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Articles

Vanishing natives and Taiwan’s settler-colonial unconsciousness

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Pages 196-218 | Received 26 Oct 2017, Accepted 16 Feb 2018, Published online: 07 Mar 2018
 

ABSTRACT

This article approaches Taiwan history through the optic of settler-colonial studies, a comparative scholarly field that has consolidated in recent years [see Wolfe, Patrick. (1999). Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology. London: Cassell; Elkins, Caroline, and Pedersen Susan (eds.). (2005). Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies. London: Routledge; Pateman, Carole. (2007). “The Settler Contract.” In Contract and Domination, edited by Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, 35–78. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press; Belich, James. (2009). Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Banivanua-Mar, Tracey, and Penelope Edmonds (eds.). (2010). Making Settler Colonial Space. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan; Veracini, Lorenzo. (2010). Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan; Bateman, Fiona, and Lionel Pilkington (eds.). (2011). Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.] The article focuses on uncovering the multiple layers of Taiwan’s settler-colonial past lying beneath dominant historical narratives. It is important to note that processes of profound historiographical transformation are already underway and that our intervention aims to contribute to a revision that is already happening. What we offer is a transnational framework and its language.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Robert Shepherd for his editorial work and helpful suggestions. Shu-mei Shih and Paul Barclay read earlier drafts and gave us encouragement and useful comments. We are grateful to them. And we also want to extend our many thanks to two anonymous reviewers for their feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Katsuya Hirano is an Associate Professor of History at the University of California, Los Angles. He is the author of The Politics of Dialogic Imagination: Power and Popular Culture in Early Modern Japan (University of Chicago Press). He has published numerous articles and book chapters on the cultural and intellectual history of Japan, settler colonialism, and critical theory, including “Thanatopolitics in the Making of Japan’s Hokkaido: Settler Colonialism and Primitive Accumulation” (Critical Historical Studies, Fall 2015).

Lorenzo Veracini is an Associate Professor of History and Politics at the Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne, Australia. His research focuses on the comparative history of colonial systems. He has authored Israel and Settler Society (2006), Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (2010), and The Settler Colonial Present (2015). Lorenzo is co-editor of The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism (2016).

Toulouse-Antonin Roy is a doctoral candidate in the History Department at the University of California, Los Angeles. He holds a Masters in history and East Asian studies from McGill University. His on-going dissertation work examines the impact of the camphor industry on colonial Japan’s conquest and occupation of Taiwan’s Indigenous territories between 1895 and 1915.

Notes

1 We borrow the term “middle ground” from Richard White Citation1991, who explored horizontal commercial, political, and cultural exchanges on the North American continent between colonists and Indigenous peoples. Throughout the period examined in White’s book, imperial states forged strategic alliances with American Indian polities to gain leverage against their rivals. These possibilities shrunk considerably with the rise of territorial nation-states. For more see White Citation1991.

2 Taiwan’s Indigenous peoples, or “Aborigines” as they are commonly referred to in English, have historically been divided into plain and mountain-dwelling groups. The Qing imperial government ranked these based on their perceived degree of acculturation (“raw” versus “cooked”) to Chinese norms. Japanese anthropologists later classified groups ethnographically. Taiwan’s sixteen official Indigenous groups are: Amis, Atayal, Paiwan, Bunun, Puyuma, Rukai, Tsou, Saisiyat, Yami, Thao, Kavalan, Truku, Sakizaya, Seediq, Hla’alua, and Kanakanavu. Most of these historically were classified as “hill” Aborigines. The total population of Indigenous people in Taiwan was 546,700 as of December 2015. Of this total, approximately 14,500 do not self-identify as belonging to any of the official sixteen categories. See Republic of China Executive Yuan Citation2016.

3 Our work is not the first to examine Taiwan history through the prism of “triangular relations.” Shepherd Citation1993 did so for the Dutch and Qing periods. While his work predates the formation of settler-colonial studies, we draw extensively from his insights. See Shepherd Citation1993.

