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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the Chinese Communist Party’s “Core Socialist Values” (shèhuì zhŭyì héxīn jiàzhíguān) to show how each of these twelve values is defined, both independently and in relation to others. Using a Gramscian analytical approach, the article examines how a Chinese “integral state” is being prepared to ensure that consensus to the state’s proscribed values is not undermined by competing discourses. Consideration is given to how civil society becomes the ground for building consensus, reinforced by coercive strategies emanating from the Chinese state. In conclusion, the paper argues that the Core Socialist Values campaign represents a shift in focus under the current Xi Jinping Administration to emphasize the superstructure over the economic base, with the objective of creating citizens of and for the People’s Republic of China.
Acknowledgements
My sincere gratitude to several colleagues who offered guidance and feedback on earlier drafts and whose support, advice, and encouragement was both welcome and invaluable: Penny Ding, Ian Gow, Katy Gow, Holly Snape, Nathan Sperber, David Goodman, Susan Robertson and Jeffrey Henderson.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Liang Citation1899, 309.
2 For one of the most in-depth analyses and criticisms, including comparisons between Xi’s policies and the mass campaigns of the Mao era, see Lam Citation2015.
3 The 48 Character Policy announced by the People’s Daily on February 20, 2016 provides 12 four-character phrases instructing the media in three broad categories: loyalty to the CCP, unity of the people, and clarity of communication. See Bandurski Citation2016.
4 For background on this issue, see Catá Backer Citation2015.
5 Minzner Citation2015.
6 See PRC Ministry of Education Citation2011.
7 Political terms and slogans contained in the main text and footnotes have been translated from the original Chinese. A full glossary of these terms, arranged alphabetically, is contained in the appendix with English, pinyin, and simplified Chinese.
8 These Chinese Dream posters are available for download at http://www.wenming.cn/jwmsxf_294/zggygg/index_12218.shtml.
9 Todd Citation1974.
10 Dirlik Citation1983.
11 Liu Citation1997.
12 Blecher Citation2002.
13 Zheng Citation2009.
14 Zhang Citation2011; Zhang and Zheng Citation2009.
15 Mayer-Clement Citation2015.
16 Su Citation2011.
17 Li Citation2015.
18 Huang Citation2015.
19 Gramsci Citation1992, 263.
20 Taylor Citation1995, 204.
21 Alagappa Citation2004.
22 Gramsci Citation1992, 244.
23 Rupert Citation1995, 30.
24 Gramsci Citation1992, 326.
25 Gramsci Citation1992, 326.
26 See Fontana Citation2005 for an in-depth discussion of this. He draws parallels between Gramsci’s common sense and Plato’s doxa, which refers to opinion given by rhetorical speech. This contrasts with Gramsci’s good sense, which he compares to the Platonic concept of episteme as knowledge given by dialectical speech.
27 Mahoney Citation2014.
28 David Shambaugh provides a detailed analysis of the propaganda infrastructure under the first Hu Jintao administration (2002–2007) which still holds largely true, save for personnel changes. See Shambaugh Citation2007.
29 For example, Municipal Publicity Department and the Municipal Spiritual Guidance Committee.
30 For example, the Xiamen Daily Press; China Network TV, or People’s Daily or Xinhua Media.
31 The term “China Dream” is used extensively in academic literature and commentary on China. However, “Chinese Dream” is the official translation and is used exclusively in official translations of CCP and PRC government English language materials.
32 Twelve “Big Head Son, Little Head Dad” Core Socialist Values episodes can be viewed online at http://tv.cntv.cn/video/VSET100213790433/824f99eeee024fc5abfa1e4c37bfa6c2 (accessed April 18, 2016).
33 Zhu Citation2011.
34 Xi Citation2014a, 120–121.
35 Liu Citation2014. Creemiers Citation2015 has provided a translation of this article at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/15/propaganda-chief-liu-qibao-elaborates-chinas-indigenous-development-path/ (accessed April 18, 2016).
36 Xi Citation2014a, 122–123.
37 Hu Citation2012.
38 Liu Citation2014. Between 1993 and 2002 Liu served as Deputy Head of the CCPPD and was Head of the CCPPD for the entirety of the Hu Jintao administration from 2002 to 2012. Since 2012 Liu has chaired the Central Guidance Committee on Building Spiritual Civilization (CGCBSC); lead the CCP Central Leading Group on Propaganda and Ideological Work (CLGPIW), and served as President of the CCP Central Party School. He has held positions of central importance to the ideological work of the CCP under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, a period spanning well over 20 years (see Shambaugh Citation2007; Dotson Citation2012)
39 I use hegemony here in its Gramscian sense, whereby the ruling elite aims to build support for its values, dispositions, and vision through a process of consensus building via civil society. Hegemonic projects are the deliberate strategies devised within political society and mobilized through civil society to engage the populous in serving the ruling elite’s interests (Gramsci Citation1992; Hoare and Sperber Citation2016).
