Historical formation of Islamist ideology in Indonesia: the role of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII)

ABSTRACT

Since the demise of Suharto’s New Order in 1998, many observers have noted the growing influence of political Islam in Indonesia, despite its peripheral presence in national politics. A notable development was an unprecedented surge in the influence of Islamists during the 2019 presidential election campaign, many of whom were known for their intolerance of religious minorities. What ideological appeal drove Islamists into unprecedented collective action for the first time since 1998? This paper sheds light on the historical trajectory of the Masyumi and an organization called Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council). More specifically, via an analysis of their discursive efforts, it shows that rather than sectarian exclusivism which has long characterized political Islam in Indonesia, historically embedded anti-authoritarian efforts developed by their predecessors during the Sukarno and Suharto regime have enabled Islamists to engage in collective actions and attract the support of many ordinary Muslims. However, such collective action will not last because they have lost the shared aspirations of their predecessors for an alternative political system.

KEYWORDS:

• Political Islam
• Indonesia
• anti-authoritarianism
• sectarianism
• ideology

Acknowledgements

I thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Any errors that remain are my sole responsibility.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Time 2017; Jakarta Globe 2017.

2 Wilson 2017.

3 Mietzner 2018.

4 Mudhoffir 2020; Robison and Hadiz 2020.

5 Bruinessen 2015, 61–62, 68.

6 Bruinessen 2015, 66.

7 Chaplin 2018.

8 Bruinessen (2002) identifies two major roots of Indonesian Islamism: Masyumi and Darul Islam.

9 Bruinessen 2002; Liddle 1996; Hefner 1997.

10 Kahin 2012 has examined Natsir’s political thought and activism. Hilmy 2010 and Feener 2007 also refer to several strands of Natsir’s thought. But these authors do not discuss how Natsir’s thought influence the ideology of contemporary political Islam. As for publications in Bahasa Indonesia, DDII members and affiliates have published a number of biographies of Natsir. See for instance Harjono et al. 2001 and Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia 2019.

11 Feith 2007, 233–237. Frequent disputes occurred with Masyumi between Natsir’s reformist faction and traditionalist NU leaders who had a dominant influence in the villages of East and Central Java. In addition to Natsir’s growing influence in the party and the increasingly marginalized position of NU leaders, disputes over the Religious Affairs portfolio in the Cabinet in 1952 ultimately led to NU’s withdrawal from the party. See Fealy 1998, 78–105, for a detailed discussion of this issue.

12 Natsir was born in a small village in West Sumatra in 1908 and attended the Hollandsch-Inlandsche School in Solok and Algemene Middelbare School in Bandung, see Kahin 1993, 159–160. While learning about European political thought, Natsir came under the influence of Ahmad Hasan, a major figure in the Islamic Union (Persatuan Islam). See Kahin 2012, 9–11. He joined the Islamic Youth Association (Jong Islamieten Bond) founded by Agus Salim and met Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Mohammad Roem, who later became Masyumi members.

13 Though he began to engage in a staunch defense of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, it should be noted that as far back as 1939 (before his career in politics) Natsir emphasized that democracy and the role of parliament needed to be limited because the teachings of Islam must not be subjected to a majority vote system. See Natsir 2008a, 550–552, 596–599.

14 Pancasila (“the five principles”) is enshrined in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. It comprises (1) belief in Almighty God, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives, and (5) social justice for all Indonesians.

15 Natsir 2008b, 120–121.

16 Natsir 2008b, 110–112, 118–123.

17 However, Tocqueville made rather negative judgements of Islam. See Kahan 2013, 89–110, for an analysis of Tocqueville’s views on Islam.

18 Natsir 2008b, 127–136.

19 In late 1957, following the attempted assassination of President Sukarno by a group which included members of the youth wing of Masyumi, Natsir and other party leaders were accused of complicity, see Kahin 2012, 110, 111. In September 1961, Natsir was arrested and held in a succession of detention centers until 1966, before being placed under house arrest for almost a year, see Kahin 2012, 150–154.

20 Nasution 1992, 325–326, 395–397. This Jakarta Charter was initially drafted as a preamble to the 1945 Constitution. However, the seven words were deleted in the final version because of objections from non-Muslims. For a detailed discussion on the debate, see Elson 2009 and Fogg 2020, 131–140.

21 Samson 1972, 551. On December 21, 1966, regional military commanders issued a joint statement refuting the proposed relaunch of Masyumi. In the following year, sixteen organizations affiliated with former Masyumi leaders founded the Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia) chaired by a relatively accommodative figure, Djarnawi Hadikusma from Muhammadiyah, the country’s second largest Islamic organization. However, in 1973, this party, along with other Islamic parties, was merged by the government with the United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan).

22 Ihza 1995, 129; Kahin 2012, 168.

23 De Gaulle resigned in 1969 after his defeat in a national referendum on constitutional reform.

24 Abidin 2012, 106–107.

25 Though he stressed the importance of Islam, Natsir also referred to Christianity, Hinduism, and customary laws (adat) as sources for moral values, see Abidin 2012, 118–119.

