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ABSTRACT
Contestation over land, resource access and rents has long underpinned both sub-national conflicts and centre-periphery tensions in Indonesia. This paper explores resource conflict management in Indonesia, with a particular focus on the political economy of Riau province. It argues a centre-periphery bargain was struck at the onset of democratisation to redistribute a larger proportion of oil and gas rents to Riau, de-escalating support for the emergent Free Riau Movement. Through a combination of national and sub-national political settlements between narrow but adaptive coalitions of political-private sector elite interests, these coalitions have maintained their power and control over resource rents in three key sectors: oil and gas, timber, and palm oil. Brokers have been instrumental in maintaining the influence of these coalitions over time – helping to co-opt households into industry supply chains, who then support aligned political elites. This has produced relative stability in the political order in Riau, but one which displays the tenets of illiberalism in which the space for contestation is limited and social interests tend to acquiesce for small gains.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Claire Q. Smith, Lars Waldorf, Tom Jarvis, Terence Lee, participants in the Comparative Peacebuilding in Asia network and the anonymous reviewers of this article for their insightful comments and inputs. We would also like to thank Azifah Astrina for her research assistance, and the interviewees who have been generous with their time to share their experience and insights. The most recent round field research for this article was funded by the Melbourne School of Government grant for the States, Frontiers and Conflict Project.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. Azca, ‘Security Forces in the Conflict in Ambon’; Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia; Davidson, ‘The Politics of Violence on the Indonesian Periphery’; Diprose, ‘Decentralisation, Power Sharing and Conflict Dynamics’; McRae, A Few Poorly Organised Men; Tajima, The Institutional Origins of Communal Violence; Sangaji, ‘Security Forces and Regional Violence’; and Wilson, Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia.
2. Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict; Herriman, The Entangled State; Smith, ‘Illiberal Peacebuilding’; and Varshney et al., ‘Patterns of Collective Violence’.
3. Indonesia’s National Violence Monitoring System (NMVS) – Available at http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id/ [Accessed 21 April 2018]; and Pierskalla and Sacks, ‘Unpacking the Effects of Decentralised Governance’.
4. The most common forms of violent conflict are captured by Indonesia’s National Violence Monitoring System (NMVS or SNPK in Bahasa Indonesia). This monitoring system draws on the systematic review of newspaper reports on violence incidence across four categories: (i) conflict (including conflict triggered by problems related to natural resources, governance, separatism, local elections, identity and popular justice); (ii) domestic violence; (iii) crime; and (iv) violence during law-enforcement. See http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id/About/.
5. Aspinall, ‘Sovereignty, the Successor State’; Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion; McCarthy, ‘Changing to Gray’; Smith, ‘Illiberal Peacebuilding’; and Schultze, ‘The Struggle for an Independent Aceh’.
6. Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict.
7. Many of the incidents that do entail physical violence of some kind involve individually targeted violence or result from clashes with security forces. KPA, Catatan Tahun Terakhir 2016; KPA, Catatan Tahun Terakhir 2018.
8. Saleh, Dinamika Perlawanan Masyarakat Riau terhadap Negara; Wee, ‘Ethno-nationalism in Process’.
9. See for example, Smith et al., ‘Illiberal Peacebuilding in Asia’; McCarthy and Farrelly, ‘Peri-conflict peace’; Jarvis, ‘The stabilising impacts of corruption’; Smith, ‘Liberal and Illiberal Peace-buliding’; Lee, ‘Political Orders and Peacebuilding’, among others.
10. KPA, Catatan Tahun Terakhir 2018, 38.
11. McCarthy, ‘Changing to Gray’.
12. See for example, Smith, ‘Illiberal Peacebuilding’; Smith et al., ‘Illiberal Peacebuilding in Asia’; and the other authors in the Conflict, Security & Development Special Issue on the theme.
13. See for example Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace’; Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’.
14. Diprose et al., ‘Regulating Sustainable Minerals’.
15. McCarthy, ‘Changing to Gray’.
16. Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders.
17. Smith, ‘Illiberal Peacebuilding’.
18. Ibid., 1517.
19. Gibson, Boundary Control.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. The Javanese account for nearly 40 per cent nationally.
23. Aspinall, ‘Democratization’.
24. Ibid.
25. For these international actors in the ICG, decentralisation represented a technocratic intervention that would hold policy makers downwardly accountable to populations in contrast to the highly centralised and coercive authoritarian government of the past. McCarthy, ‘Changing to Gray’.
26. See for example, Aspinall, ‘Sovereignty, the Successor State’; Feith and Lev, ‘The End of the Indonesian Rebellion’; Harvey, Permesta: Half a Rebellion; and Wee, ‘Ethno-nationalism in Process’.
27. Diprose, ‘Passing on the Challenges’.
28. Diprose et al., ‘Transnational Policy Influence’.
29. Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia.
