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Abstract
This article examines the place of the United Nations as a forum in which early Cold War tensions were visible among the former wartime allies with particular reference to the cases of Greece and Spain. It looks at the roles that the Big Three allocated to the United Nations in their post-war foreign policies and how these changed during the period and in particular the way in which the United Nations became less a forum for maintaining great power unity and more one in which Cold War tensions were publicly and damagingly demonstrated.
Notes
[1] His speech to the UN Association at the Albert Hall on 10 October 1945, in the National Archives, FO371/50891/U8810; all further FO and CAB references are to papers in the National Archives, Kew.
[2] CAB66/30, WP(42)516, 8 November 1942.
[3] CAB66/31, WP(42)524, 12 November 1942.
[4] The differences are covered by CitationGorst, “British Military Planning,” 91–108.
[5] FO 371/50891/U8895, Ward's minute, 20 October 1945 supporting a draft circular on the importance of the UN in British foreign policy; this circular was in fact never sent.
[6] See CitationSmith, “Ernest Bevin,” 39.
[7] FO 371/50912/U5471, “Stocktaking After VE Day,” 11 July 1945.
[8] For a broader discussion of British policy in the UN in 1946 see CitationJohnson, “Britain and the United Nations,” 5–21.
[9] See CitationHilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks , 46.
[11] See CitationUlam, Expansion and Coexistence , 412–13.
[12] FO371/56763/N4156, Roberts to Bevin, tel. 189, 17 March 1946 ; see also CitationDallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations , 27–9.
[13] CitationHull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull , 1626–33 and 1639–40; Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, 6–19.
[14] CitationCampbell and Herring, The Diaries , 409.
[15] CitationAcheson, Present at the Creation , 111–12.
[16] Kennan, Memoirs Citation 1925 –1950, 216–20.
[17] The background to the October Agreement is well covered in CitationKuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War , 100–125.
[18] The background to the October Agreement is well covered in CitationKuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War , 96–100.
[19] See CitationChurchill, The Second World War , 255.
[20] CitationGoodwin, Britain and the United Nations , 74 and FO371/56763/N4065, Roberts to Bevin, tel.181, 14 March 1946.
[21] CitationLie, In the Cause of Peace , 31. According to Stettinius, Lie had to fortify himself with some stiff drinks to get through the ordeal of the Bevin–Vyshinsky skirmish; see CitationBarros, Trygve Lie and the Cold War , 92–3.
[22] See the report on the secret session in Foreign Relations of the United States Citation 1946 , (hereafter FRUS), vol.VII, 108–112.
[23] United Nations Security Council Official Records (hereafter UNSCOR), 1st yr., 6th mtg, 1 February 1946, 73–9.
[24] See for example Bevin's statements to the Security Council, UNSCOR., 1st yr., 6th mtg and 7th mtg., January 1946; and CitationBullock, Ernest Bevin , 220.
[25] Campbell and Herring, The Diaries, 449.
[26] UNSCOR., 1st yr., 6th mtg, 1 February 1946, 88.
[27] UNSCOR., 1st yr., 10th mtg, 6 February 1946, 171–2.
[28] Cadogan's statement in the Security Council, UNSCOR, 1st yr., 54th mtg., 16 August 1946.
[29] See FRUS Citation 1946 , vol.VII, 195–7.
[30] See FRUS 1946, vol.VII, 214–15.
[31] See FRUS 1946, vol.VII, 208.
[32] See FRUS 1946, vol.VII, 207 and 217–18.
[33] UNSCOR 1st yr., 87th mtg., SC resolution 339, 19 December 1946.
[34] FRUS 1946, vol.VII, 276–77.
[35] See for example CitationZubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War , 126 and CitationMastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity , 26.
[36] See FO371/67065/R5125, notes by the British representative to the Commission, 11 April 1947.
[37] See FO371/67075/R3067 and FO371/67065/R4790, HM Consul [Salonica to FO], 1 March 1947.
[38] UN doc. S/360/Rev 1, vol. I, pt.II, 28 July 1950, conclusions 106–15. (This is a revised report which was not published until 1950.)
[39] See Gromyko's speech, UNSCOR, 2nd yr., 153rd mtg., 8 July 1947, 1232–65.
[40] See FO371/60343/Z5757, “Economic Relations with Spain,” June 1946.
[41] FRUS Citation 1946 , vol. V, 1033–6.
[42] See FO371/60352/Z2187, copy of the Soviet note, 6 March 1946, endorsing French action and; FRUS 1946, vol. V, 1058–9.
[43] FRUS 1946, vol. V, 1030–31 and 1049–51; note that the British suspected some in the State Department of leaking the position Cadogan was to take in the UN to the American press so as to pressurize Britain into being rather more active in the UN against Spain, FO371/60353/Z2669, Cadogan's guidance tel. 34, 23 March 1946.
[44] FO371/60351/Z1868, Ward minute, 1 March 1946.
[45] FO371/60351/Z1931, Tel. 203, FO to Paris, 2 March 1946.
[46] CAB128/5, CM(20)46, 4 March 1946. The British did this in spite of fears that Spain might retaliate through an economic embargo which would hit austerity ridden Britain with some force; see FO371/60351/Z1974, “On the consequences of rupture with Spain,” 28 February 1946.
[47] See CitationAhmad, Britain, Franco's Spain and the Cold War , xix.
[48] See FO371/60352/Z2193, Hoyer Millar's account of his meeting with W. Perry George, Counsellor at the American Embassy in London, 4 March 1946.
