The politics of Vietnamization

Abstract

President Nixon’s January 25th speech represented not the beginning but the end of negotiations. It signified that the U.S. is downgrading the Paris talks and that no further secret negotiations are taking place. Nixon’s statement of the “U.S.-South Vietnam Proposal for a Negotiated Settlement” and its rejection by the other side is the latest clarification of a truth which has underlain the Paris Peace Talks since they began, namely that the contradictions between the Nixon Administration’s vision of a peace in Indochina and that of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) and the North Vietnamese are irreconcilable. Nixon has never been, and is still not, willing to make the kind of concessions necessary to make real progress in the negotiations because he has throughout been committed to the maintenance of a staunchly anti-communist government in Saigon and the continuation of dominant U.S. influence over the domestic politics of South Vietnam. As a result, the PRG has not been willing to make the kind of concessions which would allow scope for negotiation because this would mean committing political suicide by entrusting itself to the tender mercies of the Thieu government.