Towards a European Security and Defence Policy

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Notes

1. Centre for European Reform (ed.), Europe After September 11tb (London, 2001); Christopher Coker, ‘Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk’, Adelpbi Paper 345 (2002); David S. Yost, ‘Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe’, International Affairs 78/2 (2002), 277–300.

2. Cf. John Borawski/Thomas Durell Young, NATO After 2000. The Future o f the Euro-Atlantic Alliance (Westport/London, 2001); John Borawski, ‘NATO Beyond 2000: A New Flashpoint for European Security’, European Security 9/2 (2000), 1–12; Philip H. Gordon, ‘Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work’, Foreign Affairs 79/4 (2000), 12–17; Jolyon Howorth, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’, Survival 42/2 (2000); Antonio Missiroli, ‘CFSP, Defence and Flexibility’, Cbaillot Paper 38 ( 2000); Adrian Treacher, ‘Europe as a Power Multiplier for French Security Policy: Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaptation,’ European Security 10/1 (2001), 22–44.

3. John Baylis, ‘British Wartime Thinking About a Post-War European Security Group’, Review of International Studies 9 (1983), pp.265–81; Anthony Gorst, ‘British Military Planning for Postwar Defence’, 1943–1945’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (New York, 1990), pp.91–108; John Kent, Britisb Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1949 (Leicester, 1993); Antonio Varsori and Elena Calandri (eds.), The Failure of Peace in Europe, 1943–1948 (London, 2002), chapter 1; Donald C. Watt, ‘British Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a Strategic Threat 1945–1950’, in Josef Becker and Franz Knipping (eds.), Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945–1950 (Berlin/New York, 1986), pp.325–8; Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, ‘Baylis on Post-War Planning’, Review of International Studies 10 (1984), pp.247–50.

4. John Baylis, ‘Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO’, Journal o f Strategic Studies 5 (1982), pp.236–47; Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951 (Oxford, 1985); John Charmley ‘Duff Cooper and Western European Union, 1944–47’, Review of International Studies 11 (1985), pp.53–64; Stuart Croft, ‘British Policy Towards Western Europe, 1947–9: The Best of Possible Worlds?’, International Affairs 64 (1988), pp.617–29; Sean Greenwood, Alternative Alliance: Anglo-French Relations Before the Coming o f NATO, 1944–1948 (London, 1996); idem, ‘Ernest Bevin, France and Western Union’, European History Quarterly 14 (1984), pp.319–38; Richard T. Griffith (ed.), Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s (Leiden, 1993); John Kent, ‘Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa’, in John W Young and M. Dockrill (eds.), British Foreign Policy 1945–1956 (London, 1989); idem, ‘The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (London, 1990); Anne Deighton and John Young, ‘British Policy Overseas: The “Third Force” and the Origins of NATO - in Search of a New Perspective’, in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds.), Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–1962: Thoughts for the post-Cold War Era (London, 1992), pp.41–61; Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945–1951 (Leicester, 1984); John Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945–1951 (Leicester, 1984).

