Youth inclusion in peace processes: the case of the Bangsamoro transition authority in Mindanao, Philippines

ABSTRACT

Drawing on the post-accord case of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) in the region of Muslim Mindanao, this research examines how far youth’s vertical integration in formal political institutions is influenced by both structural association and youth’s agential capacity. While association with the formal structural elements enables elite youth’s entry into the formal space, the latter’s agential capacity shapes the nature of that inclusion over the long-term. Positive intergenerational collaboration and interdependence between Moro elders and the Moro youth supports this process, although inclusion remains limited to only a minority of the youthful population. New empirical data collected through primary research with the elders and young Moro ministers in the BTA is used to demonstrate the workings of our argument around the importance of intergenerational collaboration and support from the elders, for a wider inclusion of young people’s skills and voices into post-conflict governance institutions.

KEYWORDS:

• Youth
• inclusion
• agency
• structure
• Bangsamoro Mindanao

Introduction

One of the problems in post-conflict societies is that of youth¹ exclusion from the formal political structures. This exclusionary practice augments young people’s invisibility to the ruling political elites.² As a result, some young people resort to informal forms of power for survival and self-representation, applying a form of subaltern agency to navigate their everyday life.³ Youth re-marginalisation in post-war societies is quite common, and these experiences tend to push youth to engage in new forms of violence and criminality.⁴ Many feel betrayed, or are disappointed with the peace dividends that are unforthcoming due to a lack of trickle-down economic effects.⁵ Simply put, youth ‘can’t eat peace’.⁶

In response to this reality of exclusion, the policy of youth inclusion in formal post-conflict governance has been emphasised in both the scholarly and policy literature. Scholarly literature recognises that the older generation of politicians, and the formal systems of governance view young people as a threat, and approach them with both suspicion and mistrust.⁷ This lack of trust can often result in the failures of post-conflict peacebuilding through the exclusion of youth from mainstream politics. Adult-led peacebuilding processes therefore need to change their imagery of youth from troublemakers to peacemakers, to ensure both youth inclusion, and long-term peacebuilding success.⁸ This is because by ‘enabling youth political participation… [the adults can] contribute to more inclusive and representative institutions, and governance structures’.⁹

Inclusion and true citizenship in civilian society is linked to how the youth are integrated across the vertical and horizontal realms of society. Vertical integration implies youth engagement in governance through their participation in decision-making processes at the community and the national levels. Horizontal integration involves involvement with peers, through supportive friendships, and the membership of youth-led, and youth-focused associations.¹⁰ Studies have found that a denser associational life among the youth can enhance both horizontal and vertical social capital.¹¹

The focus of this paper is on a single case study of vertical youth inclusion in the formal sphere during post-conflict transition, using empirical data collected through primary research with the elders and the young Moro representatives in the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA).¹² The BTA is a governing body appointed to provide leadership and oversight regarding the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) established in March 2019. The BARMM resulted from the multiple rounds of peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).¹³ The peace negotiation formally started in 2001, during the Arroyo administration, with informal explorations as early as 1986.¹⁴ About 15 per cent of the eighty-member BTA includes formal representation from young people aged less than 30 years of age.¹⁵ These ‘youth ministers’ are nominees either of the Philippine government, or from the MILF. They come from diverse backgrounds, and their representation on the BTA has important implications for the future of the autonomous region, and for the future of the Moro youth more widely.

The main argument of this article is that vertical youth inclusion in formal structures during post-accord transitions is influenced by horizontal processes. Such inclusion is mediated through the formal structural associations and through informal youth agential capacity. We define structural associations as the extent to which the youth relate with revolutionary groups, governmental bodies, and local governance structures, and to those in power who are usually from a different generation. Agential capacity refers to the youth’s social skills, technical skills, and academic background which offer valuable material and non-material resources for advancing and managing post-conflict structures and associations, and for managing the transition of power to the next generation.

In this conceptualisation, we follow Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory that rejects the dichotomy between structure and agency, and instead, articulates the connection between these two concepts as a basis for analysing human behaviour at a particular time and place.¹⁶ In this paper, we highlight the structure-agency binary and its interplay with inclusion-exclusion dynamics of intergenerational power relations using the BTA example.¹⁷ We conclude that even when the youth are formally included in post-conflict peace governance, such inclusion does not automatically guarantee the larger youth population’s access to the benefits of post-conflict policies. We also offer core reflections on youth inclusion in the BTA, and its implications for the future of intergenerational relations in Mindanao, Philippines.

The article proceeds as follows. After explaining the research design, data and methods, we present the historical arguments on the role of young people in the Bangsamoro conflict through combat participation, and informal civil society monitoring of ceasefires. This is followed by an examination of how formal inclusion in the post-accord governance arrangements in the Bangsamoro transpired. This leads us to the analysis around structural associations that advance youth’s vertical inclusion, and the role of agential capacity as a form of horizontal integration. We find that although positive intergenerational dynamics have supported young Moros’ formal participation in the transitional government, this participation is premised on an adherence to the cultural prerequisites around deference towards the elders, and conformity with the existing power hierarchies. These findings have important implications for gauging whether a genuine transformation in intergenerational relations is underway. They encourage us to consider whether a more elite-focused inclusion of the youth agenda in the BTA in fact creates further barriers for wider youth participation in peacebuilding in Mindanao over the longer-term.