40 Solé-Farràs Citation2008.
41 Perry Citation2015, 903.
42 Perry Citation2015, 905.
43 Hu Citation2012.
44 Lenin defined democratic centralism whereby criticism of suggested Party action is permissible, but only before a course of action has been decided upon (see Lenin Citation1906).
45 Xi Citation2014b, 283–289.
46 Kallio Citation2015.
47 Gramsci’s “common sense” reflects thoughts common to a group or common to society as a whole, and concerns how a ruling class may develop strategies to intervene and shape common sense to serve their own objectives. For further explanation, see Jones Citation2006, 53–55.
48 Xu Citation2015. Xu Nengyi (徐能毅) is Deputy Editor of Dangjian (党建), the journal of the CCP PD.
49 Xi Citation2014c, 60.
50 Feng Citation2015.
51 Kongshøj (Citation2015) argues that local experiments have come in response to stated national objectives of integrating the social insurance schemes of urban and rural hukou holders, and that “as so often seen before in Chinese history, local experiments often point to future national-level policies.” Kongshøj Citation2015, 581.
52 Xi Citation2014d, 161.
53 For a full discussion on “rule of law” vs. “rule by law” in China, see Orts Citation2001.
54 Orts Citation2001, 93.
55 Orts Citation2001, 93.
56 For a detailed analysis of the linguistic distinctions between these two terms, see Shick-Chen Citation2007.
57 Full document available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1029/c64387-25927606.html.
58 Peerenboom Citation2015, 55.
59 Pei Minxin discusses the culture of fear now gripping the sphere of officialdom, introducing the term miaosha, which he translates as “instant kill,” though it is borrowed from online gaming culture and is better translated into English as a “headshot.” See Pei Citation2016. The anti-corruption drive is pursued first through extra-judicial investigations under the double designation system, conducted by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), before being passed to the People’s Procuratorate for formal criminal proceedings. See Sapio Citation2008.
60 This concept is contrasted with the “organizational model of association” which Fei argues characterizes western societies. See Fei Citation1992, 60–70.
61 Henry Rosemont Jr discusses the absurdity of suggestions that people in western societies are not social beings, but qualifies this by arguing that “our sociality is at best peripheral in modern Western political and moral theory.” See Rosemont Citation2008, 47.
62 Fei Citation1992, 24.
63 Madsen Citation2008, 8.
64 Fei Citation1992, 26.
65 Bislev Citation2015, 586.
66 Xi Citation2014c, 60.
67 The CCP theoretical journal, Qiushi promotes Xi Jinping’s Four Comprehensives through dedicated pages of its website. Available at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/394278/.
68 Dangjian, the CCPPD Journal, dedicates a section of its website to reportage on the Three Stricts, Three Real campaign. Available at http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/136058/395166/index.html.
69 Ames Citation2010.
70 This saying is inspired by the Analects 15:15: “If one sets strict standards for oneself, while making allowances for others when making demands on them, one will stay clear of ill will.” See Lau Citation1979, 134.
71 Feng Citation2015.
72 In Confucian morality and ethics, the ultimate aim of the self-cultivation process, pursued through the six virtuous actions, is to become a morally superior person.
73 The first poster can be viewed at this Baidu link: http://ow.ly/Y4dt305t3Gr.
74 The second poster can be viewed at this Baidu link: http://ow.ly/POYy305t41c.
75 Cua Citation2008.
76 Good People Everyday is available online at http://www.wenming.cn/sbhr_pd/hr365/
77 Good guy refers to young men in their 20s and is a very informal term like “dude” or “bloke” in English. China’s Good People List is available at http://archive.wenming.cn/jingtai/sbhr_news/sbhr_zrwl.htm (accessed April 20, 2016).
78 China’s Good People List and the monthly voting activity is available online at http://archive.wenming.cn/jingtai/sbhr_news/sbhr_zrwl.htm (accessed April 20, 2016).
79 Xi Citation2014e, 49.
80 Xi Citation2014c, 49.
81 There are many forms of response that could be categorized as consent in the Gramscian sense: conscious agreement or conscious acquiescence, with varying degrees of enthusiasm or reluctance, or unconscious compliance. Any response which is not active and conscious resistance can be viewed as a form of consent.
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Michael Gow
Dr Michael Gow is currently Teaching Fellow in the Humanities and Social Science at Xi’an Jiaotong Liverpool University. Prior to taking up this post he was Global Postdoctoral Fellow at NYU Shanghai. He obtained his PhD in East Asian Studies from the University of Bristol’s Centre for East Asian Studies in 2013 and was the beneficiary of full scholarship funding from the British Inter-University China Centre for Masters and Doctoral studies.
