The origins of Stalin's note of 10 March 1952

Abstract

An analysis based on the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry of how the note of 10 March 1952 came into being shows that Stalin had not yet given up his hopes of a speedy conclusion of a peace treaty between the four victorious powers and Germany. From the arguments presented in preparing the Soviet initiative and from the textual changes that were made throughout the process of editing, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that, in the spring of 1952, Stalin really wanted what he said: namely, the conclusion of a peace treaty establishing a neutral Germany. That the initiative was not perfect in every respect does not alter this conclusion. In particular, it is not disproved by the observation that Stalin was disappointed by the negative reaction of the Western powers to the note. On the contrary, Foreign Ministry documents demonstrate that until the Western response of 25 March, the Soviet dictator hoped to prevent the recruitment of West German troops and the integration of the Federal Republic into the Western military alliance. Ironically, Konrad Adenauer saw it the same way - and hence did everything he could to prevent the establishment of a neutral Germany in 1952.

Notes

1. Speech at the inaugural meeting of the Protestant association of the CDU in Siegen, Siegener Zeitung, 17 March 1952.

2. English version in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol.7, pt.1, pp.169–72.

3. Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Außenministeriums. Die Hypothese des Wiedervereinigungsangebotes’, in Deutschland Archiv 26 (1993), pp.786–805, citation p.803; again taken up in idem, Bereitschaft zur Einheit in Freiheit? Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1955 (Munich, 1999), pp.200–226.

4. Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years (New York/ Oxford, 1996), pp.135, 137.

5. Stein Bj⊘rnstadt, The Soviet Union and German Unificiation during Stalin's Last Years (Oslo, 1998), p.71.

6. ‘Stalin's Directive’, transmitted by Semionov to Pieck on 19 July 1949, in Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth (eds.), Wilhelm Pieck - Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1953 (Berlin, 1994), pp.287–91.

7. Cited in Elke Scherstjanoi (ed.),‘Provisorium für längstens ein Jahr’. Die Gründung der DDR (Berlin, 1993), p.11. For further references see Wilfried Loth, Stalin's Unwanted Child.The Soviet Union, the German Question and the Founding of the GDR (Basingstoke/New York, 1998), pp.106–40.

8. Archiw wneschnej politiki Rossijskoj Federazii (henceforward AWP RF).

9. A selection of documents on which this paper is based is published in Wilfried Loth, ‘Die Entstehung der “Stalin Note”. Dokumente aus Moskauer Archiven’, in Jürgen Zarusky (ed.), Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952. Neue Quellen und Analysen (Munich, 2002), pp.19–115. For their support in preparing this article I want to thank Alexei Filitov, Ludmilla Krüger and Corinna Steinert.

10. FRUS 1950, Vol.4, pp.902–3. Also see Jürgen Küsters, Der Integrationsfriede. Viermächte-Verhandlungen über die Friedensregelung mit Deutschland 1945–1990 (Munich, 2000), pp.525–38.

11. Gribanov to Vishinsky, 7 Feb. 1951, AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.233, d.74, ll.4–5.

12. Sowjet Ministrow Inostranych Del: Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers.

13. Gribanov to Gromyko, 24 Feb. 1951, AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.230, d.47, l.1; German version in Loth, ‘Entstehung’, p.63.

14. For the career and the current positions of the Soviet diplomats see the details in Andrei A. Gromyko et al. (eds.), Diplomaticeskij slovar' v trech tomach (Moscow, 1960–64)

15. AWP RF f.07, op.24, p.16, d.188, ll.37–38.

16. AWP RF f.07, op.24, p.16, d.188, ll.1–19, citation l.5.

17. FRUS 1951, 3/1, pp.1111 and 1118.

18. On the course of the Paris pre-conference see also Küsters, ‘Integrationsfriede’, pp.538–53.

19. AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.239, d.108, ll.126–134; German version in Loth, ‘Entstehung’, pp.66–70.

20. Also see Loth, Stalin's Unwanted Child, pp.132–3.

21. In so far as it is impossible to talk about a lack of inner consistency in the proposals of Gribanov, as Bj⊘rnstad, Soviet Union, p.55, does, who reports about it based on a draft of resolution of 9 August: Gribanov to Gromyko, 9 Aug. 1951, AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.239, d.108, ll.157–72.

