Elite family politics in Laos before 1975

ABSTRACT

Major General Phasouk S. Rajphakd and Brigadier General Soutchay Vongsavanh were important right-wing military officers in the Royal Lao Army in southern Laos before 1975. However, elite family relations in Laos – especially between prominent families from the north and the south – greatly affected how they acted and interacted over the years. This article considers family relations in Laos during the 1960s and early 1970s. Kinship relations are certainly not determinant of all social or political interactions, as individual agency is also important, but they are often crucial nonetheless. There has been insufficient discussion about how elite family relations played out in Laos during the 1954–1975 period. To partially fill this gap, this article explores how tensions between the House of Champassak in southern Laos and the House of Luang Prabang and the powerful Sananikone family in Vientiane led to disunity amongst non-communist factions in Laos, and eventually contributed to the Pathet Lao takeover of the country in 1975.

KEYWORDS:

• Laos
• elites
• family relations
• the Secret War

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Pathoumma S. Rajphakd, Colonel Samrane Singrajaphak, and General Soutchay Vongsavanh for the crucial information that they provided. Thanks also for all the other people who were interviewed for this research. Thanks, also, for comments on earlier drafts by Pathoumma S. Rajphakd, Frederic Benson, Paul Carter, Ryan Wolfson-Ford, Edwin McKeithen, William Sage, and one anonymous referee chosen by Critical Asian Studies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Ian G. Baird is a professor of geography and director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. His most recent book is Rise of the Brao: Ethnic Minorities in Northeastern Cambodia during Vietnamese Occupation (University of Wisconsin Press, 2020).

Notes

1 Phasouk used the last name Somly at times (see Ahern 2006). Some claim that a friend of his was selected to study in France, but then did not want to go, so Phasouk took his last name in order to fit with the record (personal communication, Chitprasong Na Champassak, Paris, June 2009).

2 Goldston 2009.

3 Vongsavanh 1981. However, between 1961 and 1962, when Phasouk was receiving advanced military training in France, General Koth Venevongsoth served as acting commander of MR 4 (personal communication, Thongsamlith Venevongsoth, Paris, June 2009).

4 Kamm 1971; Vongsavanh 1981.

5 Ahern 2006, 419.

6 Personal communication, Bounlonh S. Rajphakd, June 2009; personal communication, Keuakoun Na Champassak, August 2013.

7 Thammakhanty 2004.

8 Thammakhanty 2004. He probably did not die clearing mine fields in Sam Neua, as Conboy 1995, 423 reported.

9 Kremmer 2003; Thammakhanty 2004.

10 Vongsavanh 1981.

11 See Baird 2018.

12 Conboy 1995.

13 He was born in 1903 in Vientiane, and entered the French colonial administration in 1923 (Halpern 1961).

14 Personal communication, Bounlonh S. Rajphakd, Paris, August 2013.

15 Bounlonh S. Rajphakd, personal communication, Paris, August 2013.

16 In this context, seven generations may refer to the next seven people born in the family, rather than strictly seven generations, as understood in European contexts.

17 Vientiane was depopulated and burnt down in 1827 after the Chao Anouvong rebellion.

18 Evans 2002.

19 Viravong 1964; Saignasith 1990.

20 Halpern 1960.

21 Wolfson-Ford 2018.

22 Sasorith 1949.

23 Brown and Zasloff 1986; Dommen 2001; Evans 2002.

24 Fall 1969; Deuve 1984; Stuart-Fox 1997.

25 Conboy 1995; Dommen 2001.

26 Halpern 1960; Fall 1969; Deuve 1984; Ngaosyvathin and Ngaosyvathin 1994; Dommen 2001; Evans 2002; Stuart-Fox 1998, 2008.

27 Creak 2015.

28 Ladwig 2017.

29 Sidwell 2020.

30 Wolfson-Ford 2018, 2020.

31 Tsing 2013.

32 Khamphoui Souksavath, personal communication, Surrey, BC, June 2016.

33 Yang Dao, personal communication, September 2013.

34 Khamphoui Souksavath, personal communication, Surrey, BC, June 2016.

35 Halpern 1960.

36 Archaimbault 1961.

37 Baird 2010.

38 Koupranom Abhay, personal communication, Paris, August 2013.

39 Wolfson-Ford 2018.

40 Halpern 1961.

41 Sidwell 2020.

42 Royal Lao Government 1949; United States Embassy Vientiane 1957.

43 Thavone Na Champassak, personal communication, Concord, NC, January 2016.

44 Vongsavanh 1981.

45 Khamsing Phaviset, personal communication, Brooklyn Park, MN, October 2013.

46 Ounla Thongsavanh, personal communication, Madison, WI, August 2014. As Major General Oudone Sananikone 1978, 37 wrote, “[A]n intense rivalry had developed over the years between Phoui Sananikone … and Prince Boun Oum” (the head of the House of Champassak).

47 Kone Mokesouphanh, personal communication, Madison, WI, April 2014; Khong Vongnarath, personal communication, Lyon, June 2009.