Methodology

Data were collected during May 2020 and July 2021 through phone calls and online interviews due to the COVID-19 pandemic that prevented in-person fieldwork.¹⁸ Initial information about the participants was secured from the BARMM Official website. A total of 28 in-depth interviews were conducted. This sample included 15 young Moro ministers, young Moro civil society leaders, and young BARMM employees. We also collected ten interviews with senior ministers from amongst the government, and the MILF nominees. Three repeat interviews were conducted with the young Moro ministers. Interviews lasted between 30 to 45 minutes and the research team used a mix of Cebuano, Filipino, and English, depending on the preference of the participants. We developed a semi-structured questionnaire to guide the interview process. Questions probed the experiences of the young ministers in the BTA. More specifically, we asked participants about (1) their engagements in the BARMM’s peace process prior to their appointment in the BTA; (2) the factors that facilitated their appointment to the BTA; (3) challenges faced while serving as BTA members; and (4) their relationship with the older BTA members. We used snowball sampling to track down research participants, who were not members of the BTA but could offer insights on its membership and operations. To further the triangulation process, reports from the newspapers, civil society organisations, and other media platforms were also included. Given the limited sample, the results presented here offer only a preliminary analysis that can guide future studies.

Background of the Bangsamoro conflict and the role of youth

The conflict between the Philippine government and Moro groups in the Mindanao region has a long history rooted in issues of economic inequality, land dispossession, and the nationalist aspirations of the Moro Muslims for political independence.¹⁹ The struggle to realise the land of the Moros, or Bangsamoro, saw two prominent insurgencies, first led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) (1970–1996), and later the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from 1987–2014. After six years of conflict, the Tripoli Agreement (1976) was signed, through which the Philippine government negotiated the first ceasefire with the MNLF.²⁰

This peace deal created fractures within the Moro movement, and gave rise to a separate faction: the MILF. Reasons for this split, include political, ideological and leadership differences. Weakening of group cohesion saw the MNLF gradually open up to the prospect of peace negotiations with the government. Under Fidel Ramos, the government launched a national amnesty programme which encouraged wider civil society participation. Public consultations were held under the auspices of a National Unification Commission, that eventually led to a ceasefire. This lull in the conflict did not last long. Between 1998–2001, the MILF was targeted militarily by the Estrada government as it launched an all-out war. In February 2001, another shift in the government’s strategy saw the Arroyo government pursuing an all out peace with the MILF under the Executive Order Number Three.²¹

Young Moros have been involved in the Moro armed struggle as combatants and as non-combatant supporters for various separatist armed groups like the MNLF and later the MILF. Due to the community-based character of these Moro armed groups, families and communities were often part of young people’s decision to take up arms voluntarily, and to join the rebellion.²² With regard to the peace process, youth involvement has been mainly in the informal sphere. Among other roles, youth have participated in various civil society organisations involved in ceasefire monitoring. Since 1976, when the first ceasefire was negotiated with the MNLF, and until 2014, when a peace agreement was signed with the MILF, Mindanao had witnessed nearly 20 years of ceasefire monitoring punctuated by periods of military escalation. After the all-out war against the MILF during the time of President Estrada in 2000, President Arroyo tried to engage the MILF in peace negotiations through the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain in 2007. This process was halted when the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional,²³ triggering another round of armed confrontation between the MILF and the Philippine armed forces.

Peace talks and informal civil society involvement

During these numerous rounds of peace talks and the temporary cessation in hostilities, Mindanao witnessed a greater degree of external involvement, and civil society activism, supported by international actors through an international monitoring team (IMT), and the presence of various civil society groups like the Asia Foundation and Non-violent Peace Force (NP), among others. Civil society groups helped the Arroyo government’s engagement with the MILF, through consultations leading up to the August 2001 cessation of hostilities. These groups also agitated for the restoration of the ceasefire in July 2003, after the Arroyo administration’s assault on the MILF’s Buliok complex. Through their involvement in the Local Monitoring Teams established under the Cessation of Hostilities agreement, and through their own parallel ceasefire monitoring efforts like the Bantay ceasefire, these civil society groups have offered impartial public analysis of any ceasefire violations.²⁴

Civil society inclusion in peace processes can range from the involvement of elites in brokering peace agreements, Track II diplomacy through different forms of community driven engagements, and workshops, to more mass-based involvement, including protests, demonstrations or street actions.²⁵ Track II diplomacy in particular has been instrumental in generating inclusive peace negotiations,²⁶ given the predominance of male leaders and elite political groups in negotiating the peace.²⁷ The durability of peace agreements increase when civil society actors including youth are involved.²⁸ Youth inclusion can also enhance the legitimacy of peace agreements in the eyes of the younger generation.²⁹

Youth are involved in peace processes through a variety of informal activities, ranging from conflict resolution, peace-making to mediation, and dialogue. For example, in South Sudan, the Anataban campaign, used advocacy, workshops, and information sessions to encourage youth to hold leaders accountable. As an artist collective, this campaign used the arts to raise awareness, and to foster public discussions around local peacebuilding, government accountability, and reparations for social injustices. Through this campaign, the youth have used social media campaigns to put pressure on the leaders to implement the 2018 peace agreement. In other examples, the Somaliland Youth Development and Voluntary Organisation (SOYDAVO) has played an important mediation role between the various warring clans. In Afghanistan, the National Youth Jirga brought together 100 representatives from all 34 provinces to discuss the role of youth in the Afghan peace process.³⁰

