From Rebels to Rulers: The Challenges of Transition for Non-state Armed Groups in Mindanao and Myanmar

ABSTRACT

This article presents a critical comparison of the ongoing peace processes in the southern Philippines and Myanmar (Burma). It does so by examining two key armed groups: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on Mindanao, and the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar. We identify common elements that help to explain the relative – albeit incomplete – success of these two groups in navigating their respective peace processes. The MILF and KNU are ethnonationalist armed groups struggling for self-determination against states that are experienced by ethnic minority communities as culturally alien, and economically and politically dominant. Both conflict actors are characterized by complex combinations of “greed” and “grievance” factors but nevertheless enjoy significant (albeit contested) political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent. We explore the complex relationships between armed ethnic groups, conflict-affected communities, and civil society actors. We argue that engagement with civil society is a key element of success in the Mindanao peace process, which could be replicated in Myanmar. We examine the roles and changing nature of the state in the Philippines and Myanmar, and contrast the degrees of international involvement, as key variables in these peace processes. We observe that negotiations of comprehensive peace settlements are threatened by “the tyranny of elections” in Myanmar (2015) and the Philippines (2016), and observe the importance of including national parliaments in peace processes in a timely manner. The peace process between Manila and the MILF represents a rare example of a Muslim minority pursuing its political objectives through structured dialogue. The article focuses on the challenges faced by armed groups moving from insurgency to reinvent themselves as credible political actors and governance authorities. Our analysis draws on peace-building literature, specifically the phenomenon of “rebel governance.”

Keywords:

• Mindanao
• Burma/Myanmar
• peace
• governance
• legitimacy

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following for help with research and comments on the text: our friends at the Centre for Inter-cultural and Urban Studies (CIRUS) in Cotabato, Professor Abhoud Syed Lingga, Faun Mercado, Romeo Salinga, Ali Saleem, Chris Rush, Johannes Dehler, Emma Leslie, Elizabeth Padilla, Alan Smith, Hamish Nixon, Ben Oppenheim, Nat Colletta, and Thomas Parks. Thanks also to the two anonymous reviewers, whose comments greatly strengthened the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Ashley South is a Research Fellow at Chiang Mai University, Center for Ethnic Studies and Development.

Dr Christopher M. Joll is a New Zealand anthropologist affiliated with the Chiang Mai University’s Center for Ethnic Studies and Development (CESD). He has been based in Thailand for 15 years, and has a PhD from the National University of Malaysia in 2009. He is the author of Muslim Merit-Making in Thailand’s Far-South (Springer 2011).

Notes

¹As below, areas of (contested) EAG influence in Myanmar are much more extensive than those they control exclusively.

²The MILF operates a militia/national guard-type arrangement, with volunteers serving on a revolving basis, meaning that at any one time there may be relatively few fighters on active service.

³The MNLF enjoys its strongest support in northwestern Mindanao among the Tausug ethnic group.

⁴These include the United Wa State Army, with over 20,000 soldiers, and the Kachin Independence Army, the Shan State Army-South, and the KNU, each with between 5000 and 10,000 troops.

⁵Berdal and Suhrke 2013.

⁶See Smith 1999.

⁷Scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler 2005 have analyzed the causes of armed conflict primarily in terms of the economic opportunities available to combatants. Keen 2008, Chapters 2–3, criticizes this approach, pointing out that conflict actors’ perceptions of sociopolitical and historical injustices are equally important in understanding their motivation. Different positions in this debate are collected in Ballentine and Sherman 2003; De Waal 1997; and Duffield 2001. Over time, armed conflicts tend to be transformed, as structural influences move away from original causes toward new factors. See Goodhand 2006, 39, who observes that “the debate on whether conflicts are caused by greed and grievance has become rather sterile,” as these are “overlapping and mutually reinforcing motives.” For further critique and nuancing of “greed factor” explanations, see De Zeeuw 2008, 5.

⁸On the liberal approach, see Richmond 2008.

⁹This is a phrase coined by Ferguson 1990, who argues that development assistance tends to depoliticize contentious issues by reframing these as amenable to technical solutions, rather than sites of political struggle.

¹⁰Mampilly 2011.

