The American Factor: Sino-American Rapprochement and Chinese Attitudes to the Vietnam War, 1968–72

Abstract

It is clear that any work dealing with the United States and China during the 1960 s and 1970 s must make reference to the Vietnam War, and likewise any work dealing with Chinese involvement in the Vietnam War cannot overlook China's burgeoning relationship with the United States. However, since the release of documents from the Nixon administration and the publication of recent Chinese-language scholarship, there has been no systematic study of the connection between these two political processes. This paper charts the impact of Sino-American rapprochement on Beijing's attitudes towards the Vietnam War, and to what extent it caused China to alter its Vietnam policy.

Notes

 [1] Westad et al., 77 Conversations. In order to protect the secrecy surrounding their origins, the editors of 77 Conversations cannot reveal the provenance of the memoranda of conversation contained in the working paper; I am led to believe, however, that they are genuine. More problematic is the fact that they are only partial documents, and may have been selectively edited by the party who provided them; this must be borne in mind when working with these documents.

 [2] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 90.

 [3] Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 172.

 [4] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 122.

 [5] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol.3, 252–253; Liu and Mastny, ‘Proceedings’, 111; Dillon et al. , ‘Who Was the Principal Enemy?’, 466. This study of the ‘hostile symbols’ used by China to describe the United States and the Soviet Union also noted that (by its measurements), in the wake of the invasion, Chinese hostility towards the Soviet Union was greater than that towards the United States at any time during the 1968–69 period.

 [6] Telno 70, Hanoi to Foreign Office, 30 August 1968, The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) FCO 15/538

 [7] Pike, ‘Democratic National Convention’; Pike, ‘Nguyen Thanh Le Holds Press Meeting in Paris’.

 [8] Pike, ‘The Bombing Halt and Peking's Deathly Hush’.

 [9] Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, 61.

[10] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 262.

[11] Pike, ‘The Bombing Halt and Peking's Deathly Hush’; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vietnam, The Truth about Vietnam–China Relations, 36; Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC, Zhou Enlai waijiao, 531; Pike, ‘Eye on China’; Qu Aiguo, ‘Zhongguo zhiyuan’, esp. 91–101; Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, 235.

[12] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 136–137.

[13] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 136–137

[14] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 2.

[15] Confidential memo by L. Giles, ‘North Vietnam and Czechoslovakia’, 4 September 1968, TNA: PRO FCO 15/538.

[16] Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 136; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 64.

[17] Pike, ‘Wait and See?’

[18] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 266.

[19] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 143.

[20] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 139, 139.

[21] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 140–141, 140–141.

[22] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 137 n. 206.

[23] Nguyen Van Linh was actually originally from northern Vietnam, but had spent most of his life in the South. See Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 144 n. 210.

[24] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 145.

[25] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 145–146, 145–146.

[26] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 267.

[27] For a full, and excellent, discussion of the changing security and ideological environment that the PRC faced in 1969, see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, 238–247.

[28] Zhang Baijia, ‘The Changing International Scene’, 69–70.

[29] Kissinger, White House Years, 170; Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, 61; Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 154–157.

[30] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 154–157.

[31] Foreign Ministry Vietnam, The Truth About Vietnam–China Relations (also known as the White Book), 37. It is now clear that many of the quotations in the White Book are paraphrased or taken badly out of context, e.g. cf. Chen Yi's 17 October 1968 comments, White Book, 37; Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 137.

[32] Liu and Mastny, ‘China and Eastern Europe’, 67.

[33] ‘Sujun zongsanmoubu jiancha zongju guanyu guoji xingshi diaocha gei sugong zhongyang de baogao’ [Report from the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army to the Central Committee of the CPSU on its Survey of the International Situation], 15 August 1969. (I am grateful to Li Danhui for giving me a Chinese translation of this Soviet document. Unfortunately it does not contain the original archival reference.)

[34] Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War, 30. Cf. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 136.

[35] Foreign Ministry PRC, Zhou Enlai waijiao, 540–546; CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 324–330; Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War, 30–31; Li Danhui, ‘Zhong-su Chongtu’, 31; Shen Zhihua, ‘Zhong-mei hejie yu zhongguo dui yue waijiao’, 224.

[36] Kissinger, White House Years, 180–181.

[37] Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, ‘Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber and Diplomatic Probe’, 195; CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 336–337.

[38] Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, ‘Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber and Diplomatic Probe’, 196.

[39] Telcon, The President/Kissinger, 6:10 p.m., 15 January 1970, file 8, box 3, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives at College Park, College Park MD (hereafter cited as NA II).

[40] Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, 251.

[41] Kissinger, White House Years, 692–693.

[42] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 363–364.

[43] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 365.

[44] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 164–165.

[45] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 366–367; Li Danhui, ‘Zhong-mei huanhe yu yuan yue kang mei’, 69.

