A political settlements lens onto Egypt’s critical junctures and cyclic violence (2011–2014)

Abstract

While there is a copious body of literature explaining Egypt’s political trajectory post-Mubarak through the lens of democratisation and transition theory, this paper argues that by using a political settlements lens, a less linear reading of the events can be offered, which highlights several attempts through both peaceful and violent means of arriving at negotiated agreements. The paper analyses the forging of three political settlements, one informal (2011) and two formal (2012, 2013) following the demise of the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the influence of intrinsic, instrumental and resultant violence on power configurations. It argues that the formal political settlement forged in Egypt in 2013 following the ousting of President Morsi cannot be read independently of the exclusionary outcomes of the informal political settlement forged in 2011 and the demise of the Fairmont Agreement of 2012. The paper relies on empirical data, including survey and focus groups undertaken in 2013–2014, complemented with secondary literature in Arabic and English.

Keywords:

• Political settlement
• Egypt
• violence
• uprisings

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Magdy Rezk, Ali Bakr, Mohamed Hussein and Akram Alfy for their important contributions to this paper. This work was supported by the Department for International Development [grant number 78880034], however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government’s official policies. The author would like to thank Jeremy Lind, Jeremy Allouche and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. All qualifiers apply.

Notes

1. Said, ‘Paradox of Transition’, 397–434.

2. Makara, ‘Coup-Proofing, Military Defection’. 334–359.

3. Brown, ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’, 45–58.

4. Darwisheh, ‘Survival, Triumph and Fall’, 108–133.

5. Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt

6. Brown, ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’, 52.

7. Mietzner, ‘Successful and Failed Democratic Transitions’, 435–452.

8. Such as Brown, ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’; and Mietzner, ‘Successful and Failed Democratic Transitions’.

9. Such as El-Shimy, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’, 75–104; Brown, ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’, 45–58; and Hamzawy, ‘On Religion, Politics and Democratic Legitimacy in Egypt’, 401–406.

10. Laws, Political Settlements, Elite Pacts; Khan, Political Settlements and the Governance; and Brown and Gravingholt, Political Settlements in Peacebuilding and State Building.

11. DFID, Building the State and Securing the Peace, 9; Parks and Cole, Political Settlements, 5; and Di John and Putzel, Political Settlements, 6.

12. World Bank, World Development Report 2011.

13. Di John and Putzel, Political Settlements.

14. Laws, Political Settlements, Elite Pacts.

15. Fritz and Menocal, Understanding State Building.

16. Barnes, Renegotiating the Political Settlement; Parks and Cole, Political Settlements; DFID, Building the State and Securing the Peace; and Whaites, States in Development.

17. Moser, ‘Gendered Continuum of Violence and Conflict’.

18. Dutta et al., ‘Structural Violence and Community Based Research and Action’.

19. Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’.

20. Di John and Putzel, Political Settlements, 5.

21. Khan, Political Settlements and the Governance, 59.

22. Laws, Political Settlements, Elite Pacts; DFID, Building the State and Securing the Peace; and Whaites, States in Development.

23. Di John and Putzel, Political Settlements.

24. Evans, ‘A Review of the Evidence’.

25. Schultz-Kraft, Nigeria’s Post-1999 Political Settlement and Violence.

26. For further information on methodology see Tadros, Settling After the Revolts?

27. Ismail, ‘Egyptian Revolution Against the Police’.

28. Hassan, ‘The Watany [Party] Forms a Paramilitary Network’; Salama, ‘An Important Report Highlights’.

29. Rezk, ‘Political Economy of Violence in Egypt’, 117–138.

30. Ibid.

31. Bakr, ‘A Panoramic Perspective on Islamist Movements’, 77–98.

32. DFID, ‘Building Peaceful States and Societies’.

33. Rougier and Lacroix, ‘Introduction: Egypt in Revolution’, 1–18.

34. Abdel Khalek, ‘Voting Yes to the Referendum’.

35. El-Shimy, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’, 18.

36. Hamzawy, ‘On Religion, Politics and Democratic Legitimacy in Egypt’.

37. Rougier and Lacroix, ‘Introduction: Egypt in Revolution’, 5.

38. El Sayed, ‘The Millioniyya of the Last Chance’.

39. Bakry, The Army and the Muslim Brotherhood.

40. Ibid., 93. See also Rabie, Documents of 100 Days, for excellent documentation of the SCAF’s official statements in 2011 in relation to confrontations with youth forces and movements.

