Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie: Lucius Clay and the Berlin Crisis, 1961–62

Abstract

The stand-off of Soviet and American tanks in the heart of Berlin in October 1961 constituted the most dangerous moment of the Cold War in Europe. It has been attributed to unnecessarily confrontational policies of General Lucius D. Clay, who served as President Kennedy's Special Representative in Berlin. This article assesses how the crisis evolved from the Berlin Wall to the tank confrontation. It centres on the role of General Clay, his communication with Washington, and his activities in Berlin. This is a study of the process by which US government policy was translated into diplomatic and military action. The article concludes that the resulting combination of force and diplomacy is crucial to understanding the crisis management of John F. Kennedy.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Professor John Lampe, Professor Keith Olsen, Professor Jon Sumida, Christina Kinsell, Nicholas Schlosser, and the anonymous reviewers of Cold War History for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

Notes

 [1] Some historians and analysts of the Berlin Crisis have contributed to this perception. Jack M. Schick and Marc Trachtenberg, for instance, never mention the tank stand-off. See Schick, The Berlin Crisis 1958–1962, and Trachtenberg, History and Strategy and A Constructed Peace . Senior officials of the Kennedy administration also omitted the tank crisis in their memoirs. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929–1969; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost; Rusk, As I Saw It; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; and Sorensen, Kennedy.

 [2] For Clay's command tenure as Military Governor see Clay's memoirs Decision in Germany; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, 223–546. Recent monographs on the Berlin Blockade and air lift include Haydock, City Under Siege and Parrish, Berlin in the Balance. For the attitude of Berliners toward Clay see, e.g., Brandt, Begegnungen mit Kennedy, 110–13, and Riller, Funken für die Freiheit, 155.

 [3] Cate, The Ides of August, 458–86; Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis; McDermott, Berlin: Success of a Mission?, 43–6, Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 303–24; Smith, Clay, 657–63; Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 167–83.

 [4] Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community”; Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 90–91; Garthoff, “Berlin 1961”; Gelb, The Berlin Wall, 245–58; Large, Berlin, 455–6; Schild, “The Berlin Crisis”; Steininger, Der Mauerbau, 305–14.

 [5] Quoted in Large, Berlin, 456.

 [6] Michael Beschloss concluded that Kennedy consented because he was “reluctant to provoke the General.” Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 333. German diplomatic historian Schanett Riller acknowledged that Kennedy permitted Clay's actions, but only after the general's course had been too far advanced to do otherwise. Riller, Funken für die Freiheit, 157. Riller's “Decision Making in the U.S. Administration” remains the only detailed archival study of the events in September and October.

 [7] For an excellent recent study of US policy during the Berlin Crisis that considers the conflicting positions of France, Great Britain, and West Germany, see Münger, Kennedy, die Berliner Mauer und die Kubakrise.

 [8] Schanett Riller argues that Clay's activities were not fully compatible with contingency plans in Washington and were potentially harmful to Kennedy's policy of negotiation. Riller, Funken für die Freiheit,157. But Riller did not consider that the demonstration of Soviet control of East German border police fundamentally altered the negotiation positions of the two superpowers. Swiss historian Christof Münger argues that Clay's actions in Berlin served to underscore the leadership role of the US in NATO, particularly when contrasted to the weak responses of Britain and France. But he also states that Clay acted on his own volition and presented Kennedy with a fait accompli. Münger, Kennedy, Berliner Mauer und Kubakrise, 129–32.

 [9] For the Berlin Crisis from 1958 to 1960 see, for instance, Bremen, Die Eisenhower-Administration; Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope”; Schick, Berlin Crisis; Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 191–215 and A Constructed Peace, 251–82.

[10] Petr LuJák shows that Khrushchev, having failed to force a compromise upon President Eisenhower, assumed that John F. Kennedy was weakened by the Bay of Pigs fiasco and would have to accept unilateral Soviet action in Berlin. But when the US government responded firmly, indicating that it was prepared for an escalation, Khrushchev settled for a smaller solution, trying to stem the flow of refugees from East Germany. LuJák, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis.” But see also Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall and “Driving the Soviets Up the Wall” for the influence of the East German government on Khrushchev's decisions.

