Defeating the General: Anglo-American Relations, Europe and the NATO Crisis of 1966

Abstract

Recent accounts of the resolution of the NATO crisis of 1966 have praised the role of Lyndon Baines Johnson and his administration. This article suggests that there was an Anglo-American dimension to the outcome of the crisis. It shows how the US government sought British assistance to defend the principles of Atlantic partnership and European integration and how the British readily and effectively responded. The result was Anglo-American cooperation to defeat de Gaulle's challenge. The two governments turned the crisis into an opportunity to reinvigorate NATO and to pursue national objectives. For the Americans, this meant the stabilization of US–European relations, particularly in regard to the Federal Republic of Germany. For the British, it meant the strengthening of Britain's position in NATO and its prospects for future EEC entry, and the reinforcement of Anglo-American ties against the backdrop of Britain's global retreat.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his gratitude to the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the British Academy for their generosity in supporting the research upon which this article is based.

Notes

  [1] Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL), Papers of Francis M. Bator (hereafter Bator Papers), Subject File, Box 27, Bator to President, 7 March 1966.

  [2] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964 –1968, Vol. XIII (hereafter FRUS 1964–1968 XIII), doc.137.

  [3] Kaplan, NATO and the United States , 96. On the foundation of NATO see Smith, The Origins of NATO ; Wiggershaus and Foerster, The Western Security Community .

  [4] National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA), RG59 DoS CF DEF4NATO Box 1587, Memorandum of Conversation (Erhard and McCloy), 17 April 1966.

  [5] On de Gaulle, France and the NATO crisis, see Bozo, Two Strategies . Also see Soutou, “La France et la défense européenne,” 21–46. On de Gaulle's foreign policy from 1958 in general, see Vaïsse, La Grandeur .

  [6] On NATO in general see Kaplan, NATO and the United States, and Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace , 95–402. On the 1966 NATO crisis and the 1967 Harmel Report see Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance”; Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution ; Haftendorn, “The Adaptation of the NATO Alliance,” 285–322; Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity.”

  [7] This is the central argument of Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe , 5; also 229–30. Also see Schwartz, “Lyndon Johnson and Europe,” 37–60. Schwartz has gone further than most in his praise of Johnson, see Brands, The Wages of Globalism , 86–121; Costigliola, “Lyndon B. Johnson,” 173–210; Gardner, “Lyndon Johnson and De Gaulle,” 257–78; and Kaplan, “The U.S. and NATO,” 119–49.

  [8] Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” 71 and 22–74 in general.

  [9] Financial contributions to the NATO budget were one indicator of authority among allies. In 1965, the United States contributed 32 per cent, the French 13.96 per cent, the West Germans 13.92 per cent and the British 13.48 per cent. The next closest were the Italians (5.92 per cent) and the Canadians (5.87 per cent). Source: NARA RG59 DoS Lot72D139 Policy Planning Council Box 313, REU-73, 10.11.1966.

 [10] The Economist, 1097, 19 March 1966.

 [11] Schwartz, Johnson and Europe , 92–186 and Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” 22–74 have considered Anglo-American–West German relations in their accounts. Earlier studies pay little attention to the role played by the British; for example see Brands, Wages of Globalism, 86–121; Costigliola, “Lyndon B. Johnson,” 173–210; Gardner, “Lyndon Johnson and de Gaulle,” 257–78. To date, John Young is alone in the attention he pays to the Anglo-American relationship as an element of the Labour government's policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and détente. See Young, The Labour Governments , 115–41. Also see Hughes, “Harold Wilson” and White, Britain, Détente and Changing East–West Relations, 108–35. On the early 1960s see for example Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War ; Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons and Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations .

 [12] For the most comprehensive study of the East of Suez decision see Dockrill, Britain's Retreat . On the Johnson/Wilson era see, for example, Bartlett, “The Special Relationship” , 107–26; Colman, A “Special Relationship”? ; Dumbrell, A Special Relationship , 62–73; and Ellis, “Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War,” 180–204.

 [13] Young, The Labour Governments , 20–21. Also see in general Colman, A “Special Relationship”? and Dockrill, Britain's Retreat.

 [14] FRUS 1958 –1960 Vol. VII, doc. 45.

 [15] Jackson, De Gaulle , 98.

 [16] John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA (hereafter JFKL), Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files (hereafter Kennedy Papers, NSF), Countries, Box 72, David Klein to McGeorge Bundy, 18 April 1963.

 [17] Jackson, De Gaulle, 97.

 [18] de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope , 202.

 [19] Of the many studies of de Gaulle's foreign policy see, for example, Bozo, Two Strategies, 1–142; Giauque, Grand Designs , 126–223; Soutou, “La France et la défense européenne,” 21–46; and, in general, Vaïsse, La grandeur.

 [20] JFKL, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, Box 316, Bromley Smith, Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No.38 (Part II), 25 January 1963.

 [21] See, for example, The National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew, London (hereafter TNA), FO371/178922/W6/3, Butler to Harlech 187, 9 June 1964; TNA, FO371/177867/RF1022/115, FO to Certain of Her Majesty's Representatives 412, 3 July 1964; JFKL, NSF, Trips and Conferences, Box 239, President's European Trip June 1963, Background Paper, European and Atlantic Situation, 16 June 1963; JFKL, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Countries, Box72A, Bohlen, “Continuing Elements of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy,” 7 August 1963.

 [22] On the origins of the empty chair crisis, Ludlow, “Challenging French Leadership,” 240–44. On its conclusion, Ludlow, “The Eclipse of the Extremes,” 247–64.

 [23] de Gaulle, Discours et messages, 19 (“Au total, il s'agit de rétablir une situation normale de souveraineté, dans laquelle ce qui est français, en fait de sol, de ciel, de mer et de forces, et tout élément étranger qui se trouverait en France, ne relèveront plus que seules autorités françaises”).

 [24] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 27, Acheson, Memorandum for the Secretary, 10 May 1966.

 [25] Brands, Wages of Globalism, 87–8.

 [26] Johnson, The Vantage Point , 24.

 [27] NARA RG59 Lot File 67D516 Box 2, Ferguson to Rusk, 9 July 1965.

 [28] See in general Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy . Also, Ball, The Past , 208–18.

 [29] Schwartz, Johnson and Europe, 92–139.

 [30] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 135.

 [31] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 166.

 [32] FRUS 1964-1968 XIII, doc. 143.

 [33] LBJL, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, National Security Files (hereafter Johnson Papers, NSF), Country File, France, Box 177, Extract of February 6, 1965 cable from Ambassador Kohler, 9 February 1965. Also, LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Country File, France, Box 171, CIA memorandum, “France's Dialogue with the Soviet Union,” 21 May 1965.

 [34] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Country File, France, Box 177, Bromley Smith to Johnson, 10 March 1966.

 [35] For example, TNA, CAB129/124, C(66)16, 28 January 1966 and FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 172.

 [36] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 27, Bator, Memorandum for the President, 8 March 1966.

 [37] FRUS 1964 –1968 XIII, doc. 144.

 [38] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 157 and doc. 159.

 [39] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 144.

 [40] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 26, Tuthill “The EEC and the NATO Crises,” 19 October 1965.

 [41] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 127.

 [42] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 140. On the US government and the Kennedy Round, Zeiler, American Trade and Power .

 [43] TNA, PREM13/1042, Wright to Wilson, 4 March 1966 and TNA, FO to UKDNATO 330–333, 6 March 1966.

 [44] TNA, PREM13/1042, FO to UKDNATO 351, 8 March 1966.

 [45] TNA, CAB129/124, C(66)16, 28 January 1966.

 [46] TNA, CAB129/124, C(66)16, 28 Janury 1966; TNA, CAB148/27, OPD(66)44, 1 April 1966; TNA, CAB158/49, JIC(63)65, 18 July 1963; TNA, CAB158/61, JIC(66)13(Final), 17 June 1966.

 [47] TNA, FO371/184288/6/12, Palliser, “British Foreign Policy,” 9 February 1965.

 [48] TNA, FO371/184288/6/13, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/38, 3 March 1965.

 [49] On Britain and the MLF, Schrafstetter and Twigge, “Trick or Truth?”; Young, “Killing the MLF?,” 295–324.

 [50] Parr, “Harold Wilson, Whitehall and British Policy,” 81–104.

 [51] TNA, CAB129/121, C(65)73, 11 May 1965; TNA, FO371/184289/6/28, Barnes, “Atlantic Alliance,” 21 May 1965 and TNA, CAB129/122, C(65)119, 5 August 1965.

 [52] TNA, CAB148/25, OPD(66)18^th meeting, 6 April 1966.

 [53] TNA, CAB148/27, OPD(66)44, 1 April 1966; TNA, PREM13/1043, Trend to Prime Minister, 4 April 1966; TNA, CAB148/25, OPD(66)18^th meeting, 6 April 1966.

 [54] TNA, PREM13/1043, Wilson to Johnson, 21 March 1966; LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Head of State Correspondence, Box 9, Wilson to Johnson, 29 March 1966.

 [55] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Country File, Europe and USSR, United Kingdom, Box 209, Memorandum of Conversation “France and NATO,” 11 October 1965.

 [56] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc.126, Memorandum of Conversation, 27 January 1966.

 [57] For an early example of the aversion see FRUS, 1950 , Volume III, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 19 April 1950: “In dealing with other Europeans, however, we cannot overtly treat the British differently and they should recognize that the special US–UK relation underlies the US–Europe relations, and that we do not consider close UK-European relations as prejudicial to the US–UK relations.”

 [58] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 27, Bator Memorandum for the President, 3 March 1966; TNA, PREM13/1042, Dean to FO 762 and 763, 3 March 1966.

 [59] TNA, PREM13/1042, FO to UKDNATO 355, 8 March 1966. For FO-State Department exchanges, TNA, PREM13/1042, Dean to FO 780 and 781, 4 March 1966.

 [60] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 27, Bator, Memorandum for the President, 8 March 1966.

 [61] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 27, Memorandum of Conversation, 6 March 1966; TNA, PREM13/1042, Dean to FO 807, 7 March 1966. Also see LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 27, Bruce to Rusk, 8 March 1966.

 [62] FRUS, 1964–1968, XIII, doc. 139. See also TNA, PREM13/1042, FO to UKDNATO 351, 8 March 1966; TNA, PREM13/1043, Dean to FO 944, 19 March 1966.

 [63] For the declaration, TNA, PREM13/1043, London Press Service “France–NATO,” 18 March 1966. For the French aide-memoire, Ambassade de France, French Foreign Policy , 25–6.

 [64] TNA, PREM13/1042, Wright to Prime Minister, 4 March 1966; TNA, PREM13/1042, FO to UKDNATO 330-333, 6 March 1966; TNA, PREM12/1042, Dean to FO 807, 7 March 1966.

 [65] For European encouragement, see TNA, PREM13/1042, Shuckburgh to FO 91, 2 March 1966 and 97, 3 March 1966; also TNA, PREM13/1044, FO to Brussels 478, 20 April 1966 and TNA, CAB148/25, OPD(66)22^nd Meeting, 27 April 1966. On British adaptation, TNA, PREM13/1043, FO to Washington 2951, 17 March 1966.

 [66] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 27, Bruce to Rusk 4232, 8 March 1966.

 [67] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 27, Bruce to Rusk 4232, 8 March 1966, undated handwritten note by Johnson. On Johnson's interventions, FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 148 and doc. 167; also see his speech to the Foreign Services Institute on 23 March: LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 26, Text of the Remarks of the President, 23 March 1966.

 [68] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Country File, France, Box 177, Bruce to Rusk 4437, 21 March 1966.

 [69] On the US and the MLF, Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, 203–43; Costigliola, “Lyndon B Johnson,” 173–210, 180–92, and Schwartz, Johnson and Europe, 39–46. On France and the MLF, Bozo, Two Strategies, 110–21.

 [70] Young, “Killing the MLF?,” 295–324.

 [71] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 28, Bator, Memorandum for the President, 4 March 1966; LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Head of State Correspondence File, Box 9, Wilson to Johnson, 29 March 1966.

 [72] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 28, Bator to Johnson, enclosing Rusk Memorandum for the President, 12 April 1966; FRUS 1964–1968, XIII, doc. 159.

 [73] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 28, Rusk Memorandum for the President, 12 April 1966.

 [74] TNA, PREM13/1043, FO to Washington 3096, 22 March 1966.

 [75] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Head of State Correspondence, Box 9, Wilson to Johnson, 29 March 1966.

 [76] FRUS 1964–1968, XIII, doc. 168.

 [77] TNA, PREM13/1044, Record of Conversation (Erhard/Wilson), 23 May 1966 and GCV(66)1^st, 24 May 1966.

 [78] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Head of State Correspondence, Box 9, Wilson to Johnson, 26 May 1966.

 [79] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Head of State Correspondence, Box 9, Johnson to Wilson, 28 May 1966.

 [80] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 144.

 [81] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 152 and doc. 170. For the attitudes of EEC member states, see Ludlow, The European Community , chapter 4.

 [82] Ball, The Discipline of Power , 88–9.

 [83] NARA RG59 DoS Lot72D139 Policy Planning Council, Box 313, Memorandum for the President, 19 May 1966.

