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Abstract
The Taliban’s attitude towards the Afghan presidential elections of 2014 differed in a very substantial way from their attitude towards previous elections. Already during 2013 there were discussions within the Taliban, about whether it would not be opportune to support a candidate, in order to get a president elected, who would be more amenable to reconciliation talks with the Taliban. However, the Taliban were unable to reach a consensus on the matter, leading to differing responses to the electoral campaign of 2014, with some Taliban networks violently opposed to it, while others decided to support specific candidates. During the second round, the large majority of the Taliban decided to support Ashraf Ghani’s election, but not without serious friction with the movement’s hardliners. The majority of the Taliban’s leaders hoped that once elected, Ghani would start negotiations with them on favourable terms, whereas they believed that an Abdullah presidency would make any negotiated settlement impossible in the future. The new approach seriously alienated the Taliban’s hardliners, laying the ground for a new wave of recriminations among the Taliban, contributing to further internal divisions.
Notes
1. Jalal, Struggle for Pakistan, 373–374.
2. Garcia et al., Colombia, elecciones 2000, 29–30. The FARC deployed similar policies repeatedly in the past, at least according to hostile accounts based on intelligence reports such as Pulido, La selva roja, Ediciones.
3. Ramana, Naxal Challenge, 73–76.
4. This article is based on the two reports which were published as a result of that effort: Giustozzi, ‘Taliban and the 2014 Elections’ and Giustozzi and Mangal, ‘Violence, the Taliban’.
5. The researchers were all experienced Afghan journalists involved in previous research projects who understand the local context, and therefore were in a position to use the contacts already developed to reach potential interviewees within the Taliban. Existing contacts were also used as introductions to new contacts to lay the ground for more comprehensive interviews. The interviewees had to be kept anonymous for their own security and the security of the interviewers. The questionnaires used were structured, but follow-up questions were allowed and encouraged.
6. van Linschoten and Kuehn, Enemy We Created; Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘Taliban at War’; Malkasian, War comes to Garmser; Martin, Intimate War.
7. Osman, ‘Murree Process’; Rubin, ‘What Could Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Death Mean’; Giustozzi and Mangal, ‘Taliban in Pieces’.
8. See Giustozzi, ‘Military Adaptation by the Taliban’; Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘Taliban at War’.
9. Franco and Giustozzi, ‘Revolution in the Counter-revolution’.
10. This picture of the Taliban’s internal alignments was drawn from the interviews with 68 Taliban leaders and cadres in 2013–2014.
11. All the 82 Taliban interviewees were asked about their views concerning elections; see also ‘Longer term consequences of the debates’ below.
12. Fifty community elders were interviewed in 2013 and 2014 and asked about previous experiences of Taliban behaviour during the various electoral campaigns.
13. AIHRC-UNAMA, ‘Joint Monitoring of Political Rights, Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, Third Report, 1 August–21 October 2009’.
14. This estimate is based on United Nations Department of Safety and Security violence statistics and estimates of fatalities inflicted by the Taliban; UNAMA, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence.
15. Interview with senior member of the Peshawar shura, Spring 2013.
16. Interviews with Taliban cadre in Paktia, spring 2014, and with senior member of the Miran Shah shura, spring 2014.
17. ‘Message of Felicitation of Amir-ul-Momineen (May Allah protect him) on the Occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr. August 5, 2013’. Unofficial translation. Available at: http://justpaste.it/3bmi. accessed 15 September 2013.
18. A total of 37 Taliban leaders, cadres and commanders were interviewed in locations spread around Afghanistan.
19. Interviews with 13 cadres and commanders, Spring 2013.
20. Interview with senior member of the Peshawar shura, Spring 2013.
21. Interview with Taliban cadre in Nerkh, Spring 2013.
22. Interview with Taliban cadre in Imam Sahib, Kundun, Spring 2013; interview with Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, Spring 2013.
23. Interview with senior member of the Quetta shura, Spring 2013.
24. Interview with senior member of the Peshawar shura, Spring 2013; Interview with Taliban cadre in Dand-i Ghori, Spring 2013.
25. Interview with elder in Mohammad Agha district, Logar, Spring 2013.
26. Interviews with five cadres of the Peshawar shura in the provinces, Spring 2013.
27. Interviews with five cadres of the Peshawar shura in the provinces, Spring 2013.
28. Interview with Taliban commander in Zabul, Spring 2013.
29. Interview with elder in Sayed Abad, Wardak, Spring 2013; interview with elder in Ajristan district, Ghazni, Spring 2013.