In Mindanao, civil society inclusion has taken place through both local level community engagements and through workshops, and Track II diplomacy, i.e. in the informal sphere. Initially, Christian groups across the NGO, development, business, and faith-based organisations were more prominent. For example, Kusog Mindanaw (Mindanao Force), an umbrella organisation, advocated with Macapagal-Arroyo, while she was Vice President, to name an all-Mindanao peace panel with the MILF.³¹ In the post-Arroyo phase, ‘peace zones’ that are demilitarised geographic areas where civilians and non-combatants were protected from violent conflict exchanges between the army and the armed groups, were formed.³² These enabled the creation of physical spaces for strengthening community security arrangements amongst the war affected communities. To monitor these spaces, a local model of ceasefire monitoring was developed. As a community-based insurgency, the MILF was particularly well regulated through such informal community level civil society monitoring of the movements of the various armed actors.³³

The civilian peace monitors were diverse, including returning evacuees, women, and even former combatants.³⁴ Women in particular were better able to maintain inter-ethnic alliances to monitor combatant movements.³⁵ As part of civilian monitoring teams, women activists documented and submitted violations to the relevant peace panels of the government and the MILF. They also collaborated with local leaders to enforce disciplinary sanctions. For example, the armed clashes between the 112-base command of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) and the Philippine Army on 18 October 2011, in Al Barka, Basilan led to court martial proceedings for the concerned military officers.³⁶ In recognition of their ability to cross ideological, political and ethnic division to create locally negotiated truce, in 2012, for the first time, two women were included in the MILF peace panels with the government.³⁷

Formal civil society inclusion and the role of youth

The formalisation of civil society inclusion progressed as the peace process with the MILF gained traction. The Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed between the Philippine government and the MILF on 27 March 2014. It was negotiated under the auspices of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) created through the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed on 15 October 2012.³⁸ The BTC crafted the Bangsamoro Basic Law, which provides the legal basis for creating the autonomous region. Due to renewed clashes between the MILF and the armed forces, and on account of its length and complexity, the bill was approved by the Congress only in July 2018, as the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). This law paved the way for the establishment of the BARMM, and the subsequent abolishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), that had been created after the Tripoli Agreement of 1976.³⁹ A plebiscite held during January-February 2019, voted in favour of the BARMM’s creation in March 2019. Based on the plebiscite’s result, BARMM became a geographically expanded region compared to its predecessor, ARMM.

With a 4.4 million strong population (2020 figures), the BARMM includes three component cities, 116 municipalities, and 2,590 barangays spread across the five provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi‑Tawi. Cotabato City is the regional centre.⁴⁰ Since 2019, the BARMM has been under a six-year transition period⁴¹ managed by an 80-member parliament, which for the first time includes representation from the non-Moro groups.⁴² There is a reserved representative for the lumads (indigenous peoples), the Christians, and sectoral representation from various groups including youth. The BARMM has a budget higher than the former autonomous region,⁴³ with the block grant equivalent to five per cent⁴⁴ of the total revenue of the Philippines.⁴⁵

The official inclusion of youth in the BARMM’s formal political structure during transitional arrangements progressed in the lead up to the CAB. During the 2014 round of peace negotiations, Moro youths were involved as members of the secretariat. They were initially assigned with managing documents, ‘a task done by the young people (especially) in the MILF secretariat to ensure that no unwanted text insertions were made’.⁴⁶ Young Moros also provided informal communication and management support to the members at the negotiating table. Their presence shaped the content and the language of the agreements.⁴⁷ As BARMM Chief Minister Ibrahim Murad said,

The youth play a role in nation-building. Half of our population are considered part of the youth sector: the next generation of Moros, who will find solutions for the problems we face today. The BARMM government will always be committed to pushing the programs and policies that will enable the youth to become what they aspire to be, to benefit the future of the Bangsamoro.⁴⁸

The formal inclusion of young Moros in the parliament of the BTA is therefore a momentous development, both in practice, and for scholarship. This is important because sixty per cent of the population of the Bangsamoro autonomous region are under the age of 24 years. Parallel examples exist in the case of Myanmar, where during the Thein Sein administration (2011–2016), youth groups across the 14 states have lobbied for representation in the peace process architecture, although formal structural inclusion was not forthcoming.⁴⁹ In the BTA case, while momentous, this formal inclusion of young Moros, does not guarantee long-term, sustainable and intergenerational peace⁵⁰ in Mindanao. To understand the long-term implications for peace in Mindanao, we must also analyse how youth’s structural association and agential capacity interact with the intergenerational relations in the BTA case. Through this we contribute new empirical insights into a growing research agenda on youth inclusion in peace processes and post-accord governance.

Young Moro’s structural association and vertical integration

The formal inclusion of youth in the BTA involves structural association italics. By this we mean the extent to which the young Moros are involved in, and relate to the formal structures and institutions through which the post-accord peacebuilding mechanism operates. The elders in the interim government have offered support for young Moros’ formal inclusion. This structural association operates through the relevant legal, cultural, and procedural logics. Legal association refers to the legal framework that supports the youth agenda during the transition period, and through which youth advocates relate to the transitional authority structures. In the Bangsamoro, these include the BOL, the Philippine Constitution, and the international mandates on peacebuilding stipulated by various donors and international organisations. As one minister stressed,

