Power-sharing and peace in Côte d'Ivoire: past examples and future prospects

Abstract

Many scholars have expressed grave concerns over the increased popularity of power-sharing agreements in Africa, arguing that power-sharing is an unstable form of government that provides only short-term reprieve from violent conflict. While most African experiments with power-sharing have failed, this does not necessarily invalidate the case for employing such agreements. The critical importance of context has been cited as a key factor in explaining the success or failure of power-sharing. In other words, it is not that power-sharing is inherently flawed but rather that it should only be employed in certain contexts. This article examines the role of context in explaining different power-sharing outcomes by analysing power-sharing in Côte d'Ivoire. The country provides an excellent case study for examining the importance of context as power-sharing agreements have been adopted in a variety of contexts with diverging outcomes. The article systematically examines key peace agreements and resulting power-sharing arrangements since the outbreak of civil war in 2002 in order to evaluate which factors help to explain successes and failures of power-sharing in Côte d'Ivoire. The article concludes by considering how previous examples may help to shed light on future prospects for power-sharing in Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance workshop on power-sharing at the University of Toronto in November 2011 and the International Studies Association Annual Meeting in San Diego in April 2012. I would like to thank the following people for their stimulating questions and insightful suggestions on earlier versions of the paper: Michael Bratton, J. Andrew Grant, Richard Marcus, John McGarry and Christina Murray. Finally, this article has benefited from the numerous comments and suggestions by the anonymous reviewers of Conflict, Security & Development. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Notes

Matthew I. Mitchell is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University, Canada. His doctoral research examines the relationship between migration and violent conflict in the cocoa regions in West Africa. His work has been published in African Studies Review, Journal of Contemporary African Studies and The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms.

 1. Cheeseman and Tendi, ‘Power-Sharing in Comparative Perspective’, 204.

 2. Cheeseman, ‘Internal Dynamics of Power-Sharing’, 338.

 3. Spears, ‘Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa’, 106.

 4. Spears, ‘Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing’, 123.

 5. Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa’, 2.

 6. Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa’, 2

 7. Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa’, 2

 8. Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa’, 2

 9. Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa’, 2

10. Falletti and Lynch, ‘Context and Causal Mechanisms’, 1152.

11. The exception here is Cheeseman who provides an excellent and comprehensive account of the internal dynamics of power-sharing across various and varied cases. See Cheeseman, ‘Internal Dynamics of Power-Sharing’.

12. Lemarchand: ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa’, 2.

13. Cheeseman, ‘Internal Dynamics of Power-Sharing’, 338.

14. According to Mehler, ‘the best bets are Burundi (2003), Liberia (2003), Sudan (2005) and Côte d'Ivoire (2007)’. See Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa’, 462.

15. Spears, ‘Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing’; Williams, ‘Thinking about Security in Africa’.

16. Spears, ‘Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing’, 125.

17. Cheeseman, ‘Internal Dynamics of Power-Sharing’, 339–340.

18. Spears, ‘Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing’, 127.

19. Tull and Mehler, ‘Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing’, 376.

20. Tull and Mehler, ‘Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing’, 376 According to Tull and Mehler, this logic was at work over the past 15 years in Burundi, Rwanda, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Central African Republic and Chad.

21. Cheeseman and Tendi, ‘Power-Sharing in Comparative Perspective’, 1219.

22. Cheeseman and Tendi, ‘Power-Sharing in Comparative Perspective’, 1219, 225.

23. Langer, ‘Horizontal Inequalities’, 30–31.

24. For an examination of the relationship between migration and conflict in the cocoa regions in Côte d'Ivoire, see, for example, Boone, ‘Social Origins of Ivoirian Exceptionalism’; Chauveau, ‘Question Foncière’; Marshall-Fratani, ‘War of “Who is Who”’, Mitchell, ‘Insights from the Cocoa Regions’; and Mitchell, ‘Migration, Citizenship and Autochthony’.

25. Langer, ‘Horizontal Inequalities', 42.

26. Crook, ‘Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics’, 223.

27. Crook, ‘Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics’, 223, 225.

28. Crook, ‘Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics’, 223, 227.

29. Crook, ‘Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics’, 223, 229.

30. Chirot, ‘Debacle in Côte d'Ivoire’, 71.

31. Chirot, ‘Debacle in Côte d'Ivoire’, 71

32. Although France's involvement in Côte d'Ivoire's protracted conflict has been the subject of much debate, at the initial outbreak of conflict the United Nations, ECOWAS and the African Union all agreed to France's role as a peacekeeper.

33. Tull and Mehler, ‘Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing’, 390. Piccolino echoes this point, as she states that ‘[f]or Gbagbo and the elite surrounding him, France's impartiality was neither acceptable nor credible, and France's decision not to activate the defence agreements between the two countries amounted to a betrayal’. See Piccolino, ‘David against Goliath in Côte d'Ivoire?’, 7.

34. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement outlined an exhaustive list of concerns addressing a wide range of issues on disarmament, security sector reform, human rights violations and media incitement to xenophobia and violence, the organisation and supervision of elections, and measures to end divisive policies on national identification, citizenship, foreign nationals, land tenure and eligibility for the presidency. See ICG, ‘War is Not Yet Over’.

35. Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa’, 462.

36. Chirot, ‘Debacle in Côte d'Ivoire’, 72.

37. ICG, ‘War is Not yet Over’.

38. Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa’, 466.

39. Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa’,466

40. Cheeseman, ‘Internal Dynamics of Power-Sharing’, 340–341.

41. Cheeseman reiterates this point in the following quote: ‘Take Cote d'Ivoire. The main protagonists in the country's slide into civil war—Alassane Ouattara, Laurent Gbagbo, Henri Konan Bédié and General Gueï—entered into a number of different marriages of convenience following the death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. While on the face of it these alliances suggest a high level of elite coherence, they were typically designed not to be inclusive of the full range of elite interests, but rather to exclude and so marginalize a mutually feared rival. Furthermore, these coalitions were generally short-lived and often ended in acrimony, and thus did not contribute to the evolution of norms of mutual accommodation. Consequently, Cote d'Ivoire is best understood as a case of low elite cohesion’. Cheeseman, ‘Internal Dynamics of Power-Sharing’, 340–341, 342.

42. Marshall-Fratani, ‘War of “Who is Who”’.

43. Yabi and Goodwin, ‘Linas-Marcoussis to Ouagadougou’, 19.

44. Yabi and Goodwin, ‘Linas-Marcoussis to Ouagadougou”, 19, 20.

45. Bah, ‘Democracy and Civil War’, 609.

46. ICG, ‘Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace’.

47. Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa’, 459.

48. Yabi and Goodwin, ‘Linas-Marcoussis to Ouagadougou’, 21–22.

49. Bah, ‘Democracy and Civil War’, 613.

50. Bah, ‘Democracy and Civil War’, 613, 614.

51. ICG, ‘What's Needed to End the Crisis?’.

52. ICG, ‘Ensuring Credible Elections’.

53. Yabi and Goodwin, ‘Linas-Marcoussis to Ouagadougou’, 22.

54. ICG, ‘Ensuring Credible Elections’.

55. Bah, ‘Democracy and Civil War’, 614.

56. Spears, ‘Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa’, 111.

57. Yabi and Goodwin, ‘Linas-Marcoussis to Ouagadougou’, 21.

58. Bah, ‘Democracy and Civil War’, 609. Piccolino draws the same conclusion, arguing that a ‘sense of “fatigue”’ was in all likelihood an important factor in explaining the widespread and rapid acceptance of direct dialogue. See Piccolino, ‘David against Goliath in Côte d'Ivoire?’, 19.

59. Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa’.

60. McGovern provides an excellent discussion about the salience of these discourses in contemporary Ivoirian politics and society. See McGovern, Making War in Côte d'Ivoire.

61. Bah, ‘Democracy and Civil War’, 599. For a detailed analysis on the importance of citizenship in the Ivoirian crisis, see Marshall-Fratani, ‘War of “Who is Who”’.

62. ICG, ‘Finally Escaping the Crisis?’.

63. UNOCI, ‘Statement on the Certification of the Result’.

64. On 3 December 2010, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire certified the outcome of the second round of elections and declared Ouattara the rightful winner. See UNOCI, ‘Statement on the Certification of the Result”

65. UNOCI, ‘Y. J. Choi to Attend African Union Summit’.

66. Lynch, ‘On Ivory Coast Diplomacy’.

67. BBC, ‘Ivory Coast Unity Cabinet Possible, says UN Ambassador’. 11 January 2011.

68. Lynch, ‘On Ivory Coast Diplomacy’.

69. Scott Stearns, ‘African Union Mediator says No Power Sharing Deal in Ivory Coast’. Voice of America News, 25 February 2011.

70. Scott Stearns, ‘African Union Mediator says No Power Sharing Deal in Ivory Coast”. Voice of America News, 25 February 2011

71. Bate Felix, ‘Power-Sharing Wrong for Ivory Coast: Tsvangirai’. Reuters Africa, 7 December 2010.

72. Piccolino, ‘David against Goliath in Côte d'Ivoire?’, 21.

73. Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa’, 472.

74. For an interesting study on the role of neutrality in forging peace agreements, see Svensson, ‘Who Brings Which Peace?’. Svensson finds that biased mediation processes are more likely than neutral mediation processes to lead to elaborated institutional peace arrangements such as power-sharing. This obviously runs counter to the Ivoirian case.

75. Falleti and Lynch, ‘Context and Causal Mechanisms’, 1151.

76. Falleti and Lynch, ‘Context and Causal Mechanisms’, 1151, 1161.

77. Spears, ‘Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa’, 117.

78. This is a point forcefully argued in a recent report by the International Crisis Group, as they caution that ‘[i]f the new government closes off all avenues of democratic political expression to the former president's heirs […] the opposition will regroup and organise abroad and may form a dangerous alliance with pro- Gbagbo military figures also in exile’. See ICG, ‘A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability’, 12.

79. ICG, ‘Continuing the Recovery’, 2.

80. ICG, ‘Continuing the Recovery’, 2, 13.