DETENTION IN MASS VIOLENCE

Abstract

This article examines the formulation and implementation of Indonesian Army policy regarding the detention of communists and other leftists in Indonesia from 1965 to 1968. The article highlights the relationship between the two primary forms of violence—killings and detentions—in the aftermath of the failed September 30^th Movement. Placing detentions at the center of analysis changes our understanding of the mass violence in several ways. First, it demonstrates that the policy to detain and “classify” large numbers of suspected communists helped to fuel the attack on the political Left. Second, it shifts the locus of analysis away from identification of the perpetrators and victims and instead seeks to highlight the processes that enabled and shaped the violence. Third, by examining the ratio between the estimated number of individuals killed and the number of individuals who remained alive in detention at a particular point in time, the article proposes a new explanation for variation in the scale and intensity of mass violence across Indonesia. This analysis encourages comparison across a much wider range of cases within Indonesia than has previously been attempted and provides a framework for future work on the mass violence in Indonesia as well as in other cases in which mass detentions or forced relocations preceded mass killings.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank Hilmar Farid, Mike Montesano, Jim Ockey, and Ryan Tans for commenting on drafts of this article and three anonymous referees for penetrating and highly constructive critiques of an early version. We are grateful to David Jenkins for allowing us to use his photographs on the cover of this issue of Critical Asian Studies and on p.461 above. It goes without saying that we are responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.

Notes

^1. Crouch 1978, 135–57, 224; McDonald 1980, 49–67; Cribb 1990, 52.

^2. Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia 1995, 111.

^3. Anderson and McVey 1971; Roosa 2006.

^4. Crouch, 1978, 137.

^5. Ibid., 160–61; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 82–84; Tanter 1990, 220–21.

^6. “Surat Keputusan Nomer: 1147/10/1965,” 10 October 1965, in Kopkamtib 1970. Two weeks later another order was issued instructing that civilians involved in the September 30^th Movement would be tried in military courts. “Surat Keputusan Nomer: Kep-1196/10/1965,” in Kopkamtib 1970.

^7. “KEP-1146/10/1965,” 10 October 1965, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^8. Aceh, at the northern tip of Sumatra, is the one anomaly: mass killings began there on or about 7 October. This appears to have been a local initiative, not an order from Suharto or the Army high command. See Melvin 2009.

^9. Determining the precise start of mass killings in South Sulawesi has not been possible.

^10. “Inspres KAB-48/D/INSTR/1965,” 20 October 1965, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^11. “KEP-069/10/1965,” 29 October 1965, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^12. Ibid.

^13. Tri Hasworo 2004, 57.

^14. Many people did in fact report to the authorities, unaware that affiliation with the PKI or other leftist organizations was considered to be a sign of complicity in the September 30th Movement.

^15. Tri Hasworo 2004, 33–34.

^16. Cable 1037A, U.S. Consulate Medan to U.S. Embassy Jakarta, 30 November 1965, Record Group 59, State Department Central Files 1964–1966, POL 23-9 [INDON], NARA [hereafter all air/telegrams from State Department Central Files 1964–1966 referred to by the file number and NARA].

^17. “KEP-070/11/1965,” 8 November 1965, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^18. Markas Besar Angakatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia 1995, 111.

^19. “INS-1015/1965,” 12 November 1965, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^20. “22/KOTI/1965,” 15 November 1965, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^21. “INS-1015/1965” and “22/KOTI/1965,” in Kopkamtib 1970. This category, according to Benedict Anderson (2000, 8), included Major General Suharto, who knew of the conspirators' plans.

^22. “INS-1015/1965” and “22/KOTI/1965,” in Kopkamtib 1970.

^23. Ibid.

^24. Crouch 1978, 154.

^25. Incoming Telegram 05RA, Department of State, received from U.S. Consulate Surabaya, 16 December 1965, POL 23-8 INDON, NARA.

^26. Telegram 455B, U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, 12 November 1965, POL 23-9 INDON, NARA.

^27. Telegram 1037A, U.S. Consulate Medan to U.S. Embassy Jakarta, 30 November 1965, POL 23-9 INDON, NARA.

^28. Incoming Telegram A-19, Department of State received from U.S. Consulate Surabaya, 28 December 1965, POL 28-8 INDON, NARA.

^29. Crouch 1978, 161.

^30. On the creation of Mahmillub, see “PENPRES-16/1963,” 24 December 1963; on using Mahmillub to try the September 30^th Movement conspirators, see “Kepres 370/1965,” 4 December 1965, both in Kopkamtib 1970.

^31. “1281/Sek/5354/11/1965,” Mahkamah Agung R.I. to the Inspektur Inspektorat Kehakiman Angkatan Darat, 16 December 1965, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^32. “‘G 30 S’ dilumpuhkan: 872 orang diringkus dan 6 peti peluru disita Komdak VII Djaya,” Berita Yudha, 12 November 1965, and “Berita Daerah Singkat Surakarta,” Berita Yudha, 27 November 1965.

^33. “Lebih 4000 Oknum ‘Gestapu’ Ditawan ABRI,” Api Pantjasila, 25 November 1965.

^34. The report is reproduced in Oei 1995, 348–66; see also Crouch 1978, 155.

^35. Complicating the “detainee” category is the fact that it includes individuals who were rounded up and those who sought refuge at military/police facilities. Detainees often had some freedom of movement.

^36. Although the great majority of people killed were first detained, for the sake of simplicity the following exercise does not double count those killed in the detention column.