30. Communication with Taliban cadre in Khost, November 2012.
31. Interview with Taliban cadre in Nerkh, Spring 2013.
32. Interview with Taliban cadre in Sayed Abad, Wardak, Spring 2013.
33. Interview with Taliban cadre in Logar, Spring 2013.
34. Interview with senior member of the Quetta shura, Spring 2013.
35. Interview with Taliban cadre in Ghazni, May 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, Spring 2014. Daudzai has been a close collaborator of President Karzai for several years, serving as his chief of staff and minister of interior, as well as ambassador to Iran and Pakistan. He was previously linked to Hizb-i Islami, and hails from Kabul Province.
36. Source within the Peshawar shura, March 2014.
37. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, ‘Notification of Islamic Emirate Regarding the Upcoming Elections’.
38. Twenty-two of the Taliban cadres and leaders interviewed in Spring 2014 confirmed this circumstance.
39. See Henderson, ‘Battle for Iraq’; Berti and Guzansky, ‘Syrian Crisis’; Ryan, ‘New Arab Cold War’.
40. Interview with senior member of the Peshawar shura, Spring 2014.
41. Interviews with Taliban cadre in Kandahar and Taliban cadre in Quetta shura, Spring 2014.
42. Interviews with Taliban cadre in Paktia, Spring 2014, and with senior member of the Miran Shah shura, Spring 2014.
43. Ibid.
44. Interviews with Taliban cadre in Kandahar, Spring 2014, and three Taliban cadres in Quetta shura, Spring 2014.
45. Interviews with senior member of Peshawar shura, Spring 2014; Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, Spring 2014; Taliban cadre in Wardak, Spring 2014; Taliban cadre in Ghazni, Spring 2014; Taliban commander in Wardak, Spring 2014.
46. Interviews with Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, Spring 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in Wardak, Spring 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in Ghazni, Spring 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in Badakhshan, Spring 2014.
47. Interview with Taliban commander in Paktia, Spring 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in Herat, Spring 2014.
48. Interviews with Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, Spring 2014, and Taliban commander in Hessarak, Spring 2014.
49. Source within the Peshawar shura, June 2014.
50. A total of 10 leaders, cadres and commanders of the Peshwar shura were interviewed in Spring 2014 and asked about their views of Ashraf Ghani.
51. Interview with senior member of the Peshawar shura, Spring 2014.
52. A total of 10 commanders, cadres and leaders of the Quetta shura were interviewed in Spring 2014 and asked about the second round of elections.
53. A total of four leaders, cadres and commanders of the Miran Shah shura were interviewed in Spring 2014.
54. Interview with Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, Spring 2014.
55. Interviews with 10 Peshawar shura commanders, cadres and leaders and two Khogyani elders, in Spring 2014.
56. Ibid.
57. See Giustozzi and Mangal, ‘Violence, the Taliban’.
58. Interviews with 10 Quetta shura commanders, cadres and leaders, and five elders, Spring 2014.
59. Interviews with one leader one cadre and two commanders of the Miran Shah shura, Spring 2014.
60. Interview with Taliban commander in Paktia, Spring 2014.
61. See Giustozzi and Mangal, ‘Violence, the Taliban’.
62. Interviews with three ulema from the Ulema councils of the shuras of Quetta, Peshawar and Miran Shah, February 2015.
63. Interview with Taliban cadre in Wardak, Spring 2013.
64. Interviews with 14 Taliban cadres, Spring 2013.
65. Interviews with four Taliban cadres, Spring 2013.
66. Interview with senior member of the Peshawar shura, Spring 2013.
67. Interview with Taliban commander in Dand-i Ghori, Spring 2013.
68. Interview with Taliban cadre in Sayed Abad, Spring 2013.
69. Interview with senior member of the Quetta shura, Spring 2013.
70. Personal communication with Western diplomat in Kabul, May 2015.
71. Taliban commander in Achin, April 2014.
72. Interviews with 13 elders in areas under the control of the Peshawar shura, Spring 2014.
73. Contacts with sources in the Quetta and in the Peshawar shuras, September 2014.
74. See Sinno, Organizations at War, for a study of the organisation of insurgent movements.