Payoffs, Parties, or Policies: “Money Politics” and Electoral Authoritarian Resilience

ABSTRACT

A key part of what sustains electoral authoritarianism over the long term is genuine popular support. Dominant parties, particularly in a developmental context (the primary setting for such regimes), and especially where elections are more than minimally meaningful, curry performance legitimacy and loyalty not just through skewed rules and coercion, but through material incentives: “money politics.” If challengers can find a way to de-emphasize support based on material inducements, they stand a chance of securing gains via elections, rather than relying on economic downturns to shrink patronage coffers. Drawing on extensive original ethnographic and survey data from electoral-authoritarian Malaysia, I explore campaign finance and distributions on both sides in the latest, most regime-threatening general election, which was held on May 5, 2013. Evidence suggests that it was by disentangling clientelist networks from the patronage they so often serve to disseminate, allowing a focus on more programmatic than particularistic appeals, that the opposition Pakatan Rakyat alliance so nearly bested the long-dominant Barisan Nasional regime. Persona – being known and seen among the electorate – still matters as much as before, but relies less consistently than in the past on targeted patronage as a premise for loyalty.

Keywords:

• Malaysia
• electoral authoritarianism
• clientelism
• money politics

Acknowledgments

All interviews cited were conducted by the author and/or members of the research team during the 2013 Malaysian election campaign, unless otherwise indicated. Thanks to Edward Aspinall, Eva Hansson, and the journal's anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions, and to Edward Aspinall, Allen Hicken, Paul Hutchcroft, Terence Gomez, and Surin Kaur for their role in the research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Meredith L. Weiss is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York. She is the author of Student Activism in Malaysia: Crucible, Mirror, Sideshow (Cornell University Press, 2011) and Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia (Stanford University Press, 2005) as well as numerous articles and book chapters. Her research addresses political mobilization and contention, the politics of identity and development, and electoral politics in Southeast Asia.

Notes

1 Among others, Haggard and Kaufman (1995); Geddes (1999); Lust (2009); Greene (2010).

2 Howard and Roessler (2006); Lindberg (2009); Roessler and Howard (2009, 117–118, 22–24); Schedler (2010b); Morse (2012, 166). Brownlee finds competitive authoritarianism no more prone to breakdown than other forms of authoritarianism, yet more likely to be followed by electoral democracy, should the opposition win. See Brownlee (2009).

3 See Gomez (1991); Gomez and Jomo (1997); Teh (2002); Aeria (2005, 129–136); Tan (2008).

4 Gomez (2012); Wain (2012), especially chap. 5. These spoils fund/inspire allegedly rampant vote-buying for party-level elections, too. For instance: Asia Times Online, October 2, 2004; Case (1997).

5 Rakner and van de Walle (2009, 117–118) describe similar resource inequities across parties in Africa, but a different balance of opposition-party strategies in response. There, the emphasis has been on seeking financial support from private businesses (which Malaysian opposition parties have also done, as noted below) or on securing patronage resources by winning local elections. Another alternative is substituting economic nationalism or Islamism for materialist appeals.

6 We distributed approximately sixty researchers, usually in pairs, across a roughly representative sample (in terms of demographics, relative urbanization, and incumbent party) of parliamentary districts nationwide. The researchers interviewed all candidates at the parliamentary and state level in that district, as well as selected party workers and local experts, observed campaign events, and collected and photographed campaign materials. Meanwhile, the other members of the core research team and I interviewed candidates from across parties and observed the campaign while traveling through all thirteen states, for a broader perspective. All translations from Malay are my own.

7 We engaged the Merdeka Center to carry out a national, telephone-based poll of 1017 voting-age Malaysians, from May 9–12, 2013. Unless otherwise noted, all survey data are drawn from this poll.

8 Schedler (2002, 37). Elsewhere, Schedler sums up the conventional wisdom, “that democratic elections combine procedural certainty with substantive uncertainty, while authoritarian elections combine procedural uncertainty with substantive certainty,” albeit noting that the latter can go awry. Schedler (2010b, 4).

9 Schmitter and Karl (1991, 76).

10 Diamond (2002, 23). Greene (2010, 811) offers a slightly different set of seven “authoritarian dominant party regimes,” which he deems a subset of competitive or electoral-authoritarian regimes – but of these, still only Malaysia and Singapore (and possibly Botswana) have endured.