22. Gribanov to Gromyko, 3 Aug. 1951, AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.230, d.47, l.12; German version in Loth, ‘Entstehung’, p.71. Wettig, Deutschland-Note, p.792, who is the first to mention this document, erroneously assumes that the project of the peace treaty had only now been taken up again.

23. Reported according to Gribanov to Vishinsky 15 Aug. 1951, AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.230, d.47, ll.14–16, as well as Semionov, Gribanov, Pushkin to Vishinsky 28 Aug. 1951, AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.222, d.13, ll.1–13 (citation l.2).

24. Badstübner and Loth, Pieck, pp.371–3 (emphasis in the original).

25. Added were the draft of a note to the Western Powers relating to the offence against the armament prohibition as well as the draft of a note addressed to the French government relating to the problem of the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan: AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.239, d.108, ll.157–172.

26. In this context there is no mention of an ‘alleged result’ of the talks ‘the coming about of which was not expected’ as stated in Wettig, Bereitschaft, p.207.

27. AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.230, d.47, ll.14–16; German version in Loth, ‘Entstehung’, pp.72–73.

28. As can be seen in a handwritten note taken by Vishinsky on 17 August and jotted down on the statement.

29. Semionov and Gribanov to Vishinsky 20 Aug. 1951, AWP RF f.07, op.24, p.388, d.33, ll.67–71.

30. For the initial correspondance, Vishinsky to Molotov, undated, ibid., ll.107–26.

31. Vishinsky to Molotov 26 Aug. 1951, ibid., ll.127–31, German version in Loth, ‘Entstehung’, pp.74–5.

32. Rossijskij gosudawstewennyj archiw sozialjno-polititschesokoj istorii (henceforward RGASPI) f.17, op.3, d.1090, Politburo-Resolution number 259, cited according to Bj⊘rnstad, Soviet Union, p.124. Hence, it was not in ‘the beginning of September 1951’ that Stalin first attended to the affair, as argued by Wettig, Bereitschaft, p.207f.

33. The handwritten additions to the Gribanov text, thus, were made on 27 August, the day of the session of the Politburo, or one day later. Gribanov to Vishinsky 27 Aug. 1951, AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.230, d.47, l.20.

34. Not the draft for the peace treaty, as Bj⊘rnstad, Soviet Union, p.56, writes.

35. AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.222, d.13, ll.1–13; German version in Loth, ‘Entstehung’, pp.76–9.

36. Reported by Kvizinsky in the epilogue to: Wladimir S. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow. Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission 1939–1991, p.392. Semionov's disclosures to Kvisinsky were most likely made in the second half of the 1960s or at the beginning of the 1970s, when Kviszinsky as a member of the West Berlin Department of the Foreign Ministry worked closely together with Semionov, who in his position as Deputy Foreign Minister at the time was responsible for the politics on Germany.

37. Ibid.

38. See Sergo Beria, Beria mon père. Au coeur du pouvoir stalinien (Paris, 1999), pp.285–7 and 365f.; Elke Scherstjanoi, ‘Die Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik nach Stalins Tod 1953. Neue Dokumente aus dem Archiv des Moskauer Außenministeriums’, Viertelsjahrhefte für Zeitgeschichte 46 (1998), pp.497–549, citation p.540.

39. ‘In this case, there was nothing to be lost, because according to insights of the Soviet reconnaissance the Western Powers were not at all inclined to allow for a destabilization of the newly founded Federal Republic’ (Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, p.392). Such an interpretation of the passage written down in 1995, of course, is not necessarily binding. In his memoirs, Semionov himself considers the notes part of the continuity of the previous all-German policies of the Soviet Union: it aimed at ‘not giving the unity of Germany out of our sight’; ibid., p.267.

40. Bj⊘rnstad, Soviet Union, pp.57–9, has already mentioned this motivation.

41. See note 27.

42. Ministerstwo Inostraniych Del: Foreign Ministry.

43. In the original underlined with blue pen.

44. Badstübner and Loth, Pieck, S.372.

45. Altogether the ‘Program for Action, which Gribanov had presented on 15 August 1951’, did not find such an unrestricted ‘approval of those responsible for foreign affairs in Moscow’, as Wettig, Deutschland-Note, p.797, claims.

