August 2014, Levada asked a more direct blame allocation question (which we chose not to use) in national surveys with an option that included the United States. Levada Center, ‘Who Downed the Malaysia Boeing in Eastern Ukraine?’ 3 Oct. 2014, available at <http://www.levada.ru/en/2014/10/03/who-downed-the-Malaysia-boeing-in-eastern-ukraine/>, accessed 3 Sep. 2017.
74. For discussion of the survey, see J. O’ Loughlin, G. Toal, and V. Kolosov, ‘The Rise and Fall of ‘Novorossiya’: Examining Support for a Separatist Geopolitical Imaginary in Southeast Ukraine’, Post-Soviet Affairs 33/2 (2017) pp 124–44.
75. G. Toal, and J. O’Loughlin, ‘Frozen Fragments, Simmering Spaces: The Post-Soviet De Facto States’, in E. Holland and M. Derrick (eds.), Questioning Post-Soviet (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center 2016) pp. 103–25, available at <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/questioning_post-soviet.pdf>.
76. For a summary of gender differences, see T.W. Smith, ‘The Polls: Gender and Attitudes toward Violence’, Public Opinion Quarterly 48/1 (1984) pp. 384–96.
77. Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), ‘The Views and Opinions of South-Eastern Regions Residents of Ukraine, April 2014’, available at <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=news&id=258>.
78. G. Toal, and J. O’ Loughlin (note 75).
79. For a consideration of how political partisans get past awkward facts about their leaders to ‘convenient truths’, see D. Westen, The Political Brain (New York: Public Affairs 2007).
80. A. Linke, and J. O’Loughlin, ‘Reconceptualizing, Measuring, and Evaluating Distance and Context in the Study of Conflicts: Using Survey Data from the North Caucasus of Russia’, International Studies Review 17/1 (2015) pp. 107–125.
81. ‘MH17: Source of the Separatist Buk. A Bellingcat Investigation’, 8 Nov. 2014, available at <https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Origin-of-the-Separatists-Buk-A-Bellingcat-Investigation1.pdf>, accessed 3 Sep. 2017.
82. R. Oliphant, ‘Ukraine Sues Russia in International Court of Justice for ‘Financing Ferrorism’, Daily Telegraph, 6 March 2017, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/06/ukraine-sues-russia-international-court-justiceforfinancing/>, accessed 3 Sep. 2017.
83. H. Hale, O. Shevel, and O. Onuch, ‘Belief Formation in the Fog of War: A Case Study of the 2014 Odesa Tragedy’, manuscript under review.