30. McCarthy, ‘Changing to Gray’.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Khan, ‘Rent-Seeking as a Process’.
34. Di John and Putzel, ‘Political Settlements: Issues Paper’.
35. Khan, ‘Political Settlements’.
36. Khan, ‘Political Settlements’, 1; and Di John and Putzel, ‘Political Settlements: Issues Paper’.
37. Di John and Putzel, ‘Political Settlements: Issues Paper’, 4.
38. Ibid.
39. Parks and Cole, ‘Political Settlements: Implications for International Development’.
40. See for example, Kelsall and Heng, ‘Inclusive Healthcare and the Political Settlement’.
41. DeWaal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa.
42. Parks and Cole, ‘Political Settlements: Implications for International Development’.
43. Tesky, ‘Indonesia and the Political Settlements Trap’.
44. Kelsall argues that, at the broadest level, Indonesia constitutes a hybrid political settlement in which bureaucratic structures are permeated by patronage and nepotism, but civil servants ‘are not entirely neglectful of their duties, and pockets of excellence may be found’. ‘Thinking and Working with Political Settlements’, 5.
45. Rao, ‘Citizens’ Role in Political Settlements’.
46. Di John and Putzel, ‘Political Settlements: Issues Paper’.
47. Dressel and Dinnen also highlight the importance of differentiating between short- and long-term arrangements, and the degree of inclusiveness of such settlements, as well as considering the implications of this for conflict management and economic development. ‘Political Settlements; Old Wines in New Bottles’.
48. See NMVS, available at http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id/ [Accessed 21 April 2018].
49. See for example, Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village; Geertz, The Religion of Java; James, ‘Return of the Broker’; Lindquist, ‘Brokers and Brokerage’; Mosse and Lewis, ‘Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage’; and Wolf, ‘Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society’.
50. Barkey, Empire of Difference; Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients.
51. Mosse and Lewis, ‘Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage’.
52. Grynaviski, ‘Brokering Cooperation’.
53. Walter, ‘Business, Brokers and Borders’.
54. Spiro et al., ‘Extended Structures of Mediation’.
55. Grynaviski, ‘Brokering Cooperation’.
56. Meehan and Plonski, ‘Borderlands, Brokers and Peacebuilding’.
57. Cf. Lindquist, ‘Brokers and Brokerage’.
58. Badan Pusat Statistic 2017. Population data, Available at: www.bps.go.id [Accessed 11 November 2017].
59. Long, ‘Bordering on Immoral’.
60. Badan Pusat Statistik, Gross Regional Domestic Product.
61. Discovered in the 1940s and with production beginning in the early-mid 1950s, two of the oil fields Minas and Duri in Riau were the most productive for all of Indonesia. See Arndt, ‘Oil and the Indonesian Economy’.
62. Central Sumatra (which included the Riau regency) was one of the strongest bases for the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) set up in 1958 by rebel regional military commanders. Kahin and Kahin (in Subversion as Foreign Policy) detail the roots of this movement in dissatisfaction among regional military commanders over the first decade of Indonesia’s independence with a faltering national economy and insufficient political and economic autonomy rather than oil rent distribution per se (as oil extraction had only begun in Riau in the few years prior). Dividing Central Sumatra into three provinces (including Riau) was one response to this movement, along with a military campaign.
63. Robinson, ‘Rawan is as Rawan Does’.
64. See for example Auty, ‘Natural Resources and Civil Strife’; Collier and Hoeffler, ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’; Collier and Hoeffler, ‘The Political Economy of Secession’; Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict’; Fearon, ‘Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others’; Ross, ‘What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War’; and Ross, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War’.
65. Ross especially interrogates the work of Collier and Hoeffler (‘The Political Economy of Secession’) on the opportunities presented from insurgents for exportable resources, and Le Billon (‘A Land Cursed by Its Wealth’) and Collier and Hoeffler on resource wealth in the periphery where ethnic minorities reside as driving efforts at forming a separatist state, among others.
66. Ross, ‘What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War’; and Ross, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War’.
67. Lindblad, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia’.
68. Arndt, ‘Oil and the Indonesian Economy’; and Lindblad, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia’.
69. Suryadi, Gerakan Riau Merdeka; and Mubyarto, ‘Perbandingan Ekonomi Regional’.
70. More recently, logging and the development of mega-plantations in forest lands for pulp and paper (and later palm oil) continue this process through informal relations between security forces and supply chain actors. Riau has seen similar trends to that of West Kalimantan, in which Eilenberg (‘Frontier Constellations’) finds a clear connection between the development of large-scale palm oil plantations and the increased military presence along the Indonesian-Malaysian border.
