Commonwealth cousins combating conflict diamonds: an examination of South African and Canadian contributions to the Kimberley Process

Abstract

Global governance frameworks are innovative initiatives that respond to international norms and incorporate state and non-state actors in efforts to address particular governance challenges. The Kimberley Process is an important global governance framework that has evolved in concert with the anti-conflict diamond norm and seeks to prevent the trade of conflict diamonds. The article examines the evolution of this global governance framework and anti-conflict diamond norm and emphasises the role of two middle powers – South Africa and Canada – in the Kimberley Process. It also analyses the cases of Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Zimbabwe in order to illustrate the type of governance challenges faced by the Kimberley Process. The article concludes with a policy-relevant discussion of the promise and limitations of global governance frameworks as well as cooperative and collaborative behaviour among middle powers.

Keywords:

• Kimberley Process
• diamonds
• global governance
• international norms
• South African foreign policy
• Canadian foreign policy

Acknowledgements

The research on which this article is based was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and an Advisory Research Committee grant from Queen's University. The author thanks the South African Association for Canadian Studies and the University of the Witwatersrand for institutional support. The author also thanks David Hornsby and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. The views presented in this article are the author's own and do not represent those of the aforementioned institutions or individuals.

Notes

Scholars differ as regards the precision of classifying countries as ‘middle powers’. For example, Jordaan (2003) distinguishes between ‘emerging’ middle powers and ‘traditional’ middle powers. Although Jordaan makes a persuasive case concerning the need for finer distinctions among middle powers (he classifies South Africa as ‘emerging’ and Canada as ‘traditional’), the present article acknowledges that while the term is contested it is nevertheless useful insofar as serving as a conceptual shorthand for states such as South Africa and Canada that have notable influence on the global stage but are not ‘super-powers’ or ‘major powers’ based on predominant military and economic clout.

Conflict diamonds (also known as ‘blood diamonds’) are those ‘rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described in relevant UNSC resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood and recognised in UNGA Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future’ (Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 2003, p. 3).

For a more detailed overview of how the Kimberley Process operates, see for example Grant (2011, pp. 163–165) and Bone (2011, pp. 191–193). Wright (2004) and Grant and Taylor (2004) describe how the KPCS was developed.

For instance, the South Africa's diamond sector employs approximately 15,000 workers in industrial large-scale mining, 1500 artisanal small-scale miners, and 2000 employees in the cutting and polishing sector (Hazleton, 2002, pp. 14–15) – not to mention the thousands of individuals employed in diamond jewellery retail sales and services.

Since assuming power in 2006, the Conservative government has delisted eight African countries from the group of Canada's priority aid recipients. As of early 2013, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Sénégal, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tanzania remain on the list of Canada's priority aid recipients in Africa. Most of these countries have witnessed increased Canadian investment in their natural resource sectors over the past seven years.

For a concise overview of how diamond mining was established in Canada and reflections on attendant governance issues, see Smillie (2002).

More than 5200 workers are employed in Canada's industrial large-scale mining areas, including the Victor Mine and Snap Lake Mine (De Beers Canada, 2011a, 2011b; Natural Resources Canada, 2011). Although relatively small in comparison to Canada's total employment numbers, this is a valuable form of work in Canada's northern regions where job opportunities are limited. Moreover, individuals who self-identify as Aboriginal represent 30–40 per cent of personnel working at Canada's diamond mines (Natural Resources Canada, 2011).

The Angolan rebel group, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), reportedly smuggled rough diamonds on a sporadic basis that were extracted from territory it controlled in the provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sud in the late-1980s and throughout much of the 1990s. UNITA, under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi, was able to tap into a network of diamond buyers based in South Africa and Zaïre/DRC and earn hundreds of millions of dollars from conflict diamonds (Ceppi, 2000, p. 41; Dietrich, 2002, p. 26; Grant, 2011, pp. 161–162). For analyses regarding the role of natural resources in Angola's civil war, see Grant (2000, 2002), Hodges (2001), Malaquias (2007), and the contributors to Cilliers and Dietrich (2000).

Author's interview with a senior South African government official involved in the Kimberley Process, Pretoria, South Africa, 27 June 2003.

See for example Grant and Taylor (2004, p. 397).

Author's interview with a senior Canadian government official involved in the Kimberley Process, Vancouver, Canada, 8 June 2008.