[46] Telcon, The President and Henry Kissinger, 19 May 1970, file 1, box 853, Files for the President – Lord: Vietnam Negotiations, National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II; Kissinger, White House Years, 694.

[47] ‘People of the World, Unite and Defeat the US Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!’, Peking Review, 23 May 1970.

[48] Holdridge, Crossing The Divide, 41; Kissinger, White House Years, 496–498; Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, 253.

[49] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 172–173; Shen Zhihua, ‘Zhong-mei hejie yu zhongguo dui yue waijiao’, 228.

[50] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 173–174.

[51] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 173–174

[52] Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, 254.

[53] Shen Zhihua, ‘Zhong-mei hejie yu zhongguo dui yue waijiao’, 228.

[54] Kissinger, White House Years, 702.

[55] ‘[T]here was a cessation of contacts for a period of time. As you know, one reason was last year's Cambodian incident, and this year there was the Route 9 battle [Lam Son 719]. This could not but affect our contacts.’ Zhou Enlai talking to Henry Kissinger, memcon, Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, 9 July 1971, file 2, box 1032, National Security Council Files/Files for the President/China, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II.

[56] Kissinger, White House Years, 706.

[57] Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War, 67; Shen Zhihua, ‘Zhong-mei hejie yu zhongguo dui yue waijiao’, 229; CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 436.

[58] Li Danhui, ‘Zhong-mei huanhe yu yuan yue kang mei’, 70; CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 441.

[59] Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War, 68–69; Foreign Ministry PRC, Zhou Enlai waijiao, 580–581; CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 441–442 (emphasis added).

[60] For a more detailed account of ping-pong diplomacy and the build-up to Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing, see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, 257–268; Kissinger, White House Years, 708–732.

[61] Shen Zhihua, ‘Zhong-mei hejie yu zhongguo dui yue waijiao’, 231.

[62] Scope paper, Polo I – Briefing Book for the President, July 1971, file 1, box 1032, National Security Council Files/Files for the President/China, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II.

[63] Polo II briefing book, October 1971, file 1, box 1034, National Security Council Files/Files for the President/China, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II; see also memcon (thematic) – Indochina, Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, 9–11 July 1971, Polo I record, file 2, box 1034, ibid.

[64] Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, ‘My Talks with Zhou Enlai’, 14 July 1971, National Security Council Files/Files for Pres/China/1032/2

[65] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 469; Westad et al, 77 Conversations, 179.

[66] Memorandum for The President from Henry A. Kissinger, ‘My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues’, November 1971, file 1, box 1035, National Security Council Files/Files for the President/China, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II.

[67] Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 49; Shen Zhihua, ‘Zhong-mei hejie yu zhongguo dui yue waijiao’, 232–233. There seems to be some discrepancy between the amount of aid Shen Zhihua estimates was given to North Vietnam by China, and that of the other main reference source: Shen Zhihua writes that in 1970 and 1971 China gave more military aid to North Vietnam than in the previous 20 years combined. Cf. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, eds., Wenhua dageming Zhong de renmin Jiefangjun. Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1989, 416.

[68] Kissinger, White House Years, 1043; memo for the record, Vernon Walters, 30 January 1972, file 3, box 849, National Security Council Files/Files for the President/Lord/China, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II.

[69] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 559.

[70] Qu Aiguo, ‘Zhongguo zhiyuan’, 101. This figure is the author's own calculation on the basis that in the four years of their operation the pipelines delivered a total of 1.3 million tonnes of oil.

[71] Qu Aiguo; Shen Zhihua, ‘Zhong-mei hejie yu zhongguo dui yue waijiao’, 236–238.

[72] Memcon, Henry Kissinger and Huang Hua, 16 May 1972, file 4, box 849, National Security Files/Files for the President/Lord/China Trip – Vietnam, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II; Kissinger, White House Years, 1192–1193, 1195.

[73] Memo for the President from Henry Kissinger, 27 June 1972, ‘My Trip to Peking, June 19–23, 1972’, file 5, box 97, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II.

[74] Memcon, Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, 20 June 1972, file 4, box 97, Henry Kissinger Office Files, National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II.

[75] Memcon, Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, 20 June 1972, file 4, box 97, Henry Kissinger Office Files, National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA II

[76] CCP Research, Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, 534; PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhou Enlai waijiao, 636; Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 179.

[77] Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 180–181.

[78] Li Danhui, ‘Zhong-mei huanhe yu yuan yue kang mei’, 75.

[79] Kissinger, White House Years, 1316; Li Danhui, ‘Zhong-mei huanhe yu yuanyue kang mei’, 75.

[80] For an early, though useful, analysis of whether Beijing ‘betrayed’ Hanoi, see Garver, ‘Sino-Vietnamese Conflict’.

[81] E.g., see Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 132.

[82] Pike, ‘China, North Vietnam and Ping-Pong Balls’.