Bangladeshi migrants in Delhi: Social insecurity, State power, and captive vote banks

Abstract

The en bloc vote of a relatively homogeneous subpopulation is often won over by precisely targeting narrow group identity (ethnicity, class, caste, religion, and so on) and articulating its perceived interests. However, in India vote banking is most often seen in spatially localized communities experiencing chronic social insecurity. New Simapuri is a case study of what happens when a closely knit community of undocumented Bangladeshi immigrants seeking to establish security of residence becomes drawn into the political machinery of vote banks. When intimidating state authority that also has the power to dispense substantive public relief is juxtaposed with illegal residence in India and electoral politics corrupted by that state power, the result is a vicious cycle of sustained social insecurity. While improving their lot economically, the immigrants become more vulnerable than ever to exploitation by antisocial elements and communal scapegoating. The labor-displacing structural disequilibrium induced by the world economic system and the widening economic differential between India and Bangladesh continue to drive them to migrate, often only to become political shuttlecocks in the diplomatic game played out by Bangladesh, India, and also Pakistan.