[49] FO371/60364/Z8663/G, Bevin's meeting with Sir Victor Mallet, British Ambassador in Madrid, 5 October 1946.
[50] FO371/60366/Z9699, Tel. 1617 relaying Bevin's views to Paul-Henri Spaak, 12 November 1946.
[51] See FO371/59756/UN2609, transcript of an interview between Michael Fry of Reuters and Oscar Lange, the Polish representative in the Security Council which indicates Lange had a tendency to clear material with Gromyko.
[52] UNSCOR, S/75, June 1946.
[53] See FO371/60363/Z6845, summary paper of the situation in the UN on Spain, 29 July 1946; and FO371/60363/Z7535, minute by Sloan, 28 August 1946.
[54] UNSCOR, 1st yr., 49th mtg., 26 June 1946, p.441.
[55] FO371/60363/ Z7535, Minute by Sloan, 28 August 1946.
[56] See CAB134/414, IOC(S)(46)1, “The United Nations Organisation and the Spanish Question,” 12 September 1946.
[57] See FO371/60364/Z9096, letter from the British Embassy, Washington, 25 October 1946 relaying the views of Gromyko to the Basque representative at the UN.
[58] See FO371/60364/Z9096, State Dept. guidance tel. 18 October 1946 given to the British Embassy in Washington.
[59] FO 371/60364/Z8659/G, Hoyer Millar's brief on Spain, 1 October 1946.
[60] FO 371/60364/Z8659/G Minute by Hoyer Millar, 28 October1946.
[61] FO371/60364/Z9153, minute by Wilson, 30 October 1946.
[62] FO371/60366/Z9705, Tel. 1694, 15 November 1946.
[63] United Nations General Assembly Official Records (UNGAOR), UN res. 39(I)59th mtg., 12 December 1946.
[64] See the comments of Bottomley, 1198–9 and Stevenson, 1217, UNGAOR, 59th mtg., 12 December 1946.
[65] FO371/60364/Z8663/G, Bevin's meeting with Mallet, 5 October 1946.
[66] CAB 128/9, CM(2)47, 6 January 1947; the British were reliant on Spanish fruit and vegetables and Spanish potash for fertilizer to improve post-war food production. British industry also needed Spanish raw materials and Spain used its currency earnings to purchase manufactured goods from Britain and other European states so adding to general post-war economic recovery; see FO371/60343/Z5757, “Economic Relations with Spain,” June 1946.
[67] CAB129/16, CP(47)2, “Economic Sanctions Against Spain,” 3 January 1947.
[68] FO371/67867/Z3617, State Dept. tel. 1531, 7 April 1947,
[69] FO371/67868/Z4417, Sargent's memo relaying the view of Lewis Douglas, the US Ambassador in London, 1 May 1947.
[70] FO371/67867/Z3617, State Dept. tel. 1531, 7 April 1947.
[71] FO371/67868/Z4093, Bevin's tel. 970, 25 April 1947.
[72] FO371/67867/Z3740, Tel. 833, 19 April 1947.
[73] FO371/67869/Z7004, State Department views to Sir Oliver Harvey, 3 July 1947.
[74] See CAB 134/384, IOC(47)189, brief for the British delegation to the UN, “Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain,” 31 August 1947.
[75] FO371/67869/Z7004, Hickerson to Sir Oliver Harvey, 3 July 1947.
[76] UNGAOR, GA res. 114(II), 17 November 1947.
[77] See the speech by Shawcross, UNGAOR, 118th mtg., 17 November 1947, 1096.
[78] Acheson, Present at the Creation, 223; Kuniholm, The Origins, 412–13.
[79] Kuniholm, The Origins, 400.
[80] For an interesting account of some of the work of the UN Commission in March 1947, see the report by one of the British representatives, Mrs. Fothergill-Payne, which indicated the widespread use of the Serbian, Macedonian and Russian languages by the partisans, FO371/67064/R4206.
[81] UNGAOR, GA res.109 (II), 21 October 1947.
[82] See UN doc. A/409, Report of the First Committee, UNGAOR, 2nd session, plen. mtgs., Annex 8, 1511–12.
[83] See FO371/72710/UN2922, summary of the Soviet press for October 1948.
[84] See for example UNSCOB's Second Interim Report, UN doc. A/522, 19 January 1948.
[85] See UNSCOB's Fourth Report, UN doc. A/1857, 15 August 1951.
[86] CitationPreston, Franco , 574.
[87] FRUS Citation 1947 , vol.III, 1091–5.
[88] FO371/79698/Z6027, Hoyer Millar to FO, 5 September 1949.
[89] FO371/79698/Z7409, Bevin to Hankey, 14 November 1949.
[90] FO371/79698/Z6378/G, Barclay to FO, 14 September 1949.
[91] FO371/79698/Z7409, memo. by Sir Roger Makins, 24 October 1949.
[92] Preston, Franco, 592.
[93] UNGAOR, 5th Session, ad hoc Political Committee 29th mtg., 31 October 1950, 184–5.
[94] UNGAOR, 5th Session, ad hoc Political Committee 30th mtg., 31 October 1950, 187–9.
[95] The Brazilians feared the UN would follow the same path as the League of Nations if the Americans continued in their abrasive approach to the Soviet Union. The Norwegians agreed, but had indications from Gromyko that the Russians would not leave, a view that was supported by Walter Bedell Smith, the American Ambassador in Moscow. See FRUS Citation 1947 , vol. I. 79, 81 and 94–95.
[96] FO371/59755/UN2426, minute by Gore Booth, 2 October 1946.
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