11 See Morse (2012) for a cogent synthesis of the dueling definitions and emphases of this literature, including a daunting tabulation of scholars’ divergent classifications (169).

12 Diamond (2002, 25–26, 29–30, 32–33); Howard and Roessler (2006, 365–366); Roessler and Howard (2009, 108).

13 Levitsky and Way (2002, 52).

14 Magaloni and Kricheli (2010, 124); also Schedler (2010a, 70–71).

15 Schedler (2002, 39); also Case (2005, 218–223).

16 Hutchinson (2013).

17 For instance: Dr. Mahathir Mohamad: Blogging to Unblock, 11 April 2013, http://chedet.cc/?p=963#more-963; Malaysiakini, April 19, 2013.

18 Diamond (2002, 24).

19 Fox (1994, 153).

20 Hutchcroft (2014, 178).

21 Stokes et al. (2013, 15).

22 Drummond and Hawkins (1970, 331).

23 The PM proposed after the 2013 elections that the EC report instead to a bipartisan parliamentary select committee, to boost public confidence.

24 IDEA, “Voter Turnout Data for Malaysia,” http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=MY.

25 See also Malaysiakini, May 7 and 8, 2013.

26 Schedler (2002, 39, 41).

27 Lee Hock (2013).

28 Weiss (2006).

29 Pakatan subsequently lost its majority in Perak, after several MPs defected to the BN.

30 Pakatan allied less formally with Parti Sosialis Malaysia.

31 For instance, Loh (2003).

32 Abbott (2004); Weiss (2013).

33 KiniBiz, March 13, 2013.

34 Merdeka Center, “Peninsular Malaysia Voter Survey, December 28, 2012: Issues of Voter Concern,” Jan. 11, 2013, p. 10 and “Public Opinion Survey 2013: Peninsular Malaysia Voter Survey,” May 3, 2013, p. 8, http://www.merdeka.org/pages/02_research.html.

35 For instance, Reuters newswire, April 21, 2013.

36 Interview, Perak, April 25, 2013.

37 Malaysian Insider, April 10, 2013.

38 Respondents in Sabah suggested PKR's divisive alliance with two ex-BN-politician-headed NGOs stemmed from these candidates’ ability to fund their own campaigns. Meanwhile, factional splits – a problem across parties – left some candidates strapped for resources. For instance, PKR's nominee for a Selangor state seat explained that she had to cover the majority of her campaign expenses out-of-pocket, as the local PKR branch, preferring another candidate, retained the funds and campaign materials party headquarters sent.

39 Interview, April 20, 2013.

40 Campaign rallies per se have been banned since 1978, allegedly due to communist threat. Jomo (1996, 94).

41 BN staff in Kedah noted a “top-top” speaker could command up to RM2000 (interview, April 29, 2013). No one from PR mentioned honoraria, although both sides cited speakers’ transportation costs.

42 Interviews, May 1, 2013.

43 Former MCA president Chua Soi Lek admitted to Transparency International that, “the official accounting does not reflect the true spending,” which usually amounts to RM500,000–1,000,000. Fernandez (2010, 67).

44 Fernandez (2010, chap. 4).

45 Fernandez (2010, chap. 3); Gomez (2012, 1372–1374, 80–84). For instance, Malaysia's Genting group, long assumed to sponsor the BN, recorded corporate social responsibility contributions of around RM190 million – 20 percent of its profits – for the first quarter of 2013. Analysts speculated that these donations might be election-related, channeled through charities (Malaysiakini, May 31, 2013). Several months previously, a timber tycoon caught in Hong Kong with RM40 million in cash and charged with money-laundering said the funds were for UMNO in Sabah, which Malaysian officials declared acceptable (Malaysiakini, October 18, 2012).

46 Interview, May 3, 2013.

47 Interview, April 27, 2013.

48 Sarawak for Change, for instance, launched an online “Everyone Donate RM30 to Defeat [Chief Minister] Taib” campaign.

49 A campaign official alleged PKR's popular Rafizi Ramli attracted over six hundred volunteers.

50 The youth vote was especially hotly contested; while observers tended to assume young voters would lean toward the opposition, actual results were mixed (though the lack of exit polls in Malaysia complicates precise determination of who voted how). See Bridget Welsh, “Inside the 505 Generation: The Youth Vote,” Malaysiakini, May 3, 2013.

