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Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Andrew Nathan (Columbia University), Michael Smith (King's College, University of London) and John Tai (George Washington University) for providing insightful comments on previous drafts of this article.
Notes
[1] Barnett, China and the Major Powers, 227–228.
[2] CitationNathan and Ross, The Great Wall, 65.
[3] Goh, Constructing, 11.
[4] Ibid, 9.
[5] Ibid., 92.
[6] Ibid., 10–11.
[7] Ibid., 11.
[8] CitationChen, Mao's China, 243.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Goh, Constructing, 4.
[13] Ibid., 5–6.
[14] Ibid., 6.
[15] CitationVan Evera, Guide, 30–34; CitationEckstein, ‘Case Study’, 118–119.
[16] See references to such constructivist works in CitationDesch, ‘Culture Clash’, 159.
[17] Goh, Constructing, 4.
[18] Ibid., 2.
[19] See references in Chen, Mao's China, 360–370.
[20] CitationGong, Mao Zedong.
[21] Chen, Mao's China; Citation Qiang Zhai , China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975; CitationRoss and Jiang Changbin, Re-examining the Cold War.
[22] Goh, Constructing, 11.
[23] CitationWendt, ‘Anarchy’, 391–425; CitationFinnemore and Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock’, 391–416.
[24] Goh, Constructing, 95.
[25] Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 35.
[26] Goh, Constructing, 95–98.
[27] CitationGoldstein, ‘Return’, 985–997.
[28] Ibid., 96 (emphasis added). On this point, see Harding's characterization of the Chinese government's reaction to American proposals for better relations. Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 35.
[29] CitationChen, ‘How to Pursue’, p. 138.
[30] Chen, Mao's China, 71, 77, 189–190.
[31] CitationKojima (ed.), The Record.
[32] CitationZagoria, ‘Mao's Role’, 139–153.
[33] Such radicalism impressed Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot who spent five months in China from late 1965 to early 1966. See CitationChanda, Brother Enemy , 62.
[34] It is estimated that between 16.4 to 29.5 million Chinese died as a result of the Great Leap Forward. See CitationMacFarquhar, The Origins, 330.
[35] Goh, Constructing, 268.
[36] Ibid., 9–11.
[37] Ibid., 9.
[38] Ibid., 11.
[39] CitationKing et al. , Designing Social Inquiry, 100–105.
[40] Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock’, 391–416.
[41] CitationKatzenstein, The Culture.
[42] CitationLegro, ‘The Transformation’, 419–432.
[43] Goh, Constructing, 257.
[44] Ibid., 258.
[45] Ibid., 9.
[46] Ibid., 261.
[47] Ibid., 12.
[48] Ibid., 259–260; CitationByman and Pollack, ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men’, 107–146.
[49] CitationWaltz, Theory; For a review of the contributions and limitations of structural realism see CitationHaggard, ‘Structuralism’, 403–437.
[50] Goh, Constructing, 4.
[51] I would like to thank Andrew Nathan and Michael Smith for fine-tuning this point.
[52] Goh, Constructing, 4.
[53] CitationZagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict.
[54] CitationGuan, The Vietnam War, 78–79, 139–140; Kojima, The Record.
[55] Qiang, China.
[56] Burr, ‘Sino-American Relations, Citation1969’, 73–112.
[57] CitationKissinger, White House, 171.
[58] Harry Harding, John Garver and Robert Ross are cited as examples providing the best orthodox accounts of the Sino-American rapprochement. Harding, A Fragile Relationship; Garver, China's Decision; CitationRoss, Negotiating Co-operation.
[59] CitationHarding, A Fragile Relationship.
[60] CitationGarver, China's Decision.
[61] Ross, Negotiating Cooperation.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Goh, Constructing, 5.
[64] CitationWolfers, Discord; CitationMorgenthau, Politics Among Nations; CitationKissinger, A World Restored.
[65] Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 5.
[66] See CitationSchweller, ‘Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias’, 90–121; CitationSchweller, ‘Bandwagoning For Profit’, 72–107.
[67] Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 2.
[68] Ibid., 1.
[69] Ibid., 17–54.
[70] CitationChristensen, Useful Adversaries; CitationRose, ‘Neoclassical Realism’, 144–172. CitationSchweller, Deadly Imbalances; CitationWalt, The Origins; CitationWohlforth, The Elusive Balance; CitationZakaria, From Wealth to Power.
[71] CitationHaslam, No Virtue Like Necessity.
[72] Goh, Constructing, 4; CitationSchweller, ‘Unanswered Threats’, 159–201.
[73] Chen, Mao's China, 241 (emphasis original).
[74] Ibid., 239.
[75] Ibid., 243.
[76] Ibid., 243.
[77] CitationYang, ‘The Sino-Soviet Border Clash’, 21–52.
[78] Chen, Mao's China, 243.
[79] Ibid., 242.
[80] Ibid., 243.
[81] Yang, ‘The Sino-Soviet Border Clash’.
[82] Comments by Vietnamese Communist General Vo Ngyuen Giap. Giap's comments were made in an interview with Miguel Rivero, Verde Olivo (Havana), 10 February 1980 and are cited in CitationPike, Vietnam, 87–88.
[83] Chen, Mao's China, 276.
[84] CitationPollack, ‘The Opening to America’, 422, 426.
[85] Goh, Constructing, 182.
[86] Cited in Pike, Vietnam, 87–88.
[87] Ibid. (italics original).
[88] CitationHerring, America's Longest War, 242.
[89] Cited in CitationPorter, Vietnam, 569–570.
[90] DRV Minister of Foreign Trade Phan Anh in an interview with Aziya Afrika Segodnya (Moscow, March 1972) cited in Pike, Vietnam, 96.
[91] See table detailing PRC Military aid to Hanoi from 1964 to 1975 in CitationLi and Hao, Wenhua Dageming Zhong, 416. See table detailing Soviet overall aid in Pike, Vietnam, 139. See also table detailing Soviet military aid in CitationThakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations, 118.
[92] CitationSocialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth about Vietnam–Chinese Relations, 21–25, 45, 79. Sino-US rapprochement is cited as the second betrayal of Vietnam. In Hanoi's view, the first betrayal is the Geneva Agreement of 1954. The third betrayal is China's post-1975 policy toward Vietnam.
[93] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Truth about Vietnam–Chinese Relations, 79.
[94] See Ngyuen Co Thach's interview in FBIS Daily Report (Asia-Pacific), 17 March 1982, K2.
[95] Chen, Mao's China, 237.
[96] Cited in CitationRoss and Changbin, Re-examining, 361.
[97] Goh, Constructing, 5.