26 The DDII tried to build support on university campuses, in mosques, and at Islamic boarding schools. They also sent trained preachers to national university campuses, where the young intellectuals who would lead the ummah and nation-state in the future were fostered. It was common for these preachers to study at the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Knowledge, a Saudi-sponsored educational institute in Jakarta, before going to universities in Saudi Arabia, see Bruinessen 2015, 66; Latif 2008, 362–363, 379–380; Luth 1999, 58–60; Nasution 1989, 15–19.

27 Asshiddiqie 2002, 16–162. This Salman Mosque movement was developed through extensive campaigns for religious outreach on university campuses. By the 1980s, this movement had become a conspicuous feature of major universities in Java. See Hefner 1993, 12–13.

28 Kahin 1993, 165; Panji Masyarakat 1991, 28, 29

29 Tempo 1994.

30 Fatwa 2000, 202-204.

31 Selamatkan Demokrasi Berdasarkan Jiwa Proklamasi dan UUD 1945.

32 Natsir 1984, 42–56.

33 Local army officers often obstructed DDII activities and even used torture methods during interrogations. Between 1978 and 1988, DDII provided legal assistance in more than fifty cases involving preachers and Muslim leaders who has been arrested on political charges, see Husin 1998, 112–113.

34 Natsir 1984, 57–58.

35 Natsir 1984, 39–64.

36 After Suharto’s speech, Sudomo, the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security, announced that press restrictions would be eased. See Shwartz 2000, 230–231; Honna 2003, 12.

37 Regarding this Natsir’s essay, see also Kahin 2012, 207–208.

38 Natsir 1990; 94–95.

39 Hefner 1997, 83. It should be noted that a negative perception toward Christianity has been shared by Persis and its leading figures, including Natsir, who have repeatedly expressed their concerns regarding Christian missionary activities since the colonial era. See Natsir 1969, a collection of essays regarding issues between Muslim and Christians.

40 Natsir 1969, 214–216.

41 Hefner 1993, 9–10.

42 The New Order recognized six religions: Protestant Christianity, Roman Catholicism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism; all were protected by the first principle of Pancasila (“Belief in Almighty God”) despite some not being monotheistic. See Lindsey 2012, 59.

43 Shwartz 2000, 34.

44 Bruinessen 1996, 18; Hefner 1997, 93. See, for instance, a Tempo interview with former student activist Abdul Quadir Djaelani, who had led Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Islamic Youth Movement, GPI) and was close to the DDII, on March 19, 2000. He was arrested for allegedly plotting the riot in Tanjung Priok.

45 Immediately after the event, Benny Moerdani, as a representative of the government, stated that nine people had been killed and fifty-three injured, see Fatwa 2000, 256. However, the actual number of casualties remains unknown.

46 Syam and Suhelmi 2004, 65. KISDI was founded initially to protest against Israel and support Palestinian rights.

47 Habibie served as Minister for Research and Technology from 1978 to 1998, when he became Suharto’s final vice-president. The initial idea to establish the ICMI came from Imaduddin Abdulrahim, one of the intellectuals who was close to Natsir. He approached the former military general and Minister of Religion, Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, who was also perceived by the other military officers as having “too Islamic” a demeanor, see Abdillah 1998, 358. Alamsyah talked to Suharto about Imaduddin’s plan and facilitated a meeting with B.J. Habibie, see Abdillah 1998, 362. For a detailed background, see Hefner 1993, 16–20 and Asshiddiqie et al. 2002, 51–55.

48 After Moerdani raised concerns about the presidential succession process and the business activities of Suharto’s children, he was fired as Commander of the Armed Forces and relegated to a less powerful position as Minister of Defense and Security. See Liddle 1996, 629.

49 In addition to establishing the ICMI, a series of changes in government policy unfolded around this period. These included strengthening the legal and institutional standing of Islamic courts, codifying Islamic family law, permitting female students to wear a jilbab (head covering) in state schools, and establishing Bank Muamalat as the country’s first Islamic bank, see Liddle 1996, 614. In the 1993 cabinet, Christian ministers were replaced by Muslim politicians close to Habibie, see Bruinessen 1996, 20.

50 Panji Masyarakat 1992, 22.

51 Syam and Suhelmi 2004, 149, 150.

52 The ostensible purpose for holding the ceremony, according to a report in the journal Tempo, was to “reiterate the NU’s loyalty to the state ideology Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.” Tempo 1992.

53 Tempo 1991b.

54 Wahid, along with leading pluralist intellectuals, founded Forum Demokrasi (Democracy Forum) after Arswendo Atmowiloto, editor of the tabloid Monitor, was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for blasphemy, see Tempo 1991a. At the 1994 NU congress, Wahid faced retaliation from NU members connected to the regime who sought to undermine his power base in the organization by launching a series of negative campaigns that included anti-minority rhetoric. See Fealy 1996, 257–277; Kayane 2020a, 7–8.

55 Anwar Harjono, then chairperson of the DDII, founded the PBB. The members of DDII and KISDI, as well as some former student activists such as Fadli Zon and Abdul Quadir Djaelani, also joined. In the 2009 general election, PBB’s vote fell below the 2.5 percent threshold required to earn seats in parliament. For a detailed discussion of the party’s issues from 1998; see Platzdasch 2009, 30–99.

