Gunning for security governance in a resource-rich African state? Interrogating militarisation in a democratic Nigeria

ABSTRACT

This article examines the socio-historical factors that underpin the political sociology of militarism in Nigeria. In spite of subscribing to a democratic constitution and several regional mechanisms that advance democratic values, security governance in Nigeria has been marked by the increasing use of military force in responding to perceived threats posed by armed militias in the oil-rich Niger Delta. I argue that the securitisation of oil is fuels militarisation, facilitated by local, national and international actors. The turn to democratisation and changing conceptions of security have reinforced rather than reined in militarism, which results in a competitive and often violent politics between national, local and global security and military actors over access to and control of oil resources. These dynamics also result in dangerous socio-economic and political consequences for Niger Delta communities.

KEYWORDS:

• Militarism
• militarisation
• securitisation
• security governance
• Niger Delta
• oil

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Obi, ‘Contending Securities in Nigeria’, 121–136.

2. Idemudia, ‘Business and Peace in the Niger Delta’, 41.

3. Krahmann, New Threats, New Actors; Abrahamsen and Williams, ‘Public/Private, Global/Local’, 539–540; Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework, 1–5.

4. See Hameiri and Jones, Governing Borderless Threats, 1–14.

5. Abrahamsen and Williams, ‘Security beyond the State’, 3.

6. Obi, ‘Contending Securities in Nigeria’s Globalized Niger Delta’, 121–136.

7. Abrahamsen and Williams, ‘Security beyond the State’.

8. Frowd and Sandor, ‘Militarism and its Limits’, 2.

9. Luckham, ‘The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa’, 24.

10. Eroukhmanoff, ‘Securitization Theory: An Introduction’.

11. Zwi, ‘Militarism, Militarization, Health and the Third World’, 263.

12. Jacobsen, ‘Maritime Security and Capacity Building’, 237–256.

13. See Abrahamsen, ‘Defensive Development’.

14. Ibid.

15. Martinelli, ‘Towards People-Centered Security Sectors in Africa’, 1–2.

16. Levy, ‘What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military?’, 76.

17. Wiley, ‘Militarizing Africa and African Studies’, 153–155.

18. United States Africa Command: https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command [Accessed 27 February 2019].

19. See Sandor, ‘Tightly Packed’.

20. See Iñiguez de Heredia, ‘Militarism, States and Resistance’.

21. Fisher and Anderson, ‘Authoritarianism and the Securitisation of Development in Africa’, 131–132.

22. Abrahamsen, ‘Return of the Generals?’, 25.

23. Soremekun and Obi, ‘The Changing Pattern of Private Foreign Investments’, 5–20.

24. UNDP, Niger Delta Human Development Report; Al Jazeera, ‘Poverty Persists in Oil-Rich Niger Delta Region’.

25. Idemudia, ‘Business and Peace in the Niger Delta’, 46.

26. Boro, The Twelve Day Revolution.

27. Utebor, ‘Applause as Bayelsa cCelebrates Adaka Boro’.

28. Ikelegbe, ‘The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta’, 214.

29. Osaghae, ‘The Ogoni Uprising’, 325–344.

30. Ukeje, ‘Changing the Paradigm of Pacification’, 83–98.

31. Bassey, ‘Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta’, 80–81.

32. Omeje, High Stakes and Stakeholders; Ezirim, ‘Oil Crimes, National Security and the Nigerian State’, 80–85.

33. Examples of such task forces include the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) which was instrumental in suppressing Ogoni protests in the 1990s, followed by the Niger Delta Joint Military Task Force which is still operational.

34. Mustapha, Conflicts and Security Governance, 13.

35. Watts and Ibaba, ‘Turbulent Oil’, 1–19; Ebiede, ‘Beyond Rebellion’, 25–46; Obi and Oriola, The Unfinished Revolution in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.

36. Ibeanu, ‘Janus Unbound’, 163–167; Owolabi and Okwechime, ‘Oil and Security in Nigeria’, 1–40.

37. Ibeanu, ‘Oiling the Friction’, 20.

38. Ross, The Oil Curse; Shaxson, Poisoned Wells.

39. Bappah, ‘Why Nigeria Should Consider’, 6.

40. Abrahamsen and Williams, ‘Security beyond the State’.

41. Ibeanu, ‘Oiling the Friction’, 20.

42. Mustapha, Conflicts and Security Governance, 13.

43. Ebiede, ‘Beyond Rebellion’, 25–46; Oluwaniyi, ‘The Challenge of Reintegration’, 8–10.

44. Ebiede, ‘Militants are Devastating Nigeria’s Oil Industry’.

45. Idemudia, ‘Business and Peace in the Niger Delta’, 41–61.

46. Ibid., 52.

47. Ibid., 53.

48. Brock, ‘Nigeria took 40 pct of Shell Security Spend’; Hirsch and Vidal, ‘Shell Spending Millions of Dollars on Security’.

49. Examples of such joint military operations in the Niger Delta include: Operation Restore Hope, Operation Hakuri, Operation Flush, Operation Crocodile Smile, Operation Pulo Shield and Operation Python Dance.

50. Given the opaque nature of their operations, it is difficult to come by exact figures of money lost to corruption, collusion or outright malfeasance involving state officials and oil companies. Some media reports and leaked documents give an idea of the huge amounts involved. For example see: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-oil-idUSBRE96T0EO20130730; https://panamapapers.investigativecenters.org/nigeria-oil/ [Accessed 28 February 2019].

51. Soriwei et al., ‘Buhari Orders Military to Crush’.

52. Vanguard, ‘Buhari to Niger Delta Insurgents’.

53. Obi, ‘Oil and the Post-Amnesty Program’, 249–263.

54. Ibid.; Eke, ‘No Pay, No Peace’, 750–764.

55. Ibid.

56. Onuoha, ‘The Resurgence of Militancy’, 4–5.

57. Ibid., 4–7; Schultz-Kraft, ‘Understanding Organized Violence’, 613–627.

58. Onoyume, ‘Amy Ends Crocodile Smile II’.

59. Ogundipe, ‘Niger Delta Avengers Calls Off Ceasefire’.

60. Amunwa, Dirty Work.

61. Soriwei et al., ‘Buhari Orders Military to Crush’.

62. Olufemi, ‘Nigeria Spends N4.62 Trillion’.

63. This Day Newspaper, ‘Tackling Insecurity in the Niger Delta’.

64. budgIT, ‘2018 Proposed Security Budget’, 3.

65. Ukwu, ‘Nigeria Army Calls for Establishment of Defence Trust/Support Fund’.

Additional information

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Cyril Obi

Cyril Obi is a Programme Director at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and leads the African Peace-building Network (APN) and Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa programmes. He has published extensively on the politics of natural resources (oil), and serves on the editorial boards of several reputable international journals. He is a research associate of the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria.