Norm dynamics and international organisations: South Africa in the African Union and International Criminal Court

Abstract

Over the past two decades, South Africa has sought to perform several roles on the world stage, such as the economic dynamo of Southern Africa, a diplomatic heavyweight representing the African continent, and a norm leader on the world stage as a so-called ‘middle-power’. Although South Africa's evolution and rise as an important player in global affairs has generated a welcome body of critical scholarly literature, comparatively little analysis has been allocated to understanding how norm dynamics and the country's ever-evolving international identities have enabled it to construct and reconstruct its ‘interests’. Social constructivism is best suited for such an analysis because it can operationalise norms, commitments, identities, and interests, and it provides the epistemological tools to map the increasingly multilateral connections between global, regional, and domestic forums. By employing a rationalist approach to constructivism, this paper remedies the aforementioned gap in the literature by illustrating how South Africa constructs and reconstructs its identities and interests in relation to membership in international organisations (IOs). To that end, the paper examines the evolution of South Africa's participation in the African Union (especially ‘peacekeeping’ contributions) and the International Criminal Court. The paper concludes by assessing the theoretical implications and practical ramifications of the norm dynamics involved in South Africa's commitment to these two IOs.

Keywords:

• norms
• international organisations
• South African foreign policy
• African Union
• International Criminal Court
• constructivism

Acknowledgements

The authors thank David Black, David Hornsby, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. The views presented in the paper belong to the authors and do not reflect those of the below funding institution or above individuals.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

A Queen's University Senate Advisory Research Committee grant provided partial research funding for this work.

Notes

1. See, for example, van der Westhuizen (1998); Schoeman (2000); Hamill and Lee (2001); Black and Wilson (2004); Nathan (2005); Solomon (2010); Hornsby and van Heerden (2013, pp. 157–160); Cravo, Hornsby, Nascimento, and Santos (2014, pp. 1–3); and Shaw (2015).

2. See, for example, Vale (1997), the contributors to Swatuk and Black (1997), and Hamill and Lee (2001).

3. The Yearbook of International Organizations contains data gathered from the year preceding the date of the Yearbook's issue. Thus, the 2014–2015 Yearbook contains data from 2013. Data presented in Figure 1 were collected by summing the totals of those organisations classified under categories A: Federations of International Organizations, B: Universal Membership Organizations, and C: Intercontinental Membership Organizations. Data presented in Figure 2 were collected exclusively in category D: Limited or Regionally Defined Membership Organizations. See Union of International Associations (1993–2010, 2011–2015).

4. Scholars and pundits alike have allocated much time and effort to comparing Nigeria and South Africa's ‘competition’ to be deemed Africa's ‘voice’ (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003; Ademuyiwa et al., 2014; Bach, 2010; Nnorom, 2013; and Hulse, 2014). Some have also questioned South Africa's admission to the BRICS over Nigeria based on the latter's leadership via Economic Community of West African States and relative economic performance. For instance, Alden and Schoeman (2013, p. 120) perceived Nigeria's economy ‘to be in an ascendant phase’ while South Africa seemed to be ‘battling to sustain economic growth’. However, accounts that focus on the relative economic strength often hold little concern for the fact that the Nigerian economy is dominated – almost exclusively – by crude oil exports (that are subject to regular ‘boom and bust’ cycles) while South Africa's economy is more diversified in terms of services, machine and transportation manufacturing, agricultural products – and even the mining sector is protected to some degree by not relying upon a singular mineral. South Africa's policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ with respect to Zimbabwe spans several issue-areas and has been critiqued by numerous observers. See, for example, Spence (2006), Prys (2009), Tjemolane, Neethling, and Schoeman (2012), and Grant (2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2014).

5. For an analysis of the norm dynamics that underpinned the multilateral campaign against apartheid, see, for example, Klotz (1995).

6. The founding members of SADCC were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

7. See also Geldenhuys (1981). Additionally, other Western countries used aid packages to SADCC countries as a less ‘punitive’ set of measures against apartheid in South Africa. As Hawkins (1992, p. 106) noted, ‘Western nations such as Britain, West Germany, the United States, and Japan, which oppose “punitive” sanctions against Pretoria … championed aid to SADCC as their contribution to the future stability of the region’.

8. As of early 2016, membership in SADC includes: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It is important to note that SADC has since become, as of 2001, much more of an amalgamation of organisations than its SADCC predecessor. Although SADCC was a precursor to the socio-economic leg of SADC, the latter has expanded its scope considerably (Ooshuizen, 2006). For a review of SADC’s efforts in: security, see Bah (2004) and Cawthra (2008); economic integration, see Lorenz and Cornelissen (2011); trans-boundary river management, see Turton (2014); and nature conservation, see Ramutsindela (2011).

9. The particular resolution was adopted by the Council of Ministers during its Secondary Ordinary Session in Lagos, Nigeria, 24–29 February 1964. See Maluwa (2005, p. 113).