There are factors that brought youth formally into the peace process. For example, the government and the MILF recommended a seat for the youth sector to incorporate the views of the younger generation. Youth involvement from the beginning up to the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law has changed from informal to formal participation. The Bangsamoro Youth Commission (BYC) is also one of the first institutional provision that the transition authority has passed. Youth are indeed included into the legal framework (i.e. in the organic law) and in the administrative structure (i.e. BYC). Their formal inclusion shows that the welfare of the youth is at the core of the political agenda of the elders during the transition.⁵¹

The BOL also advocates for the inclusion of young representatives in the interim government. This comes after the Moro youth lobbied for their own inclusion during the BOL drafting stage. They were armed with data from a series of youth consultations in the different universities and community centres across Mindanao.⁵² It is with this provision in the BOL that the Bangsamoro Youth Commission has been created. The Philippine constitution, ratified in 1987, recognises young people’s integral role in nation-building. In line with this constitutional provision, the state has established a National Youth Commission mandated to lead and implement youth programs across the archipelago. Reinforcing these structural arrangements, recent United Nations (UN) resolutions, 2250 (2015) and 2535 (2020) offer the legal and policy framework for youth inclusion in peace processes at the international level. These resolutions not only provide global recognition of the importance of young people for building sustainable peace processes; they have also paved the way for the financial and technical support necessary, especially during periods of post-conflict transition.⁵³

Second, cultural association italics refers to the young Moros association to the socio-cultural institutions based on their tribal affiliation, religious identity, and familial connections. Youth membership in the same cultural community as the more experienced political leaders has strengthened their relationships with other transition authority members, regardless of age. The Moro elders trace their lineage to the long history of the separatist conflict. They also recognise that their genealogical connections affect young Moros engagement in the transition authority. In terms of composition, the interim government’s young ministers belong to one of the 13 ethnolinguistic Moro tribes, and most of them are affiliated with the MILF. Some are local to the Bangsamoro region and are blood relatives or cousins of the former combatants, either from the MNLF or the MILF.⁵⁴ Most of them have first-hand experience of violent conflict, in addition to the stories from their elders, and the narratives written in the Moro historical accounts. As one young minister said,

Interacting with the elders is not so hard because we share the same values such as those that are based on Islam. Some suggest that there is no democracy in Islam, but we have democracy through consultation and dialogue. Islam does not teach leaders concentration of power. Even the Prophet himself did not appoint his sons in power, so there is no nepotism. We follow respect for others, and choose to coexist with others in harmony.⁵⁵

In fact, Moro identity has opened doors for young Moro ministers who were not born in, or reside in the Bangsamoro region, and whose parents were not directly involved in the armed struggle. For example, one minister has remained connected with her Moro lineage through her parents and relatives despite growing up in the capital Manila. Prior to joining the peace process as a BTA member, the minister worked in the Philippine government for 15 years.

Youth have also established trust and confidence through their direct familial connections with the leadership in the MILF or MNLF. Their relationship with the elders in the BTA, draws on their blood relations, or because the revolutionary leaders were their parents’ comrades. This cultural cum political association of young Moros with the top brass of the insurgent political leadership means a stronger representation for the MILF, which has elicited strong criticism from other Moro leaders like Firdausi Abbas. Abbas said,

What they MILF have demanded (in the BTA) is a controlling majority…it is no longer democratic, it is tyrannical. We see now the avarice for political power of the MILF, and they are grooming their children to be the political kingpins in their areas…it is a tyranny committed against the Bangsamoro.⁵⁶

Process association italics is the third category of structural association that defines youth inclusion in the interim government. This process refers to their involvement during the peace process, from the negotiation stage until the creation of the interim government in 2019. Some young Moro ministers were actively involved in lobbying, advocacy, and documenting the peace process. They were active counterparts and supporters for the older political elites. When the interim government was set up, this working association during the peace process later paved the way for their formal inclusion in the interim government. One of the female representatives on the BTA shared her experience as follows,

When we started, we explained to our elders the reasons why youth participation in the Bangsamoro government is important. It was vital that the elders think we are not too young and need to learn more. We supported them with the data from a series of consultations we conducted. After the Marawi siege in 2017, our data showed that a number of those involved in the armed confrontation were young people. We lobbied our elders to take note, if they keep excluding the youth, more young people will likely engage in violent conflict.⁵⁷

With the foregoing, it can be inferred that legal framework alone does not automatically yield to youth’s vertical integration in the formal political structure. Instead, youth’s cultural association with the elders has been a contributory factor in the eventual implementation of the legal frameworks. More so, culture positively influences intergenerational power dynamics between the youth and the elders, enabling young people’s eventual access into the structures and institutions of governance. In turn, the structures dominated by the elders, have benefitted from the youth’s presence as young people bring with them technical skills which their elders likely lack. Youth’s technical skills fill the gap in political communications especially in the twenty-first century where communication and information technology has crept into all fields, including during post-conflict governance.

Along these lines, the Moro youths’ vertical integration offers two further benefits: to the youth per se, and to the larger community. First, integrating young people officially brings the youth’s voices into the formal political structure. From the margins, they are now part of the decision-making body that determines the policies for the region. The political structure now hears first-hand the concerns and sentiments of the youth from the youth representatives themselves. Second, vertically integrating young people does not only cater youth’s agenda in the political sphere, instead it also helps the political sphere advance the larger agenda of various sectors across the region.⁵⁸ The young Moro ministers often support other agendas in the parliament, including the agendas put forward by other marginalised groups such as women and indigenous peoples. Because of their technical expertise and educational background, they also enhance the way the parliament runs its official business, including the processes of deliberation on the official agenda, discussing and crafting new laws, and implementing them.