¹¹De Zeeuw 2008.

¹²Mampilly 2011, 37.

¹³Mampilly 2011, 64–65.

¹⁴Mampilly 2011, 67.

¹⁵Mampilly 2011, 248.

¹⁶De Zeeuw 2008, 1.

¹⁷McKenna 1998, 114 and Milligan 2005.

¹⁸Federspiel 2007, 95.

¹⁹Among the most prominent voices demanding a separate national and religious identity for the Moro was Saleh Jubair (see Federspiel 2007, 212).

²⁰Despite a lack of evidence that “the Moro” as an ethnonym existed before the middle of the last century, it has been used by several outside commentators. However, McKenna 1998 questions the degree to which such narratives are accepted by non-elite Muslim communities, considering the notion of a “Philippine Muslim nation” to have “little or no resonance among the movement’s rank-and-file adherents,” and that few ordinary followers “denominated themselves as ‘Moro’.” McKenna 1998, 4, 84.

²¹Anderson 2006.

²²Adam and Verbrugge 2014; see also Peleo 2013.

²³Torres 2007.

²⁴McKenna 1998, 129.

²⁵McKenna 1998, 6–7.

²⁶McKenna 1998, 157.

²⁷McKenna 1998, 167.

²⁸The MILF was officially established in 1984.

²⁹See Johnston 2014.

³⁰McKenna 1998, 209.

³¹The annexes are as follows: (1) Transitional Arrangements and Modalities (Rappler Philippines 2013a), which established the Bangsamoro Transition Commission; (2) Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing (Rappler Philippines 2013b), which gave the MILF seventy-five percent of tax revenues and mineral wealth; (3) Power Sharing (Rappler Philippines 2013c), which established a parliamentary system of government for the Bangsamoro; and (4) Annex on Normalization (Rappler Philippines 2014).

³²See Rappler Philippines 2012.

³³For detailed accounts, see Esguerra and Dizon 2014; Casauay 2014; Philippine Star 2014; Calonzo 2014; Dizon 2014; for a MILF view, see http://www.luwaran.com/index.php. On the failure of the Congress to pass the BBL, see Clapano 2016 and Maitem 2016.

³⁴See Mogato 2014.

³⁵Field Notes, February 2016.

³⁶For coverage of the Mamasapano incident, see Cabrera 2015.

³⁷Personal communications with key actors in the peace process. For the MILF’s (very constructive) take on these issues, see Institute for Autonomy and Governance 2015.

³⁸On the marginalized position of IPs in the Bangsamoro, see Paredes 2015.

³⁹Feener 2013, 285 describes how in 2012, Irwandi Yusuf, the GAM candidate, failed to be re-elected after three years in office, during which his administration was widely perceived as ineffective.

⁴⁰Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013.

⁴¹McKenna 1998, 117.

⁴²McKenna 1998, 118.

⁴³Gulan 2014.

⁴⁴The Annex on Normalization provides for 3000 MLF combatants to join newly established joint peace and security teams (to include the AFP, the Philippine National Police, and the BIAF).

⁴⁵A disarmament process began in June 2015, with seventy-five MILF weapons handed over to the Independent Decommissioning Body (on which see below) and the first 145 MILF combatants demobilized. See BBC News 2015.

⁴⁶Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2011.

⁴⁷According to BIFF spokesman Abu Misry Mama, the MILF “continue with what they plan to do, while we continue with our struggle for Bangsamoro independence. We can’t join in that ongoing peace process” (Unson 2014).

⁴⁸In July 2013, the Nur Misuari faction of the MNLF announced the formation of a United Federated States of Bangsamoro Republik. The following September, his faction of the MNLF briefly occupied the city of Zamboanga before being driven off by government forces at the cost of scores of lives, and widespread population displacement and destruction of property.

⁴⁹Field Notes, February 2016.

⁵⁰A particularly important and innovative aspect of international involvement in the Mindanao peace process has been the establishment of the International Contact Group (ICG) in 2009. Consisting of four states (Japan, the UK, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) and four international NGOs, the ICG is unique in its role as a nonstate actor in a top-table international mediation body.

⁵¹Personal communications, December 5, 2014.

⁵²Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2011.