[11] The best account of the meeting and Kennedy's reaction remains Beschloss, Crisis Years, 211–36.

[12] Policy Planning Staff, OASD (ISA), 26 June 1961, A New Approach to Berlin. Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Secret and Below General Files 1961, 092 Germany 21–30 June 1961, Box 33, Record Group 330, National Archives.

[13] National Security Action Memorandum No. 62, 24 July 1961. Records of the National Security Council (NSC), National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), Record Group 273, National Archives.

[14] See, for instance, Memorandum by Paul Nitze, summarized in Lemnitzer to Norstad, 26 August 1961. Lauris Norstad Papers, Subject Series, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1957 thru Oct 1961 Vol. I (4), Box 103, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

[15] For NATO's Live Oak organization, installed in 1959 to develop plans for interference with Western access rights, and commanded by General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, see Pedlow, “Allied Crisis Management for Berlin.” For the plans developed by Live Oak see also Maloney, “Berlin Contingency Planning” and Pedlow, “Flexible Response Before MC 14/3.”

[16] See Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 293–5.

[17] Quoted in Beschloss, Crisis Years, 278.

[18] Relations between the two Cold War allies were already declining, as John F. Kennedy and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer could not establish a close personal relationship, unlike Adenauer and John Foster Dulles. Adenauer believed that the new American strategy of flexible response was ill-advised and would lead to the abandonment of Western Europe. In the late summer of 1961 he lamented the slow response of the White House to the erection of the Berlin Wall. More importantly, he believed that Kennedy openly favoured opposition leader Willy Brandt, the Lord Mayor of Berlin, over Adenauer in the upcoming national election. See, e.g., Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy.

[19] Norstad to Lemnitzer, 18 August 1961. Lauris Norstad Papers, Policy Files Series, Box 86, “Berlin – LIVE OAK 1961 thru 30 Aug. (1),” DDE Library. For Norstad's moderate course throughout the Berlin Crisis see Pedlow, “Three Hats for Berlin.” The French government opposed negotiations because there was nothing to be gained and it deemed the current situation the best possible outcome. See Buffet, “De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin,” 88.

[20] In November Adenauer told Dean Acheson that negotiations were the only option because NATO was too weak conventionally and he rejected the idea to use nuclear weapons in the Berlin Crisis. Acheson to Marshall Shulman, 23 November 1961. Dean Acheson Papers, Post Administration Files, State Department and White House Advisor, 1960–68, Box 99, State Department and White House Advisor, 1961, October–December, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.

[21] Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War, 251.

[22] See Clay's Decision in Germany and Smith, Clay, 277–95, 423–546.

[23] Clay to Maxwell Taylor, 15 August 1961. Lucius D. Clay Papers, Box 8, Folder 1, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.

[24] The German historian Andreas Daum argues that sending Clay, a symbolic figure for the population of Berlin, was an illustration of the significance Kennedy placed on public images and symbolism in his Berlin policy. Daum, Kennedy in Berlin, 30–31.

[25] John F. Kennedy Oral History Project, Maxwell Taylor interviewed by Elspeth Rostow, 26 April 1964, 16 and General Lucius D. Clay interviewed by Richard M. Scammons, 1 July 1964, 2–4. Oral History Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.

[26] Norstad proposed to send an engineer company and nine armoured personnel carriers for the Berlin garrison, thus fulfilling a long-standing request. He argued that the convoy entering Berlin would still look impressive enough to shore up the will of the city and its population to resist Soviet and East German pressure tactics. Norstad to Lemnitzer and Clarke, 18 August 1961. Lauris Norstad Papers, Policy Files Series, Box 86, “Berlin – LIVE OAK 1961 thru 30 Aug. (2),” Lemnitzer to Norstad and Clarke, 18 August 1961. Lauris Norstad Papers, and Lemnitzer to Norstad and Clark [sic], 19 August 1961. Norstad Papers, Subject Series, Box 103, “Joint Chiefs of Staff 1957 thru Oct 1961 Vol. I (5),” Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. For Clarke's opposition see also Senior Officer Debriefing Program, Interview of General Bruce Clarke by Francis B. Kish, 1982, Volume II, 204–5. Bruce Clarke Papers, Oral History, Box 3, Military History Institute.