It can be inferred further that vertical integration emerges as a result of the confluence of various factors. It does not rest solely on the passage of the legal frameworks. While legal frameworks have facilitated youth’s vertical integration, these did not help integrate young people to the formal political structures in themselves. This is an important reflection, as formal political structures are all anchored by law, and many scholars place a primacy on the role of the rule of law in bringing marginalised groups inside the nodes of power.⁵⁹ The Bangsamoro case shows how vertical integration is facilitated by young people’s cultural affiliation with the older generation within the formal institutional structure. Additionally, vertical integration takes time and requires incremental steps. In the BTA example, young people have taken baby steps towards vertical integration for several years prior to the creation of the BARMM. This has made their formal inclusion both gradual and incremental in nature.

Based on the nuances of their structural association, the Moro youth’s vertical integration is not merely a product of top-down integration into the formal political structure. Instead, it is a by-product of young people’s multidimensional association with the structure, and the formal institutions of post-war politics. Legal, cultural, and processual association has facilitated youth’s formal inclusion and representation within the BTA. Once formally integrated, it is the young Moros’ agential capacity that helped them navigate the Bangsamoro’s formal political structure. Their agential capacity helps the young Moro’s to further their horizontal integration.

Young Moros’ agential capacity and their horizontal integration

Agential capacity refers to the personal attributes of the young Moros as evident in their educational attainment, professional experience, technical savviness, and social skills. Most of the young Moro representatives hold graduate and post-graduate credentials. Some of the young ministers in the BTA are trained as lawyers, while others have served as civil servants in the government. There are also some who work in the academe and are trained in primary research and community engagement. One participant said,

Most of the young ministers are technically trained on how to prepare bills and deliberate them in the parliament. They were trained to do it as social science degree holders or as lawyers. This is a much-needed skill especially since the Bangsamoro is in transition.⁶⁰

Their education, and professional capacity is to some extent the result of their elders’ sacrifices. As one participant said,

In the course of fighting for autonomy, our elders (the fighters) missed the formal institutions such as the academe. Our elders fought for the autonomous region we are enjoying now. So, it was like telling the youth, we, the elders, will focus on the armed struggle. your role is to focus on your studies. This plan is true and has been established since Day 1 of our lives when our parents decided to bring us to school. Thirty years later, the revolutionaries are old, and we have finished school. I think their plan is fulfilled.⁶¹

The BARMM bureaucracy is also populated by young Moros who are holders of academic degrees from various fields. An academic degree is an honour for the Moros. The Maranao tribe called this maratabat. Maratabat is a mental construct aimed at protecting and giving honour to the clan.⁶² Keeping such honour is a fundamental value for the Moros.⁶³ Travelling to the Lanao provinces, one can see the tarpaulins celebrating family members who passed the board examinations or have earned a degree.

With their professional background, technical agility is the second manifestation of young Moros agential capacity. The interim government recognised and utilised youth’s technical capacity evident in the administrative positions given to them. As Minister Sema said,

Despite a lot of other concerns and mandates, the BTA is giving the Bangsamoro youths the opportunity to actively participative in governance. Various ministries and offices in the Bangsamoro government are occupied by the well-equipped, competitive, and empowered members of the youth sector. Some even hold key positions, many are elected in the provinces, youth leaders are also holding key positions in the national government, and the parliament have members who are from the youth sector.⁶⁴

With technical agility, young Moros can promote the BTA’s work in the social media, initiating online interviews and making videos that promote the BTA’s program on the world wide web. This is important considering that many BTA members are older adults and are not as technologically savvy as the youth.⁶⁵ At the height of the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, the BTA resorted to technological platforms in performing their duties. The young Moros took to online and offline campaigns to address misinformation about COVID-19. They made flyers about COVID-19 to publicise facts around hygiene and social distancing. These were translated into the local languages, and were posted on social media outlets, and distributed as hard copies across the Moro communities.

The third manifestation of young Moros’ agential capacity is their social skills. These skills are evident in how they have supported the legislative proposals of other BTA members, developing camaraderie and rapport with the other ministers in pursuing their specific policy agendas. As one of the young Moro representatives noted, ‘it is important to show support to the other ministers, as they also have supported us with our youth focused programmes. In fact, the youth commission is one of the first initiatives that they supported and passed’.⁶⁶ Additionally, some youth ministers are present during the family affairs of the other BTA members, such as during weddings and funerals of their family members. Their social skills are linked to both religious and tribal affiliation, as most of the young ministers are linked with the older generation of ministers through their clan and tribal connections.

One young Moro minister emphasised the value of courtesy, proper manners, good values, and politeness. He stressed that ‘despite our age gaps (with the elderly ministers), we are human beings. So, we accord them with what a regular human would do with regard to respecting the elders’.⁶⁷ In interacting with the other members of the parliament, he said that it was important to be sincere. ‘Sincerity is a social skill equally important to being technically savvy. It is important to listen attentively, and to do my best not to offend anyone’.⁶⁸

Social skills, along with technical and professional skills have shaped youth participation in the formal political structure. Youth bring with them skills earned from their formal education and professional training. They fill the technical gaps that the older generation of political leaders’ lack, because of their lack of formal education and dedication to the Moro rebellion during their younger years. However, youth inclusion also means that the parliament in the BARMM has becomes an intergenerational space where elders and youth interact in cooperative ways. In the final section, we examine how these intergenerational power dynamics have shaped the horizontal and vertical integration of the youth that are formally included in the BTA during the transition period.