46. It is, thus, impossible to speak of a mere ‘commission for formulation’, as Wettig, Deutschland-Note, p.797, does.

47. RGASPI f.17, op.3, d.1090, citation according to Bj⊘rnstad, Soviet Union, p.124.

48. See for example the draft of a memorandum for ‘the Comrade Stalin J.V.’ which Gromyko sent to Molotov on 21 Jan. 1952: AWP RF f.07, op.25, p.144, d.13, ll.38f.

49. Europa-Archiv 6 (1951), p.4398.

50. Gribanov to Bogomolov on 8 Sept. 1951, AWP RF f.082, op.38, p.230, d.47, l.21.

51. For details see Loth, ‘Entstehung’, pp.33–49.

52. AWP RF f.07, op.25, p.13, d.144, ll.94–104.

53. On pp.94–104. In contrast to Bj⊘rnstad, Soviet Union, pp.66 and 128, these remarks, jotted down with pencil, are not Molotov's ‘instructions’. Obviously, they have only been noted down after the Politburo's discussion of the drafts authorized by Molotov.

54. These were addressed to Molotov for ‘examination’: AWP RF f.07, op.25, p.13, d.144, ll.113–31.

55. Ibid., ll.124–8; German version in Loth, ‘Entstehung’, pp.113–15.

56. On the working copy of 25 Jan. 1952, the somewhat contradictory comment can be found: ‘it is necessary to have the open appeal of the GDR. In the German appeal some obligations are necessary’. Ibid., l.94.

57. Also see Vyshinski's explanatory letter to Molotov of 6 Feb. 1952, ibid., l.124. The Politburo, thus, did not at all meet the GDR leadership's proposal halfway, as Bj⊘rnstad, Soviet Union, argues (‘that the East German wish ... might, and might not, be correct’); the new draft was not ‘more lenient towards the East Germans’, as he states on p.71.

58. Here, there is a remark on the working copy ‘without chronological sequence’ and ‘without blemish’. Ibid., ll.103f.

59. Ibid., ll.116f. The ‘fundamentals’ proposal itself remained unchanged (ibid., ll.118–21), so that now there was a certain redundancy between supplementing note and material text proposal.

60. ‘Support the progr[amme]’ was noted down on the working copy of 25 Jan. 1952. Ibid., l.104.

61. Ibid., l.125. The governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia were told that the campaign had ‘the creation of a united, democratic, peace-loving German state as an objective’ and then told that it aimed ‘to expand more broadly the movement of the German people for peace, against war’, ibid., l.122. Wettig's interpretation of the Soviet motivation, Deutschland-Note, p.799, only rests on the second element of the message.

62. AWP RF f.07, op.25, p.13, d.144, l.115.

63. On the draft transmitted on 6 Feb. 1952, he noted down: ‘In favour. V. Molotov 5.2.52’; AWP RF f.07, op.25, p.13, d.144, ll.129–31.

64. A letter to Stalin signed by Gromyko on 13 Feb. 1952, refers to this resolution; ibid., l.136.

65. According to Gromyko to Stalin 12 Feb. 1952, AWP RF f.07, op.25, p.13, d.144, ll.132f. Also see the resolution ‘On measures for the acceleration of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and for the creation of a united, democratic, peace-loving German state’ of 8 Feb. 1952 (Resolution No.425) in RGASPI f.17, op.3, d.1092, and the references to the consultations on 30 Jan. and 6 Feb. 1952, ibid. In contrast to Bj⊘rnstad, Soviet Union, p.71f., the GDR leadership was not spared the obligation to again appeal to the Bonn government; a new draft did not have to be presented. By the same token, the draft package of 25 Jan. 1952 does not constitute for an ‘analogical worded Stalin-resolution’, as Wettig, Deutschland-Note, p.797, claims.