4 See Andrade Citation2008.

5 Andrade Citation2006, 430.

6 Wang Citation1980, 35–36.

7 Andrade Citation2006, 431.

8 Wang Citation1980, 35–36. One of the more important missionaries during the Dutch years was George Candidius, who served on the island between 1627 and 1637. His writings offer a rare glimpse into the ethnography of plains Aborigines during the early period of contact with the Dutch. See Campbell 1967.

9 Matsuzawa Citation1991, 274–275.

10 Cited in Andrade Citation2006, 431.

11 Knapp Citation1976, 43.

12 Hauptman and Knapp Citation1977, 177. The Dutch also exported sugar to Japan and elsewhere.

13 Hauptman and Knapp Citation1977, 177. See also Shepherd Citation1993, 47–91.

14 Andrade Citation2006, 446–449; Ka Citation1995, 13.

15 Ka Citation1995, 12–13. On the Zheng regime and its fiscal-military administration, see Shepherd Citation1993, 91–104.

16 Ka Citation1995, 16.

17 Knapp Citation2007, 17–18. Taiwan’s three non-Indigenous ethnic groups (Hoklo, Hakka, and Han Chinese exiles) constitute a hierarchy of indigenization. Groups of Hoklo and Hakka started to immigrate to Taiwan in large numbers in the eighteenth century. The Nationalist Government (KMT) gained control of the island in 1945. Violent conflicts ensued between residents and newcomers. Forced assimilation for all followed, including a common dialect. On the population economy of a settler society, a dynamic characterized by the tension between indigenizing and metropolitan settlers, see Veracini Citation2010, 16–33.

18 Ken-hu holders also oversaw many political, security, taxation, and irrigation functions. See Ka Citation1995, 17–20.

19 Knapp Citation2007, 17–18.

20 On “dispersed” versus “nucleated” patterns of settlement in Taiwan, see Knapp Citation1980, 55–69. See also Knapp Citation2007, 17–18.

21 Cited in Thompson Citation1969, 48–49.

22 Numerous attempts to clarify the legal terms of Aboriginal land tenure were made throughout the eighteenth century. These policies in many ways served as a recognition of the growing permanence of Han settlement, and as such should be seen as another stepping stone in the gradual erosion of Indigenous sovereignty. See Shepherd Citation1993, 16–21 and 239–308.

23 Cited in Shepherd Citation1993, 183.

24 See Shepherd Citation1993, 125–132.

25 As early as the Dutch period, groups in the southwest began autonomously relocating to other villages to avoid fiscal pressure. This trend intensified under the Qing, when continued eastward movement by settlers drove some plains Aboriginal groups into the mountains. This is not to say that the plains populations who fled became hill aborigines, as this origin hypothesis has long been discredited. See Wang Citation1980.

26 Hsu Citation1975, 223–225.

27 See Shepherd Citation1993, 137–214.

28 The militias, private armies, and other insurgent groups that rebelled against Qing rule on the island were often drawn from the ranks of these informal settler organizations. For an exhaustive list of rebellions in Taiwan, particularly those initiated by colonists, see Hsu Citation1980.

29 See Ka Citation2001; Tavares Citation2004, 111–128.

30 Military forces were mobilized eighteen times to put down both settler insurgencies and attacks by hill Aborigines. See Tavares Citation2004, 118–119. For more on these colonies, see also Shepherd 308–362.

31 Barclay also uses White’s “middle ground” as an analytical framework, relating Qing practices to a larger global context of expanding empires using hybridized agents on frontier peripheries. See Barclay Citation2005. On hybridized agents, see Nakamura Citation2003.

