https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3100-3303
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ABSTRACT
The 2019 protests in Hong Kong have been a watershed moment for the city, both politically and socially. These protests have, for some residents, transformed the police–society relationship into one of open antagonism, fully exposed people’s fear and loathing of the mainland and their local government, and divided some families and large segments of society. These events have also caused an ordinarily quiet and civil society to become violent, enraged (at the police and government), openly racist/xenophobic, and emotionally traumatized. And yet it is highly unlikely that the outcome will be the direct nomination and election of the city’s chief executive, let alone either de facto independence or full autonomy from the mainland. But this reality will not stop demands by the pan-democrats and other opposition members directly involved in this protest movement. This is becoming a chronic, painful condition of stasis for Hong Kong as a political entity and society. There has to be compromise and yet none is forthcoming.
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge several conversations with a number of colleagues in Hong Kong and China who shall remain nameless, but even more so my personal friends and family as together we have had to watch Hong Kong burn for no good reason.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Daniel F. Vukovich has worked at Hong Kong University since 2006, where he teaches in the School of Humanities. He is the author of China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C. (2012) and Illiberal China: The Ideological Challenge of the P.R.C. (2019) as well as numerous articles and essays.
ORCID
Daniel Vukovich http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3100-3303
Notes
1 If I am critical of the protests in some fundamental ways, and of the pan democratic cause, I should hope this does not imply an endorsement of the CE and the mainland liaison office in Hong Kong.
2 For criticisms of the bill from a decidedly pro-protest group of writers in the Hong Kong diaspora, see the Lausan Collective statement Citation2019.
3 I distinguish between protests and riots, though admittedly this is somewhat subjective. Protests do not have to be non-violent to warrant being called protests. But many instances of what the media and well-wishers have been describing as the Hong Kong protest movement are in my view far more like riots – their purpose is less political (even if the five demands are referenced) but more on creating disorder and crisis, turning on vandalism and destruction of property, both public and private, and more worryingly on xenophobia, hysteria, and moral panic (including rumors of hundreds of missing bodies and gang rapes).
4 The police have so far arrested over 4,500 protestors. It is unfeasible and even undesirable for the government to try and convict all of those arrested for rioting. If the opposition argues for a limited amnesty and a restricted use of the charge of rioting, there may be room for compromise on this demand. Of course it will be on the government to actually act!
5 I owe this insight to past conversations with Borge Bakken, Jeff Martin, and other criminology scholars at Hong Kong University.
6 According to most local reports, violent rioters have ranged from a few hundred in the guerrilla-style flash mobs smashing up MTR stations, to a few thousand during the riotous occupations of the Chinese University of Hong and Hong Kong Polytechnic University. In the case of the Polytechnic in particular, only a minority of the participants were actually students.
7 On October 4, 2019, Hong Kong authorities used the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, a British colonial-era law, to ban protesters from covering their faces in public.
8 I am not suggesting there is some type of “silent majority” at work in Hong Kong which opposes the protest movement. But in my own experience, observations, and reading, there are far more people who oppose the protests now, or their violent turn, than has been reported in the mainstream international or local media. Hong Kong people are not stupid, see the limits of independence talk, and are disturbed by the racism and violence that have blossomed.
9 See “Hong Kong’s Sinkhole” by Pan Laikwan https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4452-hong-kong-s-sinkhol00e. Interestingly, it is the Hong Kong protesters who share the Western “left” view whereas the (mainland) Chinese left view in Hong Kong is more scarce than public housing spots. LIHKG.com is a Redditt-like forum.
10 See Faure Citation2003, among others, on political education during the colonial era.
11 But it must be said that in this 2016 event the violence was one-sided, against the police who were under orders not to strike back. Needless to say this was not a good thing for police morale, and it may have encouraged later protesters.
12 This included using the slur “Shina” (支那) and faking the oath when sworn into office.
13 Mr. Leung, for example, has now been listed on Time magazine’s “100 Next.” See https://time.com/collection/time-100-next-2019/5718822/edward-leung/.
14 For a useful discussion of some of the independence issues see Lachs and Tang, “The Panda In the Room: Hong Kong’s Pro-Independence Movement,” October Citation2019. But note that it is debatable as to how much support the movement has now in light of the recent violent university occupations and traffic disruptions. Certainly this has lessened, although the protests are still supported by a majority or large minority of people.
15 See for example, Scarr et al. Citation2019 and Reuters Citation2019.
16 See the work of the long standing Hong Kong independent journalist and author, Nury Vittachi, in various places online, including Facebook. Vittachi’s work is an important, if informal resource for this series of protests.
17 See for example a Deutsche Welle interview with Ms. Joey Siu (Citation2019), among other statements justifying xenophobic or clearly malicious violence or merely stating it should not be condemned.
18 See the editorial by Alex Lo Citation2019. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3037383/hong-kong-ok-man-being-set-fire.
19 The PRC is simply not going to offer Hong Kong residents direct nomination, given that the anti-communist politics of the opposition means electing an anti-regime CE.
20 Scott Citation1985.
21 For background analysis, see among others David Bandurski Citation2017. The gist of the issue is that bookstore owners were arrested for allegedly selling books banned on the mainland through the post, and taken from within Hong Kong or while in China and held without charge for some time.
22 See the comments made by Ronny Tong to Ming Pao New Network, 2019. Tong is a moderate democrat and founder of the influential Civic Party, although he left it when it turned harder against mainland immigration and influence.
23 See for example a September 12 report from Xinhua News as well as an article on Guancha, September Citation2019.
24 See The Basic Law Citation1990, 53.
25 See Carroll Citation2019.
26 See his Xianggang Chengbanglun (City-State Theory of Hong Kong) Citation2011.
27 See Albert Citation2019.
28 See also my discussions of Hong Kong politics in Illiberal China, Citation2019b.
29 I discuss the National Endowment of Democracy in my Citation2019 book. A grant search of the NED’s database reveals funding of US$ 200,000 to groups in Hong Kong in 2018 alone. The Oslo Freedom Forum training sessions with Hong Kong activists are openly available on their website, and date back to at least 2014. I thank Kaiser Kuo for the NED reminder.
30 See Poon Citation2011 for the background and basis of this argument, including the connection to the Basic Law and Sino-British agreements.
31 For background information, see Hays Citation2006. For a contemporary critique, see Ewing Citation2016.
32 I argued for this in a September 1 (Citation2019a) editorial for the South China Morning Post, even before the escalation of the violence and racist attacks. Interestingly, my column was received favorably by the China and Hong Kong born colleagues who I sent it to beforehand or who contacted me, but attacked by expatriate colleagues, in particular those from the United States. But the Sinophobia in Hong Kong is massive and can only be defeated through reason.
33 These are the first two Articles of the Basic Law. See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China Citation1990, 73.
34 Both lines are from the first chapter of The Communist Manifesto Citation1848.