51 Interview, April 27, 2013.

52 Interview, April 23, 2013.

53 Interview, Negeri Sembilan, April 29, 2013.

54 Interview, April 28, 2013.

55 Lee (2013, 2–3).

56 Welsh estimates total spending of RM57.7 billion (USD18 billion; RM4363 per voter) in “election-related incentives” from when Najib became PM in 2009 to shortly before he dissolved parliament in 2013. Comprising that sum are RM46.7 billion in development projects targeting specific sectors and constituencies (e.g. agribusiness, fishers, taxi drivers) and RM11 billion in 1Malaysia programs (cash transfers to key constituencies, from seniors to students, that both serve a welfare purpose and build political support). This figure excludes the sorts of donations described above, of entertainment, use of private jets, community meals, and more. Malaysiakini, April 23, 2013; also Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2013.

57 Hutchcroft (2014, 177–178).

58 One BN candidate in Pahang explained the free meals at events: “Eating makes people happy and then it is easier to request for anything” (interview, April 30, 2013).

59 Stokes et al. (2013, 16).

60 Explained a village chief whom voters reported to the EC for distributing such payments, “If it was bribery, it would have been done quietly” (Malaysiakini, July 26, 2013). See also Stokes et al. (2013, 363–365).

61 Nichter (2008, 18). Parties reward passive constituents for showing up to vote, limiting the need for strict monitoring of vote choices.

62 Interview, Negeri Sembilan, April 29, 2013.

63 Interview, April 26, 2013.

64 Schaffer and Schedler (2007, 19–20).

65 See also “Post-election Payouts in Penang,” Aliran, May 12, 2013.

66 E.g. Malaysiakini, May 8, 2013.

67 Interview, April 21, 2013.

68 Malaysiakini, April 12, 2013.

69 April 29, 2013.

70 Ministry of Finance, Media Release: “Perlaksanaan Program Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia” (BR1M 2.0) [Implementation of 1Malaysia People's Aid Program], October 30, 2012, http://www.treasury.gov.my/pdf/ucapan/BR1M_2.0.pdf.

71 April 28, 2013.

72 Interview, Kuala Lumpur, January 6, 2015.

73 For an official assessment, see Economic Planning Unit, “Addressing Persistent Socio-economic Inequalities Constructively and Productively,” Mid-term Review of the Ninth Malaysia Plan, 2006–2010, http://www.epu.gov.my/epu-theme/mtr-rm9/english/thrust3.pdf; for a detailed exploration of causes and patterns, see Khoo (2012).

74 Interview, April 28, 2013.

75 Interview, Terengganu, April 24, 2013.

76 An MIC campaign staffer in Kedah complained (interview, April 29, 2013) of the incumbent Pakatan state government: “From 2008 till today, nothing has been done, especially in Kedah. We got nothing. Drains are still blocked and roads are full of potholes. If we've Barisan Nasional government, they will always patch the roads.”

77 Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1132–1133).

78 Interview, April 29, 2013.

79 Scott (1972, 8).

80 Interview, April 27, 2013.

81 Interview, May 4, 2013.

82 The record I have heard is a BN MP who claimed to have made it to fifteen weddings in one day (interview, Penang, January 3, 2015).

83 For example, Welsh (2004); Chin and Wong (2009).

84 See Chattarakul (2010); Aspinall (2014).

85 See http://www.wanitaumno.my/jalinan-rakyat/; and cf. Stokes, et al. (2013, 24–25). A number of respondents also mentioned using surveys to monitor voter sentiment.

86 Interview, April 24, 2013.

87 Aspinall (2014, 560).

88 Malaysiakini, April 29, 2013.

89 The percentage contacted declined steadily with age of the voter, and increased steadily with income and internet access. Perversely, the respondents most likely to be influenced by these messages were those least contacted: East Malaysians and the poor.

90 Stokes et al. (2013, 28).

91 Morse (2012, 162).

92 Scott (1968, 1146–1147).

Additional information

Funding

Research for this article was supported primarily by the University of Malaya and the Australian Research Council (DP140103114), with supplemental funds from the University at Albany, SUNY.