Passing on the challenges or prescribing better management of diversity? Decentralisation, power sharing and conflict dynamics in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia

Abstract

Using the case of conflict-affected Central Sulawesi in democratising Indonesia, this paper argues that decentralisation has had both positive and negative indirect impacts on conflict dynamics. First, it has allowed for the direct election of regional heads. This has changed the nature of local politics, which has heightened local tensions through competition for power at the district level. However, this has so far been peacefully managed. Second, decentralisation has to some extent achieved its aim of greater involvement of the local populace in decision making, alleviating the long-standing grievances they have had with authoritarian rule, resource extraction, and regent appointments from outside the region and the island. Third, it has changed population demographics by redrawing administrative boundaries. In the research districts, this has resulted in greater ethno-religious segregation. It has also changed the boundaries around the voting populace, which tends to play into conflict tensions wherever such boundaries reinforce sensitive identity cleavages. Fourth, carving out new regions with decentralisation has created new district legislatures and executives, further fuelling competition for these fiercely sought-after positions and the associated political power in the new districts, as well as inter-group competition for the resources in the ‘new’ regions. However, this has simultaneously reduced competitive pressures in the ‘mother’ regions, in particular in Poso, one of the regions severely affected by communal violence, which was partially linked to elite politics. While the demographic, structural, and institutional changes stimulated by decentralisation will not necessarily lead to violent conflict, they do interact with or potentially stimulate local tensions. Felt grievances, perceptions of inequalities, elite competition and claims to minority rights are just some of the contentious issues, which can interact with decentralisation policies, as they do with national level politics. Managing these tensions is imperative for ensuring that the benefits of decentralisation reach local communities.

Acknowledgements

This paper was prepared for presentation at the CRISE/University of Oxford Conference on Decentralisation, Federalism and Conflict, Department of International Development, University of Oxford, 57 October 2006. The author thanks Frances Stewart and Riwanto Tirtosudarmo for their useful comments and feedback. The author should also like to thank Novia Cici Anggraini and Hedar Laudjeng for their research assistance on this project, and the staff of Perkumpulan Bantaya and the Universitas Sintuwu Maroso in Central Sulawesi for their assistance.

Notes

 1. This paper is limited in that it does not discuss centre-regional power relations prior to Independence.

 2. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 27.

 3. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 29.

 4. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 28. For further discussion of the rise of nationalism in Indonesia see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolaution in Indonesia, 1–65.

 5. Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration, 208.

 6. Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration, 208.

 7. Harvey, Permesta, v.

 8. Booth, ‘Indonesia: Will Decentralisation Lead to Disintegration’, 1.

 9. Chauvel, ‘Beyond the Wallace Line’, 62. For discussion of the collapse of the Federal State see also: Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 71.

10. Chauvel, ‘Beyond the Wallace Line’, 70. See also Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, who defines such sentiment as ‘localisms’ which are usually of an ethnic, religious or regional nature asserting their demands vis-à-vis the centre.

11. Booth, ‘Indonesia’, 1.

12. The ‘centre’ is the common term used to refer to the central government and administration and/or the ‘centre’ of national politics.

13. Harvey, Permesta, 1. See also Kahin and Kahin, ‘Subversion as foreign policy’.

14. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 6–7.

15. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy,., 488. See also Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia, 19.

16. The armed forces are now named Tentara Nasional Indonesia—TNI.

17. Harvey, Permesta, 12.

18. Harvey, Permesta,, 9. See also Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 496.

19. ‘Son(s) of the region’ or ‘local son(s)’ is the translation used for the term putra daerah to distinguish the use of the term following the end of the Suharto administration in 1998. ‘Native sons’ is the translation often used in various texts prior to this period. See for example the translation for ‘anak daerah’ in, Harvey, Permesta, 9; and the translation for ‘putera daerah’ in Malley, ‘Regions: Centralisation and Resistance’, 90. For further discussion of this discourse, see Diprose, ‘Putra Daerah’.

20. Liddle contends that the Javanese totalled approximately 45 million of 100 million population in the 1950s. Liddle, Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration, 5.

21. Legge, Central Authority, 232.

22. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 491. PNI is the acronym for Partai Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian Nationalist Party).

23. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy,, 492.

24. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy,, 487. See also Harvey, Permesta, 7; and Legge, Central Authority, 13.

25. Legge, op. cit., 231.

26. Legge, op. cit., 231

27. Declaration of Charter of Inclusive Struggle (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam—Permesta) in Makassar, 2 March 1957 demanding provincial autonomy. Harvey, Permesta, 1, 173,

28. Declaration of Charter of Inclusive Struggle (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam—Permesta) in Makassar, 2 March 1957 demanding provincial autonomy. Harvey, Permesta,, 151–153.

29. McKahin, in Harvey, Permesta, vi.

30. McKahin, in Harvey, Permesta, See also Harvey, Permesta, 152–3.

31. Harvey, Permesta, 153.

32. Harvey, Permesta,, 152.

33. This law was concerned with the financial relations between the centre and the autonomous regions.

34. This law was enacted to modify the appointment of Regional Heads. Legge viewed this as more an attempt to weaken their office and strengthen the role of the regional parliaments. Legge, Central Authority., 52.

35. Legge, Central Authority, 209.

36. The five principles of the Republic of Indonesia acknowledge commitment to belief in one God, a just and civilised humanity, national unity, and people's rule through consultation and representation, to achieve social justice for all Indonesians. See Guinness, ‘Local Society and Culture’, 271.

37. Foulcher, ‘The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture’, 306.

38. Foulcher, ‘The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture’, 305.

39. Hooker, ‘New Order Language in Context’, 5 cf: Geertz “‘Popular Art” and the Javanese Tradition’, 89. See also Hooker and Dick, ‘Introduction’, 2.