[27] Clay's endorsement was hardly decisive, however, as Kennedy had already made up his mind earlier in the day. See Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group, 17 August 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 347–49.

[28] For the movement of the battle group and its reception by throngs of cheering West Berliners see, for instance, Cate, Ides of August, 417–23. For Soviet interference with the movement and resulting delays see Earle Wheeler, Memorandum for General Taylor, 21 August 1961, After-Action Report of Movement of Battle Group to Berlin. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02373, Digital National Security Archive. A narrative of the movement of the battle group also can be found in Headquarters, United States Army, Europe. Annual History United States Army, Europe, 1 January–31 December 1961. US Army, Europe: Heidelberg, 1962, 35–7.

[29] See, for instance, Cate, Ides of August, 407–13, Daum, Kennedy in Berlin, 48–53, and Smith, Clay, 645–6. Johnson himself estimated that at least one million Berliners had turned out to greet the vice-presidential party. Memorandum from Johnson to President Kennedy, 21 August 1961, p. 4. Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice Presidential Security File, Box 2, Berlin, Germany: Berlin Papers for the Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library.

[30] Johnson to President Kennedy, 21 August 1961, 2.

[31] Johnson to President Kennedy, 21 August 1961, 3.

[32] Johnson to President Kennedy, 21 August 1961, 5.

[33] Acheson Report on Berlin. FRUS 1961 –1963, Vol. XIV, 138–59.

[34] Dean Acheson told McGeorge Bundy in November that the border in Berlin was “the wrong place for fooling around” because Berlin was indefensible and the allies were unwilling to pursue a confrontational policy. McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, 20 November 1961. National Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Correspondence, Memos to the President 11/1/61–11/20/61, Box 405, JFK Library.

[35] See, for instance, Memorandum from President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, 21 August 1961, Berlin Political Planning, in: FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 359–60. Marc Trachtenberg argues in A Constructed Peace, 283–351, that all of Kennedy's policies during the Berlin Crisis have to be seen as subordinate to the goal of a negotiated settlement.

[36] Robert McNamara to President Kennedy, 24 August 1961. National Security Files, Country Series, Box 86, JFK Library.

[37] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum to the President, 28 August 1961, Issues to Be Settled with General Clay. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02415, Digital National Security Archive.

[38] John F. Kennedy to General Clay, 30 August 1961. NSF, Country Series, Box 86, JFK Library.

[39] Lucius D. Clay interviewed by Jean Edward Smith, 974, 991. Columbia University Oral History Collection. Unfortunately, Clay's recollection is the only available record of the conversation. It is a problematic source, but it nevertheless denotes Clay's perception of Kennedy's intentions, even if the general might have misinterpreted Kennedy.

[40] Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 170. Marshall Koniev had been brought out of retirement during the crisis to control Soviet operations in Berlin.

[41] The Soviets learned about the exercise before Clarke did. Raymond Garthoff argues that Clay “hoped to roll back the communist position of the opportunity arose.” Garthoff, “Berlin 1961,” 147–48. But given Clay's objective, it is entirely plausible that he merely intended to cause fear and uncertainty among Soviet political and military leaders.

[42] Norstad's philosophical differences with Clay are discussed in Pedlow, “Flexible Response Before MC 14/3,” 251–2.

