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Spotlight on Hong Kong

One formula, different trajectories: China’s coalition-building and elite dynamics in Hong Kong and Macau

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Pages 44-66 | Received 20 Jun 2018, Accepted 20 Nov 2019, Published online: 09 Dec 2019
 

ABSTRACT

Scholars have long identified the pivotal importance of business-led governance in the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of China. Both are governed under a “one country, two systems” arrangement which in theory provides autonomy. However, this identical formula has resulted in very different trajectories, as the coalition in Hong Kong has failed to serve as an effective intermediary between the state and society amidst a series of governing crises, whereas the one in Macau has been largely successful in maintaining political stability. This article argues that a new class of elites in Macau has emerged and competes for political influence by building communal networks and mobilizing social support. In contrast, a relatively static elite structure in Hong Kong has done little to adapt to changing political circumstances.

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Spotlight on Hong Kong

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and Robert Shepherd, the editor of Critical Asian Studies, for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. We also want to express our appreciation to Wing-yung Lai for research assistance. Any remaining errors are our own.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Mathew Y. H. Wong is an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Education University of Hong Kong. His research interests include income inequality, democracy, and the politics of Asia.

Ying-ho Kwong is a Visiting Fellow at the Department of Public Policy at the City University of Hong Kong. His research examines territorial autonomies, contentious politics, and the politics of Asia, particularly Hong Kong and Macau comparative studies.

Notes

1 Way Citation2009, 230.

2 Nathan Citation2003.

3 Dickson Citation2008.

7 Chan Citation2003.

8 Chou Citation2013, 48.

9 Wong Citation2012.

10 Financial Times, October 27, Citation2017.

11 Kwong Citation2017.

12 HKUPOP Citation2019a.

13 HKUPOP Citation2018a.

14 For the SAR government, the figures were 38.9 percent of trust and 38.8 percent of distrust, and for the national government, 31.5 percent of trust and 46.6 percent of distrust.

15 HKUPOP Citation2019b.

16 HKUPOP Citation2018b.

17 Electoral Affairs Commission of Hong Kong Citation2016.

18 Electoral Affairs Commission of Macau Citation2017.

19 Portugal tried to return Macau to China twice, in 1966, after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution on the mainland and pro-China riots in Macau, and again in 1974, after a leftist military revolution in Lisbon. The PRC declined both times.

20 Minor (but potentially significant) exceptions include: (1) The Basic Law of Hong Kong (Article 45) specifies that the selection of the Chief Executive in Hong Kong will ultimately be by universal suffrage upon nomination of a candidate by a representative nominating committee, but Macau’s version (Article 47) only states that selection will be done by election or through local consultations (2) All members of the Hong Kong legislature should ultimately be elected by universal suffrage (Article 68), but Macau’s version (Article 68) only states that the majority of the legislators shall be elected. See Ghai Citation2000, 191.

21 Fong Citation2013.

22 Davis Citation1992, based on data reported by the Hong Kong Bank (now HSBC, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Cooperation).

23 Kim Citation1997.

24 Wong Citation2012.

25 Goodstadt Citation2000.

27 Edmonds and Yee Citation1999. Although some Hong Kong businessmen did the same (e.g. Henry Fok), the majority of the business sector did not work with the PRC, unlike in Macau.

29 Young and Cullen Citation2010.

30 See Appendix , , ; and .

31 Fong Citation2014; Lee, To, and Yu Citation2018.

32 We do not argue that the PRC government has ignored the traditional elites in Hong Kong; it has prioritized the new elites. For example, of the twenty-three Hong Kong members of the 1985 Basic Law drafting committee, ten were business leaders, including Lee Ka-shing and Pao Yue-kong, whereas Tam Yiu-chung was arguably the only traditional pro-PRC figure.

33 See Appendix .

34 Fong Citation2014.

35 Scott Citation2007.

36 Tsang Citation2015.

37 Fong Citation2014.

38 On December 3, 1966, leftist students and their supporters rioted against Portuguese control of Macau. In the aftermath of this incident, Macau fell under de facto control of mainland China, with local business leader Ho Yin (1908–1983) becoming the de facto authority in the colony. Ho’s son, Edmund Ho Hau Wah, later served as the first Chief Executive of the Macau Special Administrative Region.

39 Choi Citation2010

42 Ho, together with partners, was awarded a casino monopoly by Portuguese authorities in 1962 and thereafter established the Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau (STDM). In 1972 he established Shun Tak Holdings, Ltd., a major shipping company in the region. He has a net worth of $US 2.5 billion.

43 Lo and Chong Citation2016.

44 Curiously, his departure was virtually not reported by the media, fueling speculation that the departure was not a harmonious one.

47 Hou Kong Daily October 1, Citation2016.

48 Macao Daily News February 27, Citation2016.

49 Hou Kong Daily May 15, Citation2011.

50 Kwong Citation2017.

52 Hao Citation2015.

53 Lee Citation2011.

54 Jornal Va Kio August 26, Citation2014.

55 Macau Daily Times May 26, Citation2014.

56 Macao Post Daily May 27, Citation2014.

57 Fong Citation2013, 867.

58 Fong Citation2013.

61 Kwong Citation2017.

63 Fong Citation2013.

65 Fong Citation2017.

66 Cheng Citation2016.

67 Suksi Citation2011.

68 Suksi Citation2011.

Additional information

Funding

Research for this paper was funded by an internal research grant of the Education University of Hong Kong.

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