 [84] FRUS 1964–1968, XIII, doc. 188; also NARA RG59 DoS CF EEC 3 Meetings, Sessions, Box 3292, Solomon and Stoessel through S/S to The Under Secretary, 19 July 1966.

 [85] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Country File, Europe and USSR, United Kingdom, Box 209, Ball, Memorandum for the President, 22 July 1966.

 [86] LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 24, Rusk Memorandum for the President, 24 July 1966 and LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Country File, Europe and USSR, United Kingdom, Box 209, Rostow to President, 29 July 1966.

 [87] NARA RG59 DoS CF EEC 8 Structures & Functions, Box 3292, Memorandum of Conversation “UK and the Common Market,” 29 July 1966 and LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Country File, Europe and USSR, United Kingdom, Box 216, Bator through Moyers “Memorandum for the President,” 29 July 1966. Also, TNA, FO371/190526/W2/52G, Killick to FO 2173, 27 July 1966.

 [88] TNA, PREM13/1509, Record of a Conversation, 8 July 1966. On British policy towards the EEC, see Parr, “Wilson, Whitehall and British Policy,” 105–225.

 [89] TNA, CAB148/25, OPD(66)16^th meeting, 5 April 1966.

 [90] TNA, PREM13/905, Roll minute, 6 April 1966.

 [91] TNA, PREM13/1044, Palliser to Wilson, 24 May 1966 and TNA, CAB148/69 OPD(O) (66)22Revise and OPD(O)(66)24Revise, both 29 July 1966. For the Chequers decision, TNA, CAB134/2705, E(66)3^rd meeting, 22 October 1966.

 [92] TNA, PREM13/909, Dean to FO 217, 29 October 1966; LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 25, Leddy and Solomon to Secretary, 11 November 1966.

 [93] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Head of State Correspondence, Box 10, Rostow to Johnson, 15 November 1966 enclosing Wilson to Johnson, 11 November 1966.

 [94] FRUS 1964–1968, XIII, doc. 216.

 [95] Schwartz, Johnson and Europe, 143–59. Ludwig Erhard was replaced by Kurt-Georg Kiesinger as chancellor in December 1966.

 [96] LBJL, Bator Papers, Chronological File, Box 3, Bator, Memorandum for the President, 11 August 1966.

 [97] Schwartz, Johnson and Europe, 121–2.

 [98] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Head of State Correspondence, Box 9, Wilson to Johnson, 29 March 1966; TNA, CAB148/25, OPD(66)25^th meeting, 18 May 1966 and OPD(66)36^th meeting, 11 August 1966. Also, Zimmerman, “The Sour Fruits of Victory.”

 [99] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Country File, Europe and USSR, United Kingdom, Box 210, Memorandum of Conversation “British Proposals to Cut the Cost of the BAOR,” 16 August 1966 and LBJL, Bator Papers, Subject File, Box 28, Memorandum of Conversation “British Plans to Reduce Military Spending in Germany,” 25 August 1966.

[100] FRUS 1964–1968 XIII, doc. 198.

[101] Public Papers , 1125–30. Also, TNA, FO371/190534/W6/5 Dean to FO 189 and 190, 12 October 1966.

[102] FRUS 1964–1968, XIII, doc. 216; TNA, CAB128/41, CC(66)61^st conclusions, 29 November 1966.

[103] NARA RG59 DoS Lot File 68D55 Entry 5302 NATO-General Box 12, “The France-NATO Confrontation of 1966 – A History,” undated.

[104] Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance,” 343–60; Haftendorn, “The Adaptation of NATO,” 285–322; Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” 22–74.

[105] Bozo, Two Strategies, 167.

[106] Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, 406–7.

[107] Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance,” 359.

[108] Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance,”, 348–9. Others make a similar point, for example Brands, Wages of Globalism, 88.

[109] This is the general argument of Schwartz, Johnson and Europe.

[110] Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” 72–3.

[111] For a similar view, White, Britain, Détente and Changing East–West Relations, 128–9.

[112] Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance,” 355.

[113] Dockrill, Britain's Retreat, 218–19.

[114] TNA FCO41/2, Barnes to Hood, 7 December 1966.

[115] On Wilson and Britain's EEC policy see Parr, “Wilson, Whitehall and British Policy,” 105–225, and Young, The Labour Governments, 142–65.

[116] LBJL, Johnson Papers, NSF, Head of State Correspondence, Box 10, Rostow to Johnson enclosing letter to Wilson, 11 January 1968.