[43] Clay interview by Jean E. Smith, 974–75, 989–90, illustrated Clay's surprise and disappointment at the opposition to his course of action from American military commanders in Europe, but also expressed his understanding of Clarke's dilemma. Clay and Clarke knew each other well. Both had been officers of the Corps of Engineers before the Second World War. While their relationship suffered during the Berlin Crisis, the two generals remained in communication after the crisis. See, for instance, Clarke to Clay, 6 January 1977 and Clay's reply of 11 January. Clay Papers, Box 2, Folder, Marshall Library.

[44] For the history of Steinstücken and its awkward location behind the Iron Curtain see Catudal, Steinstücken.

[45] As told by Cate, Ides of August, 467–70 and Wyden, Wall, 264–6. General Clarke is quoted in Wyden, Wall, 265.

[46] National Security Action Memorandum No. 94, 14 September 1961, Steinstücken and Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point. FRUS 1961 –1963, Vol. XIV, 404.

[47] Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Ambassador Gavin, Ambassador Finnletter, and General Norstad at the United States Embassy, Paris, France, 30 September 1961. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02518, Digital National Security Archive.

[48] See undated memorandum summarizing the main points of Johnson's discussions in Paris on September 30. The memorandum is unsigned, but it appears that it was edited by Johnson. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02520, Digital National Security Archive.

[49] National Security Action Memorandum No. 94, 14 September 1961.

[50] For the full text of the address see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States : John F. Kennedy, 1961. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962, 618–26. The Berlin Crisis is addressed on pages 624–5. The quotation is on page 625. See also Beschloss, Crisis Years, p.315.

[51] Cate, Ides of August, 470–72.

[52] Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, From Clay for Rusk only, 28 September 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 441–3.

[53] General Clay to Dean Rusk, 5 October 1961. NSF, Country Series, Box 86, JFK Library. See also Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Secretary of State, From Clay to Rusk, 29 September 1961. FRUS 1961–1963: Vols. XIII/XIV/XY, microfiche supplement (emphasis added).

[54] Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, From Clay for Rusk only, 24 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 532–4.

[55] Letter from President Kennedy to His Special Representative in Berlin (Clay), 8 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 484–6.

[56] Letter from President Kennedy to His Special Representative in Berlin (Clay), 8 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 484–6

[57] Letter from the Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to President Kennedy, 18 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 509–13.

[58] Letter from President Kennedy to the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Europe (Norstad), 20 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 520–23. See also McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum of Meeting, 20 October 1961. Letter from President Kennedy to the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Europe (Norstad), 20 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 517–19. Norstad rejected the policy directive for his NATO command. See Pedlow, “Three Hats for Berlin,” 186–8.

[59] Beschloss, Crisis Years, 311–53.

[60] Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy, 14 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 498–502. The State Department's counterproposal was mirrored in a message sent by General Norstad to Dean Rusk and General Lemnitzer. See Berlin [undated, unattributed memorandum; probably McGeorge Bundy, ca. 11 or 12 October 1961]. NSF, Countries, Germany Berlin General 10/16/61–10/19/61, Box 83, JFK Library.

[61] Dean Rusk to Embassies, 18 October 1961. NSF, Country Series, Box 86, JFK Library (emphasis in original). See also McGeorge Bundy to the Secretary of State, National Security Action Memorandum No. 107, 18 October 1961, Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point. NSF, Meetings&Memoranda, NSAM 107, Box 332, JFK Library.

[62] On 27 October General Clarke suggested to General George Decker, the Army Chief of Staff, that Watson effectively be demoted and that General Norstad or his deputy, General Palmer should take operational control of the US Army in Berlin. Decker's response to Clarke again indicated that there was no specific order that outlined Clay's authority, but the Chief of Staff agreed with Clarke's proposal to restructure command relations for the duration of the crisis. Decker to Clarke, 13 November 1961. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02625, Digital National Security Archive.

[63] Lightner himself described the course of events in a telegram to the State Department on the following afternoon. Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, 23 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 524–5.

[64] Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, 27 October 1961, Current Intelligence Weekly, 11–13. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02594, Digital National Security Archive.

[65] Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, 25 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 537–39.