32 Cited in Barclay Citation2005, 327.

33 For more on the abuses of interpreters see Hsu Citation1975, 303–305.

34 Cited in Barclay Citation2005, 335.

35 See Tavares Citation2004, 107–181.

36 See Adelman and Aron Citation1999.

37 Eskilden Citation2002; Barclay Citation2017, 43–78.

38 Chang Citation2003, 62–69.

39 The camphor industry emerged from the Qing Empire’s procurement system for gathering lumber used in the construction of ships. Later the system was dominated by European merchants, who used Han brokers and traders to secure a supply of camphor from deep in the interior. The Qing administration sought to control this system and limit foreigner access to the highlands, though they were only partially successful. Workers on the fringes of this system of production often came into direct contact with Aboriginal communities, with whom they negotiated a form of payment to avoid being attacked. Violence though was still commonplace, as the intensification of camphor logging activities led to increased hostilities over the course of the late 1860s and beyond. See Tavares Citation2004.

40 See Speidel Citation1967.

41 Speidel Citation1967, 281.

42 Speidel Citation1967, 284–285.

43 Davidson Citation1903, 253–255.

44 For works that discuss the Qing legacy in relation to early Japanese colonial rule in the highlands (and Japanese policies more broadly), see Barclay Citation2017, 1–114; Matsuda Citation2014, 1–38; Kitamura Citation2008, 31–61.

45 Barclay Citation2017, 114–161.

46 From 1869 to 1945, Japan pursued a prototypical settler-colonial policy in its colonization of Hokkaidō or Ainu Mosir inhabited by the Indigenous Ainu. The Tokugawa bakufu, the Meiji government’s predecessor, had developed an extensive (often abusive) trading relation with the Ainu people, which resulted in the latter’s rebellions against Japanese merchants and administrators residing on the island. Once Meiji Japan declared Hokkaidō to be a terra nullius in 1869, it began to promote massive migration to the colony. In comparison with Taiwan, Hokkaidō’s case demonstrates that imperial Japan deployed different colonial strategies, depending on specific local conditions, to expand its territories and create a system of capitalist expropriation. See Hirano Citation2015.

47 Barclay Citation2017 also alludes to the settler-state-native triad and its implications for Taiwan. Drawing from the work of C.A Bayly, James C. Scott, and Eric Wolfe, he distinguishes between settlers, who are involved in “intensive peasant commodity production,” and natives, who are organized in “lineages, clans, tribes, and chiefdoms,” and don’t surrender surplus wealth to the state. Settlers squat, settle, and farm. The surplus they create is appropriated by the state, which reinvests those resources. While early modern states could be found oscillating between the interests of settlers or natives, the introduction of capitalist relations shifted things decisively in favor of settler societies. Barclay Citation2017, 16–17.

48 Inō Citation1918, 3–4 (emphasis added). The translation is from Tavares Citation2004, 181.

49 Mizuno's text highlights the need to use “force (iryoku) at the same time as benevolence (buiku).” See Inō 1918, 3–4.

50 For an overview of the bukonsho’s evolution, both in terms of its institutional arrangements and policies, see Kitamura Citation2008, 41–54.

51 See Takekoshi Citation1907, 211.

52 Inō Citation1918, 2. In 1895, anti-Japanese militias formed the short-lived Taiwan Republic. Insurgencies continued in the plains until the early 1900s. For more on this Han Chinese insurgency and its role in shaping Japanese perceptions of Aborigines, see Matsuda Citation2014, 14–34.

53 Inō Citation1918, 13.

54 Takekoshi Citation1907, 228.

55 Outlines of the official duties of the bukonsho usually list firearms control as part of their responsibilities. See Inō Citation1918, 41–42 and 49. For more on the bukonsho’s firearms policy, see also Barclay Citation2017, 93–94.

56 Taiwan Government-General Police Bureau Citation1939, 70.

57 Paul Barclay likens the bukonsho to an intelligence-gathering organization. He argues that much of this system was an extension of trading posts and interpreter networks established in the Qing era. See Barclay Citation2017, 43–97.

58 For more on the gradual dissolution of middle ground arrangements between workers, camphor capitalists, and Aborigines, see Tavares Citation2005.

59 See Tavares Citation2004. Nakamura Citation1998 outlines the industry’s growth and the articulations of frontier household production and merchant capitalism which enabled it.