41. Mustapha and Abd el Lah, ‘Report of Fact-Finding Committee’.

42. The Islamists six political parties won a clear majority (71 per cent) of seats in Egypt’s free democratic parliamentary elections in December 2011–January 2012. The Freedom and Justice party acquired 46 per cent of the seats, El Nour party acquired 25 per cent and the remaining seats acquired by other Islamist parties (see Rabie, Documents of 100 Days, for detailed election results).

43. Alfy in ‘Rethinking the Youth Bulge’ suggests that among Egyptian youth groups, the Ultras were the only ones with the expertise and organisational capacity to wield violent tactics. The Ultras are a football fan club established in 1997 for Al-Ahly football team, with a large young, broad-based membership and played a prominent role in the Egyptian revolution of 25 January.

44. Said, ‘Paradox of Transition’, 397–434; and Mohamed and El Sheikh ‘Exclusive to Al-Watan’.

45. El-Shimy, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’, 89.

46. A former Prime Minister and Minister of Aviation during Mubarak’s tenure.

47. Shukrallah, ‘Once Election Allies’.

48. Ikhwanweb, Morsi Campaign Press Conference.

49. The clauses are reported by Wael Kandeel, a youth revolutionary member who was party to the Fairmont Agreement. For other first hand perspectives from representatives of non-Islamist political forces who participated in Fairmont, see Kandeel, I Lived Twice; and Abdel-Magueed, Battles of the Constitution. Terms of the deal were also reported in the press in ElBawabh, History of Failure.

50. Rougier and Lacroix, ‘Introduction: Egypt in Revolution’, 142–143.

51. Kandeel, I Lived Twice, 532–533.

52. Brown, ‘The Transition’; and Hamzawy, ‘On Religion, Politics and Democratic Legitimacy in Egypt’.

53. Alfy, ‘Rethinking the Youth Bulge’.

54. Abu el Ghar, Critical Years in Egypt’s History.

55. Alfy, ‘Rethinking the Youth Bulge’.

56. Ibid.

57. Masoud, Counting Islam.

58. Hellyer, ‘How Morsi Let Egyptians Down’.

59. Osman, ‘The President’s Approval Rate’.

60. Hellyer, ‘How Morsi Let Egyptians Down’.

61. Osman, ‘The President’s Approval Rate’.

62. This figure needs a number of qualifiers. First, the sample was the anti-Morsi protestors and hence, they have a particularly high level of grievance vis-à-vis Morsi’s tenure. It excludes the pro-Morsi protestors who would undoubtedly cite increased violence after Morsi’s downfall as being the most severe. Second, the survey was captured at the end of 2013–January 2014 and high levels of violence have been sustained since then in Egypt so if the survey were taken today, it may generate different data. Third, the survey captures not only political violence but people’s experience of everyday forms of violence.

63. Hirst and Kingsley, ‘Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi’.

64. Al-Arian, ‘The Brotherhood after 30 June’.

65. Personal interview, December 2014.

66. Nosseir, ‘The Ugly Truth’.

67. Brown, ‘The Transition’, 15–32.

68. Mohamed Baradie himself acknowledged in an interview with Die Presse that the negotiators arrived at a consensus that Morsi must go after he refused the idea of holding early presidential elections, see Ultsch, ‘El Baradei’.

69. Sorour, ‘El Sissi Asked to Sit with Us’.

70. Abou el Fadl, ‘In the Last Days of his Trial’.

71. El Sherif, What Path will Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Choose?

72. Dunne and Williamson, Egypt’s Unprecedented Instability.

73. See for example Mohamed el Beltagy, the Muslim Brotherhood’s head of the Freedom of Justice and Freedom party in an interview https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a25hAWTt18Q

74. Lynch, ‘Militants Kill 25 Egyptian Policemen’; Keller, Insights From the Wiki; Solomon, ‘Egyptian Army in Sinai’.

75. Trew, ‘Egypt’s Islamists Turn Violent’.

76. Amnesty International, Evidence Points to Torture.

77. Faheem, ‘Islamists Set Up Attacks on Christians’.

78. Agence France Presse, ‘Egypt Headed Towards Civil War’.

79. Osman, The Egyptian Street Sympathy.

80. George, ‘EU’s Ashton says Crucial for All’.

81. Hussein, ‘Was the Egyptian Revolution’.