66. Resolution ‘On the instructions for the Comrades Chuikov and Semionov in connection with the draft of the appeal of the government of the GDR to the Four Powers on the occasion of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany’ 12 Feb. 1952 (Resolution No.453), RGASPI f.17, op.3, d.1092, a working copy in AWP RF f.07, op.25, p.13, d.144, ll.134f. In the comment of the Foreign Ministry of the same day, it had been proposed to completely delete the passage concerning the ‘aspirations of imperialist forces’.

67. Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Vol.1 (Berlin, 1954), pp.73–6.

68. Gromyko to Stalin 13 Feb. 1952, as fn.63; Resolution draft with annex, AWP RF f.07, op.25, p.13, d.144, ll.137–48.

69. Undated draft for resolution, most likely 14 Feb. 1952, ibid., l.149, annex ll.150–58.

70. Gromyko to Stalin 15 Feb. 1952, ibid. l.159.

71. As stated in the explanation in a letter of Gromyko to Molotov 17 Feb. 1952, ibid., l.162. Draft for resolution and draft for answer in the annex to the letter of Gromyko to Stalin 15 Feb. 1952, ibid., ll.160f.

72. Draft for resolution of 18 Feb. 1952, with handwritten additions with blue pen, underneath: ‘Decided upon. 20.2’, ibid., l.166. As late as 17 Feb. Gromyko had transmitted a variation of the original draft of 2 Feb., ibid., l.163. The definite text of answer, among other publications, in Neues Deutschland, 21 Jan. 1952.

73. As stated by the SCC official for All-German Affairs, I.S. Bakulin, in a letter of 18 Feb. 1952, addressed to Semionov, AWP RF f.0457a, op.13, p.66, d.5, ll.5–12, quoted with other reference to the campaign in Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die KPD als Instrument der sowjetischen Deutschland.Politik. Festlegungen 1949 und Implementierungen 1952’, Deutschland-Archiv 27 (1994), pp.816–29, here pp.822–5.

74. Gromyko to Stalin 23 Feb. 1952, AWP RF f.082, op.40, p.255, d.11, ll.14–24.

75. Also see the sampling of the headlines of the Tägliche Rundschau in Jürgen Weber, ‘Das sowjetische Wiedervereinigungsangebot vom 10. März 1952’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B50 (1969), pp.3–30, here p.11.

76. Resolution No.47 in RGASPI f.17, op.3, d.1093.

77. Statement of the Federal government of 22 Feb. 1952, Europa-Archiv 7 (1952), p.4794.

78. Also see footnote 2 on the text of the note; a German translation of the previous version in Loth, ‘Entstehung’, pp.110–12.

79. On the working copy of the draft of 25 January it was jotted down in handwriting: ‘Separate the fundamentals from the preamble’, ibid., l.99.

80. Considering the state of resolutions in the documents of the Foreign Ministry, that had not been changed until the Politburo meeting of 8 March, Molotov cannot have made the final substantial changes, as Bj⊘rnstad, Soviet Union, pp.72f., writes regarding the regulations for the Ruhr region and the reparation question.

81. The draft for the note of 25 January planned for working out a ‘coordinated draft for peace treaty’ by the Four Powers ‘within three months’; ibid., ll.103f.

82. As Wettig, Bereitschaft, p.211, argues in an all too schematic comparison of supposed ‘extreme ideas’ and propagandistic disguise. In Bj⊘rnstad's observations ‘What if there had been a peace treaty?’ (Soviet Union, pp.77–91) the material changes throughout the process of drafting the ‘fundamentals’ text also lack some emphasis.

83. Badstübner and Loth, Pieck, p.381.

84. Considering this evidence, Hermann Graml's thesis that Stalin only intended a propagandistic effect ‘mainly for his own sphere of influence’ (‘Eine wichtige Quelle - aber mißverstanden’ in Zarusky (ed.), Stalin-Note, pp.117–37, here p.120) cannot be supported. See Wilfried Loth, ‘Das Ende der Legende. Hermann Graml und die Stalin-Note’,Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 50 (2002), pp.653–64.

85. In a discussion with the SED leadership on 7 April 1952, Archiw Presidenta Rossijskoj Federazii f.45, op.1, d.303, 1.179, published in Loth, Stalin's Unwanted Child, p.183.

86. Compare his comment of 16 March 1952 at the beginning of this article.