Intergenerational dynamics affecting young Moros’ vertical and horizontal integration

The BTA case shows that youth’s agential capacity, along with their legal, cultural, and procedural association, helped facilitate their entry into the Bangsamoro’s formal political structure following the peace agreement. It can be inferred that structural association influenced youth’s vertical integration. However, integration alone does not equate to, or translate into youth’s substantial participation. Here, we argue that positive intergenerational dynamics shape the nature of young Moros’ participation in the interim government which is a mix of young, middle-aged, and elderly ministers. Most of the middle aged, and elderly ministers are former combatants. They are well versed in combat, and in field level tactics. As part of the government, they must develop different types of diplomatic, political, and strategic skills.⁶⁹ At the same time, this older generation of rebels began their life as young combatants, they recognise the value and potential of the youth as they started their own revolutionary journey in their younger years.

The elders’ presence forms part of the supportive structure which advances the youth agenda. They understand the value of having young people to sustain the peacebuilding process. Some of them are in their 70s, and some have even passed away during the transition years. For the youth, continuous dialogue with the older generation, and respectful behaviour towards them is deemed necessary to sustain their support for the youth agenda and to foster positive intergenerational relationships in the interim government. While commending the inclusion of young Moros in the interim government, Minister Iqbal emphasised the idea of intergenerational coordination,

It is wrong for the youth to simply step on our head. If they have ideas, let us talk about it. What we are saying is that youth and elders should coordinate. We have experiences that the youth have not experienced. Youth have skills which we do not have, and we are here to listen to the youth.⁷⁰

This means that despite higher technical and professional skills, the ability to respect the older members in the interim government was deemed non-negotiable. As a matter of fact, connecting with the rest of the BTA members is vital to achieving support, such as passing pro-youth legislation. Building connections means knowing the youth’s own position and status in the social hierarchy. It also demands adherence to the wisdom and support from the elders. Citing Bangsamoro Grand Mufti Abuhuraira A. Udasan, one young Moro participant noted,

We use the proactiveness of the youth to complement the wisdom of the elders to succeed in governance. We honour their ideas and orders and harmonise our aspirations through dialogue. By talking with them and sharing what we are doing, we are able to prove to the elders that we are capable of executing tasks assigned to us. Gaining the respect of the leaders is important because if it is lacking, they will lose their trust in us.⁷¹

Continuous dialogue with the older generation and the dynamics of respect for them allows young Moros to be both deferential to the existing power structures while using their agency to navigate these structures informally. Being able to socially interact with the structure, by building rapport, and support through social connections is a Moro youth skill, that has been advantageous for the BYC. The BYC’s inter-agency interactions have led to it being given autonomous decision-making powers, and funding by the Ministry of Budget, Finance and Management. In its 2021 State of the Bangsamoro Youth Address, the BYC Chairperson Macasalong highlighted that it was the coordination mandate with other ministries that drove the BYC’s achievements during the first two years of the transition period. The Chairperson noted that,

We must further develop our coordination mechanisms between our office and other offices and ministries. We will continue to make effective mechanisms on how we can help one another for the benefit of our youth. We also respectfully call the attention of other ministers, agencies, and offices of the Bangsamoro government to create partnership mechanisms with the BYC.⁷²

Inter-agency interaction does not only benefit young Moros to successfully advance their agenda. It also benefitted the partner agencies themselves because it earned them new allies and supporters in the parliament through the young ministers. This is important as previous studies⁷³ show intergenerational power dynamics between the youth and elders in the peacebuilding arena are often at logger heads or largely lopsided in favour of the older generation.⁷⁴ Rarely is there collegiality, sharing and support available in ways that can advance the youth agenda during the post-war phase. In the BTA case, religious and cultural contiguity amongst the Moros of all age groups contributes to a more cooperative intergenerational partnering. For example, during the transition period, the BYC launched a #RamadhanWisdomSeries that offered a space for the religious leaders of the Bangsamoro to provide advice to the youth, based on Islamic teachings. Instead of opposition from the older generation, thus far the main barrier faced by the young Moros, has been bureaucratic red tape.

By developing coordination mechanisms with the ministers and policy-making bodies, bureaucratic delays have been overcome. One study participant noted how the bureaucratic processes often delay their youth projects, including project biddings and other budgetary protocols. Young Moros, however, are aware that they must learn to navigate these formal processes better to be able to influence and shape the youth agenda officially as part of the formal political structures in Mindanao.⁷⁵ They are also aware that their inclusion remains defined and restricted to small numbers of elite representatives and does not guarantee wider youth inclusion in peacebuilding.

Conclusion

This paper examined the case of formal youth inclusion in the BTA case through the lens of structure and agency interactions, and how these have advanced both vertical and horizontal integration of the young Moros in post-accord transitional structures. We found that while structural associations through vertical integration may open up the opportunity for young people to be formally included in peace processes, and in post-accord governance arrangements, their agential capacity can amplify their voices further.

In Mindanao, the formal inclusion of young Moros tends to be restricted to elite youth leaders with cultural association with the elders within the formal structures. While this does not clash with the features of representative democracy, we argue that integrating more local youth voices, by placing broader civic participation mechanisms in place, will cater to, and strengthen youth representation in the formal political structures.⁷⁶ The BARMM case also shows that, despite the fact that young people’s agential capacity is academically (and professionally) superior to the old guard of former Moro combatants, the young Moro ministers must possess humility and establish a relationship of submission to elders to maintain smooth intergenerational relations. This demands an awareness and acknowledgement of their cultural position as subordinate due to age and experience. To be included, they must work along with the elders in culturally appropriate ways, and cannot claim ownership of the process simply because of their youthful energy and agential capacity.

