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ABSTRACT
In Southeast Asia the Philippines holds the distinction of reporting the highest number of murdered journalists between 1992 and 2012. This record makes the Philippines closer to countries in other parts of the world characterized as “transitional” democracies. These countries enjoy near full press freedom, but their institutional setting allows the perpetrators of crimes to evade accountability. The authors of this article argue that explaining these murders as due to state repression of progressive journalists in the Philippines ignores the complexity of these killings. This article shows that journalists murdered for their occupation (classified as “motive confirmed”) did not threaten the interests of the state as state but rather the interests of local power-holders. Thus, the killings of mass media practitioners need to be understood in the context of local-level contestations over positions and resources sanctioned by the state framework, particularly following the decentralization since 1991. Preliminary data analysis of journalist deaths from 1998 to 2012 and selected case studies suggest that these killings are primarily local events, mostly in provincial towns and cities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by a Scholarly Work Award from the Loyola Schools; a Merit Research Award from the Institute of Philippine Culture; and research loads from the School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University, where the authors are members of the faculty. We are grateful for the research assistance of Feric G. Galvez.
Notes
1. Even in the United States, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), six journalists have been killed since 1992—five with “motive confirmed.” “Full justice” has been seen in only half of the cases; “partial justice” in the other half (cpj.org/killed/ americas/usa/). Indeed, U.S. history has not been spared from the unresolved death of a journalist; see Wickham Citation2011.
2. The CPJ (cpj.org/killed/terminology.php) considers a case “confirmed” only if it is “reasonably certain that a journalist was murdered in direct reprisal for his or her work; was killed in crossfire during combat situations; or was killed while carrying out a dangerous assignment such as coverage of a street protest.” The CPJ database “does not include journalists killed in accidents such as car or plane crashes.”
3. Smyth Citation2010.
4. Rosario-Braid et al. Citation2012.
5. Lagman et al. Citation2013.
6. Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) 2014.
7. Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2013, 1.
8. Freedom House (FH) 2013.
9. Reporters Without Borders (RWB) 2013.
10. Behmer Citation2009, 32; see Tran et al. Citation2011; Holtz-Bacha Citation2004.
11. Lagman et al. Citation2013, 91.
12. Sussman Citation1991.
13. On Anna Politkovskaya, named by the CPJ in 2006 as “one of the world's top press freedom figures of the past 25 years,” see cpj.org/killed/2006/anna-politkovskaya.php.
14. Roudakova Citation2009.
15. Ibid., 413, 424.
16. Ibid., 425.
17. Bj0rnskov and Freytag 2010, 1.
18. Ibid., 21.
19. On 23 November 2009, during the gubernatorial electoral contest in Maguindanao Province, thirty-two mass media practitioners were killed in the single deadliest event for journalists in history. See below for details.
20. See cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/.
21. See cpj.org/killed/americas/colombia/.
22. See cpj.org/killed/asia/pakistan/.
23. See cpj.org/killed/americas/mexico/.
24. See cpj.org/killed/mideast/iraq/.
25. See cpj.org/killed/asia/philippines/.
26. For the number of journalists killed in 2013, see cpj.org/killed/asia/india/;cpj.org/killed/americas/brazil/.
27. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) 2003.
28. Putting the Maguindanao murders aside, the total would be 107 journalists, or close to four journalists killed per year between 1986 and 2013.
29. Anderson Citation2004 (Murder), 185.
30. Ibid.
31. Manasan Citation2004, 8.
32. Holmes Citation2011.
33. The 1987 Philippine Constitution bars a president from reelection but allows for the election of a person who has succeeded as president and has not served for more than four years.
34. The “Hello Garci” scandal that surfaced in the 2004 elections later became an impetus for an impeachment case against Arroyo. President Arroyo was accused of manipulating the election results, when a taped conversation of her allegedly asking Comelec commissioner Virgilio (“Garci”) Garcillano “if she could lead her closest rival in the Presidential election by one million votes” was leaked. Ronas Citation2011, 121.
35. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Citation2004.
36. O'Donnell Citation1998; Ronas Citation2011.
37. Mendoza et al. (Citation2012) note that 70 percent of jurisdiction-based legislators in the 15th Con-gress belonged to political dynasties, while Rivera Citation2011 reports that 94 percent of provinces in the Philippines have political families.
38. Ufen Citation2008, 343.
39. Note, however, that a penetrating study of gun production and trade in the Philippines argues that “the level of gun-related violence and the eruption of vertical and horizontal conflict cannot be pinned on the shadow economy in guns” and that “the weak governance of gun ownership and trade does not always produce an escalation ofviolence.” Quitoriano Citation2013, 78.
40. Kreuzer Citation2009, 52.
41. Esmaquel et al. Citation2013.
42. Olea Citation2013.
43. Uy was a “block-timer,” meaning he leased airtime from a station owner and had to solicit his own commercial sponsors. Uy and other block-timing radio broadcasters are thus radio entrepreneurs.
44. Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility 2005 (Ding).
45. Note that CPJ 2005 (George) classifies Uy's killing under “motive unconfirmed,” despite his leftist credentials. The CPJ does not list Hernandez as a journalist victim, whether for confirmed or unconfirmed motive.
46. Philippine Daily Inquirer 2012 (Eyed).
47. The CPJ 2012 classifies Cauzo's death under “motive unconfirmed.” Fatima Reyes reports that “Cabanatuan City mayor Julius Vergara had been pushing for the HUC conversion while gubernatorial re-electionist Aurelio Umali was opposing the measure. Meanwhile, Bautista is running against Umali's wife, Czarina, for a congressional seat in Nueva Ecija.” The chair of the Commission on Elections, Sixto Brillantes Jr., is quoted as saying, “Siyempre may politics. Pwede ba namang plesbicite na nag-aaway ang mayor at governor walang politics? (Of course this involves politics. Would you allow a plebiscite when the mayor and the governor are fighting and say no politics?).” Reyes Citation2012.
48. Meruenas Citation2014.
49. Hedman Citation2009.
50. Abinales's Citation2000 seminal work on Mindanao demonstrates that local strongmen or bosses are susceptible to the vicissitudes of national politics during elections or when the central state actors withdraw support in favor of the local strongman's rival.
51. Robles Citation2011. Eight days after the massacre Andal AmpatuanJr. was arrested, brought to Metro Manila, and charged with the murders. Two weeks after the massacre six members of the Ampatuan family, including the patriarch, Governor Andal Ampatuan Sr., were arrested, brought to Metro Manila, and similarly charged.
52. Amado Mendoza also views the Maguindanao massacre as a local event fueled by the central state: “If we locate the Ampatuans within the national political economy, they are actually at the bottom of the political ‘food chain’. They enjoy local power on the say-so of the powers-that-be in the Presidential Palace.” Mendoza Citation2012, 80. Nevertheless, Mendoza concludes that “local powers-that-be appear to be responsible for the murder of journalists.” Ibid., 84.
53. Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility 2002.
54. Bjørnskov and Freytag 2010.
55. The fact sheet from the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (2005 [George]) indicates that Benaojan “might have been killed in relation to his job as a bagman of a former local Bureau of Customs official” and that Benaojan “abused his radio program to extort favors from local officials.” However, “his colleagues say that his attacks on the Bureau of Customs may have had something to do with his death.” The Committee to Protect Journalists (2005 [Benaojan]) reports that it is still investigating this case because Benaojan also ran several businesses and the motive for the killing might not have been due to his work as a journalist.
56. Interestingly all four cases with convictions are from Mindanao. No other part of the country had cases of judicial convictions with confirmed motives.
57. Lagman et al. Citation2013, 28.
58. Sidel Citation1999, 19.
59. Ibid., 19; see Rocamora Citation1995, xxi.
60. Coronel Citation1995, 11.
61. Rabe Citation2010.
62. Uyan Citation2013.
63. Comelec 2013; GMA Network Citation2013.
64. The LGPMS Social Governance Report on Ilocos Sur may be accessed here: www.blgs.gov.ph/lgpmsv2/appshome/report/rpt_sumprov_eslgpr.php?frmIdCatArea=4&fSumRptType=P&frmIdDcfCode=9&frmIdRegion=2&frmIdProvince=19&frmIdPerfArea=3; the LGPMS Social Governance Report on Cavite here: www.blgs.gov.ph/lgpmsv2/appshome/report/rpt_sumprov_eslgpr.php?frmIdCatArea=4&fSumRptType=P&frmIdDcfCode=9&frmIdRegion=6&frmIdProvince=35&frmIdPerfArea=3.
65. Quimpo Citation2008.
66. Lagman et al. Citation2013, 30.
67. Nery Citation2014.
68. Coronel Citation1996.
69. Lagman et al., 37.
70. Rosales Citation2006.
71. See note 43 on block-timers.
72. Mojares Citation2002 (Talking), 249–50.
73. Ibid., 253.
74. Ibid., 255.
75. Mendoza Citation2012, 76.
76. Lagman et al. Citation2013, 56.
77. Patricio Abinales recalls that in the 1980s a favorite term in the mass media to refer to the practice of extorting from a local politician with an insufficient hold on power was “attack-collect-promote-collect” (Abinales Citation2013). Rolando Tolentino offers one explanation: “Because the journalist is sometimes not treated as a regular employee in his place of work, there are corrupt practices that are spreading as normal practice. There is a radio broadcaster who does not have a salary, and his ‘ex-deals’ … are the expected replacement for his salary” (Tolentino Citation2012, 106).
78. Philippine Daily Inquirer 2012 (Media).