56 Hosen 2005, 421, 425. FPI was founded by Rizieq Shihab and NU affiliate Misbahul Anam in Pondok Pesantren al-Umm in Ciputat, South Tangerang on August 17, 1998, see Jahroni 2004, 213. With financial support from generals such as Wiranto (a former armed forces commander), they formed a paramilitary force called Pasukan Pengamanan Masyarakat Swakarsa (Voluntary Security Unit, Pam Swakarsa) in 1998 to counter student protesters who opposed Habibie, see Tempo 1998.

57 In accordance with Law No. 8 of 1985, all organizations needed to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation. However, in 2000, MPR issued a decision (Ketetapan MPR No. V, 2000) stating that “Pancasila has been misused by the Suharto regime” and that having Pancasila as a state ideology should be open for discussion. Amid heightened criticism of Pancasila, MUI confronted Wahid over his suggestions to legalize communism and establish trade relations with Israel, see Nur Ichwan 2005, 61–62. At its 2000 National Congress, MUI leaders declared that Islam, not Pancasila, would be the organization’s ideological foundation. Since then, MUI has claimed to serve the ummah, and is no longer a servant of the government. See Hasyim 2011, 4, 7; Nur Ichwan 2013, 61, 68, 94–95.

58 Ahnaf et al. 2015.

59 Crouch 2014; Lindsey 2012.

60 Panggabean 2016.

61 Lindsey 2012, 131–132.

62 Interview with Din Syamsuddin, February 27, 2019.

63 Ma’ruf Amin had been a member of both PPP and PKB and played a crucial role in founding the latter in 1998, see Ulum Shohibul 2018, 70. However, during the Wahid administration, Ma’ruf began to distance himself from Wahid and shifted his activities to MUI’s fatwa committee, see Karni 2018, 71, 86; Ulum Shohibul 2018, 77–78.

64 Nur Ichwan 2013, 63, 70; Karni 2018, 75–76.

65 Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2005. This fatwa was meant to reiterate MUI’s original fatwa on the Ahmadiyya, initially issued in 1980. The 2005 fatwa became useful to justify violence toward and persecution of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. See Burhani 2016, 159.

66 Hasyim 2011, 9; Karni 2018, 77. According to Asrori Karni, the chair of the MUI information committee, Ma’ruf used his connections with and influence on the government to consolidate his power base in the MUI (private interview with Karni, January 30, 2019).

67 Lobbying on the Yudhoyono government was conducted by Amin Djamaluddin, who had advocated banning Ahmadiyya since the 1980s and was close to DDII members such as Cholil Ridwan. See ICG 2008 and Burhani 2016.

68 Al-Mujtama 2008, 12–13.

69 Like Cholil Ridwan of DDII, both were educated in Gontor and at the Islamic University of Madinah in Saudi Arabia. Bachtiar and Zaitun co-founded the Council for Young Islamic Scholars and Intellectuals (MIUMI, Majelis Intelektual dan Ulama Muda Indonesia) in 2012 and joined MUI in 2015.

70 Tempo 2016.

71 Berita Satu 2016.

72 Miichi 2019, 232; BBC Indonesia 2016. Fealy 2016 also points out that the Islamists’ agenda to change the constitution to oblige Muslims to follow Shariah and to restrict non-Muslim rights were not the primary factors attracting crowds to their rallies.

73 Tempo 2018.

74 Detik 2018.

75 However, according to an anonymous activist who worked for the human rights NGO Setara Institute, in some local districts, anti-Christianity rhetoric was also deployed to consolidate popular support (private interview, August 15, 2019).

76 Kayane 2020b, 611–612, 622–623.

77 Kayane 2020b, 618.

78 Felix Siauw is an ethnic Chinese preacher associated with HTI and played a unique role in political Islam between 2016 and 2019 by alleviating the sectarian image of Islamists among ordinary Muslim voters. For information on his background and activism, see Weng 2018.

79 Kompas 2019. BBC Indonesia 2019.

80 Interview with MUI’s information committee chairperson, Asrori Karni, January 30, 2019.

81 Nuraniyah 2020, 91.

82 See Fealy 2018 and Fachrudin 2019 on alliance-making between the Jokowi administration and the NU leadership.

83 Confidential interview with a member of the Office of the Presidential Staff, August 29, 2019.

84 Sindo News 2020.

85 Police claimed that they deployed six personnel to tail a vehicle of allegedly Rizieq’s supporters, who attempted to disrupt police questioning him, and his supporters proceeded to attack police personnel by using firearms and sharp weapons. In response, the police shot six of the ten alleged attackers in self-defense. However, this police account was questioned by NGOs and human rights groups. See Jakarta Post 2020.

86 CNN Indonesia 2020. Pikiran Rakyat 2020.

Additional information

Funding

The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) provided funding for this research with KAKENHI grant number 21K17935.

Notes on contributors

Yuka Kayane

Yuka Kayane is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Japan.