[66] Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Secretary of State, Eyes only from Clay for Rusk only, 26 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, microfiche supplement, no. 221. See also Telegram from Mission at Berlin to the Secretary of State, 25 October 1961, From Clay for Rusk only. Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Secretary of State, Eyes only from Clay for Rusk only, 26 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, microfiche supplement, no. 216.

[67] Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin, Eyes only for Clay, 26 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 539–41.

[68] Lt. Col. Thomas Tyree quoted in Beschloss, Crisis Years, 334.

[69] Mission at Berlin to Secretary of State, 27 October 1961. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02599, Digital National Security Archive.

[70] For a detailed narrative of the tank stand-off see Cate, Ides of August, 480–85 and Wyden, Wall, 260–67.

[71] Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 91.

[72] Even on 27 October, just hours before the Soviet tanks were moved up, analysts in the State Department still assumed that there would be no American response to a temporary closing of the Friedrichstrasse crossing point. See Seymour Weiss to Jeffrey Kitchen, 27 October 1961. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02595, Digital National Security Archive.

[73] Watson to Norstad, 27 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, microfiche supplement, no. 223.

[74] Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, From Clay to Rusk, 27 October 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 543.

[75] There are several sources for the second conversation between Clay and Kennedy. Smith, Clay, 660–61 can be traced back to his interview with Clay, 995–7. W.R. Smyser also recalled the episode in From Yalta to Berlin, 175. See also Beschloss, Crisis Years, 334, Cate, Ides of August, 485, and Wyden, Wall, 262–3.

[76] Schlesinger is quoted in Garthoff, “Berlin 1961,” 145. His account was corroborated by Robert Kennedy. See Schlesinger is quoted in Garthoff, “Berlin 1961,” 150. See also Wyden, Wall, 266 and Beschloss, Crisis Years, 334–5.

[77] Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 178.

[78] Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 176–7.

[79] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, 30 October 1961, From Acting Secretary (Bowles) eyes only for Dowling and Clay. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 551.

[80] Mission at Berlin to American Embassy, Paris, From Clay, 31 October 1961. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02611, Digital National Security Archive. See also Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, From Clay, 2 November 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 552.

[81] Clay, “Berlin.” See particularly page 57.

[82] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, 9 November 1961. National Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Correspondence, Memos to the President 11/1/61–11/20/61, Box 405, JFK Library.

[83] Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, 9 November 1961. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 557–61. But the relationship of Kennedy and Norstad was tenuous because of the latter's opposition to the strategy of Flexible Response and rejection to include Kennedy's directive of October 20 in NATO planning.

[84] Clay to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 2 November 1961. Clay Papers, Box 6, Folder 18. Marshall Library.

[85] Clay to Dean Acheson, 22 December 1961. Clay Papers, Box 5, Folder 37, Marshall Library.

[86] Clay, “Berlin,” 54. He did not refer specifically to the tank confrontation in the article, however.

[87] See New York Times , 8 January 1962, “Kennedy and Clay Agree on Tactics in Berlin Crisis.”

[88] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, 6 January 1962, General Clay's Problems, 3. National Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Correspondence, Memos to the President 1/62, Box 405, JFK Library.

[89] Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 178–83. Later, however, Clay came to acknowledge the utility of negotiations as long as the US did not offer concessions on its core commitments to West Berlin and West Germany. Clay, “Berlin,” 55.

[90] Letter from the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to Secretary of State Rusk, 30 January 1962. FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIV, 775–79.

[91] John F. Kennedy to Clay, 15 March 1962. Clay Papers, Box 7, Folder 2, Marshall Library.

[92] Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, and John F. Kennedy to Clay, 1 March 1962. Berlin Crisis Collection, BC 02728, Digital National Archive.

[93] Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 183.

[94] Clay to Taylor, 7 September 1962. Clay Papers, Box 8, Folder 1, Marshall Library. Clay would nevertheless accompany Kennedy on the President's visit to West Berlin in June 1963. See Daum, Kennedy in Berlin, 113.