In line with these subtle dynamics of generational power distribution, even if the youth are officially included in the formal space, it is most likely that the marginal role of young people in formal politics will continue to shape their behaviour and interactions vis-a-vis the older political class. This, however, does not detract from a hopeful position. Following more than four decades of armed struggle, the former combatants of the MILF who are members of the interim government are in their old age. Their memory of the struggle to achieve self-determination has now been re-framed through the aspirations of the young Moros in the interim government, and their dedicated efforts for maintaining autonomy within the Philippine political system.

These young Moro ministers have a responsibility to continue the struggle congruent with their forefathers for maintaining Moro autonomy if not full secession. Therefore, the formal inclusion of youth in the BTA structure offers an opportunity for a somewhat ‘managed’ generational turnover in Mindanao. For the younger generation to transition to power requires them to memorialise the sacrifices and contribution of the elders. To reconcile the needs and aspirations of both generations requires that a more central role be given to the collective memory and vision of the different generations. This is possible by adopting the route of intergenerational cooperation, by coalescing the aspirations, experiences, and agency of the young and the old during the period of transition.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Primitivo III Cabanes Ragandang

Primitivo III Cabanes Ragandang is a Political Science Assistant Professor at Mindanao State University-Iligan Institute of Technology (The Philippines) where he earned a doctorate in Sustainable Development Studies in 2018. He is a PhD candidate at The Australian National University, where he explores the intergenerational intersect of community resilience and collective memory.

Sukanya Podder

Sukanya Podder (PhD Post War Recovery Studies, University of York, UK) is a Reader in Post-War Reconstruction and Peacebuilding at King’s College London. Recent work has been published in Third World Quarterly, Civil Wars, International Peacekeeping, Contemporary Security Policy, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Conflict, Security and Development and Politics, Religion and Ideology. Her latest book is Peacebuilding Legacy: Programming for Change and Young People’s Attitudes to Peace, Oxford University Press, 2022.

Notes

1. Although there is overlap, there are important distinctions between the terms’ ‘youth’, and ‘young people’ that will be used in this article. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) has defined ‘youth’ as the age between 15 and 24 years. However, there is no single agreed definition. For example, the lowest age range for youth is 12 years in Jordan, and the upper range is 35 years in a number of African countries including Sierra Leone. The World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF use the term ‘adolescent’ for those aged 10–19 years, and young people for those 10–24 years. In Mindanao, by young Moro ministers we refer to those below 35 years of age.

2. McEvoy-Levy, ‘Youth, Violence and Conflict Transformation’, 25.

3. Podder, ‘Legitimacy, loyalty and civilian support’.

4. Podder, ‘Ex-combatant agency and re-recruitment’.

5. Castañeda, ‘How liberal peacebuilding may be failing’; Mcintyre and Thusi, ‘Children and youth in Sierra Leone’s peace-building process’.

6. Bangura, ‘We can’t eat peace’.

7. Akwetey, Youth and political development; Ellison, ‘The role of youth’; Kurtenbach, Post-war youth violence; Mcintyre and Thusi, Children and youth in Sierra Leone; Oosterom, Youth Engagement in the Realm of Local Governance.

8. Enria, The politics of work, 50; Harland, ‘Violent youth culture in Northern Ireland’, 416.

9. Altiok and Grizelj, ‘We are here’, 8. For a discussion on the youth inclusion agenda at the UN and through national action plans, see Berents and Mollica, ‘Reciprocal institutional visibility’.

10. See Ragandang, ‘Youth as conflict managers’.

11. Maclay and Özerdem, ‘Use’them or ‘lose’them’, 348.

12. This article is concerned only with the formal inclusion in the BTA; discussion of youth integration across the multiple levels: community, national and international, and their interaction in the Mindanao context is outside the scope of the present piece.

13. See Abuza, Bangsamoro after the plebiscite.

14. Philippine Daily Inquirer, What Went Before; Rappler, The Aquinos and the MILF.

15. Bangsamoro Youth Commission, Bangsamoro Youth Transition Priority Agenda, v.

16. See Maclure and Denov, ‘I didn’t want to die so I joined them’, 121.

17. See Giddens, ‘Comments on the Theory of Structuration’; Gayle, ‘Structural and Cultural Approaches to Youth’; Ragandang, ‘Social media and youth’.

18. Between online (e.g. Facebook Messenger, Zoom, or Skype) versus phone interviews, there were more phone interviews as it does not require an internet connection, unlike online interviews. Between office landline telephone and cellular phone, the latter is preferred because it can be used anywhere.

19. Kamlian, Ethnic and religious conflict.

20. Schiavo-Campo and Judd, The Mindanao conflict in the Philippines.

21. Rivera, The struggle of the Muslim people.

22. Özerdem and Podder, Youth in conflict and peacebuilding; Podder, ‘Legitimacy, loyalty and civilian support’; Özerdem et al., ‘Identity, ideology and child soldiering’.

23. Caballero and Torres, ‘The peace process’.

24. Rood, Forging sustainable peace in Mindanao, viii.

25. Pouligny, ‘Civil society and post-conflict peacebuilding’; van Tongeren et al., People building peace II; Paffenholz, ‘Civil society and peace negotiations’; Nilsson et al., ‘In the streets and at the table’.

