The governance and regulation of Italian football

Abstract

Italian football represents a paradox. It produces teams which, at the elite level, are the most successful in European club competitions, and second only to Brazil in national competitions. The quality of its players, in terms of sporting excellence, make it one of the most admired football cultures in the world. The romance and tradition of Italian football captures the imagination of a global sporting public. On the other hand, the industry is chronically unprofitable and unstable, and characterized by a long history of financial scandal. The 2007/2008 season saw it continue to endure an ongoing crisis of confidence in the wake of financial and sporting scandals, an upsurge of spectator violence in dilapidated stadia and crowds well below their peak in the 1990s. This article presents a comprehensive case study of the recent history of Italian football focusing on its administration, governance and regulation. The objective of the case study is to provide a detailed context, in one of the big five European football markets (the others being England, France, Germany and Spain), against which to analyse and inform fresh thinking on how more effective systems of corporate governance in European football might be developed. Much of what is written about the governance of football tends to focus on the English industry. A premise of this article is that it is necessary to move beyond an anglo‐centric orientation and analyse the systems and experience in other European football markets and cultures. This is because football in individual countries forms part of a pyramid structure ultimately governed by the European football governing body, UEFA. What happens in individual country markets has the potential to affect what happens in other markets either by way of example, through influencing UEFA policy, or through precedent‐setting rulings in the courts, such as the Bosman ruling of 1995 which allowed players free movement at the end of their contracts without a transfer fee having to be paid as had hitherto been the case. The case study is interdisciplinary in its focus – economic, social and political dimensions are all important in trying to understand what constitutes the Italian model of football, a European model of football or indeed the European model of football. Critically the article asks the following questions: (1) Is it possible for Italian football to prosper in an environment in which there appears to have been significant shortcomings in governance? (2) If not, what should be the key planks of an agenda for reform? (3) Is there potential for ‘contagion’ of negative Italian experience in the rest of the European football market?

Notes

1. Morrow, ‘Impression Management in Football Club Financial Reporting’, 96–108.

2. Baroncelli and Lago, ‘Italian Football’, 13–28.

3. AGCM, Indagine Conoscitiva sul Settore del Calcio Professionistico, 28.

4. Agnew, Forza Italia.

5. Foot, Calcio.

6. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy.

7. Agnew, Forza Italia.

8. Foot, Calcio, updated edition.

9. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy.

10. Kuper, ‘Azzurri’s Quest Consoles Nation Rocked by Scandals’.

11. Ghirelli, Storia del calico italiano.

12. Foot, Calcio, updated edition.

13. Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC), History, 2007. http://www.figc.it/en/3149/2077/HpSezioneConMenuSX.shtml. Accessed March 10, 2009.

14. Lega Calcio, Rapporto 2007.

15. Dunford and Greco, After the Three Italies.

16. Istat, Rilevazione sulle forze di lavoro (Labour Force Survey).

17. Ridley, ‘Maradona Hand in North–South Divide – Italy v Argentina’.

18. Foot, Calcio, updated edition, 389.

19. De Biasi, ‘Ultra‐Political: Football Culture in Italy’, 115–27.

20. Ibid.

21. Semino and Masci, ‘Politics is Football: Metaphor in the Discourse of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy’, 243–69.

22. Agnew, Forza Italia, 120.

23. Ibid., 114.

24. Ibid., 101–2.

25. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 125–6.

26. Ibid., 187.

27. Reuters UK, ‘UPDATE 1 – Berlusconi Loses Libel Suit Against the Economist’.

28. For a detailed description of the organization and functions of the FIGC view its website at http://www.figc.it/

29. Squillaci, ‘Risorse, il Coni Premia il Calico (perdente)’.

30. Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio, 2007. http://www.figc.it/en/90/3087/Struttura.shtml. Accessed March 24, 2009.

31. Levante, Creative Accounting in Italian Football Clubs, 8.

32. Agnew, Forza Italia.

33. Foot, Calcio.

34. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy.

35. Hewitt, Sporting Justice, 67–71.

36. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 23.

37. Foot, Calcio, 244–53.

38. Foot, Calcio.

39. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 79.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., 69–70.

42. Ibid., 69.

43. Foot, Calcio, 255.

44. Ibid.

45. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 70–1.

46. Burke, ‘Paradiso to Inferno’.

47. Agnew, Forza Italia, 63–93.

48. Agnew, Forza Italia, 89.

49. Agnew, Forza Italia, 217–49.

50. Foot, Calcio, 266–9.

51. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 72–4.

52. Gianluca Vialli comprehensively refutes these implications in his co‐authored 2007 book on English and Italian football. Vialli and Marcotti, The Italian Job, 358–61.