5. Ginevra Andreini, ‘EURATOM: An Instrument to Achieve a Nuclear Deterrent? French Nuclear Independence and European Integration During the Mollet Government (1956)’, Journal o f European Integration History 6/1 (2000), pp. 109–28; Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (Oxford, 1998); Elena Calandri, ‘The Western European Union Armaments's Pool: France's Quest for Security and Integration in Transition 1951–1955’, Journal o f European Integration History 1 (1995), pp.37–63; Alan P Dobson, ‘Informally Special? The Churchill-Truman Talks of January (1952) and the State of Anglo-American Relations’, Review of International Studies 23 (1997), pp.27–47; Renata Dwan, ‘Jean Monnet and the European Defence Community, 1950–1954’, Cold War History 1/1 (2000), pp.141–60; Saki Dockrill, ‘“No Troops, Please. We are American” - The Diplomacy of Burden Sharing in the Case of the Radford Plan, 1956’, in Hans-Joachim Harder (ed.), Von Truman his Harmel. Die Bundesrepublik Deutscbland im Spannungsfeld von NATO und europäiscber Integration (Muünchen, 2000); idem, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament 1950–1955 (Cambridge, 1991); Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community: A History (London, 1980); Liz Kane, ‘European or Atlantic Community? The Foreign Office and “Europe” 1955–1957’, Journal o f European Integration History 3/2 (1997), pp.83–98; Winfried Heinemann and Norbert Wiggershaus (eds.), Das internationale Krisenjabr 1956, Polen, Dngarn, Suez (München, 1999); Klaus Larres, ‘Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War? Churchill's Post War Foreign Policy’, Journal o f European Integration History 2 (1996), pp. 15–49; Klaus Larres and Elizabeth Meehan (eds.), Uneasy Allies: British-German Relations and European Integration Since 1945 (Oxford, 2000); Scott Lucas (ed.), Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar (Manchester, 1996); Olaf Mager, Anthony Eden and the Framework of Security: Britain's Alternatives to the European Defence Community, 1951–1954', in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds.), Securing Peace in Europe 1945–1962: Thoughts for the Post Cold War Era (London, 1992), pp.125–38; Spencer W Mawby ‘From Distrust to Dispair: Britain and the European Army, 1950–1954’, European History Quarterly 28/4 (1998), pp.487–14; Steven Metz, ‘Eisenhower an the Planning of American Grand Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (1991), pp.49–71; Mervyn O'Driscoll, ‘Les Anglo-Saxons, F-I-G and the Rival Conceptions of Advanced Armaments Research and Development Co-operation in Western Europe, 1956–1958’, Journal o f European Integration History 4/1 (1998), pp. 105–30; idem, ‘Missing the Nuclear Boat? British Policy Towards French Military Nuclear Ambitions During the EURATOM Foundation Negotiations, 1955–1956’, Diplomacy & Statecra ft 9/1 (1998), pp. 135–62; Ronald W Pruessen, ‘Cold War Threats and America's Commitment to the European Defense Community: One Corner of a Triangle’, Journal o f European Integration History 1/1 (1996), pp.51–69; Paul M. Pitman, ‘“Un Général qui s'appelle Eisenhower’: Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community’, Journal of European Integration History 6/2 (2000), pp.37–59; Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall o f the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis o f European Defence, 1950–1955 (Basingstoke, 2000); Gustav Schmidt, ‘“Tying” (West) Germany into the West - But to What? NATO? WEU? The European Community?’, in Clements Wurm (ed.), Western Europe and Germany: The Beginning of European Integration 1945–1960 (Oxford/Washington, 1995), pp.137–73; Gilbert Trausch (ed.), Die europäische Integration vom Scbuman-Plan his zu den Verträgen von Rom (Brussels, 1993); John W Young, Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War 1951–5 (Oxford, 1996); idem, ‘Churchill's No to Europe: The “Rejection” of European Union by Churchill's Post War Government, 1951–1952’, The Historical journal 28/4 (1985), pp.923–37; idem, ‘Churchill, The Russians and the Western Alliance: The Three-Power Conference at Bermuda, December 1953’, English Historical Review 101 (1986), pp.889–912.

6. Cf. John Baylis, ‘Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the AngloAmerican Nuclear Relationship’, Diplomatic History 25/1 (2001), pp.33–51; John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945–1964 (Oxford, 1995); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957–1962 (Oxford, 1994); Ian Clark and David Angell, ‘Britain, the United States and the Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Diplomacy of the Thor Deployment 1956–1958’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 2/3 (1991), pp.153–77; John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After (New York, 2001); William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds.), The Special Relationship: AngloAmerican Relations Since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); R.B. Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations and Western European Unity 1947–1956 (London, 1972); Jan Melissen, ‘The Politics of US Missile Deployment in Britain, 1955–1959’, Storia delle Relazioni Internationali 13/1 (1998), pp.151–85; Jan Melissen, ‘Nuclearizing NATO, 1957–1959: The “Anglo-Saxons”, Nuclear Sharing and the Fourth Country Problem’, Review of International Studies 20 (1994), pp.253–75; Leopoldo Nuti, ‘The F-I-G Story Revisited’, Storia delle Relazioni Internationali 13/1 (1998), pp.69–100; David Reynolds, A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs 62 (1986), pp.1–20; Geoffrey Warner, ‘The Anglo-American Special Relationship’, Diplomatic History 13 (1989), pp.479–99.