^37. We would welcome the discovery of more reliable figures for killings and detentions as of 31 December 1965, for mid 1966 or even 1968.

^38. Benedict Anderson's translator's note in “Report from East Java” 1986, 135. Influential works emphasizing the role of civilians include Hughes 1967, Brackman 1969, Geertz 1995, and Sulistyo 2000 (the last two, not coincidentally, about East Java), while those highlighting centralized Army control include Southwood and Flanagan 1983, Törnquist 1984, and Robinson 1995. Robert Cribb's works (1990, 2001 [How], 2001 [Genocide]) have tended to argue it was a messy combination of both.

^39. Report from East Java 1986, 137.

^40. We believe that “civilian initiative” can only be understood in relation to the stance of provincial military authorities: If the provincial military commander decided to take direct action against the political Left, there were civilians willing to participate; if the provincial military commander (or his subregional commanders) decided to ignore central instructions and not take action against the political Left then and only then does civilian initiative become important. This is already captured in our model, so there is no need to add a separate variable. See the Appendix for the relationship between civilian initiative and the killing-to-detention ratio.

^41. Aside from the PKI, the other major parties included the Indonesian National Party (PNI), Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), and the banned Masjumi.

^42. See Appendix for further details and sources.

^43. Jakarta is not included in the following analysis because as the capital city (overwhelmingly urban and seat of the Army high command) it represents a special case.

^44. Tsai and Kammen 2012.

^45. Crouch 1978, 163, 168–71.

^46. Jenkins and Kammen 2012.

^47. See “Report from East Java” (1986), which offers a damning assessment of provincial leaders; also Crouch 1978, 145–8.

^48. Robinson 1995, 286–88.

^49. In fact, Djuarsa did not issue an order to arrest and detain suspected communists until 9 November, a full month after mass killings had begun and three weeks after the Kopkamtib instructions. We believe that Aceh is an anomalous case, the key factors being that 38 percent of the personnel in the Regional Military Command were former Darul Islam rebels; furthermore, communism was strongly associated with ‘outside’ (Javanese) migrants.

^50. Although we do not have figures on killings and detentions for other provinces, we suspect that West Sumatra, South Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara would all approximate the pattern in South Sulawesi.

^51. See the Appendix below for a rough sketch of rival hypotheses and further details about sources for each of the variables.

^52. See Crouch 1978, 163, according to which Major General Ibrahim Adjie, commander of West Java's Siliwangi command, was the first to do so. On 20 December, a U.S. diplomatic telegram noted that the PKI had been banned in fourteen provinces, cheerfully adding: “Only 11 more to go!” Telegram 724A, U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, 20 December 1965, POL 23-9 INDON, NARA.

^53. “45/KOTI/2/1966,” 21 February 1966, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^54. Agustinus Michael Sutardhio was an officer in the Military Police Corps and had attended officer training courses in the United States. He was appointed attorney general in August 1964. See Bachtiar 1988, 408.

^55. Crouch 1978, 174.

^56. Report from East Java 1986, 185–222.

^57. Hughes 1967, 220–21; Crouch 1978, 174.

^58. Incoming Telegram 695A, State Department, received from U.S. Embassy Jakarta, 25 February 1966, POL 15-1 INDON, NARA.

^59. Airgram A-258, U.S. Embassy Jakarta to Secretary of State, Washington, 28 September 1965, POL 15-3 INDON, NARA.

^60. Incoming Telegram 222A, State Department, received from U.S. Embassy Jakarta, 7 Mar 1966, POL 23-9 INDON, NARA. Gestok, an acronym for 1 October Movement, was Sukarno's attempt to counter the Army propaganda.

^61. Markas Besar Angkatan Bersendjata 1995, 124.

^62. Airgram A-611, U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, 5 April 1966, POL 15-3 INDON, NARA.

^63. Ibid.

^64. Crouch 1978, 165. The Army actively supported these student organizations, with RPKAD commander Col. Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, who had enrolled as a student at the University of Indonesia, playing a leading role.

^65. Crouch 1978, 166. For a celebratory student perspective, see Wibisono 1980.

^66. Crouch 1978, 159–78.

^67. Incoming Telegram 222A, State Department, received from U.S. Embassy Jakarta, 7 March 1966, POL 23–29 INDON, NARA.

^68. Crouch 1978, 179–96.

^69. Airgram A-682, U.S. Embassy Jakarta to Department of State, 7 May 1966, POL 29 INDON, NARA.

^70. Sugih Arto (also spelled Soegiarto) served as attorney general until 1970.

^71. Airgram A-786, U.S. Embassy Jakarta to Department of State, 18 June 1966, POL 24 INDON, NAA.

^72. Quoted in van der Kroef 1976, 626; see Amnesty International 1977 on the number of prisoners released.

^73. Van der Kroef 1976, 629.

^74. Davidson and Kammen 2002.

^75. Triyana 2003; Hearman 2010.

^76. “PELAK-002/KOPKAM/10/1968,” 16 October 1968, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^77. This figure is derived from data in Fealy 1994, 6–7. As of 1976, according to official Kopkamtib figures, there were still 1,745 Category A detainees.

^78. Van der Kroef 1976, 627; Amnesty International 1977, 90–100.

^79. “KEP-027/KOPKAM/10/1968,” 18 October 1968, in Kopkamtib 1970.

^80. For an overview on the process of releasing the prisoners, see Fealy 1994.

^81. Translation of Press Release No. 015/Pen/76, 1 December 1976, in Amnesty International 1977, 121–23.

^82. Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1975.

^83. For personal accounts, see Budiardjo 1996; Toer 1999.