53. Agnew, Forza Italia, 235.

54. Ibid., 233.

55. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 83.

56. Foot, Calcio, 268.

57. Agnew, Forza Italia, 229.

58. Foot, Calcio, 268.

59. Agnew, Forza Italia, 231.

60. Ibid., 227–8.

61. Ibid., 249.

62. Ibid., 242–4.

63. Ibid., 249.

64. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 74.

65. Agnew, Forza Italia, 238.

66. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 71–2.

67. Ibid.

68. Agnew, Forza Italia, 263–5.

69. Ibid., 251–65.

70. Foot, Calcio, updated edition, 282–3.

71. Ibid., 282.

72. Agnew, Forza Italia, 197.

73. Foot, Calcio, updated edition, 283–302. Foot provides a detailed account of the Calciopoli scandal.

74. Hewitt, Sporting Justice, 67–71. Hewitt provides a succinct summary of the key elements of the Calciopoli scandal.

75. Burke, ‘Paradiso to Inferno’. Burke gives a full account of the Calciopoli scandal, in particular the role of Luciano Moggi.

76. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 271–2.

77. Ibid., 272–3.

78. Burke, ‘Paradiso to Inferno’.

79. Ibid.

80. Sparre, ‘Fallen Italian Football President can Continue in the IOC’.

81. Foot, Calcio, updated edition, 289.

82. USA Today, ‘Galliani’s Match‐Fixing Penalty Reduced by 4 months’.

83. Foot, Calcio,updated edition, 264.

84. BBC Sport, ‘Italian Football’s Tangled Web’.

85. Foot, Calcio, updated edition, 287.

86. Reuters UK, ‘UPDATE 3 – Soccer – Former Juve Chief Moggi Jailed for 18 Months’.

87. Agnew, Forza Italia, 267–80.

88. Guschwan, ‘Riot in the Curve’. Guschwan provides an insightful assessment of the historical development of Italian fan culture.

89. Foot, Calcio updated edition. Foot offers an assessment of the development of ultra fan culture.

90. Agnew, Forza Italia, 275.

91. Ibid., 276–7.

92. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 81.

93. Agnew, Forza Italia, 295–6.

94. Guschwan, ‘Riot in the Curve’.

95. BBC Sport, ‘Italian Fans Face Stadium Lockout’.

96. Fraser, ‘Doors Locked for Many Italy Games’.

97. Reuters.com, ‘Italy Matches to go Ahead, Even Without Fans’.

98. For details of the activities of L’Osservatorio Nazionale sulle Manifestazioni Sportive’ see: http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/

99. BBC News, ‘Officer “Rues” Killing S.S. Lazio Fan’.

100. Kennedy, ‘Italian Football Violence Resurfaces’.

101. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 15, 2008.

102. Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor. The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: Final Report. Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor. The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: Interim Report.

103. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 24, 2008.

104. Guschwan, ‘Riot in the Curve’.

105. Agnew, Forza Italia, 278.

106. Foot, Calcio, updated edition, 536, 545.

107. Fraser, ‘Juventus Under Cloud of Suspicion’.

108. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 68.

109. Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques ‘Pyramidical Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy’, 154–88.

110. Morrow, The People’s Game?, 135.

111. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 76.

112. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 256–7.

113. Corriere della Sera, ‘La GEA dei Figli di Papa’ Sempre al Centro dei Sospetti’.

114. AGCM, Indagine Conoscitiva sul Settore del Calcio Professionistico, 118–25.

115. Marcoliguori Blog. http://marcoliguori.blogspot.com/search/label/gea. Accessed March 30, 2009.

116. Corriere della Sera, ‘Il Vero Padrone Del Calcio Italiano? Uno Banca’.

117. AGCM, Indagine Conoscitiva sul Settore del Calcio Professionistico, 118–25.

118. Foot, Calcio, 283–92.

119. Jones, The Dark Heart of Italy, 273–4.

120. Collins, ‘Rune Hauge, International Man of Mystery’.

121. Smith, and LeJeune, Football, Para. 2.1.

122. Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: Final Report. Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: Interim Report.

123. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 17, 2008.

124. Ibid., 11–21.

125. Ibid., 18.

126. Ibid.

127. Moerland, ‘Corporate Ownership and Control Structures’, 443–64.

128. Morrow, The People’s Game?, 123–6.

129. Foot, Calcio, updated edition, 543.

130. Morrow, ‘Impression Management in Football Club Financial Reporting’, 96–108.

131. Ibid., 105.

132. ANSA, ‘Soccer: S.S. Lazio Stays Afloat Thanks to Tax Deal’.

133. Agence France Presse, ‘Saving S.S. Lazio Prevented Fan Violence, Says Berlusconi’.

134. ANSA, ‘Soccer: S.S. Lazio Stays Afloat Thanks to Tax Deal’.

135. euFootball.BIZ, ‘S.S. Lazio President Sent to Prison’.