26. Cuhadar and Paffenholz, ‘Transfer 2.0’; Paffenholz and Zartman, ‘Inclusive Peace negotiations’, 2.

27. Grizelj, ‘Engaging the next generation’, 168.

28. Nilsson, ‘Anchoring the peace’.

29. Borer et al., Peacebuilding after peace accords.

30. Özçelik et al., Leadership in conflict response, 7.

31. Rood, Forging sustainable peace in Mindanao, 7.

32. Macaspac, ‘Insurgent peace’, 844.

33. Özerdem et al., ‘Identity, ideology and child soldiering’.

34. Colleta, ‘Citizen security – the role of NGOs’, 27.

35. Arnado, Women’s involvement in conflict early warning systems, 10.

36. Ibid., 13-14.

37. Busran-Lao, Philippines: women and inclusivity, 28.

38. In August 4, 2011, President Benigno Aquino and MILF leaders held a ‘secret meeting’ in Japan. Such meeting paved the way for the subsequent peace agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government.

39. Cheng, ‘Palace says ARMM a failed state’; Arguillas, The Bangsamoro Dream.

40. Tomacruz, Now that Bangsamoro law is ratified.

41. Part of the transition period is the normalisation process, which decommissions former combatants. A 2019 report of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process stated that the Philippine government designated two billion pesos (USD $102,000) for the comprehensive socio-economic packages for the families and communities of former combatants (Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process 2020).

42. The term Moro refers to the 13 Islamised tribes of Mindanao. These 13 tribes include Badjao, Iranun, Jama Mapun, Ka’agan, Kalibugan, Maguindanaon, M’ranao, Sama, Sangil, Molbog, Palawani, Tausug, and Yakan. These Muslim tribes occupy most of the territories in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan.

43. The World Food Programme has also partnered with BARMM in rehabilitating the former combatants by engaging them in agricultural activities, engaging around 2,000 former combatants (United Nations in Philippines 2020). In addition to the P100,000 cash, the Philippine government also promised worth P950,000 benefits to every decommissioned combatant as support to their families and communities, see Cabrera, ‘More than P1-million package’.

44. For 2020, the block grant for BARMM is Php 63.6 billion or equivalent to about 1.3 billion US dollars, See, ICG, ‘The Bangsamoro transition so far’.

45. Romano, BARMM block grant.

46. Alar, Young people and their role, 24.

47. Ibid., 1.

48. This is an excerpt of the speech of Ibrahim Murad during the 2021 State of the Bangsamoro Youth Address on August 12, 2021.

49. Grizelj, ‘Engaging the next generation’, 175.

50. Podder, Peacebuilding Legacy, 31–33.

51. Phone interview with R1, 12 August 2020.

52. Phone interview with R2, 24 October 2020.

53. See Ragandang, ‘Formal Peacebuilding and youth inclusion’.

54. Ranada, Ghazali Jaafar’s son takes; Tomacruz, Duterte names MILF founder’s son.

55. Zoom interview with R3, 25 September 2020.

56. This TV interview was held only a few days after the inauguration of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority in 2019.

57. Zoom interview with R2, 24 October 2020.

58. Punzalan, BARMM parliament.

59. Taylor, ‘Citizenship and social power’.

60. Phone interview with R4, 16 November 2020.

61. Phone interview with R4, 16 November 2020.

62. Custodio, ‘Maratabat – a way of the Maranao’; Galban, ‘Maratabat: Key to understanding’.

63. Sabre et al., ‘The maratabat of the Maranaw’.

64. This is an excerpt of the speech of Minister Omar Sema during the 2021 State of the Bangsamoro Youth Address on August 12, 2021.

65. One of the key mandates of the transitional government is crafting the basic codes for the autonomous region, such as education code and election code, among others. As government of the day, it is expected to create and deliberate laws, manage the budget, and implement programs for the benefit of the populace. Performing these mandates requires technical skills in areas where young Moros are better trained than their elders.

66. Zoom interview with R5, 15 July 2020.

67. Phone interview with R6, 17 July 2020.

68. Ibid.

69. Iqbal, Members of Bangsamoro Transition.

70. This is an excerpt of the interview with Minister Iqbal during the online forum entitled, ‘BYC YOUTH AGENDA: In Focus – Pilot Episode’. The forum was co-organised by the Bangsamoro Youth Commission, the United Voices for Peace Network, Inc. and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue on Education, 24 October 2020.

71. The office of the grand mufti and the Bangsamoro Youth Commission held a joint program called the ‘#RamadhanWisdomSeries’. The event offers an opportunity for young people to learn from their elders about Ramadhan as well as other Islamic teachings about engaging with the elders.

72. This is an excerpt of the speech of Bangsamoro Youth Commission Chairperson Marjanie S. Mimbantas Macasalong during the 2021 State of the Bangsamoro Youth Address on August 12, 2021.

73. Among others, Batan, ‘Charting the directions of youth’; Hettige and Mayer, Youth, peace and sustainable development; and Obaje and Okeke-Uzodike, The question of youth.

74. Akwetey, ‘Youth and political development’; Kurtenbach, Post-war youth violence; Mcintyre and Thusi, ‘Children and youth’; Oosterom, ‘Youth Engagement’.

75. Ramos-Jimenez, ‘More time needed’.

76. Kaltenborn-Stachau, ‘The missing link’.