48 Soutchay Vongsavanh, personal communication, Chantilly, VI, April 2019.

49 Vongsavanh 1981.

50 Rangxanh Souvannasy, personal communication, Brooklyn Park, MN, October 2013.

51 Halpern 1960, 1961; Lee 2015.

52 He later had a falling out with the Sananikones, particularly after the September 18, 1954 assassination of Kou Voravong, an important politician from Savannakhet, and a close relative of Phoumi. In 1985, Sisouk Na Champassak died in his sleep while staying at Vang Pao’s house in Santa Ana, California. Vang Neng was sleeping in the same room as Sisouk when he died (Vang Neng, personal communication, St. Paul, MN, November 2013).

53 Halpern 1961.

54 Deuve 1986; Stuart-Fox 1997.

55 Khamphay Muongchanh, personal communication, Seattle, WA, July 2016; Khamfanh Nouansavanh, personal communication, Fresno, CA, September 19, 2009.

56 Touane Baccam, personal communication, Madison, WI, September 2013.

57 Na Champassak 1995.

58 Ahern 2006, 197.

59 Conboy 1995.

60 Ahern 2006, 415.

61 Rangxanh Souvannasy, personal communication, Brooklyn Park, MN, October 2013; Soutchay Vongsavanh, personal communication, Chantilly, VI, April 2020.

62 Bounpone was not a blood member of the House of Champassak, but he was closely linked to the family, having grown up in Champassak, albeit as a commoner. Later, he wanted to marry one of Chao Nhouy’s daughters, Chao Heuane Nhing Sodachanh, but he did not have high enough military or political stature at the time, and so was denied approval. Over time, however, Bounpone rose up the ranks in the RLA. Eventually, he was allowed to marry another prominent member of the House of Champassak, Chao Heuane Phengphanh (also known as Phreophanh), a daughter of Chao Sone Bouttarobol, another prominent member of the House of Champassak (Baird 2017).

63 Ahern 2006.

64 Vongsavanh 1981.

65 According to Soutchay Vongsavanh,

Since there was little chance that these units would be employed in actual combat, their present-for-duty strength was always relatively high. There were also excellent opportunities for the MV IV Commander, General Phasouk, to confer political appointments on relatively poor officers without exposing their ineptness since they were constantly employed in static defensive positions.

Soutchay continued,

The loyalty of these forces depended largely on who appointed the battalion commander; in almost all cases it was the military region commander … General Phasouk appointed the Royalist battalion commanders and his brother, Colonel Khamsouk, ostensibly the Neutralist commander in MR IV, as Neutralist battalion commander. With this situation, the regular battalions could not be depended upon for other than the most mundane garrison duties.

See Soutchay Vongsavanh 1981, 47. He also wrote,

The guerrilla force commanders were appointed by General Phasouk also, but in these cases the American advisers had some influence since the troops were paid and supplied by the Americans. Although Phasouk continued to attempt to place his cronies in these lucrative command positions … his attempts were largely negated by the almost daily supervision of the irregular battalion commanders by their American supporters. A battalion commander's weaknesses were soon exposed and relief was quickly forthcoming. (See Vongsavanh 1981, 47–48)

66 Singto Na Champassak, personal communication, Metz, France, August 2013.

67 Sage 1971.

68 Hubiq 1967.

69 According to Vongsavanh,

During the period when the irregular forces were charged primarily with operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail structure in the southeast panhandle, the operations were far removed from population centers and the MR IV commander had little knowledge or interest in them. (See Vongsavanh 1981, 48)

70 General Soutchay Vongsavanh wrote,

Prior to December 1970, the war in MR IV was fought away from Pakse and really meant little to the Lao power structure in MR IV or in Vientiane. Then in December of 1970, the North Vietnamese struck at PS-22 on the eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau. The NVA raid dispersed the regular battalion, commanded by one of Phasouk’s inept brothers [Colonel Samrane], and the irregular battalion which were in the PS-22 garrison. I was ordered to PS-22 to take command of the situation and restore the defense of the shattered camp. Realizing that the RLA troops in the area were scattered and not dependable. I picked up an airborne battalion from Savannakhet … and took this battalion with me to PS-22. We reoccupied the camp and rounded-up the irregulars who were hiding out in the forest around the camp. I sent Phasouk's battalion of regulars back to Pakse, since it was of no use to me.

71 Vongsavanh 1981, 49.

72 Vongsavanh 1981, 49.

73 Godley 1970.

74 Sisanouk Na Champassak, personal communication, Paris, August 2013.

75 See also Halpern 1960.

76 Halpern 1960.

77 Sinouane Ngamvilay, personal communication, Mobile, Alabama, November 2013.

78 Rangxanh Souvannasy, personal communication, Brooklyn Park, MN, October 2013.

79 Pangkeo Nakhone Champassak, personal communication, Ubon Ratchathani, April 2017.

80 Lydon 1968. Boun Oum reportedly did not like Sisavang Vatthana and Sisavang criticized Boun Oum for including too many southerners and family members in his government when he was Prime Minister before 1962. See Rust 2014, 65–66.