Charles Taylor had also provided training and equipped the RUF with weapons and materials as well as allowing the rebels to use Liberian territory in order to launch the initial campaign against the Sierra Leone government. Taylor viewed Sierra Leone with enmity owing to his view that the country had not supported his efforts to gain power in Liberia. Taylor also had designs on segments of Sierra Leone (and Guinea) as part of his ‘greater Liberia’ strategy to expand the country's territory (Polgreen, 2006). For his support of the RUF and role in the war crimes committed in Sierra Leone, the Special Court for Sierra Leone sentenced Taylor to 50 years in prison.

Although UNAMSIL received several six-month extensions and lasted until 31 December 2005, it was an expensive endeavour. International Crisis Group (2003, p. i) underlined the financial burden of establishing and maintaining peace in Sierra Leone: ‘The international community has invested billions of US dollars to end the civil war and move the country toward peace.’ The International Crisis Group cannot be accused of exaggeration, for the final tally of the six-year UNAMSIL mission was US$2.8 billion (United Nations, n.d.). In contrast, the Kimberley Process operates at a minute fraction of the UNAMSIL budget, the vast majority of which is self-funded by Kimberley Process Participants and Observers.

Electronic versions of the reports were also made available, free of charge, via the Partnership Africa Canada website. These reports are still available, and are located under the heading ‘Diamond Industry Annual Reviews’ at www.pacweb.org/en/publications/diamond-archive.

Kimberley Process document in possession of the author, received 31 January 2006. Similar sentiments were expressed during the author's interview with a Sierra Leonean government official in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 2 June 2008.

This conclusion is based on the author's field research trips to Ghana's diamond mining and trading areas in 2007, 2008, and 2010 as well as personal communications with members of the Kimberley Process civil society coalition and UN Panel of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire in 2009 and 2010.

The Ivorian delegation also intimated that diamond prospecting licences had been issued, which prompted members of the Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring to remind the delegation that Côte d'Ivoire was not yet compliant with the Kimberley Process and would have to host a review visit before it could export rough diamonds as a Kimberley Process Participant. As observed by the author, Washington, DC, USA, on 28 November 2012.

Eventually, the general public became exposed to the diamond-related violence in Marange via ‘Zimbabwe's Blood Diamonds’, a SABC (South Africa) documentary, which first aired on 27 October 2009 in South Africa one week prior to the 2009 Kimberley Process Plenary in Swakopmund, Namibia. Copies of the documentary on DVD were made available to Kimberley Process Participants and Observers during the Namibia Plenary meetings. Shortly after its debut in South Africa, the documentary appeared on television in Canada, the United States, the UK, and elsewhere. On 16 March 2012, CNN International (USA) televised a news report, ‘Inside the Marange Diamond Fields’, which provided an update on mining activities in Marange as well as the concerns of civil society groups regarding human rights abuses and misdirected diamond revenues.

When the Kimberley Process was established Mozambique was on the extreme margins of the diamond sector because it was home to virtually no known diamond reserves and, until becoming a conduit for illicit Zimbabwean diamonds in 2006, was not known to be a diamond trading country. Hence, there was no reason for Mozambique to join the Kimberley Process when it was created. Once reports of Zimbabwean diamonds being smuggled through Mozambique arose, the civil society coalition began calling for the latter to join the Kimberley Process in 2009. Progress regarding membership has been slow, although the growing issue of the influx of illicit Zimbabwean diamonds and recent diamond prospecting in Mozambique has spurred the government into action. In February 2012, the Mozambican government did announce that it was taking steps to join the Kimberley Process by December 2012 (The Namibian, 20 February 2012). However, Mozambique has yet to submit a complete application to the Kimberley Process, and, assuming the application is approved, its admission to the 83-nation group would occur in late-2013 at the earliest.

A term that is commonly employed by small-scale miners to refer to the amount of rough diamonds found over a particular period of time (e.g., daily or weekly).

Although Jacob Zuma was eager to distance himself from Thabo Mbeki's policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ when coming into office in May 2009, South Africa has actually maintained a similar relationship with Zimbabwe in practice over much of the past four years.

Per his oral remarks to the Kimberley Process Work Group on Monitoring, as observed by the author, Washington, DC, USA, on 28 November 2012.

This figure includes the most important aspects of the most recently available figures on the annual financial value of the global diamond sector – US$12 billion worth of rough diamonds produced and US$86 billion worth of diamond jewellery manufactured – for the year ending 2010.