40. Hooker, ‘New Order Language in Context’, 5 cf: Geertz “‘Popular Art” and the Javanese Tradition’, 89. See also Hooker and Dick, ‘Introduction’, 3.

41. Guinness, ‘Local society and culture’, 269.

42. A synonym for the ‘centre’.

43. A synonym for the ‘centre’

44. A synonym for the ‘centre’, 64.

45. Foulcher, ‘Sumpah Pemuda’, 400.

46. Foulcher, Construction, 302.

47. Hooker and Dick, ‘Introduction’, 2.

48. Sen and Hill, Media, Culture, and Politics in Indonesia, 12.

49. Jones, ‘National Culture, Local Concerns’, 65.

50. Malley, ‘Regions: Centralisation and Resistance’, 76.

51. Malley, ‘Regions: Centralization and Resistance’, 77.

52. Malley, ‘Regions: Centralization and Resistance’, 77.

53. See also Chauvel, op. cit., 66.

54. Hardjono, Transmigration in Indonesia, 92.

55. Hardjono, Transmigration in Indonesia, 16.

56. Guinness, ‘Local society and culture’, 292–3.

57. Guinness, ‘Local society and culture’, 293; See also Evers, ‘Indonesian Land Policy’, 1.

58. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 152–3; see also Johnston, ‘New Social Movements and Old Regional Nationalisms’, 267–86; Johnston, Laraña, and Gusfield, ‘Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements’, 3–35.

59. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism,, 152.

60. See Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 153, for a discussion of gender versus ethnic group loyalties.

61. Law No. 22, 1999 devolves central government powers and responsibilities to local governments in all government administrative sectors except for security and defence, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal matters, justice, and religious affairs, without conditions and limitations. It also transfers functions, personnel and assets from the central government to the provincial, as well as the district and the municipal governments. Usman, ‘Indonesia's Decentralisation Policy’, ii.

62. The Indonesian language references for these two laws are, Government of Indonesia (1999) Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah 1999 (UU No.22 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Law No. 22, 1999 on “Local Government), Jakarta. Government of Indonesia (1999) Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah 1999 (UU No. 25, Tahun 1999 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan Antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah (Law No. 25, 1999 on “The Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions), Jakarta.

63. Deconcentration is the delegation of authority by the central government to the governor of a province and/or a central government official in the province.

64. Co-administration is when higher levels of government direct lower levels to undertake tasks and functions. The higher level of government provides the costs, means, infrastructure and human resources to carry out the tasks. The lower level of government is obliged to report to the higher level of government regarding the execution of these tasks or functions.

65. For example, in the Second Amendment, articles 18, 18A, and 18B grant the broadest authority possible to the provinces, kabupaten, and kota, without differentiating the authority according to level of government. Kompas , 29–30.

66. Laporan Penelitian CSIS (2001) Kemampuan Politik Lokal Untuk Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 27.

67. Interview with a representative from Sunda Tandang, 19 August, 2002. Interview with member of Forum Betawi Rempug, 20 August 2002. Interview with member of Paku Banten, May 2005, interview with member of Lampung Sai, March 2001.

68. Acciaioli, ‘Grounds of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony’, 88.

69. Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Violence in Indonesia.

70. Conflicts of a more separatist nature have also escalated in Aceh and Papua—where sections of the populations in these provinces battle for greater access to resources and self-autonomy/determination. Smaller scale violence has been present all over Indonesia, particularly in West and East Java, East Nusa Tenggara, Riau, and other provinces. It has partly taken the form of waves of vigilantism, and partly inter-group violent and non-violent disputes similar to the disputes which proceeded the mass escalation of violence in the ‘high-profile’ conflict provinces. While the rumblings of these conflicts were present before the end of the regime (often preceded by smaller outbreaks of violence), they peaked following the end of the New Order.

71. Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin, Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990–2003).

72. BPS Sulawesi Tengah (2004) Sulawesi Tengah Dalam Angka.

73. BPS Sulawesi Tengah (2004) Sulawesi Tengah Dalam Angka

74. BPS Sulawesi Tengah (2004) Sulawesi Tengah Dalam Angka

75. Varshney et al., Patterns; interviews with Muslim and Christian leaders in Poso, May 2005.

76. For more information on the conflict in Poso see: Aragon, ‘Waiting for Peace in Poso’; Aragon, ‘Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi’; Cote, ‘Historical roots of inter communal violence in Central Sulawesi’; HRW, Breakdown; ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder; YAPPIKA, Suara dari Poso.

77. Cote, ‘Historical roots’, 4.

78. HRW, Breakdown, 6.

79. Cote, ‘Historical roots’, 4.

80. Aragon, ‘Communal violence’, 54.

81. HRW, Breakdown.

82. BPS Poso (1998) Poso Dalam Angka.

83. See Tirtosudarmo, ‘Eastern Sulawesi Province?’

84. Interviews with representatives from Yayasan Tanah Merdeka, LPSM, Poso Centre, KPKPST and other NGOs monitoring violence in the region (2005 and 2006).

85. BPS Poso (2006) Poso in Figures, 2005, BPS Poso.

86. Brown and Diprose ‘Bare Chested Politics in Central Sulawesi’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Rachael Diprose

Rachael Diprose is a researcher and doctoral student at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at the University of Oxford. The focus of her research in recent years includes conflict, violence and security; identity politics; decentralisation, poverty reduction and social safety nets; horizontal inequalities; mobilisation patterns and elite politics; and access to justice. Her research has mainly been conducted in Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Cambodia), West Africa (Nigeria), and South Asia (Sri Lanka).