Voice or Recognition? Comparing Strategies for Accommodating Territorial Minorities in Multinational States

Abstract

Like many Commonwealth countries, Canada and the United Kingdom have faced challenges to their territorial integrity from assertive minority nationalist movements, especially in Québec and Scotland. Successive governments have faced the task of identifying strategies to accommodate these nations within the territorial framework of the existing state. The accommodation of national minorities is a central task of territorial management within multinational states, and essential to the state's survival. This article draws upon Hirschman's analysis of exit, voice and loyalty, as well as Taylor's emphasis upon the importance of recognition, to identify the contrasting accommodation strategies evident in Canada and the UK. It concludes by suggesting that successful territorial accommodation will depend upon the employment of strategies that provide for recognition of the status of national minorities as well as the expression of their distinctive voice within the multinational state.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the editors of this journal and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Notes

1. The focus here is on the accommodation of Québec and Scotland. We recognise that these are not the only national minorities within these states, but they are the two that these states have been most concerned to accommodate, and allow us greatest insight into the contrasting strategies employed in Canada and the UK.

2. Survey data shows patterns of dual identities in regions with nationalist movements. For Spain, see Moreno (2001), and for Scotland, see McCrone (2001: 163).

3. The current proportion of Francophones in the federal civil service is approximately 29% compared to roughly 24% in the population as a whole. See Dyck (2000: 522).

4. As we have discussed, speaking of alternation of Prime ministers is misleading since, over the last 35 years, Francophones (generally taken to be Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien) have had long stints and Anglophones (Joe Clark, John Turner and Kim Campbell) very short ones. This language issue is further complicated by the fact that some prime ministers (Trudeau and Mulroney) were equally comfortable in both languages.

5. For example, the federal government and the provinces enacted constitutional change in 1982 without the support of Québec.

6. An exception is the nationalist Bloc québécois (BQ) which fields candidates only in Québec. However, the existence of this party does not point to a consociational system since it is not recognised by other federal actors as speaking for Québec.

7. The provincial assemblies of Manitoba and Newfoundland failed to ratify the Meech Lake Accord, while the Charlottetown Accord was rejected in a popular referendum, with only the voters of Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Ontario narrowly voting in its favour.

8. Ironically, this sponsorship strategy for reaching Quebeckers seriously backfired when corruption was exposed in the sponsorship programme, ultimately provoking the Liberal government's demise.

9. This was not always the case. At the time of the Union, Scotland was given 45 seats in the House of Commons, which was then about half the number it would have been given had population share been the deciding factor. However, Scottish Westminster representation gradually increased, and prior to the 2005 General Election, Scots were represented by 72 MPs, approximately 15 more than its population share merited. The establishment of the Scottish Parliament removed the rationale for such disproportionate representation and the number of Scottish MPs has now declined to 59.

10. A territorial ministry was also established in Wales almost 80 years later, but on a smaller scale and with fewer responsibilities.

11. Notably, while debates over House of Lords reform have been common since 1997, there have been few calls to transform the upper house into a territorial second chamber.

12. A similar shift can be seen in the strategy to accommodate Welsh distinctiveness. However, although the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru, also achieved electoral breakthrough in the late 1960s, its successes were never as marked as those of the SNP. In addition, and perhaps as a consequence, the Labour Party was always much more ambivalent on the question of Welsh home rule, and the Welsh devolution referendum and subsequent establishment of the National Assembly for Wales were, in many respect, fuelled by developments in Scotland.

13. An inter-governmental protocol, known as ‘the Sewel Convention’, dictates that the UK Parliament should seek the prior approval of the Scottish Parliament before passing legislation on issues reserved to Westminster.

14. The Conservatives have sought to make political capital out of the perceived illegitimacy of this practice, but the size of Labour's parliamentary majority following their election in 1997 meant that occasions where the votes of Scottish MPs made a difference to the outcome have been rare. The 2005 General Election saw Labour's government majority substantially reduced. Moreover, although Labour continues to have more English seats than the Conservatives, the Conservatives secured a marginally higher percentage of the popular vote in England. Although it is still rare for the participation of Scottish MPs to alter the outcome of votes on matters perceived to affect England only, i.e. matters devolved to the Scottish Parliament, the issue of the voting rights of Scottish MPs is now firmly on the agenda.

15. This culturally ingrained principle of parliamentary sovereignty is also at the centre of British resistance to further European integration.