10. This is by no means an exhaustive list of every conflict in which South Africa has intervened or assisted in resolving. A complete list is provided by Lotze, de Coning, and Neethling (2013). South Africa also played an integral role in bringing together state and non-state actors in multilateral efforts to eradicate the trade of conflict diamonds – which were funding armed groups in several African countries in the 1990s and 2000s – by Chairing the Kimberley Process in the early 2000s (Grant and Taylor, 2004).

11. Nkurunziza won re-election in July 2015 with more than 69% of the vote. Human rights groups as well as the UK and the USA ‘condemned the election as not credible due to the harassment and intimidation of the opposition, rights activists, journalists and voters’ (Hatcher, 2015).

12. South Africa provides troops for two UN-led peacekeeping missions. As of 31 December 2015, this amounts to 1327 troops for MONUSCO, in the DRC, and 787 troops for the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), in Sudan. For more information on the contributors to these peacekeeping missions, see: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.

13. The other countries are Malawi and Tanzania. See Mutton (2013).

14. President Jacob Zuma has recently extended South Africa's mandate to 31 March 2016. See Stobbard (2015).

15. Neethling (2012, pp. 31–32) cites African journalist Lihle Z. Mtshali:

I can't imagine, for the life of me, why the AU does not do anything about all the tyrants running around our continent, Oh wait, I forgot, most of them [in the AU] are dictators as well. As long as that is the lay of our land, we do not have any right to criticize NATO for taking matter into their own hands when it sees a deranged dictator killing his people. … I would like to see more action by the AU on African dictators, and less yadda yadda.

16. While the AU's stance on the Libyan conflict was relatively muted, this position was not consistently held amongst all AU members. See, for example, de Waal (2013).

17. There are many wrinkles regarding the Rome Statute. For example, Article 17 of the Rome Statute's ‘complementarity principle’ limits the ICC's jurisdiction to cases where states are unable to or unwilling to pursue legal action, and thus becomes a ‘complement’ to existing domestic legislation. In response, many states have implemented domestic legislation to enmesh this principle with extant laws. In Africa, South Africa quickly created legislation while other countries, like Uganda, are still drafting legislation. See, for example, Tillier (2013) and Nsereko (2013).

18. Article 98 of the Rome Statute reads:

The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under the international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court … .

19. Additionally, the majority of African countries who are not state parties to the ICC, like Mozambique, also signed non-surrender agreements (Kelley, 2007, p. 574).

20. According to ICC data from 2006. South Africa was not the only country to be penalised by the USA. Kenya, as a consequence of not signing a non-surrender agreement, saw a net loss of $7.83 million in aid funding during the same period. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2006a, p. 1).

21. Quoted in Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2006b, p. 15).

22. Nooruddin and Lockwood Payton (2010) also note that the countries that were most often to be exempt from sanctions also were more likely to have a higher domestic respect for the rule of law. In addition to NATO allies, the USA offered exemptions to ‘major non-NATO allies’, such as those named in the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA) including Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand.

23. The quote is from South African High Commissioner to Kenya, Kinsley Makhubela. See PanaPress (20 July 2003).

24. The initial ICC indictment enumerated seven counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. In July 2010, a second indictment added three counts of genocide for killing members of the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit based on their ethnic identities. For analyses of the dynamics of war crimes in Darfur and the responses by the international community see, for example, Flint and de Waal (2008), the contributors to Grant (2009), and Verhoeven, de Oliveira, and Jaganathan (2016).

25. The quote is from South African government spokesperson, Themba Maseko. Ambivalence is reiterated in a statement from South Africa’s Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Ayanda Ntsaluba: ‘We hope that in the interests of the relations between SA and Sudan we will not have an unfortunate event'. See Jowha (2009).

26. Similarly, host Libya bowed to pressure from the European Union (EU) to disinvite Bashir from the November 2010 Africa–EU summit (Grant & Tieku, 2011, p. 266).

27. The quote is from South African Energy Minister, Kiraitu Murungi. See Rugene (2010).

28. Although 34 AU members are also members of the ICC, Ethiopia has not signed the Rome Statute. See also Fortin (2013).

29. Only recently has the spat between the EU and South Africa, which led to the EU's trade negotiator to SADC calling South Africa a ‘bully’ in its efforts to persuade SADC countries to sign an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU, been somewhat resolved (Hlatshwayo, 2009; Vickers, 2011). Although an EPA with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa (among SADC members) and the EU was finalised in mid-2014, it has yet to be ratified by all signatories.

30. In late October 2015, the ICC announced that after a five-year preliminary examination, it had decided not to pursue criminal indictments linked to the 2009 coup d’état in Honduras.

31. An ‘ICC situation’ may include multiple individuals (if the war crimes are linked) on a singular case as well as several cases occurring in one country with indictments for multiple individuals. The vast majority of ICC situations have involved multiple individual indictments. A notable exception is Libya (Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi), though it was initially a trio of indictments until they were withdrawn owing to death of Muammar Gaddafi and a successful appeal by the new Libyan government regarding Abdullah Al-Senussi (on the basis that its judiciary was willing and had the capacity to prosecute him).