136. Foot, Calcio, 537–8.

137. Agnew, Forza Italia, 287–8.

138. Calandra, ‘Milan and Inter Executives Could Face False Accounting Trial’.

139. euFootball.BIZ, ‘Inquiry into False Accounting in Inter and Milan’.

140. Jacobelli, ‘Plusvalenze, Ecco Perchè Milan e Inter Sono Stati Prosciolto’.

141. Agnew, Forza Italia, 287.

142. Ibid., 288–9.

143. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 12, 2008.

144. Szymanski, and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, Chapter 5.

145. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 37, 2008.

146. Ibid., 17.

147. Poli, and Ravenel, Annual Review of the European Football Players’ Labour Market, 38.

148. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 14, 2008.

149. Lawton, ‘Football: The Beautiful … and the Damned’.

150. Lega Calcio Centro Studi, Rapporto 2005.

151. Details of trends in attendances at Italian football can be found on the Lega Calcio website. http://www.lega-calcio.it/it/Lega-Calcio/Bacheca/Regolamenti/Dati-statistici-su-Incassi-e-Spettatori.page Accessed March 24, 2009.

152. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 15, 2008.

153. Morrow, The People’s Game?, 120–1.

154. Baroncelli, and Lago, ‘Italian Football’, 16.

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.

157. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 15, 2008.

158. Ibid., 16.

159. Agnew, Forza Italia, 290.

160. Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: Final Report. Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: Interim Report.

161. Agnew, Forza Italia, 290.

162. Porro, and Russo, P. (2004). ‘Italian Football between Conflict and State Aid’, 219–34. This article provides an extensive analysis of how the power of Lega Calcio and the FIGC has been eroded by the leading clubs in the context of the Italian market for the broadcasting of domestic football.

163. Ibid., 226.

164. Agnew, Forza Italia, 127.

165. Gratton, and Solberg, The Economics of Sports Broadcasting, 195.

166. Agnew, Forza Italia, 286.

167. USA Today, ‘Galliani’s Match‐Fixing Penalty Reduced by 4 Months’.

168. BBC Sport, ‘Beckham to Part Fund Milan Switch’.

169. Lago, ‘The State of the Italian Football Industry’, 463–73.

170. Ibid..

171. Tonazzi, ‘Competition Policy and the Commercialization of Sport Broadcasting Rights’, 17–34.

172. Lago, ‘The State of the Italian Football Industry’, 463–73.

173. Baroncelli, and Lago, ‘Italian Football’, 18.

174. AGCM, Indagine Conoscitiva sul Settore del Calcio Professionistico, 50–1.

175. Ibid., 51.

176. Ibid., 58.

177. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 13, 2008.

178. Gratton and Solberg, The Economics of Sports Broadcasting, 161.

179. Baroncelli and Lago, ‘Italian Football’, 22.

180. AGCM, Indagine Conoscitiva sul Settore del Calcio Professionistico, 5.

181. Neale, ‘The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports’, 1–14.

182. El‐Hodiri and Quirk, ‘An Economic Model of a Professional Sport League’, 1302–19.

183. Kesenne, ‘Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance’, 98–106.

184. Szymanski, ‘The Economic Design of Sporting Contests’, 1137–87.

185. Szymanski, ‘Professional Team Sports are Only a Game’, 111–26.

186. Szymanski and Kesenne, ‘Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports’, 165–77.

187. Vrooman, ‘Theory of the Beautiful Game’, 314–54.

188. Ibid.

189. Szymanski, ‘The Champions League and the Coase Theorem’, 355–73.

190. Vrooman, ‘Theory of the Beautiful Game’, 315.

191. AGCM, Indagine Conoscitiva sul Settore del Calcio Professionistico, 59.

192. Montanari and Silvestri, ‘Ieri, Moggi e Domani’.

193. Dougal and Garcia‐Bennett, ‘Two Week Time Delay to Italian Season as Clubs Dig in Heels’.

194. Tynan, ‘“Big Six” Clubs Pay Out to Ensure Italian Season Begins’.

195. Agnew, Forza Italia, 128.

196. Corriere della Sera, ‘Diritti tv, la serie A trova l’accordo’.

197. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 16, 2008.

198. Agnew, Forza Italia, 291.

199. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance, 21, 2008.

200. BBC Sport, ‘Serie A to Form Breakaway League’.