81 Sisanouk Na Champassak, personal communication, Paris, August 2013. Boun Oum was also reportedly angry with the House of Luang Prabang for not insisting that a budget be allocated for him to build a palace. See Singto Na Champassak, personal communication, Metz, August 2013.

82 United States Embassy Vientiane 1965.

83 CIA 1970, 9.

84

Finally, however, the pressures became too great, and Sisouk responded to [chief of staff] General Oudone Sananikone's request and appointed me the new MR IV commander. As General Oudone told me later, he had argued for a new commander to be chosen not from the south—for it was certain that any officer from Prince Boun Oum's territory would be Boun Oum's man and just as unresponsive to direction from the general staff as was Phasouk—but from another region and not under Na Champassak influence. (Vongsavanh 1981, 49)

85

Duly appointed, I took command of MR IV on July 1, 1971. My troubles began immediately. First, General Phasouk refused to move from the headquarters. When he finally did, three months later, he returned each weekend and signed orders and directives to the commanders of the battalions assigned to MR IV. These units were all commanded by relatives of Phasouk and continued to give him their loyalty and to respond to his orders which were generally to avoid any action against the PL or NVA … The response was usually negative so I learned to do without them until I was eventually able to get some of these commanders replaced. It was not until the end of 1972 that General Phasouk gave up this practice, and I never really gained absolute control over all the units assigned to my command. (Soutchay Vongsavanh 1981, 50)

86 Soutchay Vongsavanh, personal communication, telephone to Washington DC, May 2009.

87 Ahern 2006, 472.

88 Probably the most significant failure was the inability to end the conflict with the Phasouk family, which detracted from the war effort and caused dissention within the officer ranks of MR IV. This problem continued from the time Phasouk was appointed chief of staff of the Armed Forces in Vientiane to the end of the war. It is very difficult to fight a war while looking over your shoulder to make sure you are not being set up by the friendly forces. See Vongsavanh 1981, 104.

89 Vongsavanh Boutsavath, personal communication, Northfield, MN, November 28, 2013. See also Touane Baccam, personal communication, Madison, WI, September 2013; Khamsing Phraviset, personal communicaiton, Brooklyn Park, MN, June 2016; Tem Phongphouvanh, personal communication, Kennewick, WA, June 2016.

90 King Souvannakane, personal communication, Vancouver, WA, June 2016; Ounkham Souriyavong, personal communication, July 2020; Thongsouk Khantivong, personal communication, Surrey, BC, March 2014; Kone Mokesouphanh, personal communication, Madison, WI, April 2014.

91 Vongsavanh Sinbandhit, personal communication, Paris, August 2013. Radio Pathet Lao 1975a.

92 Oubon Xosanavongsa, personal communication, Vientiane, January 2015. The bomb thrower ended up as a political refugee at Nong Khai Refugee Camp in northeastern Thailand, and apparently admitted what he had done when drunk one night. See Singto Na Champassak, personal communication, Metz, France, August 2013.

93 Boualien Vannasay, personal communication, Bangkok, July 2012.

94 Ahern 2006, 415. See also Mome Bouachanh Na Champassak, personal communication, Paris, August 2013.

95 USIS 1971; Vientiane Domestic Service 1971.

96 Lt. Colonel Trần Ngọc Châu, in the Republic of Vietnam, was similarly well known in Kien Hoa Province for preferring to try to increase communist defections over killing the enemy.

97 Kone Mokesouphanh, personal communication, Madison, WI, September 2018.

98 According to Vongsavanh,

In three days’ time, we had control of the high ground and Route 23 into Paksong. The success of this operation can be attributed to the surprise of the airmobile assault and to the aggressive attack of GM 32 in driving into Paksong causing the NVA defenses facing the Neutralist forces to collapse. It bought more time for the reorganization of the irregular forces in MR IV and in this respect, it was totally successful. (See Vongsavanh 1981, 68)

99 Evans and Novak 1971.

100 Vongsavanh 1981, 68.

101 Evans and Novak 1971.

102 Vongsavanh 1981, v.

103 Khamphay Muongchanh, personal communication, Seattle, WA, July 2016.

104 Khammone Souvannalat, personal communication, telephone to Paris, January 2011; Houmphanh Saiyasith, personal commnication, Paris, June 2009; Yang Dao, personal communication, Brooklyn Park, MN, February 2011.

105 Goldston 2009.

106 Radio Pathet Lao 1975a; Vientiane Domestic Service 1975.

107 Radio Pathet Lao 1975b.

108 Stuart-Fox 2008.

109 Peking NCNA 1975.

110 Pangkeo Nakhone Champassak, personal communication, Ubon Ratchathani, September 2016.

111 Khamtanh Souridaray Sayarath, personal communication, Paris, August 2013.

112 Hsinhua 1975.

113 Radio Pathet Lao 1975c.

114 Bangkok Post 1975.

115 Pathet Lao News Agency 1975.

116 See Kremmer 2003; Thammakhanty 2004; Na Champassak 2010.

117 Wolston-Ford 2018.

118 Goldston 2009.

119 Halusak Na Champassak, personal communication, Paris, June 2009.