60 A Japanese government report lists a total of 557 individuals killed as a result of “headhunting and acts of resistance” in 1898. US Consul on Formosa James Wheeler Davidson, on the other hand, mentions 635 casualties. See Taiwan Government-General Police Bureau Citation1939, 70; Davidson Citation1903, 428.

61 This operation resulted in a stalemate, and no gains in territory. See Inō Citation1918, 34–35.

62 Inō Citation1918, 129.

63 Inō Citation1918, 175. For a detailed analysis of the Nanzhuang rebellion, see Tavares Citation2005.

64 Inō Citation1918, 178–179.

65 Barclay puts the total number of Japanese-Aborigines military encounters from 1896 to 1909 at 2767. See Barclay Citation2017, 97–114.

66 Takekoshi Citation1907, 216. Emphasis added.

67 A later report described the highly militarized and battle-ready state in which the guard line found itself by the early 1910s:

Where it becomes necessary to perfect the defensive arrangements, wire-entanglements, charged with electricity, are used, or mines are sunk. These have a great effect in giving an alarm of the invading savages. Grenades are very often used during the course of fighting. Telephone lines are constructed along the guard-road, and in certain important places mountain and field guns are placed. One gun is sufficient to withstand the attack of several tribes.

See Taiwan Government-General Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs Citation1910, 16.

68 Davidson Citation1903, 67.

69 For a comparison of American and Japanese colonial projects, see Barclay Citation2003. For U.S. rule in the Philippines, see Kramer Citation2006.

70 Takekoshi Citation1907, 68.

71 Takekoshi Citation1907, 69.

72 Takekoshi Citation1907, 230.

73 The “Musha Incident” began on October 27th, 1930, when a Seediq elder named Mona Ludao launched a surprise attack on a group of Japanese settlers gathered in the town of Musha (Chinese “Wushe”) for a Sports Day celebration. A number of police stations were also attacked that day. The reprisal was swift and vicious, as police and military troops chased down and encircled the rebel group. Warplanes and chemical agents were also used. The revolt ended in late November following the suicide of Mona and other rebellion leaders. For more on post-1914 assimilatory policies, or the “Musha Incident,” see Kojima Citation1981; Kondō Citation1996; Ching Citation2001; Kitamura Citation2008; Barclay Citation2017.

74 This figure is taken from Huang and Liu Citation2017, 4.

75 See Ching Citation2001, 211.

76 See Kondō Citation1996.

77 See Wu Citation2004. Wu calls the “émigré KMT regime” a “settler state” (18), but notes how this settler regime was simultaneously enabled and constrained by American suzerainty, a clearly recognizable form of imperial control. On interacting colonial legacies, see also Huang Citation2015, 133–154.

78 An army, a party, and a war machine contributing to a global Cold War effort and responding to the needs of American power could not be more different an invasion than the unorganized waves of autonomous settlers moving through a loosely supervised frontier.

79 See Liu Citation2013, 5.

80 Tomonori Citation2017.

81 Bouchard Citation2008.

82 This is a type of guardianship epitomized by its “proprietary ownership” of a number of “national treasures,” the artefacts and texts brought to Taiwan by the Nationalists in 1949. See Chun Citation1996, 116.

83 Chang Citation2008; Harrison Citation2006; Manthorpe Citation2005; Roy Citation2003.

84 Damm Citation2007.

85 See, for example, Fangming Citation2007.

86 See Shih and Liao Citation2014; Chen Citation2010.

87 Heylen Citation2010, 19.

88 Chou Wan-yao’s A New Illustrated History of Taiwan also contributed to this historiographical rupture. Wan-yao Citation2015.

89 Heylen Citation2010, 20.

90 Heylen Citation2010, 22.

91 Heylen Citation2010, 26, emphasis added.

92 See Perdue Citation2005.

93 See Shih Citation2012.

94 Shih Citation2012, 5–7. On Chinese colonialism and settler colonialism, see also Shih Citation2011.

95 Shih Citation2011, 713.

96 Shih Citation2016, 740.

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