⁵³McKenna 1998, 14–15.

⁵⁴Aspects of the census methodology were problematic, including the ethnic categories used by the censors and the fact that people living in areas not under government control were not counted (but estimated), nor were migrant workers from Myanmar living overseas (of whom there may be as many as four million, including family members). International Crisis Group 2014.

⁵⁵The CIA’s World Factbook estimates the population breakdown to be: Burman, sixty-eight percent; Shan, nine percent; Karen, seven percent; Rakhine, four percent; Chinese, three percent; Indian, two percent; Mon, two percent; and other, five percent.

⁵⁶For an overview of the Karen insurgency, see South 2011.

⁵⁷Houtman 1999.

⁵⁸On the predominantly Sgaw leadership of the Karen insurgency, see South 2011.

⁵⁹For background on ethnic politics and insurgency in Myanmar, see Smith 1999.

⁶⁰On forced migration in and from Myanmar (refugees and IDPs) in the context of the peace process, see South and Jolliffe 2015.

⁶¹See South 2008, esp. Chapter 3.

⁶²Human Rights Watch 2012.

⁶³Myanmar Peace Support Initiative 2014.

⁶⁴Two main multilateral structures represent Myanmar’s EAGs: the NCCT and the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC, a military–political alliance of most EAGs, but not including the main Shan or Wa groups). In addition to formal peace negotiations, a second set of more informal (and controversial) discussions has been undertaken since early 2014 between the top leadership of the KNU, and the Myanmar Army’s commander in chief.

⁶⁵Some EAG leaders (particularly those associated with the UNFC) have been determined to have a thoroughly “inclusive” NCA, including three small groups with few if any soldiers, and three EAGs that have (re)emerged only since the beginning of the peace process; government negotiators (particularly the Myanmar Army) insist on dealing only with established EAGs. This has been an issue of considerable dispute within and between EAGs and their various alliances, as well as with the government.

⁶⁶Within the KNU, there are a range of opinions regarding whether the organization should aspire toward quasi-governmental status or should position itself as a political party focused on the interests of Karen and other minority communities in Myanmar.

⁶⁷Foreign donors can provide direct financial support to CBOs and local NGOs, if these are officially registered. However, many donors prefer to distribute funds through established international agencies, thereby offsetting the risk and administrative burden associated with directly engaging local civil society.

⁶⁸See Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013.

⁶⁹Field Notes, February 2016.

⁷⁰The KNU (and its armed front, the Karen National Liberation Army) may itself be regarded as a sort of intra-Karen “federal union,” bringing together different autonomous geographic districts (and military brigades) from a diverse Karen ethnic community with speakers of different dialects, variable livelihood situations, and diverse religious identities. See South 2011.

⁷¹South 2011.

⁷²The BBL recognizes the Bangsamoro as an “inalienable part of the Republic of the Philippines”; cf. the Myanmar Army’s insistence on respect for the “Three National Causes,” prioritizing the indivisibility of the union.

⁷³Furthermore, the Tawi Tawi and Sulu Islands are deeply involved in mostly informal and often “criminal” international trade.

⁷⁴Smith 1999, South 2008, 2011.

⁷⁵See Jolliffe 2014.

⁷⁶Berdal and Suhrke 2013, 324.

⁷⁷Mampilly 2011, 247–248.

⁷⁸The Myanmar and Mindanao case studies support Mampilly’s suggestion that territorially based insurgents are more credible as “counter-state sovereigns” than non-territorially inspired terrorists; Mampilly 2011, 254–255.

⁷⁹Mampilly 2011, 251.

⁸⁰Tobia 2014.

⁸¹Issues that lend themselves to future analysis include the situation of, and responses to, widespread forced migration (refugees and internally displaced persons) in Myanmar and Mindanao; a comparative study of the roles of state military and paramilitary/militia forces in the two countries; a critical comparison of international diplomatic engagement with and foreign aid to these conflicts and peace processes; and a historical study of how ethnic identity frames, and is reflexively framed by, the two contexts.

Additional information

Funding

Thanks to Ian Kuperus of the Wilberforce Trust, whose generosity allowed us to make two trips to Mindanao to undertake research for this article.