7. Oliver Bange, The EEC Crisis o f 1963, Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict (London, 2000); Frank Costigliola, ‘The Failed Design: Kennedy, de Gaulle and the Struggle for Europe’, Diplomatic History (1984), pp.227–51; Richard Davis, ‘“Why Did the General Do It?” De Gaulle, Polaris and the French Veto of Britain's Application to join the Common Market’, European History Quarterly 28/3 (1998), pp.373–97; Anne Deighton and Piers Ludlow, A Conditional Application: British Management of the First Attempt to Seek Membership of the EEC, 1961–1963’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe. National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948–1963 (New York, 1995), pp.107–26; Saki Dockrill, ‘Britain's Power and Influence: Dealing With Three Roles and the Wilson Government's Defence Debate at Chequers in November 1964’, Diplomacy Statecraft 11/1 (2000), pp.211–40; Marilena Gala, ‘The Multilateral Force: A Brief History of the American Efforts to Maintain the Nuclear Status Quo Within the Atlantic Alliance’, Storia delle Relazioni Internationali 13/1 (1998), pp. 121–49; Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility 1966–1967 (Oxford, 1996); Wolfram Kaiser, ‘The Bomb and Europe: Britain, France and the EEC Entry Negotiations 1961–1963’, Journal o f European Integration History 1/1 (1995), pp. 65–85; Piers Ludlow, Dealing With Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the Six (Cambridge, 1997); idem, Using Europe. Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945–1965 (London, 1996); Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl (eds.), De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal (Oxford, 1994); Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, ‘Trick or Truth? The British ANF Proposal, West Germany and US Non Proliferation Policy, 1964–1968’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 11/2 (2000), pp.161–84; Rolf Steininger, ‘Great Britain's First EEC Failure in January 1963’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 7/2 (1996), pp.404–35; Pascaline Winand, Eisenbower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (London, 1993).

8. Karl-Heinz Kamp, ‘The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion’, Foreign Policy 98 (1995); Jonathan Eyal, ‘NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision’, International Affairs 73/4 (1997), pp.695–720; Nora Bensahel, ‘Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force’, European Security 8/2 (1999), pp.52–72; Trine Flockhart, ‘The Dynamics of Expansion: NATO, WEU, and EU’, European Security 5/2 (1996), pp.196–218; Philipp H. Gordon (ed.), NATO's Transformation (New York, 1997); Ryan C. Hendrickson, ‘The Enlargement of NATO: The Theory and Politics of Alliance Expansion’, European Security 8/4 (1999), pp.84–99; Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and the Re-shaping of European Order’, Contemporary Security Policy 21/3 (2000), pp.139–67; William T Johnsen, Stephen J. Blank and Thomas-Durell Young, ‘Building a Better European Security Enviroment’, European Security 8/3 (1999), pp.1–12; Emil Kichner and James Sperrling, ‘Will Form Lead to Function? Institutional Enlargement and the Creation of a European Security and Defence Identity’, Contemporary Security Policy 21/1 (2000), pp.23–45; Eric Mlyn, ‘The OSCE, the United States and European Security’, European Security 5/3 (1996), pp.426–47; Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy. Fullfilling America's Destiny (Washington, 1992); Joanne Wright, ‘Trusting Flexible Friends: The Dangers of Flexibility in NATO and the Western European Union/European Union’, Contemporary Security Policy 20/1 (1999), pp.111–29.