71. Agitation from the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in nearby Aceh province was growing in concert with increased oil extraction. See Suryadi, Gerakan Riau Merdeka; and Mubyarto, ‘Perbandingan Ekonomi Regional’.
72. Suryadi, Gerakan Riau Merdeka; and Mubyarto, ‘Perbandingan Ekonomi Regional’.
73. One of Sutowo’s central tasks was to ensure that the taxes and royalties paid by foreign oil companies were channelled through Pertamina. He also ensured that Pertamina and other companies, such as Caltex, privileged Suharto’s family and inner circle in the contracts for shipping and other services in oil extraction, and in contracts to provide the oil monopoly with services. See Glassburner, ‘In the Wake of General Ibnu’, 1100; and R. Fadillah, ‘Ibnu Sutowo, Raja Minyak Orde Baru dan Sengkarut Pertamina’ [Ibnu Sutowo, The King of New Order Oil and Pertamina Chaos]. Merdeka.com 28 October 2013. Available at: https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/ibnu-sutowo-raja-minyak-orde-baru-dan-sengkarut-pertamina.html [Accessed 28 October 2017].
74. Mubyarto, ‘Perbandingan Ekonomi Regional’.
75. Saleh, ‘Inisiasi Gerakan Sosial’, 179–182.
76. See GeNTA, ‘Caltex Mengekalkan Kemiskinan’ [Caltex Perpetuates Poverty], GeNTA, 20–27 June 1998.
77. This included the Forum Keluarga Besar Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia [Indonesian Youth Students Unity Action Forum – FKB-KAPPI), Forum Eksponen 66 [the 66 Exponent Forum], the Supreme Riau Malay Customary Council [Majelis Kerapatan Adat-Lembaga Adat Melayu Riau – MKA-LAMR] and a group of students from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Riau.
78. Riau Reform Monitoring Group [Lembaga Pemantau Reformasi Riau – LPPR].
79. See GeNTA, ‘LPPR Himbau Seluruh Kekuatan Reformasi Duduki Caltex Tgl 25ʹ [LPPR Appeals to All Driving the Reform Movement to Occupy Caltex on the 25th], GeNTA, 20–27 June 1998.
80. See Riau Pos on Syarwan Hamid’s stance. Riau Pos, ‘Akan Berhadap dengan ABRI: Syarwan Soal Rencana Pendudukan Caltex’ [They Will Face the Indonesian Military: Syarwan Solves the Plan to Occupy Caltex’s Offices]. Riau Pos, 25 June 1998.
81. Suryadi, Gerakan Riau Merdeka, 85–86.
82. Ibid., 81–118.
83. Ross, ‘What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War’.
84. See Suryadi, ‘Gerakan Riau Merdeka’; and Aspinall, ‘Sovereignty, the Successor State’, among others.
85. Suryadi, Gerakan Riau Merdeka.
86. The new Province of Riau Islands was eventually established in 2002 under Law 25/2002.
87. Interview, Former Minister of Home Affairs, April 2018.
88. Ross, ‘What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War’; and Ross, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War’.
89. On Aceh, see Robinson, ‘Rawan is as Rawan Does’; Aspinall, ‘Sovereignty, the Successor State’; and Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion.
90. See for example Van Klinken, ‘Patronage Democracy’; and Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken, ‘Introduction’.
91. Hadiz, Localising Power.
92. Aspinall, ‘The Triumph of Capital’.
93. Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia.
94. Aspinall and van Klinken, The State and Illegality in Indonesia.
95. Schulte Nordholt, ‘From Contest State to Patronage Democracy’.
96. Lindblad, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia’.
97. Matthews, State of the Forest, 23.
98. Multiple interviews with villagers and politico-economic elites, Riau, July 2017.
99. Matthews State of the Forest, 31, and Interviews in Riau, July 2017.
100. Cukong or toke often denote the Chinese descent of many brokers or middlemen, but are a colloquial term that has evolved to refer to brokers more generally. There are a range of other colloquial terms to describe these middlemen such as Pak Haji (a person who has undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca), which indicates their Muslim ties and Malay networks.
101. Multiple interviews, civil society representatives and villagers, Riau, July 2017.
102. Barber, ‘Forest, Fire and Confrontation’.
103. Interviews with civil society organisation representatives, Riau, July 2017.
104. Diprose has shown that when groups are economically marginalised and this is aligned with political inequalities and exclusion, then the risk of violence is greater. However, in Riau such additional income decreased these inequalities in Riau. See ‘Decentralisation, Power Sharing and Conflict Dynamics’.
105. Interviews, with civil society organisation representatives, Riau, July 2017.
106. Between 2000–2005, the average income of a farmer with a land of 0.5–1 ha was Rp 3.9 million rupiah per month – while a farmer with land for over 1 ha could earn over Rp5.5 million rupiah per month. Even the highest income from the agricultural sector during this period was on average Rp18 million per month. See Badan Pusat Statistik, Rata-rata Jumlah Pendapatan Perkapita.
107. Badan Pusat Statistik, Susenas (National Socio-economic Survey) data, 2002.
108. Multiple interviews with villagers and political and economic elites, Riau, July 2017.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Interviews with villagers and brokers, Riau, July 2017.
112. Burgers and Susanti, ‘Oil Palm Expansion in Riau Province’.
113. KPA, Catatan Akhir Tahun 2018.
114. Law No. 23/2014 on Local Government (revised in Law No.9/2015).
115. Brad et al., ‘Contested Territorialization’.
116. Ibid.
117. McCarthy, ‘Changing to Grey’.
118. Multiple interviews with civil society organisation representatives and villagers, July 2017.
119. Daemeter Consulting, Indonesian Oil Palm Smallholder Farmers.
120. Multiple interviews with civil society organisation representatives and villagers, Riau, July 2017.
121. For the ways brokers augment power, see also Grynaviski, ‘Brokering Cooperation’.
122. Multiple interviews with villagers and political and economic elites, Riau, July 2017.
123. Tans, ‘Mobilizing Resources, Building Coalitions’.
124. KPU Propinsi Riau [Riau Province Elections Commission], Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Gubernur.
125. This partly resembles the ways governors have used their control of the sub-national political economy to sustain their sub-national ‘fiefdoms’ in Argentina and Mexico (see Gibson, Boundary Control). But in Riau, new actors can enter politics and gain office, but are influenced by the political economy of extraction to gain and maintain power.
126. Diprose et al. ‘Regulating Sustainable Minerals’.
127. KPU Propinsi Riau, Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Gubernur.
128. His daughter is the CEO of Septa group which own electricity companies, palm oil plantations and palm oil processing mills. She was also the Chair of Riau Young Entrepreneurs Association from 2014–2017 and joined provincial politics in 2016.
129. Irawati Wardany, ‘Ex-governor Gets 4 years’. The Jakarta Post, 29 August 2008. Accessed at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/29/exgovernor-gets-4-years.html?1 [Accessed 19 September 2017].
130. Interviewees believed that, even after leaving politics, he still had considerable political influence, for example through securing a position for his wife as the chairperson of the Riau legislative council in 2014.
131. Further, his wife’s brother was the head of the Riau Regional Revenue Office.
132. Interviews, Riau, 14 July 2017.
133. He was a member of the Bengalis District legislative council (1999–2001) and the Rokan Hilir District legislative council (2001–2005), and then was popularly elected as Rokan Hilir District Head (2011–2014).
134. He was renowned for putting members of his family into strategic positions in the Riau provincial government such as the Employment Office, the Revenue Office, the Public Works Office, the Education Office and the Financial Bureau of the Provincial Secretariat – all had previously held positions in the Rokan Hilir district government. He also held senior leadership positions in the Riau branch of the Golkar party. See also A. Dipa, ‘Court Sentences Riau Governor to 6 years in Prison for Corrupt’. The Jakarta Post, 25 June 2015. Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/25/court-sentences-riau-governor-6-years-prison-corrupt.html [Accessed 19 September 2017].
135. Another brother is the head of the Riau Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) and his nephew holds a number of leadership positions in several youth organisations.
136. He was supported by the National Manadate Party (PAN), while his running mate for deputy was backed by Golkar.
137. This shift away from new concessions has rendered him popular with environmentally concerned civil society groups.
138. Zamzami, Konflik SDA di Riau Tertinggi di Indonesia.
139. Arumingtyas and Zamzami, Konflik Lahan 2016.
140. McCarthy et al., ‘Swimming Upstream’; and Rist et al., ‘Livelihood Impacts of Oil Palm’.
141. This includes a Minister of Forestry Decree and the 1994 Riau Spatial Plan. EoF, Penghancuran Berlanjut oleh APRIL/RGE.
142. No. 180/Menhut-II/2013.
143. Multiple interviews in Riau, July 2017. See also EoF, Penghancuran Berlanjut oleh APRIL/RGE.
144. Arumingtyas and Zamzami, Konflik Lahan 2016.
145. KPA, Catatan Tahun Terakhir 2016, and KPA, Catatan Tahun Terakhir 2018.
146. Diprose et al. ‘Regulating Sustainable Minerals’.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Rachael Diprose
Formerly of the University of Oxford, Dr Rachael Diprose is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. Her research focuses on the political economy and sociology of development, conflict management and transformation, and on the dynamics of multi-level governance and resource management.
Muhammad Najib Azca
Dr Muhammad Najib Azca lectures in the Department of Sociology at the University of Gadjah Mada and directs the University’s Centre for Security and Peace Studies in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He completed his research Masters at the Australian National University and his PhD at the University of Amsterdam.