VIGILANTISM AND VIOLENCE IN DECENTRALIZED INDONESIA

Abstract

This article examines the variable powers, positions, and legitimacy of informal authorities in Lombok, Indonesia, most notably tuan guru (Muslim clerics) and their affiliate pamswakarsa (vigilante forces). It argues that recent accounts of tuan guru as peacemakers downplay the complex structural factors that enable outbreaks of ethno-religious violence in the first place. By analyzing successive permutations of disorder, traceable back to the colonial era, this article helps locate and give context to the current policing and political dilemmas surrounding vigilantism in Indonesia. It then demonstrates how, in the era of decentralization, local and provincial authorities endeavor to domesticate pamswakarsa groups and their charismatic leaders. Finally, this article concludes that renewed spiritual expansionism, such as the renovation of Hindu temple sanctuaries in Lombok, elicits extreme responses from tuan guru. These responses provide renewed impetus for vigilante violence, strain interisland relations, and, at times, stifle economic development.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to my Indonesian colleagues, particularly Yulius and Ridho, for all of their critical input and support.

Notes

^1. Aspinall 2013, 27.

^2. Wilson 2006, 267.

^3. Huggins 1991, 3; and Pratten 2008.

^4. Henley and Davidson 2007, 17.

^5. Though dominated by a 92 percent Sasak majority, the ethnic landscape of Lombok today includes a mixture of Balinese, Sumbawanese, Makassarese, Chinese, Javanese, and Arabs.

^6. Verkaaik 2004, 12.

^7. Colombijn 2002, 323.

^8. Van Dijk 2002, 293.

^9. Huggins 1991 and Pratten 2008.

^10. Where necessary the anonymity of respondents is protected.

^11. Based on evidence from the 2008 provincial elections, Kingsley 2012 argues that tuan guru have the capacity to serve as “peacemakers.”

^12. Wink 2007, 173.

^13. Schulte Nordholt 2002, 37.

^14. Cohen 2006, 222. In 1894 Komedie Stamboel represented the (pro-Dutch version of) events leading up to the siege of Mataram, Lombok's capital, with the theatrical staging of The Fall of Sin Island.

^15. The late sixteenth century marked the arrival of Balinese from the west and Makassarese from the east (via Sumbawa), introducing new trade routes, new social hierarchies, and widespread religious conversion.

^16. Funo 2002, 221. Similarly, MacDougall (2008, 110) notes the significance of the “political residue of Balinese cultural domination” and the sectarian tension this perpetuates in Lombok.

^17. Bloembergen 2011, 28.

^18. Cribb 1991, 18. The Javanese term jago is familiar throughout the archipelago, although such strongmen have also been referred to as bromocorah, centeng, gali-gali, jawara, jeger, or rampokker (in Dutch).

^19. Schulte Nordholt 2002, 40.

^20. Barker and van Klinken 2009, 22.

^21. Cribb 1991, 21.

^22. MacDougall 2007, 291; Telle 2011, 42. For a discussion of the spiritual power of women in Lombok, see Smith 2012.

^23. Kingsley 2012, 68.

^24. Carey 1986. On 17 August 1945 Indonesia's revolutionary nationalist leaders proclaimed independence. This was followed by five years of conflict with Dutch forces, known as “police actions,” ending in December 1949.

^25. Koch 1983.

^26. MacDougall 2007, 284.

^27. National Defense Law 20/1982 legalized dwifungsi, the dual function doctrine allowing the military to perform a sociopolitical role while simultaneously safeguarding national security.

^28. Wilson 2006, 267.

^29. MacDougall 2007, 285.

^30. State organs such as the Departemen Agama monitor religious affairs and public adherence to Indonesia's officially recognized religions. As of 2006 Confucianism was reinstated alongside Buddhism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Islam, and Protestantism.

^31. Bakker 1997, 20.

^32. Ibid., 32.

^33. See, for instance, Emmerson 2000.

^34. Van Dijk 2001, 335. Front Pembela Islam is currently chaired by Habib Salim Bin Umar Al Attas.

^35. Rawski and MacDougall 2004, 152.

^36. Meliala 2002, 154.

^37. ICG 2012.

^38. MacDougall 2007, 295.

^39. Kristiansen 2003, 120.

^40. Wilson 2006, 267.

^41. Telle 2009, 142.

^42. Wahyono 2009, 140.

^43. Fogg and Ending 2011.

^44. Hamdi and Smith 2012, 36.

^45. Fogg and Ending 2011.

^46. Hamdi and Smith 2012, 36.

^47. Amphibi, which is officially designated a yayasan (foundation), invokes images of amphibious assault units poised for deployment, although TGH Sibawahi claims the actual meaning to be “amankan masyarakat pemerintah hukum Indonesia berdasarkan iman,” a mishmash of terms related to public security, government, law and a faith-based state.

^48. ICG 2003, 17. Within the sharia tradition, hudud punishments such as the mutilation of limbs are highly contentious.

^49. Interview with TGH Sibawahi in his Suralalem compound, East Lombok, 17 July 2012.

^50. See, for instance, Bali Post 2003 and Kristiansen 2003, 122.

^51. MacDougall 2007, 292.

^52. Telle 2009, 145.

^53. Kingsley 2012, 66-68.

^54. Bali Post 2006. For a number of tuan guru the “mysticism” of the Ahmadiyah sect is considered heretical and threatening.

^55. Kirsch and Grätz 2010.

^56. Tyson 2011, 661.

^57. Lombok Post 2012 (Polri), 2.

^58. Interview with senior officials from Kesbangpol Linmas, Mataram, 18 July 2012.

^59. Asdhiana 2011.

^60. Buehler and Tan 2007, 58. Kingsley (2012, 57) found that after more than three centuries of outside interference, Lombok's newly empowered elites were unprepared for the rapid political changes that occurred from 2001 onwards, leading to local rivalries and creating an environment of instability.

^61. Lombok Post 2011.

^62. Interviews and personal communications with political observers in Lombok, July 2012–January 2013.

^63. Interview with senior officials from Kesbangpol Linmas, Mataram, 18 July 2012.

^64. Documentation obtained from Kesbangpol Linmas, Mataram, 18 July 2012.

^65. Smith (2012, 253) found that for a religious figure to “qualify” as tuan guru, years of study in Mecca are required, although in practice credentials are not formally examined and titles are not systematically conferred.

^66. Interview with Muhaimin in Jerowaru, East Lombok, 17 July 2012.

^67. Interview with members of the Mataram Mediation Center, Lombok, 21 July 2012.

^68. Documentation obtained from Kesbangpol Linmas, Mataram, 18 July 2012.

^69. Kingsley 2012, 65. For all of the tuan guru's parastatal interventions and activities, their actual contributions in good governance, service delivery, inter-ethnic relations, and general everyday well-being and security need to be scrutinized.

^70. Interview with members of the Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Leadership Board) of a top political party in Mataram, 20 July 2012.

^71. Based on interviews and personal communications in Lombok throughout July 2012. For further evidence, Platt (2012, 86) found tuan guru in West Lombok to be deeply concerned with marriage contracts and possible bridal transgressions.

^72. Kane 2001, 13.

^73. Kingsley 2012, 64.

^74. Interview with school teachers in Desa Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 22 July 2012.

^75. Kristiansen 2003, 121. Based on general observations in Lombok as well as interviews at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Mataram, it emerged that local politicians and bureaucrats felt they could get nothing done without the support of tuan guru.

^76. Interview with senior officials from Kesbangpol Linmas, Mataram, 18 July 2012, and corroborated by members of the Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Leadership Board) of a top political party in Mataram on 18 July 2012.

^77. Interview with sources in Jerowaru, East Lombok, on 17 July 2012, and corroborated by senior officials from Kesbangpol Linmas, Mataram, on 18 July 2012.

^78. Sjah, Cameron and Russell 2006. The authors examined government credit schemes such as Kredit Ketahanan Pangan (Food Security Credit) as well as the practices of private lenders in Praya, Lombok.

^79. Lombok Post 2012 (Amphibi).

^80. Footage of the 11 February 2012 rescue of Brigadiers Salman and Mustafa, for instance, can be seen on the Metro TV News website. Salman and Mustafa were “held hostage” in East Praya subdistrict by members of an unnamed pamswakarsa because of unpaid debts.

^81. Bali Post 2012 and personal communications with informants from West Lombok, October 2012.

^82. Personal correspondence with academics from Mataram, 23 January 2013.

^83. Sumbawanews 2013.

^84. Ernawati 2007, 189.

^85. Interview with Dharma Wisesa members at their headquarters in Cakranegara, 20 July 2012. Provincial gubernatorial elections as well as mayoral elections in East Lombok District are both scheduled for 13 May 2013.

^86. Ramstedt 2008, 1227.

^87. Ibid., 1230.

^88. Kompas 2012.

^89. Comprehensive details of the Pura Rinjani proposal are contained in a perencanaan pembangunan (development planning) document drafted by Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia. See also Telle forthcoming.

^90. Bali Post 2005.

^91. The formal Parisada decision to recognize Pura Penataran Agung Gunung Rinjani as kahyangan jagat was made on 18 February 2003 in accordance with document No.5/PHDI-NTB/II /2003.

^92. Schellhorn 2010, 118.

^93. Lombok Post 2012 (Belum), 13.

^94. Interviews in Bayan, North Lombok, 16 July 2012. One particular Balinese noble moved to Desa Senaru in 1985, and many locals believe that he lifted a curse on the land, allowing the Balinese banjar (community, neighborhood) to thrive in the area.

^95. Interviews in Kediri and Mataram, 22 July 2012.

^96. Telle forthcoming.

^97. Schiller 1997, 22.

^98. Schulte Nordholt 2007, 9. In the most recent study of Parisada, Warren 2012 provides examples of edicts issued in response to popular protest surrounding development projects within Bali's “sacred sphere.”

^99. Interviews and observations, Parisada office, Cakranegara, 20 July 2012.

^100. Interviews conducted in the hamlet of Sabe Lendang, Desa Keru, 20 July 2012.

^101. MacDougall 2008, 119.

^102. Wink 2007.

^103. Telle